UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID

FACULTAD DE FILOLOGIA

Departamento de Filología Inglesa

A DISCOURSE-PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO NEGATION IN J. HELLER'S *CATCH-22*

Tesis doctoral presentada por:

Laura Hidalgo Downing

Directora: Dra. JoAnne Neff

1997

To my parents,
from whom I learnt about language, logic and humour,

and

to the memory of Paul Werth

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to several persons for their help and support during the writing of this thesis.

I would like to thank my director, JoAnne Neff, for her patience, her advice and support and for her encouragement of my work. I am particularly grateful for the long talks at particularly stressful moments for me, and for her as a head of department.

I am also grateful to my friends from the PALA Association and from the Systemic Workshops for their useful comments on papers related to the present work, in particular, to Mick Short, Paul Simpson, Katie Wales and Elena Semino.

I would also like to thank other friends, like Clara Calvo, Pepe Simón, Manuel Leonetti, Manuela Romano and Chris Butler, for their advice on specific issues dealt with in different chapters. I am very grateful to Clara Calvo for her advice and support during the writing of the thesis, especially for the long telephone conversations. I am also very grateful to Pepe Simón for advising me on the quantitative study and helping me choose the adequate programmes for the search of negative words. I am indebted to Chris Butler for carrying out the search of negative words in the LOB and Bown corpora and for the informal talk on some problematic examples of the corpus.

I also wish to thank friends and colleagues at my university for their support and help while writing this thesis, especially Rachel Wittaker and Ana Martín Uriz.

I am especially grateful to the late Paul Werth, for his friendship and for his encouragement of my work. A great part of this thesis is inspired in his work, including his, as yet unpublished, last book, which I have been privileged enough to read in a manuscript version which he sent me long before his death in 1995. I hope this thesis will be a humble contribution to the perpetuation of his memory and to the continuation of his work.

I am very grateful to my parents and family, especially to my mother, Angela Downing, and to my father, Enrique Hidalgo, for encouraging and supporting me day after day, and for their help and advice on aspects of the thesis. I am extremely fortunate in having in my own family an expert in linguistics, my mother, and an expert in mathematics and computers, my father, since my thesis has benefitted enormously from this. To them I owe the intellectual challenge and motivation to ever start writing a thesis.

I would also like to thank my brothers and sisters, Alicia, Raquel, Enrique and Eduardo, for being patient and understanding during this period.

I also wish to thank my closest friends, for their emotional support, and especially, for entertaining me during this period. I wish to thank Lucy, Alicia and Silvana for their telephone conversations, e-mails and letters from distant places on the planet. The informal discussions about *Catch-22*, especially those at *La tertulia*, with Antonio, José Luis, Elisa and the rest, including Isabel, who has always been there even when she wasn't, have been particularly rewarding.

I am indebted most to Miguel Treviño, who has advised me about aspects of the thesis and who has helped me get through the hardest parts with his understanding and love; to him I owe the necessary peace and happiness to have been able to carry out and finish this thesis.

INDEX OF TABLES IN CHAPTER 6

ABBREVIATIONS USED

AW:	Actual World
TW:	Text World
SW:	Subworld
TAW:	Text Actual World
TRW:	Text Reference World
APW:	Alternate Possible World
K-world:	Epistemic knowledge subworld
W-world:	Wish subworld
O-world:	Obligation subworld
MOP:	Memory Organisation Packet
TOP:	Thematic Orgatisation Packet

Introduction

> Negation and affirmation appear to be inexorably linked.
> Consciousness, so far as we know it, appears to be
> a rhythm of affirmation and negation, a power of asserting
> and denying, of constituting and deleting.
> Language, also, is a relation between affirmation and negation.
> The word (or sign) is a presence based on absences,
> having meaning only becaus eit distinguishes,
> contrasts and excludes.
> It seems impossible, therefore,
> to speak of a genealogical order of negation alone,
> to define negation from a past or ancestor of its own
> outside of its perpetual polarity of negation and affirmation.
> Kurrick (1979. 1)

> Negation may be viewed as a pun, a play upon the norm.
> It is used when - more rarely in communication -
> one establishes the event rather than inertia as the ground.
> On such a background, the non-event becomes - temporarily,
> locally - more salient, thus more informative.
> Givón (1993: 190)

1. Aims of the research

In the research reported, I explore the discourse and pragmatic functions of negation in the novel *Catch-22*. The idea of working on this area of research originated from an intuition regarding the prominent role I felt that negation played in the discourse of the novel. This intuition was formalised in the form of a hypothesis, which I have taken as a point of departure for my research. It is as follows:

HYPOTHESIS 1: Negation is a marked phenomenon in *Catch-22*.

By means of this hypothesis, I wish to claim that there is a correspondence between the intuitive feeling that negation is in some way significant in my corpus, and the observation and systematisation of specific linguistic features. This type of procedure is characteristic of work in linguistic stylistics, where an attempt is made to establish connections between the intuitions of readers regarding a particular effect and the linguistic features observable in a text or piece of discourse

which may contribute to that effect. As such, the present work is not intended to provide a definitive interpretation of the novel as a literary work, but, rather, to explore the possibilities of certain linguistic frameworks in order to account for linguistic features which are felt to be related to major themes of the novel.

Negation is a challenging and difficult subject, which has posed problems for philosophers, logicians, psychologists and linguists alike. From a linguistic perspective, while the affirmative seems to be quite straightforward, negation, by comparison, is extremely difficult to define and describe. For this reason, researchers have long been troubled by apparently basic questions, such as: what exactly is negation? what is the ontological status of negative entities? is negation ambiguous? does negation presuppose the affirmative? can we talk about negative lexical items? and so on.

In the present work, I mention the problematic aspects which are involved in an analysis of negation, but I concentrate on the difficulties of accounting for negation as a discourse phenomenon. The first difficulty is of a practical nature, as there are few theories available that deal with negation from a truly discoursive perspective. Most of the work on negation is still strongly influenced by traditional philosophical problems, such as the relation between negation and presupposition and the supposed ambiguity of negation, but little work has been carried out in the area of discourse. The second difficulty involves the problematic and complex nature of negation itself, since a

discourse account of negation cannot overlook its properties as a truth functional operator, and its semantic and pragmatic functions. Indeed, I wish to claim that a discourse approach to negation must necessarily deal with semantic, pragmatic and cognitive aspects.

Turning once more to hypothesis 1, that negation is a marked phenomenon in *Catch-22*, my aim is to explore in what way this claim may be defended. For this purpose, I carry out an anlysis of negation in *Catch-22* from a qualitative and a quantitative perspective. The qualitative analysis is primary with respect to the quantitative analysis, since the latter is only intended to support the observations made from a qualitative standpoint and help systematise the different functions proposed for negative clauses. From a qualitative standpoint, I argue that negation in *Catch-22* presents salient features which make it a natural foregrounding device which creates a pattern of discourse deviation. This pattern of discourse deviation brings into focus significant themes of the novel, such as war, death, madness, religion, economy and business, and has a defamiliarising effect on a potential reader, since it leads to the questioning of taken-for-granted assumptions about how the major themes are understood in our world. The perception of saliency and the consequent awareness of a pattern of discourse deviation is, of course, subjective. This means that the observations made during the discussion and the conclusions reached at the end of the research rely heavily on my own perception of the oddity of negation in the context within which it occurs.

In the qualitative analysis, I focus on the identification and description of the functions and ontological properties of negation in the discourse of *Catch-22*, and on how these specific functions can be said to contribute to the creation of a pattern of discourse deviation and produce an effect of defamiliarisation or schema refreshment in the reader. The main aim expressed here can be formulated by means of a second hypothesis as follows:

HYPOTHESIS 2: Negation carries out a foregrounding function which creates a pattern of discourse deviation.

My major concern in the qualitative analysis is, then, twofold: I first attempt to identify and describe the specific functions carried out by negative clauses and negative lexical items; then, to determine in what way a global consideration of the functions of negation in *Catch-22* may represent a pattern of discourse deviation which leads to the questioning of major themes presented in the novel.

In the quantitative study, I explore to what extent the findings from the qualitative approach can be backed up by a quantitative analysis. The basic question is whether the perception of negation as a marked phenomenon in *Catch-22* can be accounted for in terms of an unusually high frequency of negative items in the corpus. The main aim of this type of analysis can be formulated by means of the following hypothesis:

HYPOTHESIS 3: The frequency of negative words is predicted to be higher in *Catch-22* than it is in other similar text types (fictional works).

By establishing a comparison with other similar text types, conclusions may be reached regarding the relative frequency of

negatives in *Catch-22*. Furthermore, a quantitative analysis helps systematise the different types of functions of negation, thus enabling us to determine the distribution and frequency of negation types within the corpus of the novel. However, as I will argue in the discussion in chapter 6, the quantitative study has limitations imposed by the characteristics of the present thesis, which is primarily qualitative in nature.

The analyses of chapters 5 and 6 are the result of research into the possibilities of applying available frameworks on negation to my corpus. The choice of specific frameworks, namely, Werth's (1995c) text world theory for the qualitative analysis and Tottie's (1991) framework of negation in English speech and writing for the quantitative analysis, are the result of a process of analysis and discussion of other frameworks, which occupies chapters 1 to 4. It can be said that the present work is organised as an exploration into the explanatory possibilities of various frameworks with the aim of reaching a description of a discourse framework which may be adequate for the description of my data. In this sense, each chapter leads on to the next in search for an adequate discourse pragmatic model of negation. The adoption of a final framework, however, does not involve the rejection of all the previous frameworks dicussed. Rather, it is suggested that the text world theory is particularly adequate for the description of negation as a discourse phenomenon, precisely because it incorporates some of the cognitive, semantic, pragmatic and discourse properties of negation which I consider to be crucial for the interpretation of negation in general

terms, and in *Catch-22* in particular.

2. The data: description and classification

The data which constitute the object of discussion and analysis in the present research is the novel *Catch-22*. As I explain in chapter 6, I approach the data in two different ways, given the limitations in time and space for a work such as the one in hand. In chapter 6, I distinguish between the corpus, which corresponds to the whole novel *Catch-22*, and the subcorpus, a selection of 134 extracts (171, 235 words) listed by chronological order in the appendix. The criteria used for the selection of the extracts are provided in chapter 6, but here I would like to point out that the extracts were selected mainly because they provided interesting illustrations of the functions of negation in the corpus. This means that the corpus study is oriented qualitatively, rather than quantitatively, and I am aware that a quantitatively oriented study would require a different selection procedure.

The analyses from the qualitative and quantitative perspectives are grounded on different classifications of the data. In chapter 5, I develop a qualitative analysis of the extracts in the subcorpus by establishing a classification of the functions of negative clauses and negative lexical items in a text world theoretical model. This classification is intended to provide insights regarding the discoursive properties of negation in its functions of rechannelling or blocking the flow of information, and regarding the type of ontology created by means

of the negative subworld. This classification was considered to be the most adequate for the purpose of identifying the marked character of negative utterances and their contribution to a pattern of discourse deviation in the data.

In chapter 6, the corpus and the subcorpus are dealt with separately. The method of analysis is explained in section 3 below, but here I would like to outline the types of classification adopted in chapter 6. The classifications in the quantitative study

are carried out according to (a) the grammatical function of the negative item, and (b) the pragmatic function of the negative clause. It proved impossible to carry out a classification based on the discourse properties of negation as subworld discussed in chapter 5, except for a generalisation distinguishing the function of negation as foregrounding negative states and events, and the function of negation in creating paradox. The reasons why it was not possible to deal with the discourse functions of negation are explained in detail in chapters 5 and 6. They have to do with the fact that the notion of negation as subworld is a discourse notion, in the sense that a subworld may be understood as a conceptual and semantic domain which stretches over several utterances. This poses problems regarding the delimitation of the boundaries of the subworld and regarding the perception of the markedness of a negative over a stretch of discourse.

Since the corpus I work with is a novel, it presents idiosyncratic properties which are typical of literary discourse.

However, I will argue, as has been done before in the Hallidayan tradition in stylistics, that literary discourse can be analysed by means of general discourse theories which are created for an explanation of discourse in general terms. Consequently, I argue that the characteristics of negation as described in the present work apply not only to my data, but to negation as a discourse phenomenon in general terms.

3. Methods of analysis

While chapters 1 to 4 provide the theoretical background discussion of key issues in the fields of negation and stylistic analysis, chapters 5 and 6 are of an applied nature, and constitute my own contributions to the present study. As has been explained above, chapter 5 consists of an application of theoretical concepts from text world theory to the analysis of the discourse functions of negation in *Catch-22*. Since the size of the subcorpus precludes an analysis of each extract in detail, I have chosen illustrative examples for each section, and have suggested generalisations regarding the applicability of observations made in each section to other groups of examples and to themes of the novel as a whole. This means that, ideally, the observations made in each of the sections should be understood to apply to significant aspects of the novel as a whole, and not to the analysis and interpretation of isolated passages.

The analysis of chapter 6, which is computer based, requires further explanation. The novel was first scanned in order to make it available in a computer treatable format. Subsequently, two

different searches were carried out, one within the whole corpus of the novel, and a second within the subcorpus of 134 extracts. A first search was carried in order to identify the negative words in the corpus, with the aim of establishing a classification according to grammatical category. The programmes used were Micro Concord and Mono Concord, which searched for what I have called *explicit negative words* and for negative prefixes in lexical items. Similar searches were carried out in the files for general fiction in the LOB and Brown corpora by using the same programmes. These additional searches were carried out for the purpose of establishing a comparison between the frequency of negative words in the corpus of *Catch-22* and the frequency of negatives in two different corpora. This same search was subsequently carried out in the subcorpus, in order to establish the differences between the frequencies of negative words in the two corpora. Finally, a classification according to communicative functions was also carried out in the subcorpus. This classification included negative speech acts types, frequencies of negatives in narrative and dialogue and frequencies depending on whether the negative clause foregrounded a negative state or event or involved paradox. These classifications were carried out manually, since the corpus and subcorpus were not tagged.

4. The frameworks

I have explained above that the theoretical sections of the present work present a discussion of negation from different perspectives so as to reach an adequate model of discourse which

will account for the functions of negation in the data. Throughout the discussion of the different approaches, which are outlined in section 5 below, I single out those aspects which need to be incorporated in a discourse pragmatic model of negation and those which are not adequate for an analysis of this type. I also evaluate existing models from this point of view and illustrate the ways in which they are inadequate, by analysing some extracts from the corpus.

A distinction needs to be established between two different levels of analysis, each corresponding to two different theoretical issues:

(i) a general level of analysis which constitutes the background within the field of stylistics in which the textual analysis itself is situated. By stylistics, I will be referring to the work carried out in recent decades in the perspectives opened up by the Russian formalists and developed by contributions from discourse theories such as systemic linguistics, pragmatics and schema theory. My main interest will be in the notions of foregrounding, discourse deviation, defamiliarisation and schema refreshement, which I will use in order to account for the effect perceived to arise from the marked function of negation in the data and its connection with a particular treatment of themes of the novel.

(ii) a second, more specific, level of analysis, regarding the theoretical frameworks adopted in the analysis of the functions of negation. The main frameworks I adopt in the

analysis of chapters 5 and 6 are, respectively, Werth's (1995c) text world theory and Tottie's (1991) model of negation in discourse. I wish to explain each of these briefly, and to point out the additional frameworks which have been incorporated into the two main ones mentioned.

One such framework, proposed by Werth (1995c) accounts for negation within a text world discourse framework. This model incorporates cognitive notions, such as the fact that negation is seen as operating against the background of an assumed, expected or known affirmative form, semantic notions, which have to do with the delimitation of the scope of negation, and discourse pragmatic notions, which condition the choice of a negative form in a given context and its function in discourse. These aspects are dealt with by other authors, such as Wason (1965) and Givón (1978, 1979, 1984, 1993).

In Werth's model, negation is a subworld which contributes to the discourse function of updating and rechannelling information. Prototypical negative subworlds perform this function by cancelling parameters previously set up in the text world which are no longer applicable. Such parameters may be deictic, referring to time and place, or to entities, or they may be subworld-building parameters, in which case they are typically modalisations, or they may contain frame knowledge. There is a special type of negative subworld which Werth (op.cit.) defines as *negative accommodation* which does not cancel or deny previously existing information, but, rather, it presents new information in order to simultaneously deny it. The types of

negative subworld mentioned above share the property of foregrounding negative states and events, a notion I have adopted form Givón's (1978, 1979, 1984, 1993) approach to negation. However, Werth's model does not account for negative clauses which incur in paradox. I argue that paradox does not take part in the general function of rechannelling information, but, rather, it creates a sort of communicative short circuit which gives rise to a different type of ontology from the one observed in the previous type. Paradox is also created by means of lexical negation, which is considered apart from the instances of syntactic negation.

In chapter 6, I first deal with what are traditionally known as *explicitly negative words* (see Klima 1964, Tottie 1991b) in order to classify negative words according to grammatical category. Negative clauses are then classified according to Tottie's model of negative utterances, namely, denials (which cover what are normally understood to be negative statements), rejections (which include refusals and rejections), questions, the pragmatic signal *no* and other marginal fucntions such as repetitions and supports. In my discussion, I propose modifications to Tottie's classification in order to account for specific aspects of my data.

5. Organisation of the thesis

The present thesis is divided into two parts and consists of seven chapters. Part I, which includes chapters 1 to 4, is theoretical, while part II, which includes chapters 5 and 6, is

an application of theoretical frameworks to the analysis of the data. Finally, in chapter 7 I present the general conclusions of the present research.

Chapter 1 is an overview of basic notions in stylistic analysis and of the aims of a study based on stylistic principles; it is also a discussion of the notion of literariness from the perspective of various linguistic theories, such as systemic linguistics, pragmatics, schema theory and possible worlds theory, with an indication of the contributions that each of the theories has to make to the understanding of literary discourse. The final sections of the chapter focus on the novel *Catch-22* and are intended to provide a background regarding the main themes of the novel, its situation within contemporary fiction and the contributions of the present work with regard to previous works on *Catch-22*.

Chapter 2 is an overview and discussion of negation in different theories, from the philosophy of language and logic to psychology, grammar, and discourse and pragmatic theories. The preliminary discussions on philosophical and psychological aspects of negation are considered to be relevant to the general discussion of the thesis as a whole, because they provide insights regarding basic properties of negation which can also be observed when approaching negation from a discourse perspective. The sections on the grammatical aspects of negation are also significant, in particular, because they enable us to establish what are negative words and what are the semantic properties of negation. The second part of the chapter is devoted

to pragmatic approaches to negation, especially, to Givón's (1978, 1979, 1984, 1993) approach to negation. Although I do not adopt Givón's work as the main framework for the analysis of the data, his theory makes significant contributions to the understanding of negation from a cognitive and pragmatic perspective. The final sections of the chapter are devoted to a preliminary analysis of illustrative extracts from the subcorpus, in order to point out the limitations of certain approaches to negation and to explore the possibilities of a pragmatic approach in the line of Givón (1993).

Chapter 3 is a discussion of negation within the framework of text world theory, in particular, Werth's (1995c) notion of negation as subworld, and Ryan's (1991b) notion of conflict in fictional worlds. The present chapter complements and continues the discussion on theoretical approaches to negation in chapter 2, by providing a complex discourse framework within which specific functions of negation may be identified. The first part of the chapter is a description and discussion of Werth's (1995c) text world model, focusing on the function of negation as subworld. The second part of the chapter is a description and discussion of Ryan's (1991b) model of fictional worlds and the development of types of conflict within worlds. This second framework provides an approach to text worlds from a literary perspective, thus complementing the linguistically oriented analysis of Werth's framework. Both frameworks are illustrated by means of examples taken from the subcorpus at the end of each of the sections. The functions of negation described in the first

part of the chapter are taken as a point of departure for the analysis in chapter 5.

Chapter 4 is a discussion of negation within a schema theoretic perspective. In this chapter I bring together various aspects: (i) a discussion of frame semantic approaches to negation, such as Fillmore (1986); (ii) a discussion of other more complex schema theoretic models, such as Schank and Abelson (1977) and Schank (1982); (iii) a discussion of the view of literariness from a schema theoretic perspective, focusing on Cook's notion of *schema refreshment;* (iv) an application of schema theoretic models to the analysis of paradox and humour in *Catch-22*. The present chapter complements the theoretical discussion of previous chapters by providing the tools for the analysis of negation involved in paradox and by expanding on the approach to literarines in stylistics outlined in chapter 1.

Chapter 5 is a qualitative analysis of the data. As such, it provides a description of the theoretical notions to be investigated and then develops the analysis by selecting representative examples for each of the relevant instances of negative function or negative lexical item.

Chapter 6 is a quantitative analysis of the data; it complements the research carried out in chapter 5 by providing the empirical support to the observations made in general terms on the marked character of negation.

Finally, my conclusions and remarks on further research are presented in chapter 7, followed by the relevant Appendices and Bibliography.

Chapter 1: Basic Concepts

> There was only one catch and that was Catch-22,
> which specified that a concern for one's safety
> in the face of dangers that were real and immediate
> was the process of a rational mind.
> Orr was crazy and could be grounded.
> All he had to do was ask; and as soon as he did,
> he would no longer be crazy
> and would have to fly more missions.

This chapter is a brief introduction to the objectives of stylistic analysis and to key aspects in views of literariness in current linguistic theory. The review is not meant to be exhaustive, and for this reason I will only make reference to those theories and approaches which are relevant in some way to the study at hand. Consequently, I will not mention other theories, in particular those belonging to the tradition of literary criticism, which deal with aspects touched upon in this work but from a different perspective. My view is firmly grounded in linguistic theory, rather than on literary theory.

The discussion about the notion of literariness in current linguistic theories usually accompanies a discussion of the objectives and purposes of stylistic analysis. Both these issues are the background to the particular frameworks I will be using in my proposal. However, since the purpose of this thesis is that of accounting for negation in *Catch-22*, the discussion of the issues introduced in this chapter are meant to be merely referential and necessarily brief.

1.1. The objectives of stylistic analysis

By stylistics I am here referring to a wide range of works carried out in the last two decades as part of a linguistic tradition whose main interest has been the analysis and interpretation of literary (and non-literary) discourse. Strictly speaking, its origins are to be found in the work of the Russian formalists (see Shklovsky 1917) and, more particularly, of the Prague School structuralists (see Garvin 1964) and especially Jakobson (see Jakobson 1964), which I discuss in section 1.2. below.

Before discussing in detail the contributions of those approaches to the notion of literariness that are relevant to my thesis, I will summarize the key principles underlying stylistic analysis as it is understood in the present work. As stated above, the main principle upon which stylistics is articulated is the idea that "the primary interpretative procedures used in the reading of a literary text are *linguistic* procedures" (Carter, 1982:4). This view was already present in Jakobson (1964), who precisely pointed out that poetics should be considered as a branch of linguistics, since poetry is actually made of words, of language. It is important to realize, however, that most work in stylistic analysis does not claim to provide an 'objective' or 'scientific' interpretation of a literary text (see, for example, Leech and Short 1981, Carter 1982, Short 1989, Simpson 1993). Rather, the aim of stylistic analysis is that of systematising the intuitions that we, as readers, have of a literary work, making

our comments less vague and impressionistic by using rigorous linguistic procedures as an instrument of analysis. As such, stylistics, rather than 'dissection' of a text (see Leech and Short 1981) should be understood as observation that leads to insight and to a deeper understanding of the text in question. However, in spite of the difficulties involved in establishing explicit connections between analysis and interpretation, it is true that, to a great extent, we tend to agree about many aspects of literary interpretation (Short 1989).

The claim inherent in stylistics that it is possible to establish a connection between linguistic form and interpretation is what makes it the target of criticism from other theories, ranging from generative linguistics to reader-response theory. In approaches to interpretation there are extreme positions such as structuralist interpretations, where form is actually identified with content (Mukarowski 1964 and Jakobson 1964), and theories which dissociate all meaning from the text itself and place it in the individual reader alone (Fish 1980). While both positions are equally radical, it is possible to carry out an analysis that will take into consideration both linguistic features and the reader as part of the context in which literature is produced. Ideally, what is needed is a framework of analysis that makes explicit the connections between linguistic and textual features, on the one hand, and knowledge, including semantic content, pragmatic inferencing, on the other, and how all this is stored and processed by the reader. In this way, a particular

interpretation of a text can be said to be justified on linguistic and cognitive empirical grounds.

The aim of subsequent chapters in this thesis is to explore to what extent current discourse theories can provide the analytical tools described above in the study and interpretation of negation.[1]

1.2. The importance of text: formalism and the notions of 'deviation', 'foregrounding' and 'defamiliarization'

As stated above, the origins of stylistics as a discipline integrating linguistic analysis and an interest in poetics, can be traced back to the work of the Russian formalists (Skhlovski, 1917) and, especially, of the Prague School linguists (Havránek, 1964 Mukarowsky 1964 and Jakobson 1964). In this section I shall discuss two issues introduced by these linguists which are key aspects of studies in stylistics, and of my own view of literariness as part of the analysis of *Catch-22*. First, the notions of *defamiliarisation, foregrounding* and *deviation* as linguistic phenomena which can help us understand the nature of literariness. Second, the connection between these notions, particularly that of defamiliarisation, with the function that can be assigned to literature as a discourse type. The latter is a question I will deal with recurrently in different sections of the present work.

Skhlovski (1917) was the first to introduce the concept of *defamiliarisation* or *deautomatisation* to refer to the

process whereby things are perceived anew, in a different light, and which he illustrated with his famous example of discovering the 'stoniness' of a stone. According to Skhlovski, the purpose of poetic language should be precisely that of defamiliarising taken-for-granted experiences. Similarly, other authors have since described the deautomatising function of literature in different ways (See Garvin 1964, Pratt 1977 and Burton 1980). Burton (1980) discusses this concept with regard to its relevance for modern drama and reflects that 'modern literature can be seen to be in a self-consciously designed Alienation tradition, whose central aim is to shock and disturb' the complacent audience (Burton 1980: 111). I will discuss this issue and its more direct significance for 20th century literature in section 1.6. below.

Although the Prague School linguists in general claim that all varieties of language can present foregrounded features and deviance, most of their interest is directed towards exploring to what extent literature presents deviations from the standard. In this line, Havránek (1964) explores the notions of automatisation/deautomatisation and suggests that all varieties of a language have automatising devices which to a certain extent are shared with other varieties. Automatisation is violated by means of *foregrounding* certain linguistic features, a device which deautomatises the reading process and which is described by Havránek (1964) as follows: 'By foregrounding (...) we mean the use of the devices of the language in such way that this use attracts attention and is

perceived as uncommon'. Mukarowsky (1964) and Jakobson (1964) explore the functions of foregrounding in poetic texts, claiming that a distinguishing feature of poetic language is that it presents consistent and systematic foregrounded features which constitute deviances from the norm in the standard. In Mukarowsky (1964: 19) we find a concise definition of the terms in question and their relation to poetics:

> The function of poetic language consists in the maximum of foregrounding of the utterance. Foregrounding is the opposite of automatization, that is, the deautomatization of an act; (...) Objectively speaking: automatization schematizes an event; foregrounding means the violation of the scheme.

Here, as in Jakobson (1964), there is a clear correspondence established between poetic function and the presence of foregrounding and deviation from a norm. However, it is also the idea of the violation of a norm, which is the basis for the notion of deviation, which turns out to be problematic, as it becomes difficult to talk about one single norm from which a given piece of language can deviate (see for example Carter and Nash 1990: 5). Similarly, deviant language need not be present exclusively in literary texts (see Carter and Nash 1990 and Cook 1994, especially for deviance in advertisements), and, consequently, it makes it difficult to define literariness exclusively on grounds of foregrounded features and deviant language.

In spite of their merit in directing the focus of attention of the interpretation process to the text itself, the work of the formalists has been criticised mainly for the claims implicit in Jakobsonian stylistics, that the poetic function can in some way be identified with the presence of

formal features in a text,

such as parallelism. In Werth (1976) we find the first fully developed criticism of this point, and a suggestion by the author that formal analysis needs to be firmly grounded in semantics in order for the proposed interpretation to be valid. Werth (1976:65) argues that:

> to specify explicitly any effect associated with some linguistic feature configuration, we need three types of information (...): (i) statistical, concerning the norms of language and its varieties; (ii) psychological, concerning the response of readers of different levels of sophistication to, perhaps, different paraphrases of the same content (...); (iii) semantic, concerning the thematic and implicational content of the given piece.

Structural analysis needs to be grounded on statistical, psychological and semantic information; it can be said that at present this kind of information is available in most areas of research, especially by means of the recent interest in corpus linguistics.[2] Van Peer (1986) was the first to provide empirical evidence for the connections between foregrounding and reader response, by means of a series of tests which checked reader reactions according to variables that could be used as parameters of foregrounding in literary texts (memorability, strikingness, importance and discussion value). The results reveal that strikingness, importance and discussion value support the theory of foregrounding, though memorability does not. In this way, an important redefinition of foregrounding is introduced, whereby it is described by the author (op. cit.: 20) in the following terms:

> Foregrounding, then, is to be understood as a pragmatic concept, referring to the dynamic interaction between author, (literary) text and reader. On the one hadnd, the material presence of certain foregrounding devices will guide the reader in his interpretation and evaluation of the text; on the other hand, the reader will look for such devices in order to satisfy his aesthetic needs in reading a literary text.

The significant contribution to the Jakobsonian theory of foregrounding is the cognitive reformulation of the concept, now understood in terms of the figure/ground distinction (van Peer, op. cit: 21); thus, foregrounded features are perceived by the reader as the figure, the foreground or more salient information against the general background of the rest of the text. What is important is the relation between foreground and background, and how this is perceived by the reader in the reading process.

van Peer's work has been followed by others in the same line, among which it is worth mentioning Miall and Kuiken's (1994) study on defamiliarisation and the evocation of feelings and personal perspectives in readers. This process is defined by the authors as follows:

> by defamiliarization we mean a process during which a reader uses *prototypic concepts in a context where his or her referents are rendered* unfamiliar by various stylistic devices; the reader is required to reinterpret such referents in nonprototypic ways, or even to relocate them in a new perspective that must be created during reading. (Miall and Kuiken: 1994: 337)

There is an obvious similarity between this definition and the one above by Mukarowsky, with, however, a perspective that incorporates reader response in an explicit way. Following van Peer, Miall and Kuiken carry out experiments with readers which prove there is a connection between the foregrounding of linguistic features and defamiliarisation, on the one hand, and an effect of strikingness, higher difficulty in processing and evocation of personal experiences, on the other. Miall and Kuiken's results seem to confirm van Peer's claim that there actually is a cause-effect relation between linguistic

foregrounding and reader response. However, it also indicates that the response will vary from reader to reader, depending on personal experiences.

It is true that foregrounding in itself does not guarantee the presence of a particular effect, and for this reason foregrounding needs to be consistent and systematic. To this respect, Halliday (1973: 112) argues that 'foregrounding, as I understand it, is prominence that is motivated', that is, related to the main theme, or one of the main themes of the work. Furthermore, Halliday (1973: 115) modifies the original structuralist view that foregrounding and deviation are exclusively qualitative phenomena to suggest that foregrounding and deviance can also be quantitative. From this perspective a feature might be foregrounded and produce deviant language, not because its presence constitutes a deviation from the use in the standard, but rather because, for reasons of frequency of distribution, the given feature is more or less frequent than would be expected. Halliday (ibid.) calls this variant of deviation 'deflection'.[3] I will expand on Halliday's contribution to the notion of literariness in the following section.

To summarize the points mentioned above, the notions of foregrounding, defamiliarization and deviation are useful tools for the analysis and interpretation of a text, as long as certain conditions are met: foregrounding needs to be consistent and systematic, as established by the formalists; additionally, as argued by Halliday (1973) and Werth (1976),

it has to be grounded on empirical research regarding statistical, psychological and semantic information relevant to the features studied; furthermore, the connections between these different aspects have to be made explicit for an interpretation to be valid, as in van Peer (1986) and Miall and Kuiken (1994). Finally, deviation should not be taken as an absolute concept, but rather as a relative guideline indicating the relative variations that can take place in a language variety with regard to other language varieties. For this reason, the identification of a poetic function with foregrounded and deviant language as exclusively typical of literary language does not seem to be possible, since those features are also found in non-literary language.

1.3. The importance of context: literature as discourse

As stated in section 1.2. above, the merit of the formalists was to draw attention to the workings of the text itself in the process of literary understanding. One of the most important criticisms to text theories, however, has been precisely the failure to go beyond the structural analysis in order to consider a further meaning (see Werth 1976, Halliday 1973, Cook 1994).[4] The first step towards developing a theory of literariness integrating levels of analysis not restricted to the text itself can be said to be found in two main trends of linguistic research, first, in work developed by systemic linguistic analysis as first outlined by Halliday (1973, 1978, 1994); second, in the contribution of the natural language

philosophers (Austin 1962, Searle 1969) and subsequent pragmatic theories applied to literariness, which have given rise to interesting research.[5] In both these disciplines the common feature is the consideration of literature as discourse, that is, as a text in context. This step obviously has important consequences both from the point of view of the theoretical consideration of the nature of literariness and from the perspective of methodological applications to the analysis and interpretation of literary texts.

1.3.1. The Hallidayan approach to literariness

By introducing the idea that literature is a discourse type, some important consequences are derived. First, literature is basically not different from other discourse types, in that it can also be analysed, like other discourses, from the perspective of the three main functions which can be found in any text, namely, the ideational, the interpersonal and the textual functions (Halliday 1973, 1978, 1994 and Halliday and Hasan 1985). As an illustration of this, Halliday provides a groundbreaking analysis of certain aspects of transitivity in W. Golding's *The Inheritors*, which are described as deviations that yield an idiosyncratic view of the world, 'a particular way of looking at experience' (Halliday, 1973:120).[6]

Second, the consideration of literature from this perspective is demystifying with respect to the structuralist idea that literary texts are identified by the presence of a

'poetic function'. Systemic linguistics does not consider this to be one of the main functions of language; rather, it inverts the argument and claims that the main functions of language are also found in literature, as in other discourse types. This has the advantage of opening up the way for research from a wide variety of perspectives related to discourse issues.[7]

1.3.2. Pragmatic approaches to literariness

The view of literature as a discourse type makes literature available for analysis from pragmatic perspectives and for an analysis of the status of literature as a social phenomenon, aspects which are within the interests of systemic linguistics. Although the views of the natural language philosophers on literature were limited to a discussion of the nature of literature as a type of speech act,[8] their work has been since then extended to the analysis of literary texts well beyond the limits initially envisaged by them. M.L. Pratt's (1977) extended development of a pragmatic theory of literariness based on the Gricean notion of conversational implicature was the first attempt in this direction, and has been followed by a large number of studies where pragmatic principles have been used as instruments of analysis of particular literary texts.[9]

To conclude, it can be said that the contributions of systemic linguistics and pragmatics to the notion of literariness as a type of discourse available for interpretation like other discourse types and from the

perspective of contextual factors has been extremely important in that they have opened the way for research integrating different fields. From the point of view of the present thesis, the consideration of literature as a discourse phenomenon is crucial, as it allows for interpretation at different processing levels which include but also go beyond the text itself. In the following sections I will discuss specific issues related to the notion of literature as discourse.

1.4. The importance of the reader: literature as interaction

As explained in the previous section, a discourse approach to literariness requires the consideration of semantic and pragmatic aspects in addition to the formal features of the text itself. However, as Cook (1994: 44) points out, discourse and pragmatic theories focus on the significance of context from a social perspective and on inference procedures, and, consequently, show little interest in the part that the reader takes in the process of communication. An interest in the reader as active participant in the reading process has developed in linguistic theory particularly with the emergence of dynamic approaches to text processing. (See Schank and Abelson 1977, Rumelhart 1980, Schank 1982, Carrell *et. al* 1988, Cook 1994).

1.4.1. Schema theory approaches to reading

The contribution of schema theory to theories of literariness will be discussed more in detail in chapter 4, but

in this introductory section I would like to outline those features of schema theory that are relevant in general terms when approaching literature as a dynamic discourse phenomenon where the reader takes an active part.

In the first place, schema theories claim that the procedures necessary for the understanding of a text can never be limited to the text itself, but rather, that cognitive features should be taken into consideration. As de Beaugrande (1987: 58) points out 'There are no text properties in a vacuum: someone has to process the text and constitute the properties'. Furthermore, it is this cognitive package that contributes to the creation of coherence as a discourse phenomenon, rather than specific links identifiable within the text (see van Dijk 1977, Rumelhart 1980, Emmott 1994). Secondly, reading is seen as an active process of understanding which cannot be reduced to mere decoding. Reading involves active participation on the part of the reader, who maps the information in the text against her or his own stored knowledge, in order to make sense of the text.[10] Finally, it is claimed that processing takes place at different levels of understanding, which range from understanding of discrete units involved in bottom up processing, to holistic understanding typical of top down processing modes. (see, for example, Rumelhart 1980, Carrell *et al* 1988).

A discourse approach of this type is particularly interesting when applied to literature, precisely because of the possibility of dealing with the notions of dynamism and of

different levels of processing. The former, which has to do with the idea of text as a dynamic process rather than a static product, allows for an account of literariness where text understanding can be seen to change throughout the reading. This can help us identify interesting changes in works of fiction which are difficult to explain when considering the text as a static entity.[11]

1.5. Literature as a form of conflictive communication: the paradoxical nature of literature

As mentioned in section 1.4. above, the notion of different processing levels in reading is extremely important, because it allows the reader to interpret as meaningful at a higher processing level phenomena which are apparently contradictory, illogical and meaningless at lower processing levels. In this section, I would like to discuss briefly the notion that literature, like other forms of art, is inherently paradoxical (see Bateson 1972 and Breuer 1980). This discussion is significantly related to the following sections below: 1.7. on the features of 20th century literature as reflecting a split self, 1.8. on literature and ideology, and 1.9. on the characteristics of *Catch-22* as a paradoxical novel.

The view of literature as paradoxical is present in different theories and has been the object of discussion of philosophers, linguists and literary theorists alike. The paradoxical nature of literature is related to the ambiguous relation that holds between fiction and reality.[12] To some

extent, fiction reflects reality, at least *some kind* of reality recognisable by the reader. On the other hand, it creates a new reality, a new 'world' (see McHale 1987, Dolezel 1989, Iser 1989, Ryan 1991b). This world, being fictitious, cannot be judged by the same rules that operate in the 'real' world. In terms of speech act theory (Searle 1969, following Frege and Austin), it cannot be evaluated in terms of truth or falsity, since fiction lacks a referent in the real world. For this reason, fiction as a speech act is considered to be a 'weak' or secondary type of act (See Searle 1975, Pratt 1977, Petrey 1990).

In Bateson's (1972) theory of play and fantasy, the weakened and paradoxical nature of literature has to do with the presence of what he calls a 'metacommunicative message', *this is play*. This indicates that the acts carried out are not performed as denoting what they would otherwise do if it was not play. In this way, a paradox of the Russellian type is produced, in which what is denoted is not taken for what it should denote. The classical example of this kind of paradox is that of the Cretan liar saying 'All Cretans are liars'. Breuer (1980) applies Bateson's (1972) theory of play to literariness in order to argue that 20th century literature is not only paradoxical in the terms descibed above, but it reflects a split which is manifest in the widespread use of irony, which he compares to the split of the self in the schizophrenic.

However, a fiction does have its own internal rules and

conventions, which, as in any other discourse type, can be respected or violated (see van Dijk 1977, Pratt 1977). One of the idiosyncratic features of 20th century literature is the tendency to deliberately break the conventions of fiction at different levels: within the text itself, thus creating what from a logical perspective are impossible worlds, or worlds which have internal contradictions, as in typical postmodern fiction; and at the level of interaction with the reader, by means of the defeat of expectations regarding notions such as what is fiction, what is poetry and what is literature. Pratt (1977: 211) observes that:

> In the literary speech situation, in other words, rule-breaking can be the point of the utterance.(...) Within literature, this kind of linguistic subversiveness is associated especially with the so-called 'new' or 'anti-novel', where we find radically decreasing conformity to the unmarked case for novels and a concomitant radical increase in the number and difficulty of implicatures required to make sense of a given text.

We find, then, that literature can be seen as paradoxical and conflictive from two complementary points of view. One, because, as a type of art form, it holds an ambiguous relation with reality, which it reflects but from which it is also different.[13] Second, because fiction is a discourse type with its own rules and conventions, which are violated systematically in 20th century fiction. It is important to point out, however, that these violations are interpreted as meaningful ultimately, either through irony or other mechanisms that place a heavy burden of interpretation on the reader (See Breuer 1980 and Iser 1989).

In brief, in this section, I argue for a view of literature and fiction as paradoxical and as constituting a type of conflictive communication. By this I do not mean that literature is uncooperative as a communication type; I mean that literature violates norms and conventions, particularly 20th century literature, and this means a greater processing

effort on the part of the reader. Accordingly, this requires an account that in some way will focus on the problems inherent in literary communication as conflictive, rather than on the mapping of fiction against an ideal model of communication such as those presented by Grice's maxims and by Sperber and Wilson (1986) with regard to Relevance as a universally and all-encompassing principle. This does not mean that these theories are inadequate in themselves; it means they are inadequate if not dealt with within a broader discourse framework for the interpretation of literariness.

1.5.1. Possible worlds and the ontological status of fiction

Possible world theory as text theory (Pavel 1986, Dolezel 1989, Ryan 1991b, Semino 1994, 1995, Werth 1995c) provides the means of dealing with the conflictive relationship between different 'realities' by accepting that each world has its own internal configuration and laws. This view, summarised by Dolezel (1989), provides a solution to two traditional problems faced by philosophy with regard to the status of fiction: (a) what is the ontological status of fictional objects; (b) what is the logical status of fictional representations (Dolezel, 1989: 221).[14]

The problematic status of fiction as a non-existent object is tackled by possible world theories by defining fictional worlds as possible states of affairs. Thus, Dolezel (1989: 230) puts forward an account of fiction which develops from three main assumptions regarding the characteristics of fiction as a possible world:

1. Fictional worlds are possible states of affairs.
2. The set of fictional worlds is unlimited and maximally varied.
3. Fictional worlds are constructs of textual activity.

By means of these principles, we can deal with a fictional world as an alternative to the actual world with its own laws and internal structure. Furthermore, these characteristics are defined textually. This point is particularly interesting from

the perspective of discourse-based approaches, as it provides the starting point for an analysis of fiction as constituting a semantic domain identifiable by means of linguistic properties. Ryan (1991) takes these principles as a point of departure for her notion of *recentering*. The basic idea behind this notion is that every world is the center for its inhabitants.[15] Thus, if I am reading *Hamlet*, I do so with the awareness that the *actual world* where I live (which is only one, the 'real world') is not perceived as such by the characters of the fictional world I am reading about. Thus, for the characters in *Hamlet*, the actual world will be the imaginary - though inspired in a historical time and place - world depicted in the play.

Possible world theories as text theories are an alternative to pragmatic theories based on speech acts and conversational implicature. They provide the means of considering a fictional world as a domain with its own rules and laws. They also provide the means of analysing how conflict develops within the fictional world, from the perspective of the conflict between the domains of characters and the status quo in the fictional world (see Ryan 1991b), or by observing how specific fictional types depart from accepted conventions or rules. To this respect, a possible world approach based on textual principles leads to the acceptance of what in logic would be defined as *impossible worlds*. Dolezel makes the following observation with regard to the status of impossible worlds:

> Literature offers the means for constructing impossible worlds, but at the price of frustrating the whole enterprise: fictional existence in impossible worlds cannot be made authentic. The Lebnizian restriction is circumvented, but not cancelled.
> (Dolezel 1989: 239)

Similarly, Eco (1989) rejects the status of impossible worlds (i.e. worlds with internal contradictions) as fully-fledged worlds. Ryan (1991), however, proposes a model based on a taxonomy of criteria which enable us to establish degrees of similarity with the real world and its laws and departures from it. This proposal has the advantage of working on the hypothesis that the differences between 'actual', 'possible' and 'impossible' are a question of degree, rather than absolute distinctions.[16]

The text world approach to discourse, and, in particular, fictional discourse, is dealt with in depth in chapter 3. For this reason, my aim here has been that of providing an introduction to these theories and pointing out the contributions they have to offer to the understanding of literariness.

1.6. Language and action: literature and ideology

The ambiguous character of literature as a type of discourse that both reproduces reality but at the same time differs from it, makes it a natural vehicle for ideological issues. *Catch-22* is a good example, in the sense that the highly idiosyncratic fictional world of *Catch-22* is at once recognisably fictitious and a mirror of very specific aspects

of the society we inhabit, of which the novel is a satire.

This view of literature is grounded on the notion that language use is linked to a particular 'world view' (Fowler 1986) and that this world view reproduces an ideology. Fowler (ibid.:17) describes the process whereby language is used as a means of interpreting the real world and operating on it:

> *It seems, then, that human beings do not engage directly with the objective world, but relate to it by menas of systems of classification which simplify objective phenomena, and make them manageable, economical subjects for thought and action. In a sense, human beings create the world twice over, first transforming it through technology and then reinterpreting it by projecting classifications on to it.*

The author then goes on to describe how the use of classification becomes naturalised in a given language, thus being taken as the 'common-sense' view of reality, hypothesis or ideology of the given community. In this sense, ideology is used to stand for a particular world view, which is reflected linguistically in the way in which language is used as a classifying tool. As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, this notion is crucial when discussing the function of paradox as a means of subverting or challenging established classifications.[17]

Language classifies and gives shape to the reality we inhabit (Hodge and Kress 1994), thus conditioning our access to reality itself. Taken to an extreme, this view can lead, as in Bernstein, to a form of cultural determinism where the individual is trapped in the language system itself, which instead should be a tool enabling us to interpret and deal adequately with reality.[18] This view is particularly significant for an understanding of *Catch-22*, where language

is used as a metaphorical trap into which the characters are systematically lured by higher authorities. In this sense, negation is a particulalrly effective instrument, in that it can easily lead to a form of 'double-think' (Hodge and Kress 1994), if manipulated adequately. This potentiality of negation as leading to double-think, that is to negate and affirm at the same time, will be accounted for in detail in the chapters on *negation* below.

Language reproduces an ideology, but it can also challenge it, and stylistic analysis can be used as a means of showing how manipulations of the linguistic system are related to ideological manipulations (see Burton 1982). As said above, this implies a conception of literariness as one of the discourse types that can 'do things with words', despite the fact that the natural language philosophers did not recognise this.[19] Although the present project is not directly concerned with ideology and critical discourse analysis, it is necessary to acknowledge the importance of this issue when dealing with a novel like *Catch-22*, which is obviously critical of a given *status quo*. Heller (in Krassner 1993:7) says about the subversive character of *Catch-22*:

> I think anything *critical* is subversive by nature in the sense that it does seek to change or reform something that exists by attacking it.

The purpose of this section has been that of pointing out how the relationship between fictional world and reality in the novel under analysis is necessarily shaped as a distorted mirror image that operates as a criticism. The main body of the project, which deals with negation and paradox in *Catch-22*, will consequently deal indirectly with the significance of these linguistic phenomena as instruments of criticism and

satire.

1.7. Catch-22 as an anti-bellum novel: negation and paradox as key concepts in the analysis of the novel

This final section of the introductory chapter is intended to provide a general background to the discussion of the function of negation in *Catch-22* from the perspective of the general characteristics of the novel itself. I focus on three main issues that are significant to the discussion and analysis of subsequent chapters: (a) a brief introduction to the cultural background against which the novel was created; (b) a summary of some of the main themes the novel which is the object of analysis; and (c) an overview of the main studies on the novel.[20] This will also be used as a way of introducing key themes that will be referred to throughout the project.

1.7.1. The paranoid hero in 20th century American literature

In this section, I am particularly interested in discussing the view of Tanner (1971) regarding an interpretation of 20th century literature in terms of the influence of the current cultural, historical and psychological background. This author explores the well-known assumption that 20th century fiction, like other art forms, is the manifestation of, on the one hand, a fragmented self alienated from the external world, which, at the same time, reflects the fragmented character of the external world itself.[21] As such, literature, according to its paradoxical nature described above, both describes an external fragmented universe and an internal fragmented self, and within itself it is also fragmented as compared to art from previous centuries. In this sense, literature of the 20th century is perhaps not strictly mimetic regarding its content, but rather, it has become iconic in the sense that its form imitates a given state of affairs (see Breuer, ibid.). Heller observes this about *Catch-22* (Krassner, 1993: 9):

> I tried to give it a structure that would reflect and complement the content of the book itself, and the content of the book really derives from our present atmosphere, which is one of chaos, of disorganization, of absurdity, of cruelty, of brutality, of insensitivity, but at the same time one in which people, even the worst people, I think are basically good, are motivated by humane impulses.

In an interesting series of appendices to his work *City of Words*, Tanner (1971) describes the social, historical and psychological factors that characterise 20th century American society and which are present typically in its literature. In this section, I consider some of the aspects he mentions which are relevant to my discussion in the present chapter. Tanner makes use of the notion of the contemporary individual's incapacity to deal adequately with what he calls 'available patterns of experience' (ibid.: 421). The dilemma is often present in the American hero who has to choose between social values he does not conform to or his individuality. This clash between self and world is intensified by a feeling that the individual is predictable, manipulable, controllable. This view became widespread in the earlier 20th century as a result of scientific, psychological and social theories based on deterministic and behaviouristic principles. As Tanner (ibid.:424) points out:

> All this is anathema to the American hero, who will go to some lengths *not* to be what the situation seems to call for, in an attempt to assert his immunity from conditioning. Obviously this can produce a sort of negative determinism in which the non-conformist individual is predictably unpredictable.

This quotation is particularly significant, because it sheds light on the characteristics of Yossarian as hero of *Catch-22*, precisely in the terms described above of his consistent attempt to contradict and sabotage the patterns of behaviour imposed on him by external forces. As Seed (1989)

points out, Yossarian preserves his individuality through negative action. As a hero, Yossarian also shares the paranoid tendencies that are charcateristic of 20th century American fiction. This aspect is closely related to the perceived social situation described by Tanner (ibid.:427) as involving 'a vast conspiracy, plotting to shape individual consciousness to suit its own ends'. This paranoid feeling is also present in other American heroes[22], and it yields recurrent symbolic images representing a dread towards as Whorfian[23] socio-cultural determinism. Tanner (ibid.:429) provides an example from *Catch-22*, the image of the 'white soldier', a soldier who is completely bandaged from head to foot, and immobilised. Throughout the novel, the characters begin to suspect that there is actually nobody inside the bandages, a realization that leads to a situation of panic in the hospital. Tanner defines the symbolism of this kind of image as the terror "of the individual 'as dynamically empty": the void under the bandages in *Catch-22*' (idbid.: 429).

However, the American hero does not actively provide new structures or solutions to the conflicts described above. As Tanner (ibid.) points out, there is seldom a reconstruction of the self in recent American fiction and there are no clear ideas that would substitute those against which the hero is rebelling. Again, Yossarian, as protagonist of *Catch-22*, fits this description, particulalrly in his final decision to escape ultimately from the untenable situation, rather than confront it directly.

In brief, I have argued for a view of literariness as paradoxical and conflictive in a way that particularly reflects the situation of the individual and his or her relation to society and art in the 20th century. These aspects are particularly interesting as a background to the discussion which is the object of my project. First, it provides the background against which the novel *Catch-22* as a work of the 20th century American tradition is produced. Moreover, it is useful as an introductory way of exploring the paradoxical elements that are present in American society, self and art and how they are related to negation as a discourse phenomenon.

1.7.2. Catch-22 and war narrative

Catch-22 narrates the story of an American bombardier squadron on the imaginary island of Pianosa, off the Italian coast, during World War II. The novel is not meant to be realistic, in the sense that it does not faithfully reproduce the reality of World War II. Rather, World War II, as a prototypical example of a war, becomes the excuse to explore the workings of 20th century society. Heller himself (Merrill, 1975:160) points out that the novel has more to do with the situation of America during the Cold War, the Korean War and the possibility of a Vietnam War, than with World War II. Hence the implied criticism of the MacCarthy era with the Loyalty Oaths, the trials, the paranoid feeling towards the 'non-American'.

This is reflected in the novel mainly through a military

system governed by higly inefficient bureaucrats whose only concerns are the petty struggles for power against other military officers in the squadron or nearby squadrons. The war itself, or the enemy, are hardly present in the novel, again leading to a recurrent theme of recent American literature, that the enemy is found within the system itself, not outside. In this closed system, however, the victims are the ordinary soldiers, who are in the hands of the higher officers and their whims. Heller (Krassner, 1993: 22) emphasizes of *Catch-22*:

> I regard this essentially as a peacetime book. What distresses me very much is that (...) when this wartime emergency ideology is transplanted to peacetime, then you have this kind of lag which leads not only to absurd situations, but to very tragic situations.

Thus, the scope of the narration goes beyond the idea of criticising war and, as said above, is used as an excuse to reflect on other current aspects of American society, such as religion, justice, morality, racism, and, ultimately, the power of institutions themselves. As Walsh (1982) indicates in his study of American war literature, *Catch-22* shares with contemporary fiction its concern with a dehumanised world 'of indeterminate and anxious character' (1982: 190):

> [Heller's] formal procedures such as the devices of satiric distortion, allegory, parody and burlesque contribute to the formation of a vision of breakdown. His novel exploits the departure of the monolithic power of modern institutions, in this case conveyed through the metaphor of the army's hierarchy.

According to Walsh, the novel also reflects the shift in focus in recent war fiction, which no longer deals with the battlefield, but with 'the absurdities of the communication process itself' (ibid.: 191). The 'catch-22' itself becomes the main metaphor for absurdity as the 'seemingly willing mass

subjection of soldiers to the interests of the industrial military complex' (Walsh, op. cit.: 190). Or, as another critic has described it 'Catch-22 is a metaphysical principle of inbuilt chaos' (Hunt 1974: 129). The aspects that *Catch-22* shares with typical war narratives (see Solomon 1969), such as the idea of the military group as a home for one's loyalties, the mechanistic concept of existence, the relation between sexuality and war and the religious overtones of war's sacrifice are all ridiculed in *Catch-22*.

1.7.3. The 'catch-22'

One of the most striking features of the novel under analysis, in addition to its structure, is undoubtedly the peculiar logic that characterises language use and exchanges.[24] The catch-22 itself clearly summarises this. Catch 22 states that a soldier who is crazy can be grounded and sent home. In order to be grounded he has to make an application; however, by applying to be grounded, the applicant will be proving he is able to use rational capacity and, consequently, that he is not crazy. The catch is a type of circular argument where two propositions (a) you need to be crazy (*P*), and (b): you need to apply (*Q*), cancel each other out (if you apply you are not crazy: *if P, then not-Q*), thus making it impossible for the proposition 'to be grounded' ever to be applicable. The catch is a circular trap which can be explained further as follows:

1. if you are crazy you can be grounded *if A then B.*

2. if you want to be grounded you have to apply. *if C then D.*

3. if you apply you are not crazy. *if E then F.*

The process is circular because the last proposition (*F*) contradicts the first premise (*A*), so that *F* = *not-A*. At a literal level of understanding, the catch is paradoxical and does not make sense. However, as a metaphor of the novel itself it makes a lot of sense. It reflects the closed system that constitutes the fictional world from which there is practically no escape; it reflects the circularity present in the novel as a narrative device and as a systematic structuring principle for many exchanges between characters; it also reflects the blurring of opposites that are recurrent themes, such as craziness/sanity, presence/absence, life/death, thus challenging both language as a system that organises experience, and experience itself. This leads to the closely linked theme of the indeterminacy between reality and illusion, also present in the recurrence of images related to disturbances in visual perception, such as hallucinations, visions, dreams, nightmares, 'dejá vu' and 'jamais vu' (see Blues 1971 and Mellard 1968).

1.7.4. Previous works on *Catch-22*

Much of the literature on *Catch-22* has dealt with the themes mentioned above (see Burnham 1984, Nagel 1974a, 1974b and 1984, Davis 1984, Seed 1989, Solomon 1969, Walsh 1979, Protherough 1971, Mellard 1968, Blues 1971, Gaukroger 1974). Otherwise, it has tended to concentrate on the characeristics of the novel from the point of view of its narrative structure and chronology. The chaotic pattern of the novel has been attacked as lacking a structure (Waldmeir 1964), but it has also been defended as a chaotic structure intended to reflect the content of the novel (see Gaukroger 1974b). In this respect, different critics have interpreted this pattern in terms ranging from musical countrpoint, to information theory and entropy (Tucker 1984), the theory of chaos (see Derks *et*

al. 1994), the psychological theory of synergies (see Derks *et al.* 1994) or, more generally, as a cyclical pattern where relevant episodes are repeated incrementally (Protherough 1971, Seed 1989). Many critics agree in defining the narrative unit of the novel as the 'episode' and also point out the importance of two time lines which are the main reference points throughout the narrative: the psychological time of development and the linear time line of the increase in the number of missions (see Nagel 1974a, Solomon 1974, Gaukroger 1974b, Burnham 1974, Seed 1989).

Although the paradoxical aspect of the novel is mentioned by many authors (Greenberg 1966, Ramsey 1968, Gaukroger 1974, Seed 1989), and negation is mentioned by Ruderman (1991), to my knowledge there is no single work devoted to the discussion of negation and paradox in an extended way, be it an article or a book.[25] Most critics have, rather, concentrated on the absurdity conveyed through the use of circular logic (see Seed 1989 and Ruderman 1991). The relationship between the absurd character of the novel and existentialism and absurd drama has also been pointed out in various places (Ramsey 1968, Gaukroger 1974b). The present work is a contribution to the literature on *Catch-22* by focusing on negation and paradox as linguistic phenomena.

1.8. Conclusions

In this introductory chapter I have argued for a view of literariness grounded on the structuralist notions of deviation, foregrounding and defamiliarisation as useful tools for the analysis of negation and paradox as natural foregrounding devices leading to defamiliarisation in *Catch-22*. This view has been extended by a discussion of discourse-based approaches to literariness, arguing that the notion of context is also necessary when dealing with literary communication. This enables us to take into consideration the role of the reader in the reading process and the acceptance of literature as a conflictive and paradoxical discourse type. The acceptance

of literature as paradoxical enables us to approach it as holding an ambiguous relation to reality, which it reflects but from which it also differs. This relationship will be accounted for in terms of text world theories and schema theory, as is shown in chapters 2 and 3.

The paradoxical nature of literature has been used as the touchstone for the discussion of the relation between fiction and the reality of the 20th century, and the relation of fiction with ideology. Within this frame, *Catch-22* is described as a novel that reflects its times, in that a paradoxical fictional world both reflects and criticises a paradoxical and absurd real world. Greenberg (1966) describes what he calls 'the novel of disintegration in the 20th century - of which *Catch-22* is an example - in the following way:

> The novel of disintegration, in its focus upon the paradox of individual involvement in the entropic process, thus emerges as specifically the literature of the human condition: a literature at once subversive (to the general tendencies of the world) and loyal (to the value of the individual), tragic (in its ultimate prognosis) and comic (in its present potential), which opens through human necessity to human possibility. (Greenberg, 1966: 124)

Notes to chapter 1

1. The approach to negation followed in the present work is grounded on linguistic theory. For an approach to the notion of *'negativity' in literary theory, see Budick and Iser (1989).*

2. Cf. Leech and Short's (1981) discussion of these notions: for these authors, deviance is a statistical notion, prominence is a psychological notion and foregrounding consitutes what is literary relevant. There is a close connection between the three different phenomena.

3. In Halliday (1973), in addition to the theoretical considerations regarding foregrounding and deviation, the author also presents his view on the functions of language and, finally, his seminal work on transitivity in W.Golding's *The Inheritors*.

4. This is one of the limitations of stylistic analysis in the *transformational-generative line, which in the earlier stages of* stylistics was very popular. However, as I pointed out in section 1.2., studies such as van Peer (1986) and Miall and Kuiken (1994) do incorporate the reader in their models based on the notions of the Russian formalists.

5. See for example van Dijk (1977 and 1985) and de Beaugrande (1980), for different examples of text theories incorporating semantic and pragmatic principles to text analysis, some of which are explicitly designed for the analysis of literary texts.

6. Cf. Fowler's (1986: 44) notion of 'world view'. It is reproduced in section 1.7. below.

7. See for example Widdowson (1975, 1992), Carter (1982), Carter and Simpson (1989), Verdonk and Weber (1995) for discourse approaches to literary analysis; Fowler (1977 and 1986), Burton (1982), Birch (1989), and Simpson (1993) for critical discourse approaches to literariness; Burton (1980) for a discourse theory of dramatic discourse.

8. See Petrey (1990) for a detailed discussion of the views of the natural language philosophers on literariness and suggestions for a modification of their perspectives.

9. See for example Simpson (1989) and Calvo (1992) for an interpretation of dramatic discourse in terms of Brown and Levinson's (1987) model of Politeness, and Pilkington (1996) for an application of Relevance Theory to the interpretation of poetic discourse.

10. See also Iser (1989) for an approach to reading as dynamic and requiring reader involvement from a perspective based on game theory and inspired in Bateson (1972).

11. This view also has important repercussions in the methodology of teaching language and literature as integrated disciplines and based on a process-oriented approach, rather than a product-oriented one.

12. For a discussion of ambiguity as an inherent characteristic of literary discourse see Empson (1930).

13. In this respect, Werth (1995c: 499) argues that fiction 'is deemed to have a symbolic relationship with the world of experience'.

14. See the discussion of this issue with regard to negation in chapter 2.

15. Other authors present different alternatives to this problem with variations which depend on the degree of flexibility towards the acceptance of the equal status of possible worlds with respect to the actual world. Eco (1989), for example, does not accept the status of contradictory worlds as fully-fledged worlds or domains, since they do not abide by the Law of Non-contradiction and are thus logically unacceptable. For a further discussion of this topic, see chapter 3.

16. See the discussion in chapter 3.

17. See also Fairclough (1989) and Hodge and Kress (1994).

18. Cf. with Tanner's account of the social situation in xx century America.

19. For an intersting application of Austin's (1962) performative hypothesis to the interpretation of the myth of Don Juan see Felman (1989).

20. See Weixlmann (1974) and Keegan (1978) for complete reference guides to Joseph Heller and *Catch-22*.

21. See also Davis (1984), for a development of the idea that xx century fiction after modernism reflects the discontinuities in language, thought and society which characterise this century.

22. See Bockting (1994) for an application of the notion of mind style to characterisation in Faulkner. In her analysis, the author shows that Jason Compson's language reveals paranoid tendencies in this character.

23. See Whorf (1956).

24. Cf. Nash (1985:110-111) for a comparison of the language in the exchanges in *Catch-22* with the language of psychiatric patients.

25. See note 19.

Chapter 2: Approaches to negation

> Ordinarily, Yossarian's pilot was McWatt, who,
> shaving in loud red, clean pajamas outside his tent
> each morning was one of the odd, ironic,
> incomprehensible things surrounding Yossarian.
> McWatt was probably the craziest combat man
> of them all probably, because he was perfectly sane
> and still did not mind the war. (...)
> McWatt wore fleecy bedroom slippers with his red pajamas
> and slept between freshly pressed colored bedsheets
> like the one Milo had retrieved half of for him
> from the grinning thief with the sweet tooth in exchange
> for none of the pitted dates Milo had borrowed from Yossarian.

2.1. Introduction

This chapter is an introduction to negation in different fields, including the philosophy of language, logic, psychology and grammar, although the main focus is on functional approaches in current linguistic theory. In the sections under 2.2., I consider briefly the importance of negation in the linguistic philosophical tradition, and make reference to some of the traditional problems associated with negation, such as presuppositions, the scope of negation and quantifiers, and negative transport. I also describe the standard definition of negation as a logical operator and point out the differences which are usually outlined between negation in logic and negation in natural language. With regard to negation in psychology, I discuss those aspects that provide a background to the cognitive properties of negation as a linguistic phenomenon, and in particular, in its discourse function.

In sections 2.3., I discuss the classification of negative words according to syntactic, morphological and semantic principles, a necessary distinction in order to identify explicitly negative words. This classification will be applied

to the identification of negative words in the corpus analysis in chapter 6. In sections under 2.4., I review current approaches to negation from discourse-pragmatic perspectives: (i) the function of negation as illocutionary act, (ii) the approaches to the notion of denial and other major speech acts involving negation, (iii) the variations of negation across speech and writing, and (iv) the cognitive aspects of the function of negation in discourse. Sections under 2.5. are devoted to a discussion of Givón's pragmatic theory of negation.

The last sections of this chapter provide a preliminary analysis of extracts from the corpus. This initial analysis has the objective of showing how approaches based on traditional logic and semantics are not adequate for an understanding of the function of negation in discourse, and in particular, the discourse of *Catch-22*. This leads to the discussion of later chapters, where discourse-based frameworks are explored with regard to their adequacy in the explanation of negation.

2.2. Introductory notions on negation

In the subsequent sections, I discuss the importance of negation in the philosophical and psychological traditions as a background to the more linguistically oriented discussions. These sections are intended to provide an illustration of the importance of negation in the tradition of Western thought, and they are also meant to introduce concepts that have been extremely influential in the way negation has been understood

in language.

2.2.1. Negation in the philosophy of language tradition

Negation has been one of the major controversial issues discussed by philosophers, psychologists and linguists for centuries. Even if it has always occupied a central position in studies of logic, as Horn (1989: 1) points out, it has always 'been regarded as a suspect guest, if not a spy from the extralogical domains.' However, most of the bibliography on the subject is concerned with issues that derive from philosophical and logical problems of sentences where negation is involved. Only in recent years has there been an attempt to study the properties of negation in language use.[1]

Among the traditional problems associated with the presence of negation, the assignement of a truth value to sentences containing non-referential NPs has been particularly thorny and has given rise to a discussion in which the most famous linguists and philosophers of this century have had something to say. The problem, introduced by Russell (1905), involved the well-known propositions in (2):

(2) a. The King of France is bald.
b. The King of France is not bald - because there is no King of France.

The dilemma has to do with the answer to two problematic questions:

(a) since there is at present no King of France, because France is a republic, is sentence (2) a. false, or is it neither true nor false, thus implying there is a truth-

value gap?

(b) how does one deal with (2) b.? In (2) b. the negative proposition negates the existential presupposition presented in the affirmative proposition, thus contradicting the general principle that the presuppositions of a sentence are kept unchanged under negation.

This kind of negation, which denies the presuppositions of a proposition rather than the proposition itself, has been called EXTERNAL, WIDESCOPE or MARKED negation, to contrast it with INTERNAL, NARROWSCOPE, UNMARKED negation. Different linguists and philosophers have offered varied solutions to the Russellian problems. Austin (1962: 51) has considered utterances such as (2) a. 'void' with regard to truth value, and, consequently, infelicitous. Similarly, other authors have pointed out that the problem established in abstract terms is actually much less of a problem when the sentence is seen in context, from a pragmatic perspective. Kempson (1975) was among the first to defend a pragmatic approach to presupposition and a solution of the problems involved in assigning truth values via Grice's (1975) conversational maxims and the notion of implicature. Givón (1993: 196-97) argues that an utterance like *The king of France is not bald*, as in (2) b., is not generally used to express widescope negation in natural language, as this meaning is generally expressed by means of alternative structures which are not ambiguous. These typically involve some form of subject NP-negation, as in (3) (Givón, 1993: 197)

(3) a. There is no King of France.
b. No king of France is bald.

Indeed, the most common type of negation seems to be verb phrase negation (see Tottie 1991: 46, Givón 1993: 197), which, as Givón points out, 'typically excludes the subject, and thus applies only to the *verb phrase* (predicate)' (1993: ibid.). The reason for this is that 'in human communication definite subjects are *not* used to assert their existence. Rather, their existence (and shared knowledge of their identity) is *presupposed*, it is part of the background information and thus does not fall under the scope of assertion to begin with.' (Givón 1984: 325).

The problem of non-referential NPs and negation, of course, has ontological implications. In fact, a long-standing argument has traditionally existed in philosophy regarding the ontological status of objects in general, and, more specifically, of non-objects. The traditional questions have been (a) what objects are there? and (b) what objects exist? Some philosophers, such as Russell (see Marsh 1988) and Quine (see Dummett 1981) have defended a view where only objects which can be assigned reference, in addition to sense, can have ontological status and, consequently, can be considered to exist. On the opposite end, other philosophers, such as Meinong (see Russell 1905:45) defend a view where any grammatically correct denoting phrase may stand for an object. This means that expressions such as *The present King of France* and *the round square* are objects. Russel observes that 'it is admitted that such objects do not *subsist*, but, nevertheless, they are

supposed to be objects' (Russell, 1905: 45). For Russell, such objects infringe the Law of Non-contradiction, since they assert that the King of France exists and does not exist at the same time. As a solution to this problem, Russell proposes a distinction between *primary* and *secondary* occurrences of denoting phrases. According to this distinction, the proposition *The present king of France is not bald* can be interpreted as meaning 'There is an entity X who is not bald' and is an instance of a primary occurrence, or it may mean 'It is not the case that there is an entity who is bald', which is an instance of a secondary occurrence. In the former interpretation the proposition is false, while in the latter it is true. This distinction has had an enormous influence on theories of negation and is related with the distinction between narrowsope and widescope negation mentioned above. A further solution to the problem of non-referential NPs is porposed by the theory possible worlds, which I discuss in chapter 3 (see also the introductory section in chapter 1, section 1.5.1).

A related problem is that of scalar implicatures involving negatives (see Atlas and Levinson 1981: 32, and Horn 1989: 382-392), as in (4):

(4) He doesn't have three children - he has four.

This kind of negation goes against the principle that a scalar value will imply all the lower values below itself on a scale. Thus, in example (4) having four children implies having 3. Strictly speaking, it is not logical to deny that one

has three children if one has four. As in the previous case, Horn (1989: 384) deals with these cases as special instances of 'metalinguistic negation', where what is denied is not the content of the proposition but the proposition as a whole. Horn defines metalinguistic negation as follows:

> METALINGUISTIC NEGATION - a device for objecting to a previous utterance *on any grounds whatever, including the conventional or conversational* implicata it potentially induces, its morphology, its style or register, *or its phonetic realization. Metalinguistic negation focuses, not on the* truth or falsity of a proposition, but on the assertability of an utterance. (Horn 1989: 363)

The problems discussed with reference to examples such as (2) and (4) have been closely related to the polemical notion that negation may be ambiguous, first introduced by Russell (1905) as a case of semantic ambiguity. This view has been contested by authors who have specified that negation is not semantically ambiguous (as in Russell 1905) but pragmatically ambiguous (Horn 1989), vague (Atlas 1977), underdetermined (see Leinfeller 1994), or not ambiguous at all (Carston 1996).[2] What these views are trying to account for is the difference between answers like (5) b. and (5) c. to (5) a.:

(5) We didn't see the hippopotamuses.
a. We saw the rhinoceroses.
b. We saw the hippopotami.
(Carston 1996: 310)

Carston (ibid.) argues that (5) a. operates on the propositional content of (5) by negating its truth-value and is in some way descriptive of a state of affairs in the world, that 'what we saw was rhinoceroses'. Its propositional structure is 'not P; Q'. However, (5) b. does not have such a descriptive function, and a literal interpretation of it would lead to contradiction, that is, 'P; not P'. Its function

concides with that described in Horn's quotation above regarding metalinguistic negation, that is, an objection to an utterance on whatever grounds.

Carston (1996: 310) provides further examples of metalinguistic negation, reproduced under (6):

(6) a. We don't eat tom[a:teuz] here, we eat tom[eiDeuz].
b. He isn't neurotic OR paranoid, he's both.
c. I haven't DEPRIVED you of my lecture on negation; I've SPARED you it.
d. The President of New Zealand ISn't foolish; there IS no President of New Zealand.

The utterances under (6) are said to express an objection to a previous utterance, in (6) a. on phonological grounds, in (6) b. with relation to the exclusion of a predicate said of an entity, in (6) c. on the choice of a lexical item, and in (6) d. we have the classical example of the negation of the presuppositions in a proposition. This is not the place to go into a detailed discussion of this topic, but it is important to point out, following Carston (op. cit.: 312), that negations of this type are not representations of states of affairs in the world, but, rather, representations of representations. Following this line of thought, Carston (op. cit.) defends an approach to metalinguistic negation as echoic, in the sense used by Sperber and Wilson (1986). According to the author, echoic uses are defined as follows: 'A representation is used echoically when it reports what someone else has said or thought and expresses an attitude to it.' (Carston 1996: 320). A typical example is an ironic utterance, such as (6):

(7) The obnoxious beady-eyed woman is my wife.

Example (7) could be taken literally, but, most probably,

it would be interpreted as being a repetition, an echo of what somebody else has said, thus yielding an echoic utterance with an ironic value. According to Carston (op. cit.: 320-21) its echoic nature is the crucial property of metalinguistic negation. This view may have consequences for the view of negation in general terms, but I turn to this aspect in section 2.4.4. below.

To end this introductory section on the traditional problems associated to negation, we can also mention those cases that have been of particular interest to generative semanticists (see Bolinger 1977, Jackendoff 1983), since they have brought up problematic issues with regard to the contention that variations in surface structure do not reflect variations in meaning. A classical example is that of ambiguity arising with regard to the scope of negation when quantifiers are present, as in (8):

(8) a. All the arrows did not hit the target.
b. *Many arrows didn't hit the target.*

The two sentences under (8) cannot be said to be equivalent, since (8) a. is ambiguous. The first interpretation is that none of the arrows hit the target, and the second interpretation is that some of the arrows (=not all) hit the target. Only in this last interpretation can it be considered to be equivalent to (8) b.

Finally, another much discussed aspect of negation has been that of negative transport or negative hopping, whereby the negative that should modify a verb in an embedded clause moves to modify the verb in the matrix clasue, as in (9):

(9) a. I think he won't come.
b. I don't think he'll come.

Processes of this kind, like the ones under (8) above, have been particularly interesting for generative semanticists (Bolinger 1977), who have been concerned with the possible changes in meaning from one structure to another. Horn (1989: 343) proposes a reading of raising or negative transport as an indirect speech act, whose meaning is recovered by means of conversational implicature. In the case of some verbs, like *think, believe, want*, the meaning has become conventionalised, thus yielding short circuited implicatures.

Although none of these issues are the direct concern of my present work, they illustrate briefly what has been the state of the art with regard to negation for many years. In the following sections, I discuss the view of negation from the perspective of propositional logic, which is also extremely important in the understanding of negation as a discourse phenomenon.

2.2.2. Negation in logic

It is generally known that negation in natural language has different properties from those of negation in logic. However, it is important to consider the characteristics of negation as a logical operator for two reasons: (i) because these operators are also present in natural language to some extent, and (ii) so as to establish the points where natural language differs from logic. First, I shall describe the properties of negation in traditional logic, as well as

contradictions and disjunctions, two types of proposition which are closely related to negation as a logical operator and whose functions in natural language are quite different from those in logic.

In logic, negation has the status of an operator that forms a compound sentence whose truth value is the opposite of the truth value of the sentence it operates on (Allwood *et al.*, 1974: 30). We can establish a table of correspondences so that for every proposition *P* that is true there is another proposition - *P* that is false, and viceversa (see also McCawley 1981: 62):[3]

(10)

P	- *P*
t	f
f	t

In linguistic terms, if the sentence *It's raining* is true, then the negative sentence *It's not raining* is false.[4] Negation can also be described in terms of set theory (Allwood *et al.* 1974: 31), so that a set *A* is defined as the set of all possible worlds where *P* is true. - *P* will be the set of all possible worlds where *P* is false, which is the same as C *A*, or the complement of *A* (from Allwood *et al.* 1974: 31).

The view of negation in terms of possible worlds or set theory can be illustrated by means of an example from *Catch-22*. There is an episode where the narrator is describing how people die in the war, outside the boundaries of the hospital. He uses negative statements which state *what is not the case* within the

boundaries of the hospital:[5]

(12) There was none of that crude, ugly ostentation about dying that was so common outside the hospital. They did not blow up in mid-air like Kraft or the dead man in Yossarian's tent, or freeze to death in the blazing summertime the way Snowden had frozen to death after spilling his secret to Yossarian in the back of the plane. (extract 70)

In terms of possible worlds, the description in (12) shows two mutually exclusive sets of states of affairs; as such, they apply to complementary domains:

(13) a. People die violently. *P*
b. People do not die violently. - *P*

This can be paraphrased as, for all the cases where *P* (People die violently) is true, - *P* (People do not die violently) will be false, and viceversa. The domain where *P* applies is the domain indicated by the war, life outside the hospital, while the domain where - *P* applies is the domain of the hospital.

In natural language, negation can be expressed in different ways, such as the structures in (12) (Allwood *et al.* ibid.):

(12) a. It is false that
b. It is not the case that
c. Not
d. It is incorrect that
e. It is not true that
f. It is wrong that

The structures in (12 a., b., d. e. f.) are parapharases of EXTERNAL negation, while (12 c.), represents the negative operator; the former rejects the truth value of a whole proposition together with its presuppositions, while VP negation only negates part of a proposition, typically the

predicate or a single constituent; in this case, the presuppositions are kept intact. Although this issue is controversial, as I have pointed out in section 2.2.1. above, there is a tendency to argue that negation in natural language is fundamentally of the INTERNAL type, while the EXTERNAL type is more unusual in actual language use (Lyons 1981: 129, Givón 1979: 113).[6] This leads us to establish one of the main differences between negation in logic and in natural language, pointed out by Allwood *et al.* (op.cit: 29-32): (i) while in propositional logic negation operates on a whole proposition, in natural language almost any constituent can carry the negative operator, as in example (13):

(13) Non-students are not allowed.
(Allwood *et al.* op.cit. 31)

The negation of a NP - or of any constituent below the clause - is not possible in propositional logic.

There are further differences between negation in natural language and negation in traditional logic:[7] (ii) natural language has phonetic resources such as stress and focus to indicate constituent negation in a way that cannot be captured by traditional logic either, as in example (14).

(14) a. Jack didn't hit Jill.
b. *Jack* didn't hit Jill.

(iii) Finally, and perhaps most importantly, logic cannot account for functional differences of negation in discourse. As Lyons (1981: 134) points out, logic cannot express the difference between assertion of negation and denial, as in (15), where (15) a. is a negative assertion or negative

statement, while (15) b. is a denial.[8]

(15) a. I went into the room and noticed there was nobody in.

b. A: You shouldn't have bought that car.
B: I didn't buy it, they gave it to me.

From the points discussed above, it becomes clear that negation in natural language needs to be considered from a wider perspective than that offered by propositional logic. Contextual or pragmatic factors are extremely important in determining the meaning and functions of negation in discourse, as will be discussed in the sections below.

2.2.2.1. Negation in complex propositional structures

In this section, I describe two propositional logic types that are closely related to the use of negation, i.e. contradiction and disjunction.

Contradictions are complex propositions that are assigned the truth value *F* irrespective of the truth of the simple sentences. Thus, (16) is a contradiction:

(16) It's raining and it's not raining.

This can be represented in the following table:

(17)

p	- *p*	*p* & - *p*
t	f	f
f	t	f

Although this is the structure that is normally understood to yield a contradiction, Escandell (1990: 924-925) draws our attention to the fact that other structures may also yield

contradictory meanings. Thus, this author distinguishes between *formal contradiction*, which reflects the structure above, and *non-formal contradiction*. Both are illustrated in examples (18) below:

(18) a. It's raining and it's not raining.
b. It was good and it was bad.

While (18) a. illustrates the standard type of formal contradiction, (18) b. is a form of non-formal contradiction. This distinction illustrates the classical distinction between the use of *contradictories* and *contraries* (see Horn 1989). An opposition between contradictories involves the use of syntactic negation, as in (18) a. and has the logical form *p & not-p*, while an opposition between contraries involves the opposition between predicates, as in (18) b. and has the logical form *p & q*, where *q = not-p* (Escandell, 1990: 924).

Escandell (op. cit.: 925) further distinguishes between *simple* and *complex* forms of contradiction, depending on the structure of the proposition. This distinction is illustrated in (19) below:

(19) a. Her husband is not her husband.
b. This bachelor is married.
(Escandell 1990: 925)

While (19) a. is a complex formal contradiction, (19) b. is a simple non-formal contradiction.

Contradictions, like tautologies, which are always assigned the truth-value *T*, have standardly been regarded as meaningless and uninformative in traditional semantic theory (see Leech 1974 and Levinson 1983: 194). Pragmatics has made an attempt to provide the means of interpreting contradictions

as meaningful by making reference to their context of use. The claim that contradictions may be meaningful in a context is based on the intuition that expressions like (20) must have a meaning, since they are used in everyday language use:

(20) He's here and he's not here.

Escandell has observed (1990: 928-29) that there have been three different lines in the possible pragmatic explanation of utterances such as those in (20). The first possibility is to interpret them as being informative by means of conversational implicature. In this view, (20) a. can be assigned a meaning which is recovered thorugh inferencing procedures; this meaning may be that somebody is physically present but whose mind is on something else, different from the context where he is physically situated. The second possibility is to interpret them as special kinds of speech acts which are self-defeating, as in (21):

(21) I promise not to keep my promise.

As Escandell (op. cit.: 929) observes, this view does not account for the fact that here the incompatibility lies in the relation between propositional content and illocutionary force, as the conditions for the production of the illocutionary act are not satisfied. In contradictions, this incompatibility does not arise, since the sincerity conditions are satisfied and the speaker believes in the simultaneous validity of the two terms of the contradiction. This fact also invalidates the last pragmatic approach to contradiction mentioned by Escandell (op. cit.: 930), Relevance Theory (see Sperber and Wilson 1986:

115). In this view, a contradiction is interpreted by eliminating one of the two contradictory terms:

> We assume that in these situations the contradiction is resolved by other means: for example, by a conscious search for further evidence for or against one of the contradictory assumptions. This seems to correspond to the introspective evidence that some contradictions are resolved by an apparently immediate and automatic rejection of the faulty premises, while other contradictions require deliberation. (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 115)

This view is not acceptable because in the utterance of a typical contradiction both terms are presented as being equally valid. Escandell (op. cit.: 931) argues for a semantic-structural approach to contradictions where the interpretation of these kind of utterances does not depend on contextual information but can be recovered from the structure itself. This view hinges upon a distributive interpretation of complex formal contradictions, as in (22) and (23):

(22) a. It's raining and it's not raining.
b. In a sense it's raining, in another sense it's not.

(23) a. I liked it and I didn't like it.
b. In a sense I liked it, in another sense, I didn't.

These examples can be interpreted by understanding that each of the terms in the contradiction is valid in a different domain (spatial, temporal or other), indicated by the two conjoins in the coordination structure. I will come back to this interpretation in chapter 4, where a similar view is presented by establishing a connection between different domains and schematic knowledge.

The use of contradiction in everyday language is explained in similar terms by Givón (1984: 321), who observes that, although contradiction is avoided by human beings as rational

thinkers, it is used nevertheless for other reasons:

> Unlike formal systems, humans are capable of compartmentalization, whereby contradictory beliefs held at the same time are rigidly segregated in subparts of the cognitive system, under different *personae*, etc. Further, humans are also capable of *change* or *faulty memory*, whereby they can hold contradictory beliefs in temporal succession. Finally, they are also capable of *contextualizing* parts of their entire belief system, thus making the truth of some propositions vary with the change of internal or external context. (Givón, 1984: 321)

Thus, contradiction can arise in language use because of internal inconsistencies or complexities of a person's belief system, or because of the effects of change through time or in different contexts with regard to beliefs previously held. This implies a reformulation of the logical notion of contradiction as a more flexible discourse phenomenon which involves the denial of the truth of a previously held proposition within a domain where such a denial would not be expected. Such a domain is, for example, a person's attitude to a particular issue.

In natural language, then, an operation suchas contradiction may convey a meaning that cannot be expressed by a strictly logical approach. As Givón (1989: 167) observes, while in logic we have the two extremes of tautology (propositions which are always true) and contradiction (propositions which are always false), natural language is a hybrid system, 'a compromise between the two extremes' (Givón, ibid.):

> (a) **Tautologies**: total informational redundancy; no interest.
> (b) **Contradictions**: total informational incompatibility; no coherence.
> (Givón 1989: 268)

Thus, most propositions in natural language fall between these two extremes, since they are 'informational hybrids which

carry some presupposed ('old') and some asserted ('new') information' (Givón, ibid.: 167).

Disjunction is another complex proposition type which corresponds to the function of *or* in natural language. It can be *exclusive*, in which case the proposition will be true if and only if both conjoins are true, or *inclusive*, which will be true if only one of the conjoins is true. Allwood *et al.* (1977:34) provide the following examples of true and false disjunctions:

(24) a. Mars is a satellite or a black hole. (F)
b. Mars is a planet or a black hole. (T)

In terms of set theory, 'the truth-set for *p V q* will be the set of all worlds where *p or q* is true - which is the same as the union of *A* and *B*.' (Allwood *et al.* ibid.). Like contradiction, disjunction in natural language functions differently from the way it does in logic, as the latter does not capture the uncertainty typical of the *either-or* structure in common language use. Allwood *et al* (1977: 36) point out that in logic it is possible to build a structure like that in (16) while looking out of the window:

(25) Either it's raining or it's not raining outside.

In natural language, (25) would be odd, as disjuction is usually associated with the expression of doubt or potentiality of some kind, as in (26):

(26) Either he's at home or he's left (but I don't know which).

Furthermore, in natural language, disjunction is very often of the *inclusive* type, while in logic disjunction is

generally understood to be *exclusive*.[9] This distinction has consequences in language use that cannot be captured by logic. In logic, disjunction establishes a binary contrast between two mutually exclusive terms which together form a set. Whether the truth value assigned to it is *T* or *F* has no consequences on a given context of use. In natural language use, however, disjunction has consequences which stem from the cognitive organization of experience into mutually excluding options. As has been pointed out by psychologists (see Clark and Clark 1977, Apter 1982) and linguists (Grice 1975, Lyons 1977), there is a tendency to categorise experience in terms of binary systems of opposite terms, to talk of things as either black or white, good or bad, etc.. In many cases, the binary contrast admits a middle term, an alternative to the terms referred to in the disjunction (*grey, neither good nor bad*). However, this middle term (or term from a different set altogether) is often overlooked, sometimes with dramatic effects on the way experience is conceptualised.[10] I will come back to this point in further sections throughout this chapter and the next.

2.2.2.2. The Laws of Non-Contradiction and of the Excluded Middle

In logical terms, both contradiction and disjunction are closely related to what in propositional logic is referred to as the Law of Non-Contradiction and the Law of the Excluded Middle (see Horn 1989: 79). The Law of Non-Contradiction establishes that if a proposition *P* is true, *not-P* is false (see Givón, 1993: 187, Horn 1989: 18). The Law of the Excluded Middle establishes that a proposition *P* is *either* true or

false, thus excluding the possibility of having a middle term. Both laws exclude the possibility of being and non-being at the same time (Horn, ibid.). However, as I have pointed out above, natural language functions in ways where the Laws of Non-contradiction (LC) and of the Excluded Middle (LEM) are not followed.[11]

To this respect, it is interesting to observe that the acceptance of the LC and the LEM is exclusively a Western phenomenon, as the Eastern philosophical tradition does not consider them as logical laws (see Horn 1989: 79-96). Thus, Horn (op.cit.: 79-80) points out that by means of the 'Principle of four cornered negation' contradiction and excluded middle are parts of a process where no final solution is provided. The principle states the propositions which would 'describe a subject S in relation to an entity or class P', as presented in (27):

(27) a. S is P.
b. S is not P.
c. S is both P and not-p.
d. S is neither P nor not-p.

As can be obeserved from example (27), the process represented here infringes the LC and LEM followed by Western logic, since it involves the simultaneous acceptance of contradictory propositions. In Eastern logic, there is a long tradition in meditation as a means of achieving an insight as a solution to a logical problem, rather than the rational process typical of Western thought. Consequently, the task of the would-be philosopher or 'sage' (Horn, 1989: 80), would be to consider in turn each of the propositions in (27) and reject

them all. Although the discussion of such philosophical differences is not the direct concern of the present work, it is interesting to observe that, while in our Western tradition the transgression of certain logical principles will indicate inconsistency, falsity or incoherence, the fact is that this is only one view. In other traditions, such as the one mentioned above, violations like contradiction are not considered to be violations at all, but rather as one more element in the process of perception and observation of reality.[12]

2.2.3. Negation in psychology

Negation has been the focus of attention of many studies in psychology, both because of its cognitive properties as contrasted with the expression of the affirmative, and because of its significance in therapeutic processes. From a linguistic perspective, both aspects are interesting, because the former provides insights regarding the ideational component of negation, while the latter does so with regard to interpersonal aspects of negation. I will deal with both aspects in turn, and I will then go on to discuss the view of contradiction and paradox from the perspective of the theory of psychological reversals (Apter 1982) in section 2.2.3.1.

The findings on the cognitive processing and production of negatives have been very influential on the understanding of negation as a linguistic phenomenon. In particular, the cognitive properties of negation constitute the main evidence

in favour of considering it the marked term in the polarity system. It is generally agreed that negation as a structure involves the formation of a complex structure with regard to the corresponding affirmative, and that this complexity is evident in the different perspectives from which negation has been studied.

From the point of view of language acquisition, negative structures are acquired later than affirmative structures, that is, the negative particles are incorporated into previously learned affirmative structures; however, the process of acquisition and production of negation in general terms is rather more complex, as children learn quite early to say 'no', or to express negation (non-existence, refusal and rejection) by non-linguistic means (see Clark and Clark 1977: 348-351). This process has a parallel in diachronic change in language, since negation is incorporated into many languages once the affirmative structure has already been developed (Givón 1979: 121). Furthermore, as compared to the processing of affirmative structures, negatives take longer to process. This has been proved by different studies carried out by means of making subjects go through tests directed at the identification of the processing time of affirmative and negative sentences (Wason 1965, Just and Clark 1973, Clark 1976). These results are applicable also to inherently negative lexical items, such as *absent*, which are also harder to process than their positive counterparts, such as *present* (see Clark, 1976: 42).

Similarly, other tests have concentrated on the identification of factors conditioning the production of negative sentences. In this case, the pioneer was Wason (1965), who established that the production of negative structures takes place when there is an expectation that is being denied (Wason op.cit.: 7).

These findings seem to indicate that there is an asymmetrical relation betwen negative and affirmative structures, the negative being a second-degree operation that is realised on a pre-existing affirmative structure or proposition.[13] This view is obviously present in approaches to negation which are based on the idea of the 'denial of an expectation', which will be discussed in sections 2.4.4. and 2.4.5. below.[14]

Another important issue in the psychology of negation is its role in the perceptual coding of experience. To this respect, there are several observation to be made. (i) Experience is usually coded in positive terms, rather than in negative terms. Clark and Clark (1977: 240-241) point out that tests on subjects asked to make descriptions of places, invariably yielded the use of the affirmative. However, denials will be used when the speaker wants to deny an expectation he assumes the listener is holding (see Wason 1965: 7, Clark and Clark 1977: 99). (ii) With regard to negation in the lexicon, there seems to be a close relation between the use of positive terms to express extent and the use of negative terms to express lack of extent (Clark and Clark, 1977: 538), a

phenomenon which is apparently universal; thus, the terms *long, tall, wide* are considered to be positive against their corresponding opposites *short, low, narrow,* which are classified as negative. (iii) Finally, positive terms are more informative than negative terms; we describe things by what they are and not usually by what they are not (see, for example, Clark 1976: 54). Thus, in pointing to my house, I will normally say (28) and not (29):

(28) That is my house.
(29) That is not my parents' house, that is not my friend Gina's house, that is not my teacher's house, etc...

The arguments mentioned above provide evidence in favour of the fact that experience is usually coded positively, and that negation tends to be used only if there is an expectation that is not being fulfilled. These characteristics will be expanded from a linguistic perspective in sections 2.4.4., 2.5.1. and 2.5.4. below, where I deal with the marked character of negation and its presuppositional nature.

With regard to the second aspect of negation mentioned at the beginning of this section, negation is also relevant as a stage in a therapeutic process, or, in psychoanalytic terms, the use of negatives is significant as a means of revealing character traits and the emergence of subconscious material into consciousness (see Freud 1976 and Labov and Fanshel 1977). These observations are relevant to linguistic research because language use reveals information about the people and communities using it. If we are dealing with fiction, as in the case of the present work, information about the psychological

features associated with specific language uses can provide insights regarding the characters who use language in that way.[15]

With regard to the importance of negation in a psychoanalitical perspective, there are two important observations to be made. (i) negation is standardly used by patients during therapeutic processes in order to deny information from the subconscious which has been repressed. Negating this material is the first step towards the achievement of an awareness of such material, which is usually traumatic (see Freud: 1976: 253, Labov and Fanshel 1977: 334-335). This phenomenon is interesting from a linguistic perspective because it is obviously based on the idea that negation both negates and affirms at the same time. Though this is not, strictly speaking, true, I will try to prove in further sections that negation in certain specific uses actually works in this way, more precisely in the phenomenon called accomodation. (see section 4.3.4. in chapter 4 below). (ii) The second observation to be made in terms of the relevance of negation from a psychoanalytic perspective is the well-known fact that there is a close relation between negation and acts of resistance, such as the one mentioned above in a therapeutic process, and other challenging acts, such as rejection or refusal. A consistent use of acts of this type might be indicative of rebelliousness of some kind, and illustrate conflictive behaviour on the part of characters in fiction. This will be illustrated in the application, where I discuss

the functions of negation in *Catch-22*.

2.2.3.1. Contradiction and paradox as cognitive synergies

In the sections under 2.2.2. I introduced the issue that, although the organisation in terms of opposites is widely accepted
as a universal tendency in language, the simultaneous presence of opposite terms in order to yield contradictory statements, paradoxes or ambiguities is generally regarded as anomalous, in the sense that phenomena of those types are logically unacceptable, linguistically deviant and psychologically disturbing. Apter's (1982) theory of psychological reversals provides an attractive alternative to more traditional views which focus on normative and unproblematic behaviour in general terms. In this section I discuss some aspects of Apter's (op. cit.) theory which are relevant to the interpretation of contradiction and paradox, as phenomena involving negation, in *Catch-22*.

Apter (op. cit.: 8) establishes that the theory he presents is concerned with inconsistency and paradox as part of human behaviour and motivation. According to this theory, it can be said that inconsistency pervades all human behaviour, in the sense that as individuals we are subject to variation with respect to different factors. Thus, two individuals may react differently to the same situation, and, furthermore, the same individual may react in different ways to the same situation at different points in time.

What I am particularly interested in discussing is the notion of cognitive synergy, which has to do with the way in which we perceive contradictory meanings as co-existing. The phenomenon is described as follows by the author:

> The idea is that opposite characteristics may co-exist in the sense that one is aware of both in consciousness, in relation to a given identity, and that these opposites both contribute something to the full meaning of the identity, or contribute alternative meanings to the identity. Either way, synergies always embody some form of self-contradiction. (Apter, 1989: 141).

The author gives the simple example of the chequer-board, which is constituted by mutually exclusive attributes, black squares and white squares, however, as a whole it can be said to be both black and white. The notion of cognitive synergy develops from the observation that, not only do we manifest a tendency to interpret experience in terms of opposites, but also that in certain cases one identity may be assigned two opposite characteristics and display contradictory meanings. As the author points out (ibid.) 'Although this may not be logically possible, phenomenologically it is prevalent.' Furthermore, a synergy has the peculiarity of producing an effect that could not be achieved by the two constituting elements in isolation. The term *synergy* is used in other disciplines, such as medicine, to indicate this meaning, such as when it is said that a mixture of alcohol and certain drugs may have unpredictable effects.

The author further provides examples to indicate the different ways in which contradictory meanings may coexist. For example, if one is not sure whether a person is male or female, he will try to find evidence in favour of one of the two

interpretations by identifying relevant properties in a process where opposite properties will be assigned in turn. In this sense, the process is described as bi-stable, as properties belonging to each of the two domains are focused on at different moments.[16]

We can take an example from *Catch-22* to illustrate how this kind of process is exploited in the novel. In example (30) we have a comment on a character who is a friend of the protagonist. He is described as follows:

> (30) McWatt was the craziest combat man of them all probably, because he was perfectly sane and did not mind the war. (p. 80).

In this description we have the definition of an identity (McWatt) by means of two opposite terms (*sane* and *crazy*), defined by Apter as 'strong opposites' (or contraries, in Horn's terminology), as opposed to complementaries such as *sane-not sane*, which he defines as *weak opposites* (or contradictories). It can be said that the simultaneous perception of both attributes gives place to a cognitive synergy, which requires the acceptance of both terms. Our knowledge of the world, and of wars in particular, including reactions to being part of a war leads us to try to solve the paradox by interpreting the terms as belonging to different domains. Thus, McWatt is crazy from a subjective perspective, because he does not manifest a reaction that would be the expected one (for the narrator in the novel and many readers), that is, one of worry, despair, etc. In this sense, he is crazy because his 'anomalous' reaction is implicitly contrasted to

the more usual and therefore sane reaction. Furthermore, he is sane from an objective perspective, that is, he is not clinically crazy with respect to ordinary behaviour, except for what has been described above. This leads to a perception of the character as being both crazy and sane.

It is also interesting to observe that paradox and ambiguity can be received as either threatening or stimulating and enjoyable phenomena depending on the mental state of the receiver (Apter, 1989: 145-153). Also, paradox is typical of certain domains of human activity, such as art, as was discussed in chapter 1. This view may account for the different reactions to paradoxical literary works, such as *Catch-22*, which may either be rejected as nonsensical and incoherent or enjoyed because such inconsistencies can be perceived as funny and challenging in a positive way. Later in this study (in chapter 4) I focus on the relation between paradox and humour.

What is interesting for the purposes of the present research is to point out that phenomena in which negation is involved, such as paradox and contradiction, may be logically unacceptable, but from a psychological point of view they are justified and yield some kind of meaning. The establishment of whatever meaning may be associated with contradiction and paradox has traditionally been very problematic, both in psychology and in linguistics. Apter's (1982) notion of cognitive synergy has been proposed as an alternative to traditional theories which consider paradox and contradiction as marginal and anomalous phenomena. In further chapters of

this work I will attempt to account for these phenomena from a linguistic perspective.

2.3. Descriptive approaches to negation

In these sections, I introduce the notion of negation as a linguistic concept by considering the classifications that are standardly presented of negative words.

2.3.1. Classifications of negative words: explicit and implicit negatives

As has already been discussed above, negation understood in broad semantic terms can be expressed in different ways in natural language. In this section, I describe the main distinctions followed currently in the literature and establish a classification of negative words according to morphosyntactic and semantic criteria, since the distinctions presented here will be applied to the corpus study in chapter 6.

The main problem involved in the identification and classification of negative words has been the lack of correspondence between word content and word form, already observed by Jespersen (1917: 22). Not only is it the case that there are words with no overt mark of negation (*absent, fail, lack, forget*) which, however, are generally understood to convey a negative meaning (Jespersen, 1917: 38, Quirk *et al* 1985, Huddleston 1983: 428), but also, there are cases where there is a lack of fit between the grammatical structure of an utterance and its force (see Tottie, 1991: 34). In the latter

case, we may well have negative sentences with the force of agreements, as in (31), or, conversely, affirmative sentences with the force of a refusal, as in (32):

(31) A:...and I didn't like his attitude at all.
B: No...

(32) A: Look, you just have to leave.
B. I'm staying here.

In this section, I will concentrate on a description of negative words, while the discussion of negation and force will be dealt with in sections under 2.4..

Klima (1964) was the first to attempt to establish a formal distinction between words which could be identified as negative both in form and meaning and words which are negative in meaning but not in form.[17] Since then, the tests of co-occurrence of negative words with non-assertive terms, such as *any* and *either* in coordinated structures and the combination with positive tags, have been standardly applied in order to identify what have been called EXPLICIT NEGATIVES. This can be observed in (33):

(33) a. *He never told us in time, and she didn't either.*
b. * He never told us in time, and she did too.
(34) a. He never told us in time, did he?
b. * He never told us in time, didn't he?

By explicit negatives, then, we understand the following group of negative words: *not, n't, no, nobody, no-one, nowhere, nothing*. They are negative in meaning, they are marked morphologically for negation and they follow co-occurrence restrictions which single them out as syntactically negative. They are referred to by different authors as 'clausal

neagation' (Huddleston, 1984: 423, Quirk *et al.* 1985: 777-782, Quirk and Greenbaum, 1990: 223), 'syntactic negation' (Givón, 1993: 202) or 'nuclear negatives' (Downing and Locke, 1992: 180). Huddleston (1984: 423-24) proposes further tests in order to distinguish what he calls *clausal* negation from *subclausal* (or constituent) negation, such as fronting, which in the case of clausal negation forces subject-verb inversion, while subclausal negation does not.

Syntactic negation usually includes also the group of 'broad' negatives or semi-negative words formed by the adjuncts *hardly, scarcely, seldom, rarely,* and the determiners *few* and *little*. Although these words have negative meaning, they have no morphological indication of a negative affix or particle, unlike the negatives mentioned above (See, for example, Quirk *et al.*, 1985: 780). However, because co-occurrence tests show they tend to function like explicit negatives, they are usually classified in this group. Thus, they can combine with *at all* (see Jespersen, 1917: 38, McCawley 1995: 32), an expression identified as co-occurring with non-assertive forms only, and with the non-assertive forms *any* and *ever*, although they do not combine with affirmative tags. This can be seen in examples (35) to (38):

(35) ? He hardly recognised her at all.
(36) a. * He hardly recognised her, did he?
b. He hardly recognised her, didn't he?
(37) a. He hardly ever discussed any of his problems.
b. * He hardly never discussed some of his problems.
(38) a. He had hardly had any brakfast.
b. * He had hardly had some breakfast.

Further, distinctions are extablished between negation of

the verb and negation of other constituents, (henceforth V-neg and Constituent-neg respectively). Thus, Jespersen (1917) distinguishes between 'nexal' (V-neg) and 'special' negation (const-neg and lexical neg.). Quirk *et al.* (1985: 775) distinguish between what they call *clausal negation* and *local negation*, Huddleston (1984: 419-20) distinguishes between *clausal* and *subclausal negation*, Givón (1993: 202) distinguishes between *syntactic*, *morphological* (words with negative affixes) and *inherent* negation (words assigned a negative value in a pair of opposites), and Tottie (1991: 9) talks about *not-negation* and *no-negation* respectively.

As Clark (1976: 33) points out, Klima's (1964) tests leave out what are usually referred to as IMPLICIT NEGATIVES, or words which convey a negative meaning although their syntactic co-occurence rules are the same as for positive terms, that is, they combine with assertive terms and with negative tags, as shown by examples under (39):

(39) a. John is unhappy, and Mary too.
b. * John is unhappy, and Mary either.
c. John is unhappy, isn't he?
d. * John is unhappy, is he?

By IMPLICIT NEGATIVES, we understand both words where the negative meaning is indicated by affixation, or 'morphological' negation (Givón, 1993: 202), and words which are inherently negative, or 'inherent negation'.

Morphological negation may be indicated by prefixes, such as in-, im-, il-, dis-, un- in English, or by the suffixes -less, and -out, as in *without*. However, even the identification of morphologically marked negative terms might turn out to be

problematic, since not all affixes indicate the same type of relationship between positive and negative terms. Thus, while there are clear-cut cases, such as those in (40), where the negative term indicates an opposite value to that expressed by the positive term, the examples in (41) express a different kind of relationship, and those in (42) lack a corresponding positive term:

(40) true-untrue, expected-unexpected, legal-illegal
(41) appear-disappear, load-unload,
(42) uncouth, restless, disgruntled

In the case of inherent negatives, the identification of such terms is still more problematic, both for practical and theoretical reasons, as is pointed out by several authors, from Jespersen (1917: 43) to Tottie (1991: 7). In practical terms, the task of identifying inherent negatives in a corpus is practically unthinkable, (Tottie, 1991: ibid.). Furthermore, from a theoretical standpoint, nothing prevents us from reversing the process by which we assign a negative value to a word (Jespersen, 1917: ibid.). That is, while we usually think of a word like *fail* as meaning *not succeed*, we may just as well think of *succeed* as meaning *not fail*.

In brief, a distinction is established in general terms between words which are EXPLICITLY negative, or syntactic negation, and words which are IMPLICITLY negative, or morphological and inherent negation.[18] I shall refer to the latter also as 'lexical' negation, since it involves the expression of negation through lexical rather than syntactic means. This distinction will be followed in my corpus analysis

of chapter 6, where only explicit negatives are searched by the computer.

In the next two sections I discuss the properties of syntactic and lexical negation further.

2.3.2. Syntactic negation types

Syntactic negation is typically carried out by means of negating either the lexical verb or the auxiliary in clause structure, as in (43):

(43) a. He didn't wake her up.
b. Not wanting to wake her up, he tried to leave quietly.

Syntactic negation can also be carried out by negating non-verbal constituents (see Quirk *et al.*, 1985: 790, Huddleston, 1984: 419, Downing and Locke, 1992: 180, and Givón, 1993: 198-199). The possibility of attaching the negative to almost any constituent was already pointed out by Jespersen (1917: 56), who described the two opposing tendencies manifested in negative attraction: on the one hand, a 'universal tendency to attract the negative to the verb even where it logically belongs to some other word' (Jespersen, 1917: 56), and, on the other hand, another tendency to attach the negative particle to 'any word that can easily be made negative.' (ibid.). Below is a classification based on Downing and Locke (1992: 180); it shows the different types of syntactic negatives, or 'nuclear negatives', where a consituent different from V is negated:

(44)	Neg. pronoun	at S	Nobody knows.
		at Od	I told nobody.

Neg. specifier	NP det.	I felt no pain.
	NP predet.	Not many people left.
	AdjP spec.	It's none the worse...
	Avd. spec.	...not even...
Neg. Adjunct		I've never been there.
Neg. coordinator		Neither this nor that.

The choice of V-neg versus constituent-neg is governed by structural and pragmatic factors. This is mentioned by different authors (Jespersen, 1917: 56, Downing and Locke 1992: 181) and is dealt with in depth by Tottie (1991) in her monograph on negation in English speech and writing. Here I will simply outline some of the relevant issues involved in the choice of the two forms of negation.[19] From a pragmatic perspective, stylistic and contextual factors condition the choice of the negative form: V-neg is preferred in spontaneous, informal speech, while constituent-neg is preferred in formal, written varieties of English. However, there are also structural constraints on the choice of the negative form. Thus, if the negative occupies initial position, only constituent-neg is possible.[20] As is pointed out by Downing and Locke (1992: 181) this is closely connected with the phenomenon of the scope of negation, which I discuss below.

2.3.3. The scope of negation

By scope of negation we refer to the semantic influence that the negative item exercises over the constituents of the clause where it appears, or the semantic domain on which negation applies (see Huddleston, 1984: 428-432, Quirk *et al.*, 1985: 787-790, Downing and Locke, 1992: 182, Givón, 1993: 197-98). Usually, all the constituents that follow the negative

fall under the scope of negation, while the subject remains outside. This can be observed by the fact that assertive forms may occupy Subject position, while non-assertive forms will be found in other positions, as in example (45):

(45) Some people don't have any sense of humour.
(Downing and Locke, ibid.)

In (45), the non-assertive form *any* lies within the scope of negation, while the subject pronoun *Some* is outside the scope of negation. Assertive forms can sometimes occupy positions following the verb carrying the negative, but in this case the meaning is different from that expressed by a corresponding clause with a non-assertive form. Downing and Locke (ibid.) provide the following examples:

(46) a. He didn't reply to any of my letters.
b. He didn't reply to some of my letters.

In (46) a., the scope of the negative extends to the end of the clause and yields the meaning that *None of the letters received a reply*, while (46) b. yields the meaning that *Some of the letters received a reply*.

The scope of negation can be indicated by means of contrastive stress, which narrows down the scope of negation to the constituent that receives the focus, leaving the rest of the clause presupposed (Quirk *et al.*, 1985: 789, Givón, 1993: 197). This can be observed in the following examples:

(47) a. John didn't hit Bill.
b. **John** didn't hit Bill.
c. John didn't hit **Bill**.

While in (47) a. we have an example of neutral negative focus, which, consequently, involves the negation of the whole

predicate, in (47) b. we have subject focus (someone hit Bill, but not John), and in (47) c. object focus (John hit someone, but not Bill). According to Huddleston (1984: 432-34), contrastive stress selects the foregrounded entailment which is applicable in a given situation, thus specifying the scope of negation for that particular utterance.[21]

Adjuncts tend to attract the focus of negation, so that the rest of the clause is presupposed. Givón (1993: 197) argues that this accounts for the fact that in examples like (38) only the adjunct is understood to fall under the scope of negation, and not the verb or any other constituent:

(48) a. *She ran as fast as she could.*
b. She didn't run as fast as he could.
c. She didn't write the book for her father.

In (48) b. the adjunct *as fast as she could* falls under the scope of negation, though the presupposition *she ran* is kept unchanged, the same as in the affirmative. The same process takes place in (48) c., where the adjunct *for her father* falls under the scope of negation, while the presupposition *she wrote the book* is kept. Givón (op.cit: 199) argues that the reason for optional constituents to attract the focus of negation may be the fact that these constituents are the focus of assertion, even when the structure is affirmative. Thus he argues that the following pragmatic inference operates in such cases: "If an optional element is chosen, chances are it is the focus of asserted information." (Givón, ibid.).[22]

2.3.4. Lexical negation

The question of negative polarity in lexical items was already introduced in section 2.2.3. above. Here, I take up the question again in order to provide some further considerations from a linguistic, rather than a psychological perspective. However, the view defended here is still the one presented above, which argues for a cognitive basis in the way in which polarity distinctions are manifested in the lexicon.

2.3.4.1. The cognitive basis of binary oppositions in language

It is a natural tendency in human language to classify experience in terms of opposites, which are manifested linguistically as pairs of antonyms (See Lyons, 1977: 271, Clark and Clark, 1977: 426, Apter, 1982: 137, Cruse, 1986 (chapters 10, 11 and 12), Horn, 1989: 39, Givón, 1984: 351, Werth, 1984: 22). It was pointed out in 2.2.3. above that, in terms that express perceptual coding, the term that indicates lack of extent is assigned a negative value, while the term that indicates extent is assigned a positive value. This has further consequences on language use, since the positive term 'neutralises' and becomes the term that is used to indicate the whole scale that is being referred to. Negative terms are never used in this way. (See Clark and Clark, 1977: 426). This can be observed in the examples under (49):

(49) a. How long was the movie?
b. ? How short was the movie?

While (49) a. is the neutral way of asking about the length of a movie, (49) b. would only be possible in specific

contexts, i.e., when the notion of 'shortness' has already been introduced, for example, by means of an utterance like (50):

(50) The movie was very short.

Indeed, Lyons (1977: 275-76) argues that utterances of the type illustrated in (49) b. presuppose the negative property, while utterances like (49) a. are neutral in this respect.

While the apparent arbitrariness of the linguistic assignment of positive and negative values to lexical items has been observed on several occasions (see, for example, Jespersen, 1917: 43), in psychology and cognitively-based linguistic theories it is argued that the linguistic system of coding such values is far from arbitrary (see Clark and Clark, 1977: 534-35, Givón, 1984: 351, Werth, 1995c: 32-33). Rather, as discussed above, the assignment of positive and negative values follows cognitive principles of perceptual saliency versus perceptual backgroundedness.

This can be observed also in terms which do not express perceptual coding but an evaluation, such as *good-bad, mortal-immortal, legal-illegal*. In these cases, there is a natural tendency to classify these oppositions into a positive and a negative term, even when there is no morphological mark of negation (as in *bad*). Clark and Clark (1977: 539) argue that the term which usually expresses the expected norm, the typical state, will be categorised as positive, while a departure from a norm or the taken-for-granted status quo will be categorised as negative. In these terms, *bad, immortal* and *unusual* indicate departures from more frequent - or desirable - norms indicating

what is *good, mortal* or *usual*. Hence 'Normal states are conceived of positively, and abnormal states as the absence of normal states, as negative states' (Clark and Clark, ibid.).[23]

Cruse (1986: 197), in an insightful discussion of the different types of relationships between opposites, observes that opposites have a paradoxical nature, as they are simultaneously maximally separated and close. Their closeness has to do with the fact that opposites have the same distribution and frequency. Cruse (ibid.) further argues

> The paradox of simultaneous difference and similarity is partly resolved by the fact that opposites typically differ along only one dimension of meaning: in respect of all other features they are identical, hence their semantic closeness; along the dimension of difference, they occupy opposing poles, hence the feeling of difference.

2.3.4.2. Contraries and contradictories

A further important issue concerning lexical opposition is the distinction between different types of opposition. In this section, I will consider briefly the importance of the distinction between *contraries* and *contradictories*, as it is relevant to the analysis I will carry out in subsequent chapters, but I will refrain from discussing in detail other types of relationships between opposites, since this would represent a diversion from the objectives of the present work.[24]

Contrary and *contradictory* are the terms used by Horn (1989: 39), on the basis of traditional classifications dating from Aristotle, in order to distinguish between opposite terms that are gradable (contraries) and those that are not gradable (contradictories). This distinction is expressed in other

authors by means of the terms *antonym* and *complementary*, respectively (Lyons, 1977: 279, Werth 1984: 158, Cruse 1986: 197-222). In any case, a contradictory or complementary is a term that is governed both by the Law of Non-Contradiction and the Law of the Excluded Middle, while a contrary is a term that is governed only by the Law of Non-Contradiction (Horn 1989: 270-271). This can be observed in the following examples, discussed by Werth, (ibid.) :

(51) a. John is neither clever nor stupid.
b. ? John is neither dead nor alive.

(51) a. contains two contraries, *clever-stupid*, that is, two gradable opposites which exclude each other but accept the existence of middle terms between the two ends of the scale; (51) b. contains two contradictories, *dead-alive*, two terms that mutually exclude each other without accepting the possibility of a middle term.

It is interesting to observe that there is a tendency in human communication to use contraries as if they were contradictories, thus accentuating the binary opposition between the two extreme terms, rather than the choice between several items on a scale (see Grice 1975, Lyons 1977: 278, Horn 1989: 332). Thus, Lyons (ibid.) observes that 'If we are asked *Is X a good chess-player?* and we reply *No*, we may well be held by the questioner to have committed ourselves implicitly to the proposition that X is a bad chess-player.' From a logical standpoint, there is a lack of fit in the relation between two contraries, while there is no inconsistency in the case of contradictories (Lyons 1977:272). Thus, the proposition in (52)

a. implies (52) b. and (52) c. implies (52) d., indicating relationships of logical consistency:

(52) a. *X is dead*
b. *X is not alive*
c. *X is not alive*
d. *X is dead*

However, in the case of contraries this does not happen. Although (53) a. implies (53) b., (54) a. does not imply (54) b.:

(53) a. *X is not clever*
b. *X is stupid*

(54) a. *X is not stupid*
b. *X is clever.*

Contrariety can furthermore be applied to the different types of oppositions illustrated in (55):

(55) a. black/white
b. black/red

In this case we have oppositions of terms belonging to a multiple-member-set, rather than the oppositions between members at the end of a scale, as in the examples above. Contraries like those in (55) a. have been called 'polar opposites', while those in (55) b. are also referred to as 'disjuncts' (see Horn 1989: 39).

I will henceforth follow Horn's (ibid.) classification of opposites, which is organised as follows: *contradictories* will refer only to the contradictory status of a proposition, that is, I will not use this term as applied to lexical items, but only to propositions. Among contraries, the author distinguishes between the following types: *mediate contraries* or *weak contraries*, and *immediate contraries* or *complementaries*

(odd/even). Among *weak contraries*, we can further distinguish between *disjuncts* (black/red) and *polar opposites* (black/white). This classification is reproduced in the diagram below:

(56) a. contradictories: black/not black

b. contraries: c. weak contraries: d. disjuncts: black/red
e. polar opposites: black/white

f. strong contraries or complementaries odd/even

To end this section, I will briefly make reference to the lack of fit between an item that is negated syntactically and the corresponding morphological and inherently negative forms (see Givón, 1984: 342, Werth, 1984: 152, Horn, 1989: 334). Thus, (57) illustrates the scale on which such a relation can be represented:

(57) a. He isn't happy.
b. He is unhappy.
c. He is sad.

From a logical point of view, the three forms represented in (57) should be equivalent; however they are not. Givón (ibid.) argues that there is a difference in degree of strength of the utterance which varies depending on the criterion adopted: if the scale is measured in terms of speech act strength, the syntactic negative (57) a. is the strongest and the inherent negative (57) c. is the weakest. But in terms of subjective certainty, it is the other way round. This seems to be related to the fact that syntactic negation is felt to be more vague than lexical negation, while from a speech act perspective, syntactic negation yields strong assertion, versus

the weaker froms containing lexical negation.

2.4. Application to extracts from *Catch-22*

In this section I consider some of the issues discussed in the present chapter and their applicability to the analysis of extracts from *Catch-22*. I will be particularly interested attempting to prove the following points: (i) negation cannot be accounted for only in terms of its definition as the reversal of the truth-value of a proposition; (ii) contradictory statements are meaningful, but their interpretation cannot be carried out in terms of propositional semantics. The rejection of these interpretations signals to the need to explore further possibilities of analysis.

Let us consider first a couple of examples which contain syntactic negation:

> (58) To Yossarian, the idea of pennants as prizes was absurd. No money went with them, no class privileges. Like Olympic medals and tennis trophies, all they signified was that the owner had done something of no benefit to anyone more capably than everyone else. (p. 95)

In (58) we have the following examples of syntactic negation: (1) *No money went with them, (2) no class privileges [went with them], (3) the owner had done something of no benefit to anyone....* An analysis based on propositional logic or on structural analysis would not be able to account for the functional and ontological properties of these sentences, an approach which is necessary if our aim is that of describing the function of negation in discourse. In subsequent chapters, I will argue for a functional-discoursive approach to negation

which takes as point of departure its cognitive properties. In this sense, what has been said above about the important link between negation and the defeat of expectations is crucial, and can throw some light on the function of the negative sentences in extract (58) above.

The negative sentences in (58) can be said to be propositions with the structure - *P*, and which indicate that a given state of affairs (*P*) is not the case. Thus, they can be paraphrased as follows:

(59) a. It is not the case that money goes with pennants.
b. It is not the case that privileges go with pennants.
c. It is not the case that someone has done something of benefit.

This explanation, however, does not tell us why the reader perceives the negative sentences as being slightly humorous. In order to be able to capture this aspect, we need to make reference to how discourse is based on information that is shared by interlocutors in a communicative situation. The negative sentences in (58) are unusual and slightly humorous because they go against the commonly held assumption that prizes, even if financially irrelevant, are very highly valued because they provide prestige and status. The negative statement obviously defeats a previously held assumption about the way certain things are valued in our society. In order to capture this interpretation, we need a framework which will address the following questions: (a) why are negative sentences used in discourse, (b) what are the ontological properties of negative sentences, (c) what is the function of negation in

discourse, and (d) what is the relation between the negative term and its corresponding affirmative. These questions will be answered throughout the rest of this research.

To end this chapter, I will comment briefly on further extracts from *Catch-22* which illustrate the use of contradiction in the corpus. Example (60) illustrates logical contradiction and (63) contrariety which leads to paradox. As will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6, the three uses of negation illustrated in these examples are recurrent in the corpus.

> (60) Group Headquarters was alarmed, for there was no telling what people might find out once they felt free to ask whatever questions they wanted to. Colonel Cathcart sent Colonel Korn to stop it, and Colonel Korn succeeded with a rule governing the asking of questions. Colonel Korn's rule was a stroke of genius, Colonel Korn explained in his report to Colonel Cathcart. Under Colonel Korn's rule, the only people permitted to ask questions were those who never did. Soon the only people attending were those who never asked questions, and the sessions were discontinued altogether, since Clevinger, the corporal and Colonel Korn agreed that it was neither possible nor necessary to educate people who never questioned anything. (p. 49)

While the first negative sentence in the extract *((1) for there was no telling what people might find out once they felt free to ask...)* is an ordinary use of negation, in the sense it does not violate any laws of logic or rules of acceptability, and can be grouped with the negatives discussed in (58) above, whereas the rest of the negative sentences in this extract are involved, directly or indirectly, in contradiction. Sentence (2) *the only people permitted to ask questions were those who never did* is an open contradiction,

as it can be paraphrased as follows:

(61) You can ask questions if, and only if, you don't ask questions.

The following structures involving negation are a development of this rule: (3) *Soon the only people attending were those who never asked questions*. In this case, there is no overt contradiction, however, it implicitly reinforces the previous sentence, since it can be paraphrased as follows:

(62) Only the people who don't ask questions go to the educational sessions where one is supposed to ask questions.

This interpretation of the sentence is recoverable by means of our knowledge of the world and how educational sessions are supposed to work. It is this kind of information, in particular, the assumptions about how educational sessions should be directed, that allows us to identify the oddness of the last two sentences involving negation: (4) *it was neither possible nor necessary to educate people (5) who never questioned anything*. These sentences are not logical contradictions either, and they are grammatically acceptable; however, it is obvious there is something odd about them. Their oddity lies in the fact that they deny something that is implicitly recoverable from the previous discourse, and which, as readers, we assume on the basis of our knowledge of the world; namely, that if higher officers have started the educational sessions it is because they thought it was necessary for the soldiers. In this light, (60) is outrageous, since it denies the fact that there were people who were interested in asking questions but who have been got rid of,

which leads us to the opening of the extract in a sort of circular process where the rules are inverted. The use of contradiction in this extract is not the type of contradiction which strictly speaking requires the acceptance of both terms as applying in different domains; as I will argue in chapter 5, contradictions of this kind have a discourse function which is in the line of Givón's observation that people contradict themselves for different reasons (see section 2.2.2.1. above). In this case, the officer's contradiction involves a reformulation of a previous decision which he later finds out to be wrong for his purposes. This kind of contradiction is of the type described by Sperber and Wilson (1986), where one of the terms (in this case, the second one) is favoured over the other.

The change in the officer's attitude reveals the kind of double moral the officers are playing with, where, on the one hand, they think educational sessions may be necessary, but, on the other, do their utmost to prevent the soldiers from learning too much. This reasoning leads to the cliché that knowing is power and ignorance is submission, a pattern that is promoted by the officers.

This provides the key to the interpretation of the extract and of the contradictory statements, since contradiction may be seen as a powerful weapon in the hands of the higher officers, who act arbitrarily, proposing something and then contradicting what is implicit in the proposal, and cheating by allowing the soldiers to do something they are not allowed

to do. In this sense, the episode is a criticism of the arbitrary and repressive behaviour of the officers.

In these last examples, I have been using the term *deny* instead of *contradiction* in order to establish a difference between the standard definition of contradiction and the more informal way of contradicting previously processed information by means of structures which are not necessarily contradictory. As such, this example illustrates two important points: (a) that contradiction is meaningful, and (b) that contradiction may be expressed by other means different from logical contradiction in order to create other kinds of what may be called informally 'discourse contradictions'.

In (63) we have an example of how two contraries *(good/bad)* are used to create what Escandell (see section 2.2.2.1. above) called non-formal contradictions:

> (63) Every time Colonel Cathcart increased the number of missions and returned Hungry Joe to combat duty, the nightmares stopped and Hungry Joe settled down into a normal state of terror with a smile of relief. Yossarian read Hungry Joe's shrunken face like a headline. It was good when Hungry Joe looked bad and terrible when Hungry Joe looked good. Hungry Joe's inverted set of responses was a curious phenomenon to everyone but Hungry Joe, who denied the whole thing stubbornly. (73)

The contradictions may be paraphrased as follows:

(64) a. It is good, if it is bad.
b. It is very bad, if it is good.

The meaning of the contradictions is not obvious in themselves, but is recoverable by means of information provided in the discourse context. Thus, we are told that Hungry Joe's reaction to the increase in the number of missions is that of

smiling, which, however, conceals a *normal state of terror*. This expression can also be said to be contradictory in informal terms, since *state of terror* would not normally be modified by an attribute such as *normal*. Our knowledge of the world leads us to assume that terror is an unusual state, not a normal one. This is not so for Hungry Joe: when he looks bad, the news is usually good. Also, the fact that this character's behaviour works on the basis of inverted sets of responses is also indicated explicitly.

The contradictions can be accounted for by identifying the different domains where each of the opposite terms operates: from Hungry Joe's perspective, 'it is good' to have to fly more missions, while for the rest of the soldiers it will be bad; conversely, if Hungry Joe looks bad, it will be good for the rest of the soldiers (they might have a chance to be sent home).

However, it is important to be aware of the simultaneous validity of the contrary terms within the text world, since it reveals a deeper meaning of contradiction which has to do with conflict. This would favour an interpretation where both meanings of the contradictions are kept, even if it is said explicitly that Hungry Joe's responses are inverted, which could justify the discarding of the terms that operate from his perspective. The significance of the acceptance of both meanings and keeping the contradiction becomes obvious in the context of the whole work, where there is a progressive increase in the number of 'abnormal', unusual and unfamiliar

situations, which, also significantly, have to do with terror.

2.4. Discourse-pragmatic approaches to negation

In the following sections I deal with negation from discourse pragmatic perspectives and discuss relevant issues related to the use of negation in context.

The traditional view of negation has been that of a logical operator which reverses the truth value of a proposition, which has conditioned its status as a semantic concept in much of the literature in the field. However, research in pragmatics and related disciplines has incorporated negation as an element determining the creation of specific discourse pragmatic functions, such as denial. A negative utterance can be part of any functional or pragmatic classification just in the same way as affirmative utterances are, as long as their different properties are accounted for. Thus, negative sentences are used as illustrations of specific speech act functions in Vanderveken's (1991) classification of speech acts. Unfortunately, however, most work on negation on these terms has a semantic orientation, and the examples are typically isolated sentences. Very little work has been carried out on the discourse and pragmatic properties of negation in context. The pioneer work is Jespersen's (1917) monograph, which, although it does not deal with negation from a discourse perspective as it is currently understood, many of his intuitions on the use and properties of negation are pragmatically based. The most

extense works in the field are those by Givón (1978, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1993) and Tottie (1982, 1991). While the former develops a framework of negation based on the notion of negation as a propositional modality and on the ontological properties of negative states and events, the latter carries out a detailed computer-based study of the variants of negation in English speech and writing. Other authors have also contributed to the field, either by devoting sections of grammars, or of broader studies, to the functions of negation (Lyons 1977, Quirk *et al.* 1985, Horn 1989, Downing and Locke 1992, Halliday 1994, Werth 1995c), or by focusing on specific aspects of its use (van der Sandt 1991, Leinfeller 1994, Pagano 1994). Thus, Leinfeller (1994) considers the rhetorical properties of negation as a means of foregrounding and as a means of establishing cohesion. The cohesive function of negation, in particular of lexical negation in discourse, is also mentioned by other authors (Lyons 1977, Halliday and Hasan 1985, Werth 1984). The notion of negation as involving the denial of an assumption or a defeated expectation has also been the focus of attention of many studies, although the majority have been concerned with psychological aspects of the processing of negative terms or sentences (Clark 1976, Clark and Clark 1977), rather than on the processing of negatives in discourse, be it spoken or written. An interesting study from a discourse-textual perspective is that carried out by Pagano (1994), in particular with regard to the connections established between negation as a discourse phenomenon and its

interpretation within a schema-theoretic viewpoint. This approach to negation in terms of frames was first developed by Fillmore (1982 and 1985), although the possible relations between the utterance of negatives and the evocation of schemata had already been mentioned (Shanon 1981).

2.4.1. Illocutionary acts performed by negative utterances

In this section, I consider the types of illocutionary act that are typically carried out by negative utterances. Traditional theories of speech acts are not directly concerned with negation, as negation is seen as the logical operator that is applied to an utterance in order to yield a complex speech act. Searle (1969: 32-33) points out that negation can operate either on a proposition or on the force of a proposition. This distinction is illustrated in the following formulas and examples:

(65) a. *F (P)* I don't promise to come.
b. *F (- P)* I promise not to come.

As Lyons (1977: 769) points out, only negative utterances like (65) b. constitute an illocutionary act of promising, while (65) a. is rather a statement concerning the refusal to make a promise. As such, utterances like (65) a. also perform illocutionary acts, defined by Lyons (op.cit.: 770) as 'acts of non-commitment.' These acts need to be distinguished from not saying anything and from making descriptive statements. These kinds of acts are not considered by speech act theory, which concentrates on acts to which commitment is shown. However, non-committal acts are discoursively very significant,

as Lyons points out (ibid.), because by refraining from committing oneself to the truth of a proposition *P*, one may be implying that *P* is actually true. Consider (66):

(66) I *can't tell* whether he's crazy or not, I don't know him well enough.

By uttering (66) a speaker may be implying that the other person is crazy but he does not want to commit himself to stating it.

A closely related issue is the status of reported speech acts, which can be problematic in a similar way. In the light of what has been said above, they may indicate non-committal within the reported act. This is illustrated in (50) and (51), from Downing and Locke (1992: 183) and Tottie (1991: 35) respectively:

(67) He didn't promise to come.

(68) He asked if she knew.

(67) Will be considered as the reported non-committal to a promise, and (68) as as reported question. Both functionally have the illocutionary force of assertives.

A further issue concerning the status of negatives as illocutionary acts is the fact that illocutionary acts may be conveyed both directly and indirectly. Examples in (69) show the difference between a direct act, in (69) a., or an indirect act, as in (69) b.:

(69) a. I didn't say that. (speech act of denial)
b. Why don't you come along? (indirect speech act: suggestion)

In Vanderveken (1991) we find a classification of speech acts which accounts for negative utterances. His categories are

exemplified by affirmative and negative utterances, where relevant. Vanderveken (op.cit.) establishes a semantic-based classification of speech acts into five main groups: assertives, commissives, directives, expressives and declaratives. Here the category of *assertives* has replaced Searle's (1969) *representatives*. Vanderveken also follows Searle (1975: 22) in considering that there are verbs which can take more than one illocutionary force and others which are consistently ambiguous between two forms (Vanderveken: op.cit.: 168). Consequently, there are verbs which appear in more than one of the categories he develops. Below I list the speech act types that are illustrative of cases where negation is a component of the illocutionary act and which are exemplified by the author by means of a negative sentence. (i) In the group of assertives, Vanderveken (op.cit. 169-181) includes the following negative acts: negate, deny, correct, disclaim, disagree, dissent, object. (ii) Among the commissives, reject, refuse, renounce. (iii) Within directives, forbid, prohibit, interdict. (iv) Among declaratives, renounce, deny, disapprove. And, (v) among expressives, disapprove. This classification shows a predominance of assertive speech act types, including the categories that are most frequently mentioned by other authors, namely, negative statement, denial and correction. It also reveals the ambiguity or multiple membership of certain verbs, such as deny and disapprove.[25] Thus, deny is defined as follows (Vanderveken, op. cit: 170):

> "Deny" is systematically both assertive and declarative. In the assertive sense to deny a proposition is to negate that proposition by asserting the contrary or opposite proposition. There is generally, perhaps always, a preparatory condition to the effect that the denial is a denial of something that has been affirmed. Further, while virtually any claim may be negated, denial seems to be related to matters of some importance and perhaps also related to accusation (further preparatory conditions). I may *negate* a claim that it is snowing outside by saying that it is not snowing, but it would take special contexual factors for me to want to *deny* it. On the other hand, I would naturally deny a (false) assertion that I had neglected to inform you of a contractual deadline.

The distinctions established here between *negate* and *deny*, bring together some of the main issues discussed by other authors, and which concern the question whether the two illocutionary acts are variants of the same category, or whether they constitute separate categories. While there are authors who consider negative statement and denial as separate categories (Brown 1973: 17, Vanderveken 1991: 170, van der Sandt 1991: 331), there seems to be a tendency to consider them as variants of the same pragmatic function (Wason 1965: 7, Clark and Clark 1977: 98, Lyons, 1977: 777, Tottie 1991: 22, Givón 1993: 190, Pagano 1994: 250-51). This phenomenon is most clearly illustrated in the widespread use of the term *denial* to stand for the main function of negative clauses in most of the authors mentioned. The reasons for this tendency are obviously related to the use of negation in discourse, a view that is not captured by semantic-based approaches to speech acts, which tend to deal with illocutionary acts of sentences in isolation. Similarly, a speech act account of this type cannot deal with textual related functions of negation, like contrast and contradiction, which are also mentioned as relevant discourse-pragmatic functions of negation by other authors (see for example Jespersen 1917: 4-5).

Continuing with the discussion of the classification provided by Vanderveken (op.cit.) above, it has to be pointed out that, while the speech acts listed can be recognised as prototypical speech acts of negation, in that the illocutionary act is typically associated with the utterance of a negative sentence, there are other speech acts that are not typically or necessarily negative, but to which the negative operator can be applied. This can take place both in direct and indirect speech acts. Thus, the most common type of these acts is probably that of questions, which Vanderveken (op. cit.: 190) lists under directives, but there are others, such as warning, reminding, advice, caution, hypothesis, swear, etc., which can be expressed by means of a negative proposition. Some of these illocutionary functions are illustrated under (70) below:

(70) a. Didn't he give you his address? (question)
b. Don't go near the cliff! (warning)
c. I wouldn't ring her before Tuesday. (advice)

It is particularly important to observe that negative utterances are not necessarily expressions of challenging or disrupting illocutionary acts, contrary to Givón's (1993: 188) observation that 'negation is a confrontational, challenging speech act.' This is pointed out by Downing (1995: 233) and Downing and Locke (1992: 182-84), and even Givón (op.cit.: 195), who admits that negation can be used even as a polite down-toner. Downing and Locke (op.cit.: 184), point out the function of negatives as polite hedges. Both politeness-related uses are illustrated in the examples under (71):

(71) a. I really can't say... (polite hedge)
b. Wouldn't it be better if... (polite suggestion)

Similarly, it is important to observe that although negative sentences typically carry out certain illocutionary acts, such as *contradicting* and *correcting*, this does not means that all these illocutionary acts are carried out exclusively by negative sentences. Thus, Clark (1976: 35) points out that the illocutionary functions of agreement and contradiction can be carried out both by affirmative and negative sentences, as he shows in the examples reproduced in (72) and (73) (Clark ibid.):[26]

(72) a. So Mary has been here all day? Indeed, she has.
b. So Mary hasn't been here all day? Indeed, she hasn't.

(73) a. So Mary has been here all day? I'm sorry, she hasn't.
b. So Mary hasn't been here all day. I'm sorry, she has.

Example (72) Illustrates an agreement expressed by an affirmative in (72) a. and a negative in (72) b. Example (73) a. illustrates a negative contradicting an expectation while (73) b. is an affirmative carrying out this function. The notion of contradiction used here is obviously function-based and different from the formal approach of standard logic, where contradiction is found in a single proposition.

Many authors agree that negative utterances are typically used to make negative statements. Thus, Quirk *et al.* (1985: 179) consider this to be the main function of a negative clause, which, however, can also carry out other functions, such as asking tactful questions, uttering exclamations and giving commands. Similarly, Downing and Locke (op. cit.: 183-184) mention the following illocutionary acts that can be

carried out by negative clauses: negative statement, question - indicated by a negative statement with rising intonation, request, exclamation, directive, promise and polite hedge.[27] These authors also point out (op.cit.: 184) that transferred negation takes place with certain verbs expressing mental process. Horn (1989: 202) stresses the disparity between the logical symmetry and the functional asymmetry of affirmation and negation, and points out that the main functions of negative sentences are to correct and contradict. However, the author does not deal with the functional aspects of negatives in discourse, as most of his work is devoted to issues regarding philosophical, psychological and semantico-pragmatic questions of negation with examples that are not contextualised.

2.4.2. Discourse functions of negation: Tottie's (1991) denials and rejections

The problems in defining the functions of negative sentences arise with regard to the organisation and labelling of the different categories, a question already introduced in section 2.4.1. above. It seems to be widely accepted that there are at least three main basic functions that can be carried out by negative sentences, summed up by Brown (1973: 17) into nonexistence, denial and rejection. As argued in 2.4.1. above, there seems to be a tendency to classify nonexistents and denials together as forming a broader class of negative utterances that has a common discourse function: that of

denying a proposition that was either explicitly stated or which expressed an assumption or an expectation that is being defeated.

Tottie (1991: 22) establishes a classification of negative sentences based on the distinction between DENIALS and REJECTIONS. Among denials, she distinguishes between explicit and implicit forms. This distinction, as Pagano (1994: 252) points out, refers to whether the corresponding affirmative proposition has been explicitly stated in previous discourse or not, and not to the character of the negative sentence. Thus, while the notion of explicit denial corresponds to the prototypical sense applied to this category, implicit denial is used by Tottie to mean negative statement or negative assertion. The distinction is illustrated in examples (74) and (75):

(74) A: I've lost my wallet...
B: No, you haven't, I found it under the sofa this morning.
(75) A: What do you think about Jack?
B: Well, he's not the kind of person I'd go out with...

Example (74) examplifies an explicit denial, which is easily recognised by the possibility of recovering ellipted constituents in the negative clause. Example (75) illustrates an implicit denial, where there is no explicit utterance in the discourse which is being denied but, rather, an implicit assumption that the speaker imagines the hearer might hold and which is being denied.

Tottie (op. cit.: 21) argues that the two types of negative utterance can be considered to belong to the same

category on pragmatic grounds, in the sense that both deny the truth value of propostions, some of which are expressed, while others are inferred contextually. Her position differs from the traditional distiction between these two categories, but Tottie (ibid.) argues that the reasons for postulating two different classes of negative statement are based on semantic and psycholinguistic reasons. To this respect she points out:

> It seems clear that the production of sentences expressing the nonexistence or nonpresence of objects is characteristic of a particular stage in the acquisition of language by children. One might also claim that nonexistence forms a separate semantic category expressing the absence of an object rather than denying the truth of a proposition. (Tottie, 1991: 21)

In my view, the classification defended by Tottie (op.cit.) foregrounds the type of link that is established between the negative utterance and the corresponding affirmative proposition; however, it overlooks the communicative functions of the two different types of denial, which also provide a pragmatic perspective on these utterances. Thus, explicit denials are typical of interactive discourse, and the results in Tottie's (1991) study show they do not appear in the written language. However, implicit denials, which are the most widespread type in general, occur both in speech and writing, and their interpersonal component is less obvious than in the case of explicit denials.

With regard to Tottie's (ibid.) category of rejections, she argues that both rejections and refusals are variants of the same category. She distinguishes this class from that of denials on several grounds: (i) rejections, unlike denials, are not found only in language, since a rejection and a refusal can

be expressed by means of gestures or body language; (ii) rejections contain a component of 'volition' that is not present in denials. Although the first point may reflect a real distinction between the linguistic use of negation and the use of negative acts in general terms, the second point is arguable on the grounds mentioned by Pagano (1994: 251); it is not the presence or absence of volition, which is probably present in all human communication, but, rather, the predominance of the ideational or the interpersonal components in each of the acts. Thus, denials, are predominantly ideational, since their function is to deny the truth value of a proposition, while rejections are predominantly interpersonal.

2.4.3. Negation in speech and writing

In this section I continue the discussion already developed in previous sections on the functions of negatives in discourse, but concentrate on the differences of frequencies between spoken and written varieties of language. This is relevant to my discussion in that the categories used for my analysis in chapter 6 are based on the categories discussed in this section and previous ones. Furthermore, the quantitative analysis of chapter 6 is also compared to the results obtained in studies like those discussed in the present section.

Hardly any work has been carried out on the variations of negation and the functions of negative utterances in context, although some authors mention small scale studies of the frequencies of negative items or clauses within a corpus. Givón

(1993: 191) provides the frequencies of negative and affirmative clauses in a small sample of English narrative texts which includes two text types, academic writing and fiction. The results show that the affirmative is by far the most frequent clause type (95% of occurrences in academic wrting and 88% in fiction), while negative clauses have significantly lower frequencies, with a higher percentage in fiction (5% in academic discourse, 12% in fiction). Givón (ibid.) accounts for the higher percentage of negatives in fiction by explaining that fiction also contains conversation, which is an interactive mode, while academic writing does not. Tottie's (1991) study concentrates on the differences of occurrence of *not-negation* and *no-negation* in English speech and writing. The corpora used by this author do not include fiction, a genre the author avoids because of the problems involved in analysing a hybrid mode. A preliminary analysis carried out for this purpose (Tottie 1991: 17) shows that negatives are more than twice as frequent in spoken than in written language (27.6% of occurrences in speech versus 12.8% of occurrences in writing, counted as number of negative items per 1000 words). The author considers that the presence of the pragmatic signal *no* in conversation is not enough to account for this difference, which she suggests, is produced by a combination of factors which are directly linked to the interactive character of spoken discourse. Thus, she proposes a classification of discourse categories for negation in spoken language where most of the categories do not occur in written

language. The discourse functions proposed by Tottie (op.cit.: 37) are the following: explicit and implicit denials, rejections, questions, imperatives, supports and repetitions. Of these, only implicit denials and, arguably, repetitions can occur in written language. By supports (Tottie, op.cit.: 34) the author means 'listeners' signals that information has been received, accepted and agreed upon', as in example (76):

(76) A: it wasn't typical.
B: no.

Repetitions are defined by the author (op.cit.36) in the following terms: 'Repetitions may also be used as a floor-holding device, to prevent another speaker from taking over the turn. This use is hard to distinguish from repetitions due to performance factors, when the speaker repeats old material while trying to continue by adding new words and phrases.' The frequencies of the different types are the following: implicit denials are the most frequent category (63%), followed by explicit denials (14%), questions (8%), supports (8%), rejections (2%), and repetitions (4%). There was only one occurrence of an imperative and it was not statistically significant.

With regard to the categories themselves, they are undoubtedly adequate for the analysis of conversation. However, it seems to me that certain observations have to be made regarding the terminology used and the organisation. Decisions regarding terminolgy should be consistent within a classification; but this is not always the case, thus, Tottie (op.cit: 37) uses terms naming illocutionary acts, such as

denial and rejection, and other discourse functions, such as support and repetition, but uses the term *imperative*, which names the mood structure, instead of *order* or *command* or *directive*, which would be more adequate in the classification. Similarly, the classification as it stands does not establish a difference between what can be called 'full illocutionary acts', like denials, rejections, questions and imperatives, and other functions like supports and repetitions, which have a different discourse function, as Tottie (ibid.) points out. Finally, although the term *support* is explained very clearly by the author (Tottie,op. cit.: 37), it may be useful to point out that this notion of *support* is only indirectly related to the notion of *support* in other works in discourse analysis, suchs as Burton (1980), where acts in conversation are divided into supports and challenges.[28] This is important with regard to negation because, as discussed above, not all negatives express challenging illocutionary acts, consequently, the fact that there is a class named *support* does not imply that the rest of the categories are challenges.

Tottie's (1991) study also deals with the variations of not-negation and no-negation in speech and writing. Her results (1991: 46) show that not-negation is the most frequent alternative in both varieties (73% in spoken language and 67% in written language). These results also show that affixal negation is more frequent in writing (33% versus only 8% in conversation). I am not concerned with the details of the subsequent analysis, but the results discussed above provide

an interesting background against which to compare the frequencies of my own corpus.

The only study I know which deals with the frequencies of negatives in fiction is Watson's (1996) study of Mudoroo's fiction. His study concentrates on the percentages of negatives per 1000 words and of the main types of negation according to grammatical category, as part of a more complex computerised analysis of the style of the Australian writer. Watson's (op. cit.) results show that the average percentage of negative items in Mudoroo's novels is of 16.8%, varying from 12% in the novel *Ghost* to 22% in *Wildcat*. These results show that, indeed, fiction tends to have higher frequencies of negative items than other genres of written discourse (see also Givón 1993), although in the case of this author the percentage is not as high as the one typical for spoken discourse. Watson's study (op.cit.) also confirms Tottie's (op.cit.) results concerning the percentages of affixal and nonaffixal negation. In Watson, as in Tottie, there is a predominance of *not*-negation (52.4% in Watson's study).

2.4.4. Negation and the denial of background information

Discourse-based approaches to negation tend to focus on the relation between the negative utterance and a corresponding affirmative that has either been explicitly said in previous discourse or which expresses an assumption that is denied or an expectation that is being defeated (Jespersen 1917: 82, Wason 1965, Clark and Clark 1977: 98, Horn 1989, Givón 1993:

189, Leinfeller 1994, Pagano 1994).[29] Thus, Wason (op. cit.: 7) defines the function of negative statements as follows: 'In assertive discourse the function of such statements is generally to emphasise that a fact is contrary to expectation. The *subjective* context for their utterance is the assumption that another person, or persons, might classify a fact wrongly.' This applies to situations which are not necessarily interactive, such as those described in experiments by Wason (1965) and Clark (1976), where the production of negatives corresponds to the defeated expectation in the speaker regarding the presence of an object which is not present. It also applies to interactive situations, both in spoken and written interaction. In spoken interaction, the process is more obvious, and it can be summarised by Givón's (1993: 190) exemplification of how background assumptions differ in affirmative and negative utterances:[30]

Affirm-assertion:	the hearer does not know. the speaker knows.
Neg-assertion:	The hearer knows wrong. The speaker knows better.

Similarly, other authors (Horn 1989, Pagano 1994: 254) also stress the importance of the relation between the utterance of the negative sentence and the idea that the speaker, in virtue of the communicative principle, wants to correct or prevent a supposedly wrong assumption that the hearer might hold. This process is described by Pagano with regard to written language as follows:

> the writer creates a picture of the reader, who thus becomes an 'ideal reader', and attributes to this reader certain experience, knowledge, opinions and beliefs on the basis of which the writer builds his/her message. (...) As the writer somehow assumes what the reader's questions and expectations are, s/he tries to provide information about these. Therefore, in cases where certain information is non-existent, the writer can report that by means of denials of what was expected. (Pagano, 1994: 253).

The fact that negative utterances are used to deny previously held assumptions is illustrated in the examples under (77):

(77) a. There's no milk left!
b. A: We could drive to the centre this afternoon.
B: I've got no petrol.
c. Visitors are requested not to feed the animals.

Example (77) a. illustrates the use of a negative sentence to indicate non-existence functioning as the denial of an expectation that there should be milk in the fridge. This kind of utterance is not necessarily interactive, as its main function is mainly descriptive. Example (77) b. is an exchange where speaker B denies the assumption she imagines A holds regarding her car, and (77) c. is a written notice typically found in zoos, which denies the assumption a visitor might have that it is possible, or one is allowed to feed the animals.

Pagano (op.cit. 258) proposes a classification of denials in written texts in four different subtypes, depending on the type of relationship established between the denial and the proposition that is being denied. The four types are the following:

(i) denials of background information.
(ii) denials of text processed information.
(iii) unfulfilled expectations.
(iv) contrasts.

While the first three categories are clear, and the

examples provided by the author illustrate the definitions, the last one is problematic. The category of *contrasts* is really a different category altogether from the others in the classification. A relationship of contrast can be expressed by semantic and/or structural means. Pagano (op.cit.: 263) follows a semantic approach, which leads her to classify as a contrast the following example, which I reproduce from her article under (78):

(78) 'For past generations, lifestyle was the leading pharmacopeia. *They had no antibiotics, no cures for infectious disease*. They had to rely on their manner of living to preserve their health.'

Pagano (ibid.) says about (78): 'Here, there is an implicit comparison between the past and the present, and the differences are pointed out.' In my view, it is not clear at all that this and other examples should be contrasts, while others which are classified under any of the three other categories should not, especially even if they are introduced by overt markers of contrast, such as *but*. It seems to me that the first three categories approach negation from a cognitive perspective, while the notion of contrast is rather a textual-semantic category.[31] As such, contrast is usually indicated by structural-semantic and/or prosodic means; for instance, by the presence of explicitly contrastive words or structures, or by the application of contrastive stress and focus. (see Werth, 1984: chapter 7). This means that any of the three cognitive categories, denial of background information, denial of text-processed information and denial of expectation can be contrastive.

With regard to the three cognitive categories, intuitively, they systematise the types of denial that can be said to operate during the reading process. Thus, the denial of background information denies assumptions about shared beliefs or other cultural knowledge; the denial of text processed information denies information that has been previously introduced in discourse or as an anticipation of what is going to be said. This function is particularly important from the point of view of the contribution of negation to the cohesion and coherence of a text, as it establishes connections with previous and subsequent discourse.

Finally, denials can also indicate unfulfilled expectations. The distinciton between the categories is not clear-cut, particularly the notion of denial of expectation. An expectation may be created by activation of certain shared knowledge or background information from elements present in the context of the situation, or it may be created by means of the activation of background knowledge in text-processed information. In this sense, it is not clear that it constitutes a separate category either.

Another problematic issue regarding the use and processing of negatives concerns the criteria for pragmatic acceptability of negative utterances in a context. In my view, there are two ways of establishing the appropriateness of negative utterances in a context: one as established by frame-semantic or schema-theoretical principles (see Fillmore 1982, 1985, Shanon 1981, Pagano 1994),[32] and the other as established by the

ontological properties of negative states and events (Givón 1993). I discuss the first approach in chapter 4, on negation and schema theory, while I discuss the second one in 2.5. below.

2.5. Givón's functional-pragmatic theory of negation

In the following sections I discuss Givón's (1978, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1993) theory of negation. It is one of the few fully developed discourse-pragmatic theories on negation in English, and I apply his framework to my analysis of the corpus in chapters 5 and 6. The main points dealt with by this theory concern the marked character of negatives, the discourse presuppositional nature of negation, the role played by negation as a propositional modality and the ontological properties of negative states and events. I discuss each of these aspects in the following sections.

2.5.1. The marked character of negation

Negation is standardly considered to be the marked form in the polarity system. Some of the reasons for its markedness have already been mentioned in section 2.2.3. above, where I described the cognitive principles that condition the production and processing of negative structures and negative lexical items. Givón (1979: 115-130) explains the marked character of negation in virtue of the following features: (i) distributional restrictions, (ii) syntactic conservatism, and (iii) psychological complexity. With regard to the first

aspect, the author (op.cit.: 119) argues that marked structures have distributional restrictions which condition the freedom of elements that can be embedded in them and the possibility of embedding themselves in other structures. Among the structures where such restrictions apply with regard to the use of negation, Givón (ibid.) provides the following examples:

(79) a. Where did you leave the keys?
b. ? Where didn't you leave the keys?

(80) a. He continued to work.
b. ? He continued not to work.

(81) a. There used to be a story that went like this...
b. ? There didn't use to be a story that went like this...

The distributional restrictions of negation are pragmatically motivated and are rooted in its ontological properties - which are discussed in section 2.5.5. below - and its uninformativity as compared to the affirmative.

With regard to the syntactic conservatism of negative structures, Givón (op.cit: 121) argues that 'negative clauses, which are more presuppositional and carry less new information in discourse, will turn out to be more conservative with respect to elaborative diachronic change.' Thus, in several languages, changes are introduced first in the affirmative and then afterwards in the negative, though sometimes only in a partial way.

Finally, with regard to psychological complexity, an issue that has already been discussed above, Givón (op.cit. 131) stresses that the longer processing time required for negative terms with respect to positive ones reveals conceptual

complexity and not structural complexity in negation. Furthermore, the author points out that this complexity is related to pragmatic factors, and not to the logic of negation (ibid.). Thus, in strictly logical terms, the assignment of a positive or a negative value to the members of an opposition (the pairs like *high-low, strong-weak*, etc, discussed above) is arbitrary. In language, however, this is not arbitrary, but, rather 'it reflects deep pragmatic and ontological facts about the way the human organism perceives and construes the universe.' (Givón ibid.).

Horn (1989: 201) accounts for the marked status of negation as an interaction between two opposing principles: a quantity-based principle which requires speakers to be as informative as possible - where affirmative sentences are prototypically more informative than negative sentences, and a relevance-based principle 'directing the speaker to omit anything irrelevant to the concerns of his interlocutor which might increase processing effort.' (Horn op. cit.: 201). The author argues that negative statements are typically, though not necessarily, less specific and less informative than positive statements, and that this establishes a pragmatic asymmetrical relation between the positive and the negative. The asymmetry does not lie in the relation between a negative and a positive proposition, but between speaker denial and assertion, thus revealing a difference between the logical symmetry of affirmation and negation and its functional asymmetry. Horn (op.cit. 203) summarises the charcateristics

of negation as follows:

> Negatives (...) are by nature no more false than affirmatives, but prototypically they are psychologically harder and more loaded, epistemologically less specific and hence less valuable, emotively more inhibiting (or at least less highly valued), and pragmatically more difficult to use appropriately within an arbitrary discourse context. Not every negation is a speaker denial, nor is every speaker denial a linguistic negation, but the prototypic use of negation is indeed as denial of a proposition previously asserted, or suscribed to, or held plausible by, or at least mentioned by, someone relevant in the discourse context.

To this, the author (ibid.) adds that the strong asymmetricalist position is 'literally false but psychologically true.'

2.5.2. Negation as propositional modality

Negation is one of the propositional modalities in language (see also Halliday 1994: 88, Werth 1995c: 376). As such, it can be placed at the end of a scale where positive assertion (YES) is at one end, and negative assertion (NO) is at the other end, with modalised options in between (MAYBE YES/MAYBE NO)(see Halliday op.cit: 89). Givón (1984: 319) argues that the nature of negation is more complex, and that it is a hybrid mode that shares properties with presuppositions, realis (or factual) assertion and irrealis (or non-factual) assertion. Thus, negation can be said to occupy different places on the scale mentioned above, depending on the criteria which are taken as a reference point. According to the author (ibid.) there are at least three scales on which the relative properties of negation may be observed.

(i) From the perspective of propositional semantics, which is concerned with truth conditions, negation occupies one of the extreme points of the scale, where presupposition

occupies the opposite end. As such, negation expresses the reversal of the truth value of a proposition:

PRESUPPOSITION> REALIS-ASSERTION> IRREALIS ASSERTION> NEG-ASSERTION

This is justified by the fact that there is a cline going from the information expressed in presuppositions, which is taken for granted as true, to that expressed by means of realis-assertion which is strongly asserted as true, to irrealis assertion, which is weakly asserted as true, to negative assertion, which is strongly asserted as false.

(ii) Givón (op.cit.: 322) argues that scale (i) is misleading from the point of view of subjective certainty or strength of belief, and must be replaced by a scale where both realis assertion and negative assertion occupy the same place:

PRESUPPOSITION > REALIS ASSERTION > IRREALIS ASSERTION
NEG-ASSERTION

On this scale, negation, as a form of asserion, indicates a 'mid-level of certainty a speaker may assign to his assertion that an event/state did not take place' (Givón ibid.).

(iii) From the perspective of discourse pragmatics, that is, the use of negation in context, negation seems to share certain properties with presupposition. This is the perspective of negation as an illocutionary act that denies an utterance that has previously been said in discourse, an assumption or a defeated expectation (see

sections 2.4.4. above). On this scale, negation occupies the same position as presupposition:

PRESUPPOSITION > REALIS ASSERTION > IRREALIS ASSERTION NEG-ASSERTION

The similarities of negation with the mode of irrealis and with presuppositon are discussed in sections 2.5.3. and 2.5.4. below.

2.5.3. Negation and irrealis

Givón (1989: 162-193) suggests that there is a similarity in the semantics of negation and irrealis, regarding referential opacity, i.e. the possibility of having a non-referential interpretation of NP arguments within opaque propositions. The argument is that argument NPs can only be interpreted referentially if they are under the scope of realis-assertion or presupposition. However, both irrealis assertion and negation make it possible to have a non-referential interpretation of the NP arguments under their scope. This can be illustrated by the following examples, from Givón (1989: 163):

(82) John saw *a movie*. (R-asserted)
(=there's a *particular* movie that John saw)

(83) It is good that John saw *a movie*. (Presupposed)
(=there's a *particular* movie that John saw)

In examples (82) and (83), under realis-assertion and presupposition above, the NP *a movie* is interpreted referentially, i.e., it refers to a particular movie. Compare with examples (84) and (85) below:

(84) John may go to see a movie tomorrow. (IRR-asserted)
(i) There's a particular movie that John plans to see.
(ii) John plans to see some movie, though neither he *nor I have in mind any particular movie.*

(85) John didn't see *a movie.* (NEG-asserted)
(i) There exists no movie such as John saw it.
(ii) * There exists a *particular* movie such as John didn't see it.

In (84), under the scope of irrealis-assertion, both a referential (in ii) and a non-referential interpretation are possible (in i). Finally, in (85), only a non-referential interpretation is possible (as in i). Thus, NEG-assertion does not admit a non-referential interpretation of an indefinite NP under its scope. In order to indicate referentiality one must use a definite NP, as in (86):

(86) John didn't see the movie.
(= there's a *particular* movie such as John didn't see it).

Givón (ibid.) argues that the reason Neg-assertion does not accept a referential interpretation of indefinite NPs under its scope is probably related to the presuppositional character of negation. If a negative statement or denial in discourse operates on a previously expressed affirmative proposition, or an assumption or expectation which is in some way familiar to both speaker and hearer, then the argument in the negative proposition, being co-referential with the one in the affirmative proposition, must be definite. As Givón (ibid.) explains, 'If a proposition is familiar to the hearer, the identity of the referring arguments within a proposition must also be familiar to the hearer; the argument must then be definite'. Furthermore, the same author (1984: 332) argues that

it is a pragmatic factor which has to do with the fact that negative statements are not used to introduce new information in the discourse, or to introduce new referential participants, but, rather, to deny propositions or utterances that are already part of the common ground in the discourse situation.

This argument has very important consequences for the way negation is perceived to function in discourse. Thus, the above arguments can be summarised as follows: negation allows two important operations (Givón 1984: 332): (i) to eliminate the referential-indefinite interpretation of NPs that is possible under realis and irrealis, as seen from examples (67) to (71) above, and (ii) to make possible a non-referential interpretation of NPs under realis, as shown in example (70).

The latter is easy to account for, according to Givón (ibid.), who considers that 'negation creates an explicitly nonexistent world, a feature it shares with irrealis, which creates a potential but not yet existing one.' This feature of negation as a modality that projects a world is also mentioned by other authors (Pagano 1994: 256, Leinfeller 1994: 95) and is particularly interesting when considered from a text world perspective (see Werth 1996: 376), where negation enters the set of possible alternative to the reality projected by what is the actual world. This will be discussed in chapter 3.

2.5.4. The presuppositional nature of negation

The functional asymmetrical relation between the negative and the affirmative in discourse is expressed in terms of what

Givón (1979: 93, 1993: 188) defines as the 'presuppositonal status of negative speech acts' (1979: 93). The notion of 'presupposition' here is obviously not the traditional semantic concept of presupposition, but rather, a discourse-based notion referring to the information that is already present in the common ground (Werth 1995c: 91) or the context (Givón 1989: 135). Context, in Givón (ibid.) includes the following types of information:

(a) Shared situational context:
  (i) deictically obvious information
  (ii) speaker as direct participant
(b) Shared generic context
  (iii) information universally shared
  (iv) agreed-upon conventions, rules or games
  (v) divine revelation
(c) Shared discourse context
  (vi) information which was asserted earlier in the discourse by the speaker and the hearer did not then challenge it.

Discourse presuppositional information is used by the author to refer to information that is 'known to, familiar to or otherwise unlikely to be challenged by the hearer.' (ibid.).[33] Within this framework, Givón (1993: 189) specifies that 'a negative assertion is made on the tacit assumption that the hearer has either heard about, believes in, is likely to take for granted, or is at least familiar with the corresponding affirmative proposition.' The author (op.cit.: 188) provides the following examples:

(87) A: What's new?
  B: The President died.
  A: *Oh, when? How?*

(88) A: What's new?
  B: The President didn't die.
  A: Was he supposed to?

The contrast between (87) and (88) shows the different discourse functions of the affirmative and the negative structures. While (87) illustrates an exchange where new information is introduced (The President died) and further information is required about the topic, (88) reveals that the introduction of new information by means of the negative form is made against the background of a corresponding affirmative proposition. In this case, it would be the assumption or belief shared by the speakers in (88) that the President was going to die, and now that expectation is being defeated.

Givón (op.cit. 189) distinguishes among the following types of relationship that can be established between the negative structure and the corresponding affirmative:

(i) The affirmative proposition may be explicitly stated in the previous discourse, either by the same speaker, or by a different speaker. This is illustrated in examples (89) and (90):

(89) I asked John to lend me that book, but he didn't.
(90) A: I thought you were coming along.
B: No, I'm not. What made you think I would?

(ii) The affirmative proposition may not be expressed in previous discourse, (cf. Tottie's 1991 implicit denials). In this case, the negative may deny a background expectation or assumption in the hearer. This is illustrated in (91) (Givón ibid.):

(91) A: So you didn't leave after all.
(i) No, it turned out to be unnecessary.
(ii) Who said I was going to leave?
(iii) How did you know I was going to?

In (91) there are three different possible reactions to

A's utterance. Each of them shows a different relationship between A's beliefs and B's beliefs or assumptions about the fact that B should be leaving or not. (i) shows that both speakers share the same background assumptions, and they are being denied; (ii) reveals that A has probably been mislead and his wrong assumption is being corrected; (iii) shows B's surprise at A's knowing the information, which is presented as true.

(iii) Background assumptions may also be part of the culturally-shared information shared by speakers. Givón (ibid.) compares the appropriateness of sentences like those in (92) and (93):

(92) a. There was once a man who didn't have a head.
b. ? There was once a man who had a head.

(93) a. ? There was once a man who didn't look like a frog.
b. There was once a man who looked like a frog.

(92) a. and (93) b. are felicitous because they single out exceptions from the general norm (a man without a head, versus the general norm of having a head, and a man who looks like a frog, versus the general norm of human not looking like frogs). (92) b. and (93) a., however, are inapproapriate because they are tautological; they repeat the general norm and do not add any new information.

This leads us to the ontological properties of negative states and events, which are discussed in section 2.5.5. below.

2.5.5. The ontology of negative events[34]

Givón (1993: 190) accounts for the differences in

appropriateness of use of affirmative and negative statements in discourse by establishing a similarity between this opposition and that of the *figure/ground* distinction in cognitive psychology. Changes, or events, are less frequent and cognitively more salient than stasis, or non-events. Thus, an event, which is prototypically expressed by means of the affirmative, stands out against the background of stasis, or non-activity; it expresses the counternorm against a background of normality. Being less frequent and more salient cognitively, events are more informative than non-events.

Negation, as a linguistic phenomenon, can be viewed as 'a play upon the norm' (Givón ibid.). 'It is used when - more rarely in communication - one establishes the event rather than inertia as ground. On such a background, the non-event becomes - temporarily, locally - more salient, the more informative.' (ibid.)

Givón (1993: 191) illustrates this point with the following examples:[35]

(94) a. A man came into my office yesterday and said...

b. * A man didn't come into my office yesterday and said...

c. ? Nobody came into my office yesterday and said...

As the author (ibid.) points out 'The non-event (79) b. is pragmatically - and indeed grammatically - the oddest. This must be so because if an event did not occur *at all*, why should one bother to talk about a specific individual who "participated" in that non-event?' Visits to one's office are rarer and less frequent than the times nobody visits one's

office, so that visits, as events, are more salient, and thus more informative, than non-visits, or non-events. This also explains why (94) c., which sounds more acceptable and could be a possible answer to a question, is still odd and would not normally be used as an opening statement, unless there was a clear expectation that the contrary should have been the case. An important point to make here, which is not indicated by Givón, is that the considerations made above regarding the ontology of negative events are valid for what we understand to be illocutionary acts of negative statement (or implicit denials, if we follow Tottie's terminology). While (94) b. could not be used even as a denial, (94) c. could be used in this way, as can be observed from example (95):

(95) a. A: A man went yesterday into your office...
b. B: ? A man didn't come yesterday into my office...
c. B: Nobody came into my office yesterday...

While (95) b. could hardly function as a denial of (80) a. for the reasons explained in section 2.5.3. above, (95) c. is an adequate denial of (95) a., with narrow scope of negation on the subject.

2.3. An application of Givón's framework to negation in *Catch-22*

In the two extracts below I take up the notions of the presuppositional nature of negative sentences and of their ontological properties and make some comments on their significance in the analysis of the function of negation.

2.1. The presuppositional nature of negation

Example (96) is a good illustration of the presuppositional discourse properties of negative sentences:

> (96) He gasped in utter amazement at the fantastic sight of the twelve flights of planes organized calmly into exact formation. The scene was too unexpected to be true. There were no planes spurting ahead with wounded, none lagging behind with damage. No distress flares smoked in the sky. No ship was missing but his own. For an instant he was paralyzed with a sensation of madness. Then he understood and almost wept at the irony. The explanation was simple: clouds had covered the target before the planes could bomb it, and the mission to Bologna was still to be flown.
> He was wrong. There had been no clouds. Bologna had been bombed. Bologna was a milk run. There had been no flak there at all. (p. 186)

The episode describes the reaction of Yossarian, the protagonist, when the planes that were supposed to bomb Bologna on a very dangerous mission, return undamaged. He is on ground because he has managed to find an excuse in order not to fly the mission. We can divide the extract above into two sections, and consider the function of the negative sentences within them.In the first part, up to *Bologna was still to be flown*, we have the following negative sentences: (1) *There were no planes spurting ahead with wounded*, (2) *none lagging behind with damage*, (3) *No distress flares smoked in the sky*, (4) *No ship was missing but his own*. These sentences clearly have the function of denying an expectation held by Yossarian about the return of the planes that had gone on the mission to Bologna. None of this information has been expressed previously in the discourse, however, it is present implicitly as an assumption that is based on knowledge of the world: if planes go on a

dangerous mission, it is to be expected that there will be damaged planes and wounded soldiers, but this expectation is not fulfilled. This phenomenon illustrates the notion of 'discourse presuppositionality' discussed above, since the negative sentences presuppose that an expectation has been previously created which is now being denied. The facts described lead Yossarian to infer that the weather conditions have prevented the mission from taking place, and lead him to develop a new assumption which adapts to the changed situation. He believes that the mission still has to be run. The second part of the extract denies this second assumption, by means of the negative sentences (5) *There had been no clouds*, (6) *There had been no flak there at all*, in combination with the explicit indication that his assumption was wrong (7) *He was wrong*. In this sense, the negative sentences contribute to explaining why Yossarian's assumption was wrong. Sentence (5) denies information which is present in the previous discourse (*clouds had covered the target*), and (6) denies the expectation that the enemy would defend themselves from the attack and counter-attack.

To sum up, the argument that negation has a presuppositional nature provides the means of accounting for one of the reasons why negative sentences are used in discourse. The example discussed here illustrates the point that negatives deny expectations and assumptions held by speakers which may be explicitly expressed in previous discourse or implicitly present in the common ground. It is

also interesting to observe that there is a progression in the negative sentences of the extract, corresponding to the two different parts. This shows that the function of negation in discourse needs to be considered in the context of the preceding and following utterances, since the isolation of the sentences would limit the possibilities of interpretation enormously.

2.3.2. The ontology of negative states and events

In extract (97) below, I briefly consider the significance of Givón's observations about the presuppositional nature of negation and of the ontology of negative properties and events.

> (97) 'What the hell are you getting so upset about?' he asked her bewilderedly in a tone of contrite amusement. 'I thought you didn't believe in God.' 'I don't,' she sobbed, bursting violently into tears. 'But the God I don't believe in is a good God, a just God, a merciful God. He's not the mean and stupid God you make Him out to be.' Yossarian laughed and turned her arms loose. 'Let's have a little more religious freedom between us,' he proposed obligingly. 'You don't believe in the God you want to, and I won't believe in the God I want to. Is that a deal?' That was the most illogical Thanksgiving he could ever remember spending. (p. 231)

This extract is taken from a long conversation between Yossarian and Lieutenant Scheisskopf's wife, who is his lover. The conversation has turned to religious matters, by means of angry comments and insults regarding religious systems in general, and God in particular, on Yossarian's part. Lieutenant Scheisskopf's wife is affected by his blasfemous utterances. The first negative utterance (1) *I thought you didn't believe in God*, denies an assumption that Yossarian has held about his

lover's beliefs, on the grounds that she has previously told him she does not believe in God. His comment is an utterance of surprise against her unexpected reaction. The striking nature of this extract lies in the use of the negative sentences as an explanation of Lieutennant Scheisskopf's wife: *first, and again, surprisingly, she contradicts herself* and confirms the original assumption held by Yossarian, by means of (2) *I don't*. This negative utterance is interesting from the point of view of its function because it simultaneously confirms and denies information conveyed previously in discourse. The contradictory nature of this utterance is expanded by the following utterances, which are totally unacceptable from a logical point of view: (3) *The God I don't believe in is a just God, a merciful God....* This utterance is even more interesting because it is an example of the famous and polemical structure where the presuppositions of a sentence are negated (see the discussion on this topic in chapter 2). It is a contradiction because an entity in Subject position which is described in terms of positive attributes (*just, merciful*) is, at the same time, denied its existence. This view is confirmed by the utterance (4) *He's not the mean and stupid God you make Him out to be*, where, again, the speaker corrects *Yossarian's assumption about God*.

Now, from the point of view of the kind of information that is being expressed by means of these utterances, we may ask ourselves to what extent they are informative, and if they are, why. The explanation must be found not in the accounts of

traditional logic but in the functional and ontological properties of negation. According to Givón, negation foregrounds a negative state or event, which would otherwise constitute the exception in our description of the things in the world. By foregrounding the fact that there is a lack of belief in God, even if his presence is in some way acknowledged, we are being directed to a very representative characteristic of humanity in the era of technology: the existence of God is rejected in modern society, a society with few ideals, but, at the same time, this lack of spiritual involvement, which was more characteristic of 'older' ages, is yearned for and clung to desperately by some people. People need something to believe in, in spite of the scientific awareness that there may be nothing beyond what we know in our life on earth. This explains the paradox between the non-existence, the non-being, the spiritual emptiness, and the attempt to believe, at whatever price.

Yossarian's reaction to Lieutenent Scheisskopf's wife's comments is equally contradictory and absurd, as he proposes: (5) *You don't believe in the God you want to*, (6) *and I won't believe in the God I want to*. These two negative utterances carry out the illocutionary acts of request and promise, respectively. In these cases, the functions of negatives as related to a corresponding affirmative form is much more subtle and indirect.

To end this section, I will add some comments about the foregrounding of negative events along the lines of Givón's

observations, by means of considering its applicability to the use of negation in the following extract:

> (98) Sharing a tent with a man who was crazy wasn't easy, but Nately didn't care. He was crazy, too, and had gone every free day to work on the officers' club that Yossarian had not helped build. Actually, there were many officers' clubs that Yossarian had not helped build, but he was proudest of the one on Pianosa. It was a sturdy and complex monument to his powers of determination. Yossarian never went there to help until it was finished- then he went there often, so pleased was he with the large, fine, rambling shingled building. It was truly a splendid structure, and Yossarian throbbed with a mighty sense of accomplishment each time he gazed at it and reflected that none of the work that had gone into it was his. (p. 28)

In (98) we have a striking use of negative clauses which foreground negative vents. The first two negative clauses (1) *Sharing a tent with a man who was crazy wasn't easy,* and *but Nately didn't care,* carry out the standard function of foregrounding negative states for the purposes of correcting wrongly held assumptions in the reader (that it might be easy to live with a crazy man and that Nately should mind this fact), and they connect back to previously processed information. The following negative clauses, however, are odd: (2) *the officers' club that Yossarian had not helped build,* (3) *Actually, there were many officers' clubs that Yossarian had not helped build,* (4) *Yossarian never went there to help until it was finished,* (5) *and Yossarian throbbed with a mighty sense of accomplishment each time he gazed at it and reflected that none of the work that had gone into it was his.*

These clauses also foreground negative states or events (*not build, not go, none of the work was his*) and, in strictly

logical terms, they are totally uniformative: why devote a whole paragraph to describing the actions not carried out by a character? This use obviously takes to an extreme the property of negation as an indicator of an empty, vacuous and static ontology. It inverts the usual process in communication, where we are usually more interested about the actions of characters and how they contribute to the plot, than in the non-actions, as these tend to form the background. This paragraph shows the contrary phenomenon where the relevant event is the non-event, the fact that a charcater has done absolutely nothing to contribute to the building of an officers' club, and that he is proud of it. From the point of view of Givón's approach to negation and its function in communication, this extract provides an interesting illustration of how the foregrounding of the non-event and the non-being may be taken to an extreme.

However, neither this approach, nor any of the other approaches discussed in the present chapter, accounts for the the way in which the apparent uninformativity of extract (97) is recovered as ultimately informative by the reader, or how the paradoxes in (98) are interpreted as meaningful. In order to obtain this explanation, we need a theory which will be able to tackle the question of how knowledge packages are activated and processed while reading. This theory may be schema theory, which is discussed in chapter 5. Furthermore, the approaches discussed in this chapter are restricted to the analysis of isolated sentences or brief exchanges. This necessarily limits

the explanatory capacity of even a powerful pragmatic theory, such as Givón's. Text world theories, discussed in chapter 4, provide the means for dealing with negation throughout long discourse stretches. This sets the necessary grounds for a more detailed description of the properties of negation as a discourse phenomenon and in order to make explicit the relation between negative and affirmative within the framework of a central text world and projected subworlds.

2.7. Conclusions

In this chapter I have reviewed works on negation that are relevant to the study I carry out in chapters 5 and 6. I have provided an introduction to basic concepts regarding negation from the perspectives of the philosophy of language, logic and cognitive psychology. I have described the grammatical characteristics of negation and the functions that can be carried out by negative utterances, pointing out polemical aspects in the description and definition of such functions. Finally, I have reviewed the contributions of Givón's theory of negation to the understanding of how negation is produced and processed in discourse.

The last section in the chapter is devoted to an anlysis of three extracts from *Catch-22*, in the light of some of the notions discussed in the theoretical sections, in particular, from Givón's functional-pragmatic approach to negation. To sum up the observations made above, I have tried to show (1) how negation can be said to have a presuppositional nature which

is manifested in the links that are established discoursively to previous assumptions and expectations; (2) how negation foregrounds negative states and events in such a way that the non-existent is focused on for reasons that are explained contextually. These facts show that functional and ontological aspects of negation are primary in its interpretation as a discourse element. Subsequent chapters contribute to this line of thought by expanding on issues not developed by the frameworks discussed in the present chapter, namely, the dynamic dicourse function of negation and the way negation is processed in relation to stored knowledge.

Notes to chapter 2

1. Among the approaches to negation in language use, or from discourse-pragmatic perspectives, see Givón (1978, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1993, Shanon, 1981, Tottie, 1982 and 1991, Leinfeller, 1994, Pagano, 1994, Werth, 1996).

2. For a detailed discussion of the supposed ambiguity of negation see Kempson (1975).

3. See McCawley (1981: 62-64) for a discussion of how the truth table for negation is interpreted in logical terms. The main idea undelying this account is that, in logic, 'a proposition and its negation must have opposite truth values' (McCawley, 1981: 63). This means that if there is a proposition *p*, which describes a state of affairs and is assigned the truth value *T*, there must be another negative proposition *not-P* which is assigned the truth value *F* for that state of affairs.

4. See Mc Cawley (1981: 67-69) for a discussion of a non truth-functional approach to negation. The truth functional or non-truth functional character of negation determines the nature of the connectors *&* and *if then*. McCawley points out that a non truth-functional approach to negation is ruled out by classical logic but it is worth consideration, as it may be derived from the application from the rules of inference in logic and may allow us to accept cases where a proposition and its negation may be both true or may be both false. This may be the case of propositions which contain a false semantic presupposition, as in *The King of France is bald* and *The King of France is not bald* discussed above in the present chapter. According to McCawley, 'Under the narrow conception of falsehood, if a proposition and its negation both fail to be true, then both lack any truth value; under the broad conception of falsehood, if a proposition and its negation both fail to be true, then both are false.' (McCawley, 1981: 259)

5. For a discussion of this example within the model of text worlds, see the section devoted to negative accomodation in chapter 5.

6. Cf. Atlas and Levinson (1981: 32). These authors consider negation in natural language to be unambiguously of an external, widescope, sentential type, while 'the usually preferred interpretation as a choice/narrowscope/predicate/internal negation is pragmatically induced.'

7. There are other systems of logic which incorporate aspects such as phonological markers, however, I will refer to traditional logic only.

8. Kempson (1975: 95-100) points out the inadequacies of propositional logic in the distinction between descriptive negation (the term she uses for negative statement) and denial with reference to the problem of the ambiguity of negation. In the general literature on the discourse-pragmatic functions of neegation both 'negative assertion' and 'negative statement' are terms used indifferently to define a speech act of a descriptive type. It ususally indicates the non-presence of something which was probably expected to be present. Denial, also a representative speech act, rejects the truth value of a propostion that has been mentioned previously in discourse or implied. Cf. Tottie (1991), for whom all negative representatives are denials, the difference being whether they deny a proposition explicitly mentioned or an implicit proposition.

9. The inclusive meaning may be considered to be basic, and the exclusive meaning may be recovered by conversational implicature.

10. See the discussion in chapter 5 of how the *either-or* dijunction reveals this kind of problem in the chaplain in *Catch-22*.

11. See section 2.3.4. below on the distinction between contraries and contradictories.

12. This perspective is significant if we compare it to the process of understanding a paradoxical literary text, like *Catch-22*. The process described by several authors (see Leech and Short 1981, Norrick 1986, Cook 1994) whereby inconsistencies or incongruities at the literal level can be interpreted as meaningful at a higher level of interpretation, can be compared to the process followed in Eastern philosophy where the rejection of the literal value of specific propositions leads to an insight and understanding at a higher level.

13. The symmetricalist view of negation argues that the relation between affirmative and negative is understood biunivocally. That is, the negative works upon the previous existence of the affirmative, but the affirmative also requires the existence of the negative in order to exist. This view is reformulated as an aesthetic theory of negativity which has also influenced current literary theories. Iser (1989), for example, claims that the notion of *negativity* in literature should be understood as the 'unsaid', as what is absent in a text, which is the complementary of the written text itself.

14. See Horn (1989: 45-78) for a discussion of the views argued by symmetricalists and asymmetricalists, with regard to the question whether negation makes reference to a corresponding affirmative form.

15. Ineke Bockting (1994) carries out an analysis of Faulkner's characters based on a description of the different linguistic features that characterise each character.

16. Cf. Escandell's account of contradictory statements discussed in section 2.2.2.1. above.

17. Jespersen (1917) had applied tests sporadically in order to identify some words, such as broad negatives, as negative. However, the application of tests was not carried out consistently and systematically, as is pointed out by McCawley (1995: 32) in his review of Jespersen (1917).

18. Clark (1976: 37) classifies negatives into four different types, according to two main criteria: whether or not they are full negatives or not (i.e. whether they are explicitly negative), and whether or not they are quantifier negatives.

19. See sections 2.4.2. below on variations in the use of negation in English speech and writing.

20. For a detailed discussion of the constraints on the use of no-negation and not-negation see Tottie (1991).

21. Huddleston (1984: 432) argues that in order for an utterance such as *John opened the door* to be true, the following entailments and presupposition (v) must be true:

i Someone opened something.
ii *Someone opened the door.*
iii John opened something.
iv *John opened the door.*
v At the time prior to the time at issue, the door was closed.
etc.

The proposition *John opened the door* will be false when the set of conditions outlined above are not satisfied. However, from a strictly semantic point of view, negation does not specify which of the conditions is not satisfied in every possible situation. Huddleston (ibid.) argues that this information is provided pragmatically (by means of implications) or porsodically (by means of contrastive stress).

22. There are also adjuncts which tend to fall outside the scope of negation, as is observed by Huddleston (1984: 429). Thus, a sentence such as *He didn't do it because he was angry* is ambiguous, and the interpretation depends on whether the adjunct is understood to fall under the scope of negation or not.

23. This view seems to be grounded on the well-known Pollyanna Principle, which states that the natural tendency is to focus on positive aspects, and not on negative ones.

24. For further discussion of the differnt types of relationships between opposites, see Lyons (1977: 270-290), Werth (1984: 151-165), Cruse (1986, chapters 10, 11 and 12) and Horn (1989: 35-45).

25. For further discussion on the characteristics of the functions carried out by negative sentences, see section 2.4.2. below.

26. See also Lyons (1977: 771) and van der Sandt (1991: 331) for similar arguments concerning the fact that both affirmative and negative sentences can function as denials.

27. See also Tottie (1991: 37) for a classification of discourse functions of negation. I discuss her approach in section 2.4.4. below.

28. In Burton (1980: 156-159) what Tottie (1991: 37) calls *supports* are classifed as *accept* and *acknowledge* acts.

29. For a detailed discussion of the relation between negative utterances and the corresponding affirmative forms see sections below.

30. Givón's (1978, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1993) approach to negation is discussed in the last sections of the present chapter.

31. See Werth (1984: chapter 7) for a discussion of contrast as one of the three functions of *emphasis* which contribute to the creation of coherence in texts.

32. The schema-theoretic account of the appropriateness of negatives in discourse has a cognitive basis which is obviously linked to the findings in cognitive psychology discussed in section 2.2.3. above.

33. Other authors (Clark 1976, Clark and Clark 1977, avoid using the term 'presupposition' and use the term 'supposition' to describe the phenomenon discussed by Givón.

34. For a discussion on the ontological properties of negative states see section 2.2.3.1. and 2.3.4.1. above, on the cognitive properties expressed by means of lexical negation.

35. Example 94 b. would be acceptable and informative if it is understood as a correction to a previous utterance. However, it sounds odd if it is an opening statement.

Chapter 3: Negation and Text World Theory

> Now that Yossarian looked back, it seemed that Nurse Cramer rather than the talkative Texan, had murdered the soldier in white; if she had not read the thermometer and reported what she had found, the soldier in white might still be lying there alive exactly as he had been lying there all along...

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I continue the discussion of negation by considering its function from a text world perspective. The frameworks discussed in this chapter, together with that discussed in chapter 4, are intended to provide the basis for a dynamic discourse perspective to negation, a view that is not developed by any of the authors discussed in previous chapters. For this purpose, I discuss two text theoretical models which provide different approaches to the phenomenon of negation and its function in discourse.

I deal first with the function of negation as a subworld in Werth's (1995c) framework, paying particular attention to the role of negation in the re-channelling of information and to the phenomenon of negative accommodation. The view of negation within text world theory contributes the following aspects to previous models of negation:

(a) it takes up the discussion of the ontological properties of negative events by incorporating it into a dynamic discourse perspective where negation functions as a subworld; (b) the cognitive approach to discourse processing andinterpretation characteristic of Werth's (1995c) text world theory connects to the schema theoretic frameworks discussed in chapter 4.

The text world framework approach to negation developed by Werth (1995c) is based on a view of negation as a pragmatic phenomenon with specific ontological properties which situate it in an asymmetrical relation to the affirmative. In this sense, Werth's (op. cit.) theory contributes to the line already discussed in chapter 2 and followed by authors such as Givón (1979 and 1993), Pagano (1994) and Leinfeller (1994), among others. What is perhaps the most relevant aspect within this common line of thought, is the approach to negation by means of a cognitive perspective which underlies its function in discourse. The main contribution of Werth's (op. cit.) theory in this respect is the systematisation of observations regarding cognitive and ontological properties of negation within a dynamic text world perspective.

In the second part of the present chapter, I deal with the notion of conflict in the fictional world as developed by Ryan (1991b), and I discuss the role of negation in the expression and development of conflicts in the fictional world. From this perspective, Ryan's (1991b) framework complements previous models by providing the means of observing and describing the expression of conflict in the fictional world, an aspect that is extremely important in the data I am analysing.

3.2. Possible worlds, text worlds, fictional worlds

In recent decades there has been a great deal of cross-fertilisation between different disciplines, such as philosophy, logic, linguistics, cognitive psychology and

literary theory.[1] Text world theory has developed as a result of such an integrative trend (see Pavel 1985, 1986, Dolezel 1976, 1989, Bradley and Swartz (1979), Allén 1989, Ryan 1985, 1991a, 1991b, Semino 1995, Werth 1994, 1995a, 1995c). It is important to define here what is understood by text world theory and the particular aspects of this model that I am interested in applying to the analysis of negation. Teleman (1989: 199) points out that the term *possible world*, from which the notion of text world derives, is often used in a vague and ambiguous way. It is associated mainly to two main trends in linguistic theory: propositional semantics and text theory. The notion of possible worlds, which was originally created by the philosopher Leibniz, was first introduced into modal semantics in order to account for the notions of necessity and possibility (see van Dijk 1977: 29-30, Lyons 1995: 118-19). Thus, in terms of propositional logic, we can say that a proposition *P* is necessarily true if *P* is true in all possible worlds, or, to put it in different terms, if it is true in 'any situation we can imagine' (van Dijk 1977: 29). Similarly, *P* is possible if there is at least one possible world (or situation) in which *P* is true. In these terms, 'a possible world may be identified with the set of propositions that truly describe it' (Lyons ibid,). As van Dijk (ibid.) indicates, we can think of a possible world in more intuitive terms to represent a 'situation' or a 'state of affairs'. As such, a possible world is an abstract construct about which a set of propositions are said to be true. Conversely, a proposition may also be defined

in terms of its relation to the possible worlds where it is true; from this perspective, a proposition is the set of possible worlds in which it is satisfied.

Possible world logic has been particularly useful in the explanation of irrealis phenomena, such as the syntactic and semantic properties of modal verbs, counterfactual conditional clauses, and complement clauses of world-creating predicates (e.g.: *want, believe*), as well as the tense and aspect systems (see Teleman 1989: 199). While propositional logic has been extremely influential in the development of formal semantic theory and the systematisation of truth conditional semantics, the application of possible world principles to text theory has focused on the idea of text as a mental construct. Thus de Beaugrande (1980: 24) defines a text world as 'the cognitive correlate of the knowledge conveyed and activated by a text in use. As such, it is in fact only present in the minds of language users.' Furthermore, a text-based perspective of possible worlds has led to the substitution of logical principles (eg.: logical necessity and logical possibility) by cognitive and epistemic principles more consonant with the process of text production and understanding.[2] This affects two main aspects of text:

(a) text processing, an aspect overlooked by formal possible world theories, which in text world theories is systematised according to principles such as coherence (See de Beaugrande 1980, van Dijk and Kintsch 1983) or coherence and co-operation (Werth 1995c), in connection

with the way in which knowledge is stored, processed and activated (de Beaugrande 1980, van Dijk and Kintsch 1983, Cook 1994, Werth 1995c).

(b) the internal structure of text worlds, where the notion of *accessibility* replaces that of *possibility* in order to explain differences in the internal structure of worlds or universes and how they diverge from a given Actual World or central Text world (see sections under 3.4. below).[3]

These principles have been applied to the analysis of fictional worlds by concentrating on two aspects (see Semino 1995: 80): (a) the ontological status of fictional entities and of propositions in fictional discourse; (b) the classification and description of fictional worlds. I discuss the latter aspect in the present chapter.

The approach I follow covers two distinct parts, where I deal with two different but complementary text world theories, as explained in section 3.1. above, Werth's (1995c) text world theory and Ryan's (1991b) text world model for narrative discourse.

(a) Werth's (1995c) text world theory has a basis in cognitive linguistics and provides a complex discourse approach to the analysis of texts from a linguistic perspective; furthermore, this framework accounts explicitly for negation as part of the modal options created in discourse.

(b) Ryan's (1991b) text world theory of narrative will be

used in the present chapter in order to account for the notion of conflict in the fictional world; this means I leave aside other aspects of her framework which are not relevant to my discussion.[4] Ryan's work is oriented to literary theory rather than to linguistic theory, and for this reason it complements the previous framework in aspects concerning the development and expression of conflict in the fictional world.

3.3. Werth's (1995c) Text world theory

The following sections are devoted to a discussion of negation within the framework of text world theory developed by Werth (1991, 1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c). In section 3.3.1. I outline the main characteristics of his discourse framework, in order to provide the relevant background for the understanding of the role of negation as a discourse phenomenon. For reasons of space, however, I focus on the issues that are significant in the application of the model to the notion of negation, leaving aside other aspects of the framework which are also important but which are not directly relevant to my discussion. I take as a point of departure the notions of 'discourse world', 'text world' and 'subworld' in order to situate the function of negation as a subworld within this framework. The subsequent sections deal with the functions of negation by means of focusing on specific aspects, such as its main features as a subworld, its function in the re-chanelling and updating of information and its role in the

phenomenon of negative accommodation.

3.3.1. Discourse world and text world

Werth's (1993, 1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c) framework is a proposal for a cognitive-based discourse model which adopts notions from formal semantics, including possible world theory, which are adapted to a broader discourse perspective. Its characteristics as a discourse theory in general terms are established by means of identifying the 'discourse' and the 'text' as the units of analysis, since sentence-based approaches are considered by the author to provide only a limited range of insights into the properties of language and how it is used (Werth, 1995c: 6).

Thus, the author describes his proposal in the following terms:

> all of semantics and pragmatics operates within a set of stacked cognitive spaces, termed "mental worlds". (...) My argument for this, in a nutshell, is that uses of language presuppose occurrence in a context of situation, and that on top of this they also presuppose the existence of a conceptual domain of understanding, jointly constructed by the producer and the receiver(s). (Werth 1995c: 26)

The quotation reveals the cognitive basis of communication in this framework, where interaction is considered to involve the activation and use of packages of knowledge, as in frame-semantic theory, and the construction of abstract conceptual structures of different levels of complexity. I will henceforth use the general term *domain* to refer to these cognitive spaces or mental worlds which linguistically are defined by deictic and modal parameters, as I describe below.

As in other discourse theories, interaction is governed by a series of principles, among which those of communicativeness, cooperativeness and coherence are primary, as they regulate the negotiation of the discourse situation (Werth, 1995a: 78-79). The definitions of 'discourse' and 'text' draw extensively from cognitive linguistics theories, in their stress on the cognitive aspects of the processing and use of knowledge in communication, and from possible worlds theories, in the conception of texts as projected worlds. They are defined as follows:

> discourse: a deliberate and joint effort on the part of producer and recepient to build up a 'world' within which the propositions advanced are coherent and make complete sense. (...)
> text world: a text world is a deictic space, defined initially by the discourse itself, and specifically by the deictic and referential elements in it. (Werth 1995c: 95)

Further, discourse is defined as a 'language event' and is identified with the 'immediate situation', while the text is the language itself (op.cit. 26). Both discourse and text are constructs based on human experience (perception, memory and imagination), which together make up a representation of discourse, and which are different from reality itself, since we do not have direct access to reality. Communication is described in cognitive terms, as a process where 'speakers build up a repertoire of scenes which encapsulate their expectations about how particular situation-types will turn out.' (op. cit.:172). The repetition of similar situation-types (manifested through particular text worlds) leads to the creation of *frames*, which are 'conceptualisations of real-world phenomena' (op.cit.: 181). (for a discussion of the notion of

frame as contrasted to other schema theoretic frameworks, see chapter 4). Thus, a text world will contain knowledge which is evoked by frames and knowledge which is contributed by the discourse situation. In particular, the discourse situation will provide specific variants to schematic frames (names, places, time, etc.) thus enriching the text world (op. cit.: 259). Furthermore, the text world is not defined as a fixed entity independent from the interlocutors, rather, it is a dynamic phenomenon which undergoes constant change. In this sense, the text world is defined as 'a representation of the cognitive space which the author and the reader are co-operating to form between them' (Werth, 1995b.: 191). The space delimeted by the text world is subject to change because both readers and the text itself change through time. Thus, the development of the text world may be compared to the succession of frames in a movie film, an analogy that foregrounds the view of text as ongoing process.

In the process of communication, the way knowledge is organised is extremely important. The knowledge that is organised and negotiated in the discourse, which Werth (op.cit.: 91) defines as the Common Ground, is constituted by the set of expressed propositions in the discourse, plus the set of entailed and pragmatically connected propositions, which can be 'potentially relevant' (ibid.), and some of which can be activated. The propositions refer to 'possible situations' in the discourse world (ibid.), so that the propositions are consistent and cohere with the propositions which define the

text world. This view constitutes a reformulation of the principle of truth condition assigned in a possible world, where it is substituted by the principle of coherence or consistency within that world. Thus, the status of a proposition *P* within the Common Ground (henceforth CG) of a discourse can be identified as belonging to one of the following types (Werth, op. cit.: 92):

(A) *P* is already in the CG, or

(B) *P* is not in the CG, but is:

either (i) coherent with CG, in which case *P* is:
either (a) a conventional assertion
or (b) an unconventional assertion
or (ii) incoherent with CG, in which case *P* is:
either (a) rejected as irrelevant
or (b) interpreted as conversational implicature and incremented as metaphorical, ironic, etc.

This is an approach to discourse as a process based on an incremental view of communication, where the definition of worlds and the rules for their acceptability and the acceptability of propositions within them is not governed by rules of logic (i.e. the rules of truth-conditional semantics or modal logic). Rather, it is governed by discourse principles, mainly, coherence, and epistemic accessibility. As such, coherence is not a property inherent to the discourse itself, but it is provided by speakers and hearers, 'by evaluating hypotheses formed on the basis of their knowledge of the meanings involved' (op. cit. 208). Truth is considered as a relative notion ranging on a scale from 100% certainty to 100% falsity, through different degrees of possibility.

With regard to knowledge and communication, the author

(op. cit.: 162) further specifies what constitutes the shared knwoledge between speaker and hearer in a particular discourse (cf. Givón 1989: 135). Shared knowledge is divided into general knowledge and mutual knowledge, where general knowledge includes cultural and linguistic domains, and mutual knowledge includes the perceptual and experiential shared domains.

3.3.2. Layering, world-builders and subworlds

The protagonists of the discourse situation include the participants, or interlocutors in a discourse world (speaker and hearer in a conversation, writer and reader in written communication) and the characters, which include narrators and characters within a text world (op. cit. 291). This distinction is based on the establishment of at least two different levels in the discourse situation, the level of the discourse world and the level of the text world.[5] Other possible layers within the text world are created by means of 'world builders', words which can create subworlds according to location (space and time deixis), modality (probability, which is not governed by truth conditions) and interaction (the use of direct speech within a narrative constitues a subworld) (op. cit.: 283). As the author points out (op.cit.: 286), 'Sub-worlds typically use the language of what semanticists call opaque contexts to build themselves' and typically belong to the area of modality. While the discourse world is mainly interactive (between speakers, or reader-writer), the text world is identified deictically and displays a viewpoint - the one of a speaker-writer - for the

benefit of an interlocutor; finally, subworlds are created via modal/epistemic elements which 'stipulate situations which cannot (as yet) be confirmed' (op. cit. 286).

Typical subworld-building elements are 'modals, probability markers, verbs of propositional attitude, non-factive verbs, adverbials denoting imaginary, speculative or stipulative environments, and so on' (op. cit.: 288). Some subworlds are directly accessible from the discourse world, for example those that alter the parameters of the text world by shifts in space or time (a flashback is a typical example). Others, however, are not directly accessible from the discourse world, as they are mediated through another entity, such as a character in the text world. Typical examples of this kind are modal worlds built by means of modalised expressions (In John's mind, Jack believed..., Mary realised..., It seemed that...). Werth (1995a: 77) summarises the types of character accessible subworlds as follows:

1. Cognitive domain: in John's mind, Mary believed that..., I think, it seems..., Einstein knew..., Bill realised...
2. Intentional domain: Miriam wanted to..., in order to..., so that..., you must...
3. Representational domain: in the picture, according to Leavis, Carol dreamed that..., on TV, in the story.
4. Hypothetical domain: if..., had you not..., were you looking for...?
5. Epistemic domain: perhaps, possibly, must have, would have, certainly.

In addition to these types, Werth (ibid.) observes that a further type of subworld may be envisaged, the assumption, which he defines as a 'proposition whose function is to help define a world rather than to denote situations which take place against the backdrop of an otherwise defined world.' (Werth, 1995a: 78). A typical example is the *if*-clause in a conditional. Furthermore, the author stresses the crucial role played by knowledge-frames in the construction of worlds, since

they contribute significantly to the process of 'filling out and enriching the text world' (1995a: 78). Even if these elements are not world-builders in themselves, they have more to contribute to the process of definition of the text world and subworlds than to the plot advancing function.

Below, I reproduce an example of a deictic shift in time which builds a temporal subworld (adapted from Werth, op. cit.: 331):

> (1) The five men were spread out like the points of a five-pointed star. They had dug with their knees and hands and made mounds in front of their heads and shoulders with the dirt and piles of stones. Using his cover, they were linking the individual mounds up with stones and dirt. Joaquín, who was eighteen years old, had a steel helmet that he dug with and he passed dirt in it.
> He had gotten his helmet at the blowing up of the train...
> (Hemingway 1941/1964: 262)

The original paragraph is much longer but it is partially reproduced in order to exemplify the shift in time deixis within a text world. This takes place in the last sentence in (1), where the change from simple past to past perfect (had gotten) indicates that there is a flashback. Similarly, other subworlds may be created by means of evoking action in another place (meanwhile, back at the ranch...), or by projecting characters' wishes (Mary wanted to go) or beliefs.

In brief, there are three main types of subworld (Werth, 1996: 329):

> (a) deictic alternations: they include alternations in time, place or entity.
> (b) propositional attitudes: they represent notions entertained by the protagonists, such as desires, beliefs and purposes.
> (c) epistemic subworlds: they are modalised propositions expressed by participants or characters. They include hypothetical worlds and modal worlds. To these the subgroup of quantity should be added: it includes quantity and negation.

World builders such as the ones described above are differentiated from *plot-advancing or function-advancing*

propositions. The difference is captured by the two following examples:

(2) While the news was on, John finished his dinner.

(3) While John was eating his dinner, the phone rang.

(Werth, op. cit.: 293)

In (2) and (3) we can establish a distinction between the plot-advancing propositions *John finished his dinner* and *the phone rang*, where a certain action takes place, and world-building propositions, like *While the news was on* and *While John was eating his dinner*, which deictically contribute to the creation of a text world. Although function advancing propositions are typical of the text world, they may also occur within a subworld, where they may create parallel substories. The author provides the following example (op. cit.: 295):

> (4) At dawn today, John struggled out of bed. He took his fishing gear down to the river. If John catches a big fish, he'll take it home. He'll then give it to Mary to skin and clean. Mary will complain like hell, but she'll do it anyway. Then she'll cook it into some exotic and delicious dish.

In (4) the conditional *if*-clause is a world builder which projects a subworld which alters the parameters established in the text world regarding time (*at dawn today*). The subworld constitutes a kind of pause, where a hypothesis is developed about future events. It can be said that the subworld develps a (hypothetical) story-line and, consequently, has function advancing propositions which make the story move forward within that particular world.

To sum up the main aspects of the framework under discussion, we can say that it proposes a discourse model which

integrates a (a) cognitive approach to communication, by means of the incorporation of frame knowledge as an element that enriches the ongoing discourse, and (b) text world theory as inspired in possible worlds. In this sense, discourse and text are seen as constructs based on human experience which we use to conceptualise such experience and to communicate about it. The definition and organisation of discourse and text worlds is not based on laws of logic, but, rather, on discourse principles involving assumptions about interaction and deictic information. The structure of discourse and text worlds can be very complex, depending on the degree of layering within the text world. Layering is created by means of the projection of subworlds, which constitute shifts in deictic, interactive or modal parameters of the text world.

Werth provides an extremely clear summary of his model as follows (1995a:78):

> A world as we've used the term, is a conceptual domain representing a state of affairs. A text world, in particular, represents the principal state of affairs expressed in the discourse. First, the world must be defined: this is effected by means of the deictic and referential elements nominated in the text, and fleshed out from knowledge (specifically, knowledge-frames), a process I've called world building. World building, then, sets the basic parameters within which entities in the text world may operate.

In the subsequent sections, I focus on the role of negation as subworld in the framework under discussion.

3.3.3. Negation as subworld

As a propositional modality, negation belongs to the third type of subworld, that of modal shifts from the parameters set in the text world. More precisely, negation is dealt with as a form of quantification, since both negation and quantifiers have to do with the question 'how much?', a scalar property (op. cit.: 376). The difference between Werth's (op. cit.: 373-

376) categories of quantification and negation is that quantification relativises otherwise absolute statements, while negation does not alter the text world parameters by relativisation but by cancelling previously expressed or assumed propositions. This can be observed in the examples under (5)

(5) a. There were eight Swedes in the room. Some were called Jan.
b. There were eight Swedes in the room. None was called Jan.

While (5) a. introduces a quantifier sub-world (by means of *some*) which relativises the absolute nature of the preceding statement, (5) b. contains a denial of an assumption that any of the men might be called Jan. The assumption may be present for whatever reason in the Common Ground, for example, because *Jan* is a typical Swedish name, and it creates the expectation that it should be the most common name in the set. By means of negation, this proposition, in this case an assumption, is deleted from the text world. The view of negation as quantifier complements the previously discussed view of negation as propositional modality (see section 2.5.2. in chapter 2), so that negation can be seen both in terms of quantity and truth.

With regard to the scope and meaning of negation, the author (op. cit.: 378) defends the view discussed in chapter 2 (cf. Horn 1989, Givón 1979, 1993) in which the interpretation of negation is dictated by the context. Thus, he claims (ibid.) that a de-contextualised sentence such as (6) may have at least four different interpretations:

(6) A dog wasn't barking.

A. A [dog] WASN'T [barking] = 'It is not true that a dog was barking' (widescope) It denies the previously asserted:

A dog was barking.

B. A *dog* wasn't [barking] = 'Not even was there a dog barking' (widescope) Contrary to expectation (= *Not a dog was barking)*.

C. A DOG wasn't [barking] = 'It wasn't a dog that was barking' (narrowscope) Conceding that something was barking, but denying that it was a dog.

C. A [dog] wasn't BARKING = 'It wasn't barking that a dog was engaged in doing' (narrowscope) conceding that a dog was doing something, but denying that it was barking.

The author agrees with other linguists (cf. the review of Givón in chapter 2) that negation does not consist of merely stating a negative state of events. He agrees with Givón (1979, ch. 3) that negation has a foregrounding function, whereby a previously mentioned or assumed proposition is brought to the foreground and challenged in some way. According to Werth (op. cit.: 379) this is the reason why negation is rarely used to open an exchange, and it accounts for its asymmetrical relation to the affirmative. Thus, while (7) could easily be used as discourse initial, (8) would sound strange.

(7) A dog was barking.
(8) A dog wasn't barking.

Werth observes that 'The essential mechanism is communicative: one does not comment on the absence of some situation unless its presence has been expected, asserted or presupposed.' (op. cit.: 380). In the same line as the authors discussed in chapter 2, Werth (op.cit.: 381) argues that a cognitive approach to the function of negation is necessary in order to understand its meaning in discourse. According to the author, this meaning is closely linked to the presence of

expectations of some kind:

> You cannot, that is to say, negate something, unless there is a good reason to expect the reverse to be the case, whereas you *can* affirm something whether or not there is good reason to expect the opposite to be the case. The explanation for this is perfectly commonsensical: to deny the existence or presence of an entity, you have somehow got to mention it. (ibid.)

Werth thus takes up the asymmetricalist view of negation which claims that its function in discourse depends on the explicit or implicit presence of a corresponding affirmative form. The relationship between the affirmative and the negative from a text world viewpoint is that 'the text world identifies the common ground, or set of expectations, for the particular discourse, while a negation is naturally expressed by way of a subworld.' (op.cit. 382). The author provides an example from *The Importance of Being Ernest*, reproduced under (9) below:

> (9) ALGERNON: Please don't touch the cucumber sandwiches. They are ordered especially for Aunt Augusta.
> JACK: Well, you have been eating them all the time.
> ALGERNON: That is quite a different matter. She is my aunt.
> (...)
> LADY BRACKNELL: ...And now I'll have a cup of tea, and one of those nice cucumber sandwiches you promised me.
> ALGERNON: Certainly, Aunt Augusta. (...) Good heavens! Lane! Why are there no cucumber sandwiches? I ordered them specially.
> LANE: There were no cucumbers in the market this morning, sir. I went down twice.
> ALGERNON: No cucumbers!
> LANE: No, sir. Not even for ready money.
>
> Wilde (1899/1954: 261)

In (9) an expectation is created in Lady Bracknell that there will be cucumber sandwiches for tea. However, at tea-time, there are no cucumber sandwiches (since Algernon has eaten them all). In terms of text world theory, this is explained as the expectation being created within the common

ground of the text world, and subsequently this information is altered by means of a negative utterance (*Why are there no cucumber sandwiches?*). This leads to a redefinition of the text world parameters, with the cancelling of the information that there are cucumber sandwiches. The main difference between the type of alteration of the text world parameters carried out by negation as compared to the alterations realised via other subworlds, is that in the case of negation the changes are not temporary but permanent and affect other world building parameters. In the case of the example above, it is the intention on the part of the character to eat cucumber sandwiches that is affected by negation, as it will not be fulfilled.

3.3.4. Negative accommodation

While negation as the defeat of an expectation that is created within the common ground is considered to be a prototypical function of negation, the author points out that negation may also be involved in a less prototypical phenomenon, which is however very interesting, viz. negative accommodation (op. cit.: 384). By accommodation, the author refers to the phenomenon whereby entities are introduced into the discourse without being asserted explicitly. Typically, they appear within dependent structures, although they introduce new information (op. cit.: 421). Thus the author provides the following example, reproduced in (10) (op. cit.: 404):

(10) A: How's life with you?
B: Great! I realised last night that my brother wasn't dead.
A: I didn't know you had a brother!

While new information is typically conveyed via assertions, in this case it is less typically introduced by means of a dependent structure, in this case the NP Subject of a subordinate clause. The author names the phenomenon *unconventional assertion* or *accommodation*.[6]

Negation can be used in this way to deny something while at the same time presenting it and introducing it into the common ground. The author provides an interesting example from E. M. Forster's *A Passage to India*. I reproduce part of the passage under (11):

> (11) There are no bathing steps on the river front, as the Ganges happens not to be holy there; indeed, there is no river front, and bazaars shut out the wide and shifting panorama of the stream. (op. cit.: 386)

The author (ibid.) argues that the denials (*no bathing steps, not holy, no river front*) introduce the expectation that those items should be there, while at the same time they deny their presence. The expectations are culturally based and they are connected to frame-knowledge about India, rivers, cities and so on (Werth 1995b: 196). This has two important consequences: (a) it is not important whether the reader is acquainted or not with the facts that are denied, i.e. that there are usually steps on river fronts in India, that the Ganges is a holy river, etc. The reader who does not know this information previously can still understand the text, because the denials both present and deny the information at the same

time; (b) the evocation of culturally determined frames determines the acceptability of certain sentences versus the unacceptability or oddity of others (cf. the discussion in 2. in chapter 2). Thus, Werth (1996: 386) points out that it would be odd to have a paragraph like (12) in the context of The Forster text on Chandrapore:

> (12) There are no ice-cream stands on the river front, as the Ganges happens not to be holy here; indeed, there is *no river front, and restaurants shut out the wide and* shifting panorama of the stream.

This is so because *ice-cream stands* and *restaurants* are not part of the frames evoked by words such as GANGES. The process of reading involves a dynamic interaction between the different elements of the discourse and text world. Thus, the frames, which are within the text world and contain the knowledge about India, in example (11), the Ganges, etc., together with associated inferences and connected information (eg.: antonyms), set up a complex network of expectations about the relevant topic within the text world; the relation between the processing of frame knowledge and information introduced by means of a subworld is explained by the author as follows: 'the text, by way of the negative subworld, informs us that these expectations have been departed from' (Werth 1995: 198). In this way, a dynamic process of understanding is developed (here only a part of the whole process is accounted for) where there is a constant and continuous checking of new information against expectations created in the existing common ground.

3.3.5. The function of negation in up-dating information

Within the process of text production and understanding, the function of negation is that of up-dating information by means of altering parameters of the text world or by cancelling previously held expectations.[7] This function can be compared to that of re-channelling information mentioned by Leinfeller (1994) discussed in chapter 2. As compared to the functions of other subworlds, negation in its prototypical form and in the form of negative accommodation pose problems with regard to the categorisation within the class of subworlds. Thus, subworlds in general carry out either of two functions: (a) to temporally change parameters established in the text world (eg. time and place shifts), or (b) to project an inaccessible state of affairs, typically by means of the expression of wishes, beliefs and intentions of characters. Werth (op. cit.: 387) observes that the first type of negation (prototypical negation) seems to strain the characteristics of the former kind of subworld, since prototypical negative subworlds constitute permanent changes in the states of affairs mentioned in the text world. The second type of negation, or negative accommodation, seems to take the notion of inaccessibility to an extreme by means of the simultaneous presentation and denial of information. The author concludes that the main function of negative subworlds is closely related to that of information up-dating or incrementation by means of topic-change. Thus, while by means of other subworlds, we may have temporary departures from the text world parameters, negation leads to

a permanent change of a parameter. For example, a flashback does not alter the fact that the main narrative is taking place at another moment in time, and the story will at some point move back from the flashback to the main text world narrative time. Thus the temporal parameter set up previously in the text world is not radically changed but only temporarily departed from. The same applies to the projection of subworlds by means of conditionals or world-creating predicates; in principle, these constitute only temporary shifts from the main deictic indicators of the text world. However, with negation the departure from a parameter becomes permanent, and this leads to a change or shift in the topic dealt with.

A distinction is further drawn between the characteristics of participant-accessible negation and character-accessible negation (op. cit.: 388-90), introduced by the author in order to account for the peculiarities of negation as a subworld. In this sense, it becomes clear that negation has functional characteristics which make it necessary to consider it apart from the other types of subworlds.

The distinction between participant-accessible negation and character-accessible negation is associated to the two different uses of negation as described above: participant-accessible negation typically involves the more prototypical function of negation of permanently changing previously introduced information, while character-accessible negation involves the phenomenon of negative accommodation, which projects and denies an inaccessible state of affairs from the

discourse level viewpoint. While participant-accessible negation alters assumptions which are present in the common ground, as in the example from *The Importance of Being Ernest* mentioned above, character-accessible negation does not involve an alteration of assumptions in the common ground, at least in a direct way. Thus, the use of negation in example (11) to introduce and deny at the same time information about the Ganges at Chandrapore does not have any obvious further implications. According to Werth (op.cit.: 389), however, the effect of negation in these cases can be compared to that of a delayed action information bomb: 'When the appropriate time comes, the dormant proposition will suddenly gain full significance' (ibid.). In my view, however, the distinction between participant-accessible negation and character-accessible negation need not be associated with the two different functions mentioned by the author. Intuitively, it should be possible to have prototypical negation and negative accomodation at both levels of accessibility. This can only be proved by the analysis of more data.

To sum up, negation in Werth's (1995c) text world theory is defined as a subworld which has two important discourse functions: (a) to alter or change parameters previously introduced in the common ground, and (b) through negative accommodation, to project an inaccessible state of affairs which constitutes the simultaneous presentation and denial of new information. The process by which this takes place is a dynamic process which involves the checking of information

contained in the common ground, including inferences and frame-knowledge which create expectations in the text world, and the information that is altered by means of negative subworlds. The process is one of constant up-dating and changing of the flow of information as it develops in the text world. This view of negation as an element within a dynamic discourse process is extremely important for the understanding of fiction. It will be discussed in sections under 3.4. below.

3.4. An application of Werth's model to negation in *Catch-22*

In the following sections I analyse two extracts from *Catch-22* in order to provide illustrations of how the theoretical framework discussed above may be applied to the analysis of negation in the corpus. I take up first an example of what I have been calling 'prototypical negation', that is, an example where negation functions as a subworld which alters the parameters of the text world. Then I discuss an example of negative accomodation, which corresponds to the less prototypical function of negation which both presents and denies information.

3.4.1. Negation as subworld which cancels previous information

Example (13) is an extract from a chapter devoted to the character known as Major Major. The chapter tells the story of his life, from when he was a child to the time when he is promoted as Major in the squadron on the Italian island of Pianosa, the main setting in the novel. The passage tells how

Major Major, as a child, is told that his real name is different from the one he has been previously given, and that his father has deceived him and his mother by making them believe he was called Caleb. An apparently minor problem like this one turns out to have dramatic consequences on Major Major's life.

> (13) On Major Major himself the consequences were only slightly less severe. It was a harsh and stunning realization that was forced upon him at so tender an age, the realization that he was not, as he had always been led to believe, Caleb Major, but instead was some total stranger named Major Major Major about whom he knew absolutely nothing and about whom nobody else had ever heard before. What playmates he had withdrew from him and never returned, disposed, as they were, to distrust all strangers, especially one who had already deceived them by pretending to be someone they had known for years. Nobody would have anything to do with him. He began to drop things and to trip. He had a shy and hopeful manner in each new contact, and he was always disappointed. Because he needed a friend so desperately, he never found one. He grew awkwardly into a tall, strange, dreamy boy with fragile eyes and a very delicate mouth whose tentative, groping smile collapses instantly into hurt disorder at every fresh rebuff. (112)

We can distinguish between two different parts in this extract regarding the projection of negative subworlds. The first part is introduced by the clause (1) *the realization that he was not (...), Caleb Major*, and is expanded by two other negative clauses: (2) *about whom he knew absolutely nothing* and (3) *and about whom nobody else had ever heard before*. These clauses create a non-factual domain which contrasts with the status quo in the text actual world, and which can be summarised as a contrast between the propositions *Major Major is Caleb* and *Major Major is not Caleb*. However, while clause (1) carries out the prototypical function described in the

discussion of the theoretical framework above, the two other clauses are more difficult to account for. Thus, clause (1) deletes the information that was previously presented in the text world that a certain character was called Caleb. In this sense, it can be said that the negative subworld carries out a correcting function, in that it corrects an assumption that is wrongly held. Clauses (2) and (3) are odd (and sound funny), because they are based on an identification of a name and a person, in such a way that the name *is* the person[8]. Thus, Major Major is confused when he finds out that his real name is different from what he thought, but not because his father has deceived him, or because he doesn't like the name, or because it is simply not nice to find out someone has lied to you about your real name. He is confused because this event produces in him a strong identity crisis which has extreme consequences, not only on him but on the people that surround him. Seen in the light of the whole novel, where problems of identity are recurrent for several characters, we can say that this extract underlines the importance of identity as something that is imposed from outside, rather than something a character develops as an internal property. Thus, it becomes more important to know a character's name (is it Caleb or Major?) than to know his internal characteristics as a person. Furthermore, the external attribute, unlike internal properties, is always arbitrary, and this arbitrariness is stressed by the fact that Major Major's father takes up the responsibility of giving his son a name as a playful joke on

his fate. Thus, the clauses (2) *about whom he knew absolutely nothing* and (3) *and about whom nobody else had ever heard before*, can be said to expand on the negative subworld introduced by clause (1), by pointing out the *lack of identity* of the character determined by the fact that he has a new name.

Part 2 of the extract is introduced by the clause (1) *What playmates he had withdrew from him and never returned*, which projects the second negative subworld in this episode. This second subworld is developed by the following negative clauses (2) *Nobody would have anything to do with him* and (3) *Because he needed a friend so desperately, he never found one*. The negative subworld developed by the propositions in these clauses can be said to focus on interpersonal consequences of his change of name: people refuse to have anything to do with him any more. In this sense, the negative subworld projected here deletes previously existing parameters in the text world regarding assumptions and inferences about other people's behaviour with regard to Major Major. There is a change from a positive and friendly attitude to a negative distancing attitude of rejection (*nobody would have anything to do with him, he never found [a friend]*).

To summarise, we can say that negation is used in this extract in order to project two related non-factual domains, one focusing on Major Major's loss of identity when he finds out his real name, and the other focusing of the interpersonal consequences of the first event, which lead to an attitude of rejection of others towards Major Major. Both subworlds alter

parameters set up in the text world with regard to assumptions and inferences a reader may hold regarding the properties of Major Major as a character; these changes prove to lead to dramatic consequences. However, this change takes place because an unusual equation is established between the identity of a person and that person's name, in such a way that the name *is* the person. In section 3.6. below I will comment further on this extract by pointing out how negation is linked to the expression and development of conflict in the text world.

3.4.2. Negative accommodation

In this section I analyse an extract where the second function of a negative subworld takes place, that of negative accommodation, as defined in section 3.3.4. above. The extract closes the long episode of Clevinger's trial, when Clevinger, a clever soldier who is always trying to do his duty as a soldier well beyond what is actually required by the military regulations, is considered to be under suspicion by the higher military officers. These bring charges against him for no particular reason (see a discussion of this episode in chapter 7). In example (14) Yossarian is talking to Clevinger just after the trial has finished.

> (14) Yossarian had done his best to warn him the night before. 'You haven't got a chance, kid,' he told him glumly. 'They hate Jews.' 'But I'm not Jewish,' answered Clevinger.
> 'It will make no difference,' Yossarian promised, and Yossarian was right. 'They're after everybody.'
> Clevinger recoiled from their hatred as though from a blinding light. These three men who hated him spoke his

> language and wore his uniform, but he saw their loveless faces set immutably into cramped, mean lines of hostility and understood instantly that nowhere in the world, not in all the fascist tanks or planes or submarines, not in the bunkers behind the machine guns or mortars or behind the blowing flame throwers, not even among all the expert gunners of the crack Hermann Goering Antiaircraft Division or among the grisly connivers in all the beer halls in Munich and everywhere else were there men who hated him more. (106-107)

The episode contains the two uses of negation dicussed above, negation whose function is to update information in the text world and negative accommodation. The first function can be observed in the first part of the extract, in sentences (1) *You haven't got a chance, kid*, (2) *But I'm not Jewish*, and (3) *It will make no difference* [9]. While in extract (13) the first three clauses could be seen as constituting one common domain, in this case, the interpersonal function is more prominent, and for this reason each of the negative utterances projects a different domain which modifies the preceding utterance. The process can be described as being based on an illogical assumption: Yossarian, using one of his typical faulty logic arguments, inverts the relation 'the whole can stand for the part' to establish that 'a part can stand for the whole'. In the terms of the example, the higher officers are against everybody (the whole), which includes Jews (a part), consequently, it doesn't matter whether I take a part or the whole since the result will be the same. Yossarian's first utterance, *you haven't got a chance*, thus denies Clevinger's possible assumption that he might have a chance to be acquitted. Clevinger's reaction, *But I'm not Jewish*, denies Yossarian's implication that he might be Jewish (*They hate*

Jews). Yossarian's last utterance denies Clevinger's utterance by revealing the peculiar logic of his argument, *It makes no difference*, and denying the validity of Clevinger's excuse, that of not being Jewish.

From the point of view of what are standard assumptions about communicative behaviour, this exchange is odd, in the sense that it would have been much more economical and straightforward for Yossarian to say: *You haven't got a chance, they're after everybody*. In this way, Yossarian would be denying an assumption (and hope) that Clevinger could be declared innocent.

In terms used by Relevance theory, the processing effort would be balanced by the contextual effects, as the utterance would be maximally efficient. Yossarian's utterances, however, impose a very high processing effort with apparently no gain in contextual effects, at least for Clevinger. However, it can be said that the gain in contextual effects is directed to the reader. By expanding the exchange by means of Yossarian's inverted-logic process, attention is brought, once again, to arbitrariness as a pervading factor in life for the men in Pianosa. This time, the arbitrariness has to do with the identity of the person as belonging to a community or social group; it doesn't matter whether you're Jewish or not, even if Jews are pointed out as being particularly apt to be the object of persecution, thus making reference to events in World War II. It doesn't matter because anybody may be persecuted,

irrespective of their social identity. This seems to justify arbitrariness as a means of linguistic and logical expression. The way this arbitrariness is focused on by Yossarian's peculiar reasoning process reveals the need to understand the reading process in general and the function of negation in particular as dynamic. It is not until the reader has reached the sentence *They're after everybody* that the reader becomes aware of the implications of the previous exchange[10]. Thus, the reader is led from believing that the higher officers may share an underlying fascist ideology with the enemy in persecuting Jews to realising that the higher officers' hate is extended to include everybody.

Turning now to the second part of the extract, we find that the use of negation here corresponds to what has been defined above as negative accommodation, that is, the simultaneous presentation and denial of an item. This function is carried out by the following negative clauses (some of which are elliptical): (1) *nowhere in the world*, (2) *not in all the fascist tanks or planes*, (3) *or [not in] submarines*, (4) *not in the bunkers behind the machine guns*, (5) *or [not in] mortars*, (6) *or [not] behind the blowing flame throwers*, (7) *not even among all the expert gunners of the crack Hermann Goering Antiaircraft Division*, (8) *or among the grisly connivers in all the beer halls in Munich*. In each of these clauses, an item is presented and its presence denied. The negative clauses can be said to project two parallel domains, one referring to the higher

officers and their hatred towards Clevinger, and another one referring to the Germans, the real enemy. The presence of the German as enemies is precisely introduced by means of the negative clauses: *not in all the fascist tanks or planes, not even among all the expert gunners, or among the grisly connivers in all the beer halls in Munich*, etc.. However, their power as a 'real' enemy is denied. This leads to the identification of a potentially more fearful enemy in the higher officers of the American army (*men who hated him more*). The episode is striking precisely because it inverts the set of assumptions a soldier has regarding who is the enemy. In this passage, we are told that no matter how terrible the Germans may be, there are other men who are even more dangerous, and they are Americans too.

To summarise some of the main points discussed above, in examples (13) and (14), the reader's interpretation of the ongoing story is subject to continuous revision and reinterpretation as the reading proceeds. Negation carries out a crucial role in this process of up-dating and re-channelling previously held assumptions, sometimes with unexpected consequences, as I have tried to show in the preceding discussion.

3.5. Possible worlds and fictional worlds

Possible world theory has been extremely influential with regard to the discussion of the ontological properties of fictional entities. Indeed, it presents an alternative to the

speech act approach to literariness, where fictional discourse is defined as a 'weaker' or 'pretended' form of assertion (see Searle 1975, Pratt 1977, Petrey 1990, McHale 1987). In this view, inconsistencies within the discourse and figurative uses of language, such as metaphor and irony, are interpreted by means of indirect speech acts or by means of conversational implicature (see Pratt 1977). While speech act theory concentrates on the characteristics and the definition of the type of force of the utterances expressed within the fictional world, and of the fictional text itself as a 'mega utterance', possible world theory applied to the study of fiction focuses on the definition of the boundaries of what a fictional world is and the description of the internal properties of that world. As Dolezel (1989: 221) points out, possible world theory considers fictionality from the perspective of two problems: (a) the ontological status of fiction as a nonexistent object; (b) the logical status of representation. Dolezel (op. cit.: 228-29) observes that, while in pragmatic theories these problems are solved in terms of conventions and pretended assertions as explained above, possible world theory offers a view based on two main principles (ibid.):

(a) possible worlds are possible states of affairs.

(b) the set of fictional worlds is unlimited and maximally varied.

The former principle solves the problem of assigning reference to non-existent entities, as reference will exist within the particular world where the entity is located. For example, Hamlet, as a character in a fictional play, has sense

and reference within that play, within that world. The latter principle allows for a redefinition of possible world theory where even a world which does not follow the Law of Non Contradiction is possible. This view is based on the assumption that even the 'real' or actual world which we inhabit is a construct (see also Lewis 1979, Eco, 1989 and Ryan 1991b); this means that it is also defined as a possible world among others. Each world is the actual world for the characters who inhabit it (see Lewis 1979: 184). This assumption has important consequences on the way we conceptualise the relation between fiction and reality. As McHale points out (1987: 34), the possible worlds approach both complicates the view of the internal ontological structure of fiction, and it also blurs the external boundary that differentiates it from reality. According to McHale (ibid.) classical pragmatic and semantic theories have been particularly careful to keep the distinction of boundaries between reality and fiction as clear as possible. Possible world theory as outlined by Lewis (op. cit.), Dolezel (op. cit) and Ryan (op. cit.) leads to a weakening of the limits between different worlds, bringing into focus aspects where fiction and reality overlap and diverge.

Indeed, according to Eco (1989: 344), the functional interest of possible world theory applied to the understanding of fiction lies precisely in its adequacy for the explanation of how a possible world diverges from the actual world. Possible world theory taken in these terms seems to be particularly adequate for the description of conflictive texts

from an ontological perspective, an aspect that is typical of postmodernist fiction. For a discussion of how conflictive ontologies are accounted for in terms of this theory see McHale (1987) and Dolezel (1989).

3.5.1. Ryan's (1991b) model of fictional worlds

In the following sections I discuss Ryan's (1985, 1991a, 1991b) contribution to possible world theory as applied to the description of conflict in fictional worlds. As explained above, this framework is intended to complement what has been said about text worlds in the sections above, by providing further instruments of analysis which focus on conflict and its expression in the fictional world.

Ryan takes up the view of possible worlds discussed above where a fictional world is seen as a possible world, and where reality, or our actual world, is also another possiblity within what is better defined as a 'universe' of alternate possible worlds. The author (1991a: 553) points out, however, that the acceptance of the ontological status of fictional texts as possible worlds is not enough in itself, and it certainly does not justify the existence of fictional worlds which are internally contradictory or otherwise conflictive. Further specifications regarding the notion of possibility and the accessibility relations between different worlds need to be made in order to provide a convincing account of fiction in terms of possible world theory.

Ryan (1991a) takes up Kripke's (1971: 64) original distinction of the three basic elements regarding the notion of a possible world and borrows also the important notion of *accessibility*, which substitutes that of logical possibility, as explained in section 3.2. above. According to Kripke (ibid.) a possible world is defined according to three main elements: (a) the actual world (henceforth AW), the possible world (henceforth PW) and the relation between them. On the basis of these observations and Dolezel's theory of multiple worlds, Ryan (op. cit.: 554) develops a model based on the idea that a text as a semantic domain is not a single world, but, rather, it projects a 'system of worlds' (ibid.) or universe which is centred around the 'textual actual world' (ibid.). Further, the mental representations produced by characters's beliefs, wishes, dreams, fantasies, etc., constitute alternate possible worlds within the textual system (cf. Werth's system of subworlds described in section 3.3.2. above).

Ryan's (1991) theory provides a combination of Lewis's (1979) indexical theory of possibility, where 'every possible world is real' (Ryan, 1991b: 18) and Rescher's (1979) defense of the privileged status of reality as 'the actual world'. Ryan does this by means of the notion of *recentering*, whereby a possible world becomes temporarily the actual world, as in dreams, hallucinations and children's make believe games. In these cases there is a temporary shift from the parameters defined in the actual world to those established in an alternate possible world. According to this, possible worlds

are actual worlds from the point of view of their inhabitants (Ryan, op. cit.: 554). The notion of recentering, also allows us to reconcile the view that there is only one actual world, in the sense of 'real world', and the fact that fictional worlds, which in absolute terms are alternate possible worlds, are accepted 'as if' they were temporarily actual worlds in themselves.

The author (op. cit.: 555) observes that the notion of fictional recentering is based on a distinction among three modal systems: 1) the actual world (AW); 2) the textual universe, at the centre of which is the text actual world (TAW); and 3) the Text Reference World (TRW), the system the text actual world represents. The author further explores the relations between the three modal systems, and, in particular, the degrees of divorce that may take place between them. These differences revolve mainly around the factors that distinguish the AW and the TAW or TRW in different genres. In fiction, which is our main interest here, the divorce lies in the fact that the TAW does not refer to the AW but to the TRW:

> Fiction is characterised by the open gesture of recentering, through which an APW (Alternate Possible World) is placed at the center of the conceptual universe. This alternate possible world becomes the world of reference. The world-image produced by the text differes from the AW - except in the genre of true fiction (...) - but it accurately reflects its own world of reference, the TRW, since the TRW does not exist independently of its own representation. The TAW thus becomes indistinguishable from its own referent. (Ryan, 1991a: 556)

The differences between AW and TAW are further accounted for in terms of accessibility relations between worlds, which I explain in section 3.4.1.1. below.

3.5.1.1. Accessibility relations between worlds

A world is defined as possible when it is accessible from the world at the centre of the system. In philosophy and logic, possibility, and hence accessibility, are interpreted in logical terms, so that a world is possible if it satisfies the Laws of Non Contradiction and of the Excluded Middle. As explained in chapter 2, this means that in order for a proposition to be acceptable in a possible world, it has to be either true or false in that possible world but not both. This view would immediately classify many fictional worlds as impossible worlds. Ryan (1991a, 1991b), following other philosophers, such as Kripke (1971) and Lewis (1979), proposes a redefinition of the notion of accessibility which is based on epistemic rather than logical principles, and which establishes different criteria according to which a given world may diverge from the characteristics of our actual world as we know it.

With regard to this point, Ryan (1991a: 558) establishes a difference between two types of transworld relation:

> (a) the domain of the relations between AW and TAW, which is a trans-world or trans-universe relation;
>
> (b) the intra-universe domain of the relations which can be established between the TAW and the alternatives that are projected within that world.

The relations between AW and TAW describe the degree of resemblance (and divergence) between the system represented by the TAW as compared to reality, while the relations between

worlds within a system provide the internal structure of the textual universe (Ryan, op. cit.: 558). I discuss the former in this section, while the latter is discussed in section 3.4.1.2. below.

The author (op. cit.: 558-559) provides a list of what she considers to be the accessibility relations from the AW and which are involved in the construction of the TAW. They are reproduced in the list below (Ryan 1991a: 32-33):

> a. Identity of properties: The TAW is accessible for the AW if the objects common to TAW and AW share the same properties. b. Identity of inventory. The accessibility depends on whether the TAW and the AW are furnished with the same objects.
>
> c. Compatibility of inventory. The TAW is accessible from the AW if the TAW's inventory includes all the members of the AW, as well as some native members.
>
> d. Chronological compatibility. The TAW is accessible from AW if it takes no temporal relocation for a member of AW to contemplate the entire history of TAW.
>
> e. Physical compatibility. TAW is accessible from AW if they share the same natural laws.
>
> f. Taxonomic compatibility. TAW is accessible from AW if both worlds contain the same species and they have the same properties.
>
> g. Logical compatibility. TAW is accessible from AW if it follows the Laws of non-contradiction and of the excluded

middle.

h. Analytical compatibility. TAW is accessible from AW if they share analytical truths, i.e., if objects designated by the same words have the same essential properties.

i. Linguistic compatibility. TAW is accessible from AW if the language in which TAW is described can be understood in AW.

I will provide examples of the different types of accessibility relations. Ryan (ibid.) points out that a TAW may be accessible from the AW regarding all aspects, but there is always one in which they differ, and that is the fact that the sender of the fictional text is situated in the AW and not in the TAW or TRW. According to Ryan (1991a: 33) identity of properties and of inventory are characteristic of accurate nonfiction, such as journalism, and true fiction, such as stories based on true facts, like, for example, Truman Capote's *In Cold Blood*. In historical novels like *War and Peace*, on the other hand, we have identity of properties, but not identity of inventory, where this is substituted by 'expanded inventory' (ibid.). In the genre referred to as 'historical fabulation' (1991a: 36), identity of properties is transgressed in order to create alternative possibilities to the lives of historical characters. This would be characteristic of a story where Napoleon travels to New Orleans or Hitler wins the war. Emancipation from chronological compatibility is characteristic of science fiction, which might otherwise maintain all other

accessibility relations intact. Transgression of natural laws is found in fictions about ghosts or Kafka's *Metamorphosis*, and trasgression of taxonomic compatibility in fairy tales with TAWs populated by fairies and dragons, for example, *The Lord of the Rings*. Emancipation from logical compatibility leads to nonsense, such as nonsense poetry or postmodern fictions where contradictory events are part of the fiction. Nonsense or absurdity may also be induced by transgressing analytical compatibility (Ryan 1991a: 38), in such a way that objects described do not have the properties they have in the AW, for example, a horse that has the properties of a computer. To end, linguistic incompatibility appears in fictions which make use of invented language, such as Lewis Carroll's *Jabberwocky*. Ryan (op. cit.: 39) also points out that there may be undecidable relations, which arise from internal instabilities of the text world. I will not go into the details of these text types, as it is a point that does not directly concern the analysis of my corpus.

In the terms described above, the TAW of *Catch-22* can be said to conform to identity of properties, expanded inventory, physical compatibility, taxonomic compatibility, analytical compatibility and linguistic compatibility. This has to do with the pseudo-historical character of the novel, which is supposed to tell the story of an American squadron in Europe during World War II. However, it does not conform to compatibility of inventory, as imaginary characters populate the fictional world, and it does not conform to chronological or logical

compatibility either. These last two are closely connected. The transgression of chronolgy is manifested in the chaotic structure of the novel, whose time development cannot be recovered linearly without incurring in contradiction (see the discussion in chapter 1). Although the contradictions in this sense are not immediately obvious to the reader, and thus prevent the novel from being truly postmodern in this sense[11], the transgression of temporal sequencing does contribute to the projection of a world which seems to be suspended in time, where it is difficult to establish a beginning and an end. This is also related to the image of circularity and closedness that characterise this fictional world. These aspects are reinforced by the emancipation from criterion g. logical compatibility. Ryan observes (op. cit.: 565):

> Emancipation from G. Logical, opens the gates to the realm of nonsense. (...) nonsense is characterised by the rejection of the law of noncontradiction. *P* and *not-P* can be true, not just in separate worlds of the textual universe, but in its actual world as well.

It is important to point out that the transgression of the logical component in *Catch-22* does not take place in the way it does in postmodern fiction, where this kind of transgression is manifested by means of contradictory events or states, such as the fact that a character may be both dead and alive at the same time, or that alternative story lines may take place simultaneously. In *Catch-22*, the transgression of logical principles is carried out by means of linguistic manipulation, it is the language use that is not logical. Ryan does not consider this possibility, since the only linguistic transgressions she mentions are the use of nonsense language

or the use of an invented language. In *Catch-22*, logical incompatibility is manifested by means of a kind of determinism which establishes a cause-effect relation between language use and reality. Linguistically, this may be described in general terms as a violation of pragmatic principles which are rooted in semantic and logical relations.

An example is that of the extract (13), discussed in the last sections of this chapter, where we are told how Major Major realises his name is different from what he has thought for several years. The realisation that he has a different name produces in him an identity crisis which changes his life radically, as nobody else recognises him for who he is any longer. This can be explained as a phenomenon where language determines reality in a way that goes against standard assumptions about logical relations and how they are coded pragmatically. Thus, the logic of the world of catch-22 as manifested in the episode about Major Major, seems to rely on the assumption that there is a one-to-one relation between a name and a referent. That is, if the name *Caleb* stands for a particular entity in a world, the name *Major* must stand for a different entity in the same world. This reasoning process goes against the well-known pragmatic principle that different referring expressions can be used to pick out one single entity at a time (e.g: I can refer to a certain person as *that man over there, Mr. Smith* or *the philosophy Professor*).

While the set of criteria discussed in this section identify differences and similarities between the fictional

world and the Actual World, the categories discussed in section 3.4.1.2. below provide the means of analysisng degrees and types of conflict within the fictional universe.[12]

3.5.1.2. The narrative universe

The idea of how conflict develops within the fictional universe is dealt with by Ryan in her (1985) article and in chapter 6 of her (1991) book. In these two works an initial distinction is established between two types of worlds, which correspond approximately to the definitions of 'text world' and 'subworlds' in Werth's (1995c) framework, and their corresponding relations of accessibility. Ryan (1985: 720) classifies them as the Text Actual World, which has 'an autonomous or absolute existence' within the universe where it belongs, and characters' domains, 'whose existence is relative to somebody, i.e., which exist through the mental act of a character' (Ryan ibid.). Ryan (1991: 112) also establishes a difference of interpretation levels which can be compared to Werth's distinction between the 'discourse world' and the 'text world' (see sections under 3.3. above). In Ryan (ibid.) the distinction is established as a difference between what she calls the *semantic domain* of the text, which contains 'all the meanings suggested by a text, the set of all the valid inferences and interpretations' (ibid.) and the *narrative universe*, 'the collection of facts established for the various worlds of the system' (ibid.). This distinction seems to require the presence of the reader in the concept of *semantic*

domain, while the narrative universe is defined as existing independently from reader and writer. The definitions used by Werth seem more adequate for the explanation of the textual and contextual components of the two notions, in particular with regard to the degree of detail in accounting for the communication process from a more rigorous linguistic perspective, but Ryan's concepts are valid for her own purposes. For this reason, I will not discuss the details of Ryan's (1991b) definitions regarding the textual universe as an ontological entity, as I will adopt Werth's more linguistically oriented definitions of text and discourse.

In this section I will concentrate on Ryan's (1991b) proposal for an internal structure of worlds as a basis for the explanation of conflict. Her model complements Werth's (1995c) distinction between types of subworlds described in section 3.3.2. above. What Ryan has to contribute to Werth's framework is the degree of detail regarding the variations in the internal configuration of subworlds, and the explicit account of how different kinds of inconsistencies are connected to the creation of conflict. By combining these two frameworks I am attempting to cover both the linguistic account of how worlds are created and projected, as described by Werth, and how the configuration of these worlds contributes to the creation of conflict, as described by Ryan.

3.5.1.3. The components of the fictional world

In Ryan (1991b) the text actual world (TAW) of the

fictional universe is defined as 'a succession of different states and events which together form a history' (op. cit.: 113). In addition to this central domain, there are other regions which may exist absolutely or relative to the private world-view of specific characters (cf. Werth's participant-accessible and character-accessible subworlds). For example, in *Alice in Wonderland* there is a clear difference between the TAW where Alice and her sister are sitting on a bank and the alternate world created by Alice by means of her dream. In this case, the dream occupies the centre of the story, while in other fictions it may be otherwise. Strictly speaking, all subworlds constitute alternate possible worlds with respect to the central TAW. Ryan (op.cit.: 114) distinguishes the following types:

1. **Authentic worlds**: they are opposed to pretended worlds, and imply that the propositions creating them are sincere. There are several types.

(a) **K-world** (or belief/knowledge world). Each K-world is defined with regard to the realisation of relevant propositions with reference to the operators of necessity, possibility or impossibility reinterpreted in narrative terms. Thus, in the epistemic system of knowledge, they are translated into knowledge, belief and ignorance (Ryan, op. cit.: 114). The author (op. cit.: 115) points out that the concept of knowledge is straigtforward, and is described as follows: 'a character "knows" a proposition *p*, when he or she holds it for true in the reference world and *p* is objectively true in this world.'

(ibid.). The notion of impossibility would involve a contrary-to-fact proposition. Possibility involves an incomplete representation, and is more complex and more difficult to account for. The most interesting observation with regard to this type of K-wold is its characteristic indeterminacy, which may take place for one of two reasons: incompleteness or partiality. An incomplete K-world leaves propositions unanswered. Ryan (ibid.) provides an example of a detective wondering who might be the murderer in the case he's working on. A partial K-world involves not knowing some of the facts from the actual world. Ryan (ibid.) gives an example of a character who is unaware that another character has been murdered. According to this, we can establish a system for the computation of characters' K-worlds by means of checking propositions by assigning them the following operators (Ryan, ibid.):

+ (correspondence, knowledge): x holds p firmly for true
- (conflict, misbelief): x holds p firmly for false, while p is true
0 (absence, ignorance): p is unknown to x
i (indeterminacy, uncertainty): x is either uncommitted to the truth of p or leans to some degree toward the truth (i.e. considers p possible, probable, unlikely, etc.)

Finally, Ryan (op. cit.: 116) points out that K-worlds may contain other K-worlds, so that a potentially infinite structure of embedded K-worlds may be created. Hypothetical structures are classified as prospective extensions of K-worlds and are often related to the projection of plans and goals.

(b) **O-world** (or obligation world). This type of subworld is defined as follows: 'a system of commitments and prohibitions defined by social rules and moral principles.' (Rayn, op. cit.:

116). These rules allow us to classify actions as allowed (possible), obligatory (necessary) or prohibited (impossible). Stability and lack of conflict with respect to this subworld are defined by the realisation of all obligations and the non-realisation of transgressions. Variations of this pattern lead to the establishment of different conflictive plots and different resolutions, such as the punishement of infringement of laws or the reward of the realisation of merits. Other conflicts may arise because characters may belong to different communities with conflicting obligations.

(c) **W-world** (or wish world) establishes what is good and what is bad in terms of the individual's desires. Thus it contrasts with the moral obligations institutionally imposed by means of O-worlds. Typical desired states are the possession of objects or other desired things, such as success, wealth, etc., and typical desired events are gratifying activities (op. cit.: 117). The satisfaction of a W-world takes place when the propositions labelled as 'good' are satisfied in the TAW. The non-satisfaction of desires will produce conflicts of different types. An important observation made by the author (ibid.) is that the notions of 'good' and 'bad' are relative and should be seen as extremes on a cline which may vary throughout the fictional work.

2. **Pretended worlds**: Unlike authentic worlds, they involve the entertainment of insincere propositions. A character may construct a private world in order to deceive another character. In this way, the complete domain of a character will

contain sincere beliefs, obligations and wishes, and mock beliefs, obligations and wishes if he or she constructs pretended worlds.

In addition to the subworlds described above, there is another type labelled as 3. **F-universes** which expresses creations of the mind, such as dreams, hallucinations, fantasies and fictional stories created by characters within the fictional world. They are defined as universes because they require an operation of recentering, whereby actuality is temporarily shifted to what in global terms is seen as an alternate possible world. Thus, a dream will have an actual domain and a set of characters' domains and subworlds, just in the same way as the Text Actual World.

In the next section I describe the relations that can be established between different worlds and how conflict arises.

3.5.1.4. Conflict in the fictional world

As in Werth (1995c), Ryan's (1991b) model of fiction is a dynamic system, where such dynamism is dictated by the desire of characters 'to make the TAW coincide with as many as possible of their private worlds' (op. cit.: 119). In this view, conflict develops when there is an imbalance between the private domain of a character and the status quo of the TAW. Particularly important is the observation that conflict is not

just a factor in the complication of plot, but, rather, a more or less permanent condition of fictional worlds. This observation has always been valid for drama, and it can be argued that also in narrative conflict is a primary source for the development of a story (arguably, conflict is also a permanent state of ordinary life).

Ryan (op. cit.: 120) establishes a typology of narrative conflicts depending on (a) the type of subworld which departs from the TAW, and (b) 'the relative position of worlds within a character's domain' (ibid.).

(1) Conflicts between the TAW and private worlds

The most frequent conflict of this type involves an unrealised wish. This pattern gives rise to the quest, which is typical of medieval literature and fairy tales but is also present in a less obvious way in other genres. A conflict with an O-world leads to typical patterns of prohibition-violation-punishement, mission-accomplishement-reward, etc. A conflict involving K-worlds may produce errors, which can be spontaneous, as in tragedy, or the product of deceit, as in comedy. It can also produce enigmas, which correspond to indeterminate or incomplete K-worlds. (Ryan, op. cit.: 121)

(2) Conflicts within a character's domain

Conflicts of this type arise when the satisfaction of one world within a character's domain implies the nonsatisfaction of another (op. cit.: 121). They may include patterns such as a conflict between a W-world and an O-world, when social

conventions prohibit behaviour desirable for characters, such as murder or adultery.

(3) Conflicts within a private world

In this case, private worlds cannot be satisfied because there are internal inconsistencies within worlds, such as contradictory desires, or a lack of definition of the borders of internal worlds, as in postmodern fiction (op. cit.: 122).

(4) Conflicts between the private domains of different characters

This type of conflict is possibly the most usual source of conflict in narrative, since it is based on the creation of antagonism between different characters. Such antagonism is rooted in the fact that the satisfaction of the private world of one character will imply the non-satisfaction of a private world in another character. This is most obvious in cases where two (or more) characters are opposed in a hero-villain pattern (op. cit.: 122).

3.6. An application of Ryan's (1991b) model to the analysis of negation and conflict in *Catch-22*

In this section I wish to apply Ryan's framework to the analysis of conflict in an extract from *Catch-22*. The extract is the same one discussed in section 3.5.1. above, where it was analysed from the perspective of Werth's (1995c) framework. The extract is reproduced under (15) below (for an explanation of

the context in which it occurs see section 3.5.1. above):

> (13) On Major Major himself the consequences were only slightly less severe. It was a harsh and stunning realization that was forced upon him at so tender an age, the realization that he was not, as he had always been led to believe, Caleb Major, but instead was some total stranger named Major Major Major about whom he knew absolutely nothing and about whom nobody else had ever heard before. What playmates he had withdrew from him and never returned, disposed, as they were, to distrust all strangers, especially one who had already deceived them by pretending to be someone they had known for years. Nobody would have anything to do with him. He began to drop things and to trip. He had a shy and hopeful manner in each new contact, and he was always disappointed. Because he needed a friend so desperately, he never found one. He grew awkwardly into a tall, strange, dreamy boy with fragile eyes and a very delicate mouth whose tentative, groping smile collapses instantly into hurt disorder at every fresh rebuff. (112)

As in section 3.5.1. above, we can consider the extract as consisting of two different parts, each projecting complementary domains. The first domain is introduced by the sentnece *It was a harsh and stunning realization that he was not, as he had always been led to believe*, and which goes on up to *about whom nobody else had heard before*. The word *realization* is a world-creating predicate which introduces the domain expanded by means of the *that*-clause. The negative subworld (*that he was not...*) provides evidence of the existence of a conflict between Major Major's K-world or knowledge/belief world and the status quo in the Text Actual World. This can be expressed as meaning that Major Major thinks he is somebody and finds out that he is somebody else. The conflict arises because of the character's ignorance of the facts in the actual world.

The second part of the extract, which goes from *What*

playmates he had withdrew from him to the end, expresses a different conflict, which is the direct consequence of the previous event. This conflict is between the different domains of Major Major and other characters. The conflict can be described as a conflict between different wish-worlds, where Major Major's wish to have friends and be accepted socially is not satisfied, as it is contrary to other characters' wish worlds to have nothing to do with him. Although the reaction on the part of the characters towards Major Major may seem unjustified, it shows a recurrent aspect in the novel, which is the development of conflict from a situation of deceit. In this case, the deceitful situation has been created by Major Major's father, who has made his son believe he was called Caleb. This has produced an imbalance in the text world, between the actual situation (his son's name is Major) and the knowledge/belief worlds of his son and everybody else (his name is Caleb).

A striking feature of this episode from the perspective discussed above, is that such a trivial question as a character's change of name may lead to a conflictive situation and to the marginalisation of the character. In addition to the idea of arbitrariness mentioned in section 3.5.1. above and referring to the way in which identity is identified by means of external attributes, such as names, we can also talk of absurdity in that characters rely more on external temporary attributes rather than on internal permanent properties.

Now, if we consider the type of complex world projected

in this extract, we can ask ourselves to what extent it conforms with the characteristics of the real world and to what extent it differs from it by using Ryan's (1991a: 32-33) table of accessibility relations between worlds in order to identify such similarities and differences (see section 3.4.1.1. above). As I already pointed out above, this extract shows a transgression of logical principles, in the sense that an unacceptable cause-effect relation is established between a linguistic act of naming and a 'real' act of being: you are your name; furthermore, I also pointed out that there was a violation of a pragmatic principle whereby one referring expression may be used to pick out different entities in the world. The combination of these trasgressions with otherwise normal features produces the odd image of this world. However, more information is needed in order to identify in a more exact way why it is that a description such as the one discussed here is unacceptable for the reader. This will be expanded upon by making reference to how knowledge is stored and processed and how expectations are defeated in the reading process, which is discussed in chapter 5.

3.7. Conclusions

In this chapter I have discussed two different approaches to text world theory with the idea of complementing the approaches to negation as a discourse phenomenon presented in chapter 2. I have pointed out the ways in which Werth's (1995c)

framework can contribute to the interpretation of the function of negation within the perspective of a dynamic discourse framework. This framework can be said to expand significantly on the frameworks discussed in chapter 3 by means of systematising the ontological properties of negatives within a text world framework. This has the advantage of providing a view of discourse negation where it projects a subworld which has specific functions within the text world. These functions have been described as (a) up-dating information previously introduced in the text world by means of explicit propositions, inferences or frame knowledge, and (b) to present and deny an item at the same time, by means of the phenomenon of negative accommodation.

I have also described how this framework can be expanded by incorporating the typology of accessibility relations and conflict types proposed by Ryan (1991b) in her work on narrative fiction. This framework has provided useful tools for the identification of criteria which indicate points of similarity and conflict between the real world and the text fictional world. As applied to the analysis of negation, even though Ryan does not deal with this subject, I have proposed an analysis where the application of her criteria may be helpful in identifying the ways in which negation as a linguistic phenomenon contributes to the projection of a particular world. In this sense, I have pointed out that negation is closely connected to the transgression of logical principles within the text world, by means of contradictions

or the establishment of unacceptable logical relations of cause-effect and reference. However, a deeper understanding of the way in which such incompatibilities are developed is necessary, and I argue in chapter 4 that schema theory can greatly contribute to this by providing the means of analysing how expectations are created and defeated in the reading process.

Notes to chapter 3

1. See Enkvist (1989), Partee (1989) and Petöfi (1989) for different approaches to the integration of possible world theory into linguistic theory. Enkvist (1989) concentrates on the integration of possible world semantics in the process of comprehension and understanding of text, Partee (1989) focuses on the relevance of possible world theory to propositional semantics, and Petöfi (1989) summarises some of the main papers collected by Allén (1989) considering the contributions of possible world theory to linguistics in more general terms, though focusing on semantic and pragmatic aspects related to the sense-reference distinction.

2. Werth (1995.a, 1995.b and 1995c) distinguishes between two types of accessibility relations, which depend on the epistemic accessibility on the part of the reader with respect to domains defined within the text world. Thus, if a shift in time or place is presented directly by the narrator, these shifts from the basic text world story line will constitute domains directly accessible to the reader. They receive the name of *participant accessible subworlds*. However, if a shift from the text world parameters is introduced by means of a projection from the mind of a character, such as a wish, a hypothesis, a belief, etc., the domain defined hereby will not be directly accessible to the reader, as the reader has access to such a type of domain indirectly. These receive the name of *character accessible subworlds*.

3. For a discussion of the ontological status of possible worlds and their relation to the actual world see Loux (1979).

4. For a criticism of certain aspects of Ryan's (1991b) theory, together with praises of her contributions, see Semino's (1993) review of Ryan's (1991b) book.

5. See also Leech and Short's (1981: 281) classification of the different levels of interaction in the reading process:
writer------reader
narrator----interlocutor
character---character

6. The notion of *unconventional assertion*, of course, provides a different approach to the traditional notion of presupposition. According to Werth (1995c: 395) presuppositions are 'completely dependent upon the context they occur in', and not all the cases which are traditionally treated as presuppositions are considered to be so from the view of unconventional assertion. Thus, those cases where new information is introduced in a backgrounded way,

as the examples discussed in the present section, are not considered to be presuppositions at all, but a type of unconventional assertion.

7. By world parameters, the author (op.cit.: 296) refers to world-building (deictic) emenents, and knwledge frames together with associations and inferences.

8. As I argue in section 4.4.1.1. below, this oddity is linked to the wrongly held assumption that different referring expressions must necessarily pick out different referents in a world.

9. Negation of modal verbs and other world-creating predicates will be discussed in chapter 5.

10. My attention was directed to this fact by Clara Clavo (p.c.).

11. See McHale's (1987) discussion of postmodern fiction as compared to modernist fiction, and Aguirre's (1991) outline of postmodern features, in particular, the violation of the Law of Non-Contradiction.

12. For a review of Ryan's notion of fictionality based on these notions see Semino (1995). Semino criticises Ryan for her rigid definition of fictionality as based on expectations from real world facts.

Chapter 4: Negation, Frame Semantics and Schema Theory

> His speciality was alfalfa, and he made a good thing out of not growing any. The government paid him well for every bushel of alfalfa he did not grow. The more alfalfa he did not grow, the more money the government paid him, and he spent every penny he didn't earn on new land to increase the amount of alfalfa he did not produce.

4.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I analyse negation from the perspective of frame semantic theory and schema theory. For this purpose, the chapter is divided into two main parts, which deal with the following aspects: (a) an introduction to the principles of schema-theoretic models and a discussion of the frame-semantic view of negation defended by Fillmore (1982, 1985) and mentioned by Shanon (1981) and Pagano (1994); (b) an introduction to a more complex and dynamic conception of schema processing and change by discussing the more complex versions of schema theory provided by the models of Schank and Abelson (1977) and Schank (1982); and (c) a discussion of its applications to the notion of literariness; here I will focus on Cook's theory of discourse deviation and the notions of *schema refreshment* and *cognitive change*. Practical examples of the applications of schema theory and Cook's model of discourse deviation to the analysis of negation in *Catch-22* are carried out at the end of the chapter. In the last sections, I pay particular attention to the relation between negation and the creation of paradox and humour.

The present framework overlaps to some extent with the text world approaches discussed in chapter 3, in its

foregrounding of the cognitive aspects of text processing and understanding. In fact, the adoption of a text world model like the one proposed by Werth (1995c) and other authors, which contains the notion of frames, is easily compatible with a deeper analysis of the functions of stored knowledge units during processing. The possibility of this combination is discussed at length by Semino (1994, 1995) in her analysis of text worlds in poetry, where she proposes a combination of text world principles in the description of the internal structure of fictional worlds and schema theoretic principles applied to the processing of information projected by the fictional worlds (see the discussion of Ryan's (1991b) framework in chapter 3). Semino (1994: 125) argues that schema theory can contribute to text world theory because

> *the reader's perception of the world projected by a text depends on the* way in which his or her background knowledge is reinforced or challenged *during the process of interpretation.*

Frame semantics and schema theoretic models can contribute greatly to the understanding of negation in discourse and its function in the context of a literary work like *Catch-22*. The asymmetrical relation of negation with respect to the affirmative, and its description as involving the defeat of an expectation, as discussed in chapter 2, makes this structure particularly accessible to a schema theoretic approach: schemata are standardly defined as expectations; if negation is understood as the defeat of an expectation, we can understand the relation between a negative and a positive term in terms of the relation between the schemata or frames evoked

by each term. These are important aspects in the novel which is the object of analysis of the present work, and, consequently, the discussion of the present chapter will provide a background to the discussion of certain aspects in chapters 6 and 7. Furthermore, if we consider the function of negation from a more general discourse perspective, and, more particularly, if we consider its function within a literary work like *Catch-22*, schema theoretic principles regarding text processing and adaptation and change of schemata during the reading process may prove very enlightening. The models proposed by Schank and Abelson (1977), Schank (1982) and Cook (1994) have important contributions which, in the case of Cook's model, concern the processing of literary texts in this way, namely the notions of schema refreshment and cognitive change in literature mentioned above.

4.2. Schema theoretic approaches to text processing

In chapter I above, I mentioned some of the relevant principles of schema theory as applied to reading and discourse processing. I also pointed out the significance of an approach of this type to the understanding of literature. In chapter 3, I discussed a dynamic approach to discourse based on text-theoretical principles which also included the notion of packaged units of knowledge, there referred to as frames. In the following sections, I consider the relevance of schema theoretic principles and their application to the understanding of negation.

4.2.1. Historical background

The notion of schema goes back as far as the philosopher Kant, but is usually understood as developing from Bartlett's (1932) work *Remembering*, where he set the basis for later schema theoretic models in the 1970s. Bartlett's investigations showed that human memory of perceptual and textual data works by means of reference to previously lived experiences, which are activated during the recall process. This accounts for differences in recall of the same textual or visual data by different subjects, and, more particularly, for difficulties in remembering and understanding data from a different culture. Thus, the author carries out experiments where a story from an Indian community in North America is read to American subjects who then are asked to reproduce it. In the reproduction, it was proved that individuals changed the original story in order to adapt it to their own experience, thus providing evidence for the existence of schematic packages of information according to which we interpret new experience. Bartlett (op. cit.: 202: 12) points out that it is necessary to develop a theory which will account for how new schemata are produced, since schemata are not static elements but units with which we do things. This is a crucial question in the theories developed in the 1970s, when a revival of schema theory takes place.

Psychologists such as Bateson and Minsky and social anthropologists like Goffman contributed greatly to the development of schema theory in the 70s. Bateson (1972)

developed the idea of a 'frame' as a metalinguistic signal on the basis of his well-known research on the behaviour of monkeys. According to this author, the monkeys he observed used some kind of signal to tell a partner whether the actions they were engaged in were 'serious', like fight, or 'playful'. These observations were applied successfully to the observation of human activities, including the engagement in games of make believe and creation of fictional situations (see the discussion of this theory with reference to the notion of fictionality in chapter 1 above). Goffman (1974) applies the notion of frame to the classification of different interactive situations in communication. Minsky (1975) defines 'frames' as units that represent stereotyped situations with attached information regarding the expectations we have of that particular situation and our behaviour in it. He also introduces the notion of *slots* that are filled in at particular situations. Thus, as van Dijk and Kinstch explain (1983: 47) we may have a BUS schema which contains a series of variables, such as the actor roles 'driver' and 'passenger'. These variables are replaced by constants in specific situations, where they refer to particular persons. This view is the one which is standardly referred to when talking about frames and schemata in general terms.

A major contribution to the development of schema theory has been that of researchers in the fields of Artificial Intelligence (Schank and Abelson 1977, Schank 1982, Rumelhart 1980) and Second Language Acquisition (see, for example,

Carrell *et. al* 1988). Schank and Abelson (op. cit.) developed the well-known model where they systematise schemata according to four main types: scripts, plans, goals and themes. The dynamic aspects of processing which were not dealt with in this work are the focus of Schank's (1982) *Dynamic Memory*, where the author develops a model that can account for how schemata change and how new schemata may be created. This issue, also dealt with by Rumelhart (1980), is discussed more in detail in section 4.3.2. below.

Schemata are also incorporated in text or discourse theories as part of a cognitive theoretical background that accounts for aspects of text processing and understanding in the framework. This is the case of the discourse theories developed by van Dijk and Kinstch (1983), de Beaugrande (1980), de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) and Brown and Yule (1983), where schemata are considered to play crucial roles in the way text coherence is understood; finally, schemata or frames also play significant roles in the works of cognitive linguists such as Langacker (1990) and Lakoff (1982).

A problem with theories based on schema theoretic principles has been the lack of agreement on terminological issues. Thus, while the term 'schema' has been used in general terms by Artificial Intelligence researchers (see Schank and Abelson 1977) and ESL acquisition theories (see Carrel *et al.* 1988), other terms denoting similar concepts have been used in other fields, such as 'frame' (see Bateson 1972, Goffman 1974, Minsky 1975, Fillmore 1985, Werth 1995c), 'script' (Schank and

Abelson 1977) or 'scenario' (for a review of the terms see Brown and Yule 1983, chpater 4). For example, Schank and Abelson (1977) first introduce the now popular term SCRIPT to refer to frames that contain the conceptualisations of complex situations, such as the restaurant script.

The notion of frame is also incorporated by Werth (1995c) in his text world model. In chapter 4 we saw that frames were introduced in his model, together with world-building parameters, as significant factors which contribute to the creation and fleshing out of a text world. Werth (1995b: 197) distinguishes between frames that are derived from culturally shared expectations, and other frames which are specific to individual experiences. Furthermore, he argues that frame knowledge may be learned in two different ways, (a) by direct experience, or (b) by inferencing. Learning frames by inferencing often takes place by linguistic means, as we saw in the examples of negative accommodation in chapter 4, where an item was introduced and denied at the same time. Frames in Werth's model, then, constitute packages of information, both idiosyncratic and culturally shared, which enable the reader to fill out the details regarding the definition and description of the text world. They contain 'general knowledge and connected information, including opposites (antonyms)' (1995b: 198), and they determine the expectations a reader will develop throughout the process of reading a text.

In the present thesis, I will use both the terms schema and frame to stand for the same kind of concept, that is, a

packaged unit of information activated in discourse. It may be simple or more complex, in which case the specific type of schema or frame referred to will be defined at the appropriate places.

4.2.2. Characteristics and functions of schemata

I will now describe the characteristics and functions of schemata in discourse by making reference to some of the authors mentioned above and to other works that are relevant to this respect, which also provide a background to the discussion of Cook's framework in section 4.3.2. below.

Schemata and frames are defined in the following ways by different authors:

> A schema then, is a data structure for representing the generic concepts stored in memory. These are schemata representing our knowledge about all concepts: those underlying objects, situations, events, sequences of events, actions and sequences of actions. (Rumelhart 1980: 33)

> A schema is a description of a particular class of concepts and is composed of a hierarchy of schemata embedded within schemata. The representation at the top of the hierarchy is sufficiently general to capture the essential aspects of all members of the class. (Adams and Collins 1979: 3)

> By the term 'frame' I have in mind any system of concepts related in such a way that to understand any one of them you have to understand the whole structure in which it fits; when one of the things in such a structure is introduced into a text, or into a conversation, all of the others are automatically made available. (Fillmore 1982: 111)

> The prototype, like the frame, refers to an expectation about the world, based on prior experience, against which new experiences are measured and interpreted. (Tannen, 1993: 17).

Schemata, then, are packaged units of information which represent knowledge about objects, events, situations and sequences of actions. Not only are they organised in networks as indicated by Fillmore, but they are also organised hierarchically. The network patterning permits the

establishment of syntagmatic and paradigmatic associations with related schemata or frames, while the hierarchical organisation allows for the possibility of combining top-down and bottom-up processing modes in understanding.

As pointed out in chapter 1, the interaction of both processing modes is crucial for an understanding of text processing as an active procedure, rather than as a passive receptive skill based on decoding. While bottom-up procedures are based on decoding, top-down procedures work on higher level conceptualisations which help us to make hypotheses about the input. The importance of a combination of both modes is demonstrated by a series of experiments with second language learners where excessive reliance on one of the two modes may lead a learner to errors in processing (see Carrel *et al.* 1988, chapter 7). Thus, excessive trust on top-down processing modes may lead to vagueness and imprecisions, while excessive reliance on bottom-up processing may lead to deficiencies in the understanding of the more general and abstract concepts. In Carrel *et al.* (1988: 79) we also have the distinction between *content* schemata or *world* schemata and *formal* schemata, which correspond roughly to the distinction which Cook (1994) establishes between world schemata on the one hand and language and text schemata on the other.

Schemata are viewed by Rumelhart as providing the 'skeletons around which the situation is interpreted' (1980: 37). In this way, default elements are provided by schemata and particular variations characterising specific situations may

be indicated within the general 'skeleton' provided by the schema.

The notions of schema and frame rest upon the notion of expectation, since schemata and frames are used in order to understand new experience by making predictions and hypotheses about the new situations by comparing them to previous experiences collected in schematic packages (see Carrell et al, 1988, Tannen 1993: 16, Rumelhart 1980: 38-39). This leads to a dynamic view of schemata as discourse units, although the dynamic perspective is by no means common to all schema theories. An example of a dynamic view of the function of schemata in discourse processing is Rumelhart's theory, where schemata are considered as

> active computational devices capable of evaluating the quality of their own fit to the available data. That is, a schema should be viewed as a procedure whose function it is to determine whether, and to what degree, it accounts for the pattern of observations. (Rumelhart, 1980: 39)

Rumelhart goes on to point out that top-down and bottom-up processing modes are combined in order to obtain 'enough evidence in favour of a schema' (op. cit.: 42).

There is a close relation between the notions of schema or frame and that of prototype. As Tannen (1993: 17) points out, both have to do with expectations and knowledge of the world. Thus, in th Anglo-Saxon population, a word like ROBIN is a prototype of the family BIRD, which creates expectations in English speakers regarding what a bird should look like, by means of a paradigmatic comparison to other members of the class. The establishment of connections with other members in a class is also typical of schematic relations, which are

exemplified by Fillmore (1982: 111) by means of the word SON, which, in order to be understood, requires the understanding of the whole network of social relationships which are present in syntagmatically associated frames, such as FATHER, MOTHER, SISTER.

Semino (1994) points out that the difference between prototype theory and schema theory lies in the objectives of analysis of the two disciplines: while prototype theories (as in Rosch 1975) are concerned with the organisation of experience regarding objects, persons or actions, schema theories are concerned with more complex relations, such as the representation of sequences of actions, for example, the restaurant script. As Rumelhart (1980: 33) points out, a schema theory embodies a prototype theory. Similarly, Fillmore (1982: 117-118) observes:

> One generalization that seemed valid was that very often the frame or background against which the meaning of a word is defined and understood is a fairly large slice of the surrounding culture, and this background understanding is best understood as a 'prototype' rather than as a genuine body of assumptions about what the world is like.

On the basis of the observations above, the goal of schema theory can be described as that of accounting for 'how knowledge is represented and how that representation facilitates the use of the knowledge in particular ways' (Rumelhart 1980: 33). Similarly, schema theory should also account for the relation between reader and text in text comprehension. Thus, Adams and Collins (1979: 3) consider the main function of schema theory to be the following:

> The goal of schema theory is to specify the interface between the reader and the text - to specify how the reader's knowledge interacts with and shapes the information on the page and to specify how that knowledge must be organised to support the interaction.

Cook (1994: 27) also stresses the significant role played by the reader in schema theoretic frameworks, and for this reason considers them adequate complements to more formally-oriented discourse theories. This will be expanded in section 4.3.2. below.

To sum up, for the purposes of the present thesis, schema theory can provide useful insights regarding the following points: (a) the way in which expectations are created and defeated or confirmed in discourse; (b) the way in which reading and understanding of a (literary) text is not a passive activity, but an active dynamic process.

Schema theory has drawbacks, such as the lack of specificity regarding the number and types of schemata that may exist or may be activated at one particular point, the overlap between different categories of schemata and between different levels in hierarchies of schemata, and, as Cook (1994: 74) and Emmott (1994: 157) point out, the tendency to overlook the relations between schemata and specific linguistic items or structures. In general terms, schema theories lack the necessary constraints for a scientific theory to be fully developed and to make it testable (see Thorndyke and Yekovich, 1980). However, as these authors add, the theory also has enough flexibility and capacity of insight to be a useful instrument of analysis.

In section 4.2.3. below, I am concerned with considering how negation can be accounted for by means of frame semantic theory, as developed by Fillmore (1982, 1985), Shanon (1981)

and Pagano (1994).

4.2.3. Fillmore's frame-semantic approach to negation

Little work has been carried out on the possible application of schema theoretic or frame semantic principles to the understanding of negation in discourse. The few works that deal with negation from this perspective typically deal with simpler versions of schema theories, where no specification is made of a hierarchy of schema types and their functions. However, these studies are interesting in that they provide the basis for an approach to negation in frame-semantic terms.

The view of negation as involving a relation between a negative and a positive term that are conceptualised by means of frames or schemata is defended by studies such as Shanon (1981), Fillmore (1982, 1985) and Pagano (1994).[1] In this section, I deal with the following issues from a frame-semantic point of view: (a) the criteria for the appropriateness of negative utterances in a context; (b) the characteristics of negatives as argued by Fillmore: context-free and context-bound negation, and within-frame and across-frame negation.

A frame-semantic approach to negation may account for the appropriateness of some utterances and the inappropriateness of similar ones in identical contexts, where no syntactic reason for their acceptability or unacceptability is involved. The authors mentioned above argue that the fact that sentences like those in (1) are appropriate, while those under (2) are

inappropriate, can be explained by reference to the frames that are operating in each case:

(1) a. There's no furniture in the room.
b. The picnic was nice but nobody took any food.
(2) a. ? There are no diamonds in the room.
b. ? The picnic was nice but nobody watered the grass.

Shanon (op.cit.: 42) argues that (1) a. is acceptable because FURNITURE is part of the ROOM frame, while (2) a. is not acceptable or sounds odd because DIAMONDS is not part of the ROOM frame. Similarly, Pagano (1994: 257) argues that (1) b. is an acceptable utterance because FOOD is part of the picnic schema, while (2) b. sounds odd because watering the grass is not something one usually associates to picnics. The view presented by these authors is that for a negative utterance to be appropriate it has to operate within an activated schema or frame. Such frames or schemata might be activated by specific lexical items in the discourse, such as ROOM and PICNIC in the examples above, but they might also be shared assumptions concerning cultural behaviour, beliefs and in general shared knowledge that is not explicitly expressed in the discourse. Thus, Pagano (op. cit.: 256) points out that the utterance of (3) denies an assumption that is part of our shared knowledge about a world where people wear white dresses at weddings:

(3) The bride was not wearing a white dress.

Utterances of this kind reveal aspects which are variable across cultures. Shanon (1981: 42) provides a similar example where a cultural schema is activated not by a particular item

in the discourse, but from the particular situation. In his example, the situation involves the activation of a typical RESTAURANT script, where WAITER is a a constitutive part:

(4) A: Why did you pick your food yourself?
B: Because I saw no waiter.

Turning now to Fillmore's (1982, 1985) view of negation, the author first distinguishes between frames which are *evoked* by the text (e.g.: the ROOM and PICNIC frames) and frames that are *invoked* by the reader in order to make sense of the text (Fillmore, 1982: 124). The latter are 'genre-culture specific frames independent from the text', like, for example, the Japanese tradition of starting a letter by making a comment on the current season. According to Fillmore (1982: 124) the reader invokes a schema for letter-writing in Japanese which he applies when reading a Japanese letter, and this enables him to make sense of the reference to the season. What is not clear is if these invoked schemata are exclusively genre-related or if they are actually independent from the text; it can be argued that specific lexical items in the text also *evoke* the CURRENT SEASON schema in the reading process. The question is, rather, whether this schema, CURRENT SEASON, is part of the higher level schema LETTER or not, as is argued by Shanon (1981) and Pagano (1994) in the examples above.

Fillmore (1985: 242-245) further discusses the properties of negation from a frame-semantic approach by considering (i) the differences between what he calls 'context free negation' and 'context dependent negation', and (ii) the differences between 'within-frame negation' and 'across-frame negation'.

As an illustration of the difference between 'context-free' and 'context-sensitive' negation, Fillmore provides the following examples:

(5) a. Her father doesn't have any teeth.
b. Her father doesn't have any walnuts.

According to Fillmore's notion of context, which seems to coincide with that of co-text or immediately preceding discourse, (5) a. is context-free, in that the expression of the negative does not need to be cohesively related to a previous item in the discourse, since the frame for a person's face is always available to us. In (5) b., however, negation has to be interpreted in relation to some previously uttered discourse of which the frame WALNUTS is a part. In my view, the distinction between context-bound and context-free negation in these terms is not sufficiently clear. It seems to me that both examples are context-bound types, although the context dependency operates at different places in discourse in each case. In a. the dependency is on a word within the same sentence, while in b. it is on a word supposedly outside the boundaries of that sentence. This can be explained in the following way, where the acceptability of a. versus the oddness of b. in absolute terms still obeys the same principles as those argued for examples (1), (2) and (3) above. Both sentences in (5) have the word FATHER, which evokes a particular frame. (5) a. is easily understandable because TEETH forms part of the frame FATHER as FATHER contains the feature HUMAN, which contains the attribute HAS TEETH. However, (5) b. is not understandable outside a broader context because WALNUTS

is not a property of FATHER in the way TEETH is. Thus, utterance (5) a. denies a part of a frame which is present in the utterance itself, while (5) b. denies an item that is not present in the utterance and consequently has to be recovered from previous discourse.

With regard to the distinction between 'within frame' and 'across frame' negation, it reflects the same kind of dychotomy that is presented between predicate and metalinguistic negation when dealing with syntactic negation (see section 2.2.1. in chapter 2). The difference is illustrated by Fillmore (1985: 243) by means of the following examples:

(6) a. John isn't stingy. He's generous.
b. John isn't stingy. He's downright thrifty.

While (6) a. is an example of within-frame negation, in that the frame STINGY is introduced and kept by establishing an opposition between the positive and the negative terms STINGY-GENEROUS, (6) b. is an example of across-frame negation, since the frame itself is denied in order to introduce a different one. That is, instead of operating on a scale where *stingy* and *generous* are the polar opposites, a new frame is introduced, where *stingy* and *thrifty* are established as opposites. The phenomenon of across-frame negation is particularly interesting if seen from the perspective of linguistic creativity. Leinfeller (1994: 81-82) points out that *ad hoc* relations may be established in literature for stylistic effects. Leinfeller (ibid.) provides the follwoing example from everyday conversation:

(7) This is not grey. It is dirty.

In this case, we are asked to discard the set in which *grey* would be normally understood, that is, as contrasting with other colours, which would yield a sentence like (8):

(8) This is not grey, it is white.

By saying *it is dirty*, the speaker is introducing a different set altogether, which creates a new and unexpected contrast between two apparently unrelated terms *grey* and *dirty*. Here, again, knowledge of the world and cultural knowlege are crucial in order to understand the opposition. In example (8), it is obviously the fact that we all know that light coloured surfaces go grey or brown, or in general darker if one does not bother to clean them periodically. This phenomenon is particularly interesting when apparently incongrous oppositions are created with a humorous effect, an aspect which is discussed in the examples at the end of this chapter.

The frameworks discussed in this section provide interesting insights to semantic and contextual principles governing the use of negation, as they provide the necessary tools to tackle the question of how stored knowledge intervenes in the process of understanding the negative term, its relation to the corresponding affirmative and its adequacy in a discourse context. However, the explanations are limited for several reasons. First of all, the examples provided in this section are limited to sentences or brief exchanges; this seriously limits the possibility of creating networks of schemata, a standard process when reading a text. A related problem is that no specific hierarchy or distinction of

categories of schemata is made in such a way that we may be able to account for more complex and even conflictive examples, such as those found in the corpus I am analysing. For these reasons, I turn to two works in schema theory that are more elaborate and which provide powerful tools for the analysis of how schematic knowledge is organised and processed in discourse. They are discussed in the two subsequent sections.

4.2.4. Schank and Abelson's (1977) Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding

Schank and Abelson's (1977) book is an extremely influential work that provides a comprehensive and powerful framework of schema theory. Its main objective is to develop a model of human knowledge which will also apply to artificial intelligence. They take as a point of departure the notion of episodic memory (op. cit.: 17), which they define as follows: 'an episodic memory is organized around propositions linked together by their occurrence in the same event or time span' (ibid.). From this they develop the notion of script, a notion that is based on the observation that certain situations are coded as more or less fixed sequences of actions. Below is the famous example of the restaurant script situation:

(9) John went to a restaurant. He ordered a cocq au vin. He asked the waiter for the cheque and left.
(Schank and Abelson, op. cit.: 39)

The word *restaurant* activates the RESTAURANT script, which contains a number of props (for example, *table, chair*), the roles of participants (*the customer, the waiter, the cook*), the

entry conditions (being hungry), results (hunger is satisfied), and scenes (entering the restaurant, reading the menu, ordering the meal, eating the meal, paying and leaving). These elements are called 'headers' (op. cit.: 48-49). Scripts can be of three types (Schank and Abelson, op. cit.: 41):

a) situational scripts: restaurant, bus, jail.
b) personal scripts: being a flatterer, being a lover, being a friend.
c) instrumental scripts: starting the car, lighting a cigarette.

The main function of scripts is to provide the means of recovering the presence of default elements in the discourse when these are not expressed explicitly. Thus, because we activate the reastaurant script when reading (9), we understand who is the waiter in that situation and what is his role, and we are able to infer that if John ordered cocq au vin he most probably ate it, and that if he asked for the cheque, he paid for it too. At the same time, scripts also allow us to recognise variations in the default elements, by means of what Schank and Abelson call 'tracks'. In the example above, other tracks may be Coffee Shop, Fast Food Restaurant, Chinese Restaurant, etc.

A script is defined as follows: 'a script is a predetermined, stereotyped sequence of actions that defines a well-known situation' (Schank and Abelson, op. cit.: 41). The definition reveals that, being stereotyped entities they are useful in handling everyday sittuations, while they cannot deal with unfamiliar or totally new situations. The distinction is not clear-cut, but rather a cline. An experience may be new

once, but after several occurrences it may be eventually stored in the form of a script.

However, it is important to realise that not all connected pieces of text reveal script-like structures. Below is an example of a connected text which is not a script:

(10) John wanted a newspaper. He found one in the street. He read it. (Schank and Abelson, op. cit.: 39)

Continuing now with the characteristics of scripts, another important feature is that a script must be written from the point of view of a particular role. That is, the restaurant script, for example, must be written from the point of view of the customer, the waiter, the cook, or whatever. Some scripts are not fully activated during comprehension, but may be partly instantiated only. This is the case of 'fleeting scripts' (op. cit.: 46). In the restaurant script above, fleeting scripts may be evoked by headers in the script. In order for a script to be non-fleeting at least two headers or two lines from the script sequence must be activated (op. cit.: 46).

In addition to scripts, Schank and Abelson (op. cit.) consider there are other higher level structures which intervene in the process of understanding situations which are not stereotyped. Thus, PLANS are used in situations for which there is no available script: 'A plan is made up of general information about how actors achieve goals' (op. cit.: 70). While scripts are specific, plans are more general and they enable us to identify goals. The authors provide the following example:

(11) John was lost.

He pulled up his car to a farmer who was standing by the road. (op. cit.: 75)

The notion of plan enables us to identify a purpose in John's stopping to ask the farmer, by means of inferencing a goal (KNOW). By means of a planbox (ASK) we understand John's plan to ask the farmer in order to get to know his way. If we are not able to identify plans and goals, it may be difficult to make sense of a text, as in (12):

(12) John was lost.
He noticed a chicken.
He tried to catch it. (op. cit.: 76)

Here it is extremely difficult to identify the reasons for John's behaviour, as there seems to be no connection between the fact that he's lost and the fact that he notices a chicken and tries to catch it, unless he's been lost for a very long time and he's starving, or something similar. In any case, the difficulty in understanding the text as a whole is linked to the lack of a unifying goal and plan.

Goals, then, are also basic to understanding, and they constitute the level above plans on Schank and Abelson's hierarchy. Goals can be of different types (op. cit.: 113-119)[2]:

1. S-satisfaction goals: of hunger, sleep, sex.
2. E-enjoyment: travel, exercise, sex.
3. A-achievement: possessions, power, job, skills, social relations.
4. P-preservation: health, safety, position, property.
5. C-crisis: (a special class of P-goals): health, fire, storm.
6. I-instrumental goals: goals that are instruments in order

to achieve other goals.

7. D-delta goal: similar to I-goals, only that they involve scripts.

Goals come from THEMES, which is defined as 'A Theme is essentially a generator of goals. When a theme is identified, it makes sense of a person's behaviour by providing a prior context for his actions' (op. cit.: 119). There are three types of themes: role themes, interpersonal themes and life themes. Themes enable us to identify actors' goals and to make predictions about future goals. Some role themes are institutionalised (waiter, President) others are not (customer, messenger). Examples of interpersonal themes are friend, lover, enemy. Life themes describe the general aim in a person's life, like being rich or honest. The authors provide the following example of the LUXURY LIVING life theme and its associated goals (op. cit.: 147-48):

LUXURY LIVING LIFE THEME

- theme recogniser patterns: eg.: stay at smart hotels.
- general goals: eg.: have desirable objects.
- instrumental goals: eg.: work hard
- production rules: eg.: if there's an opportunity for money, take it.

To bring together the four types of schemata developed by Schank and Abelson, they are collected in the following hierarchy:

THEMES

GOALS

PLANS

SCRIPTS

The advantages of a framework of this kind against simpler versions of schema theory can be summarised in the following points:

(a) the establishment of a hierarchy of schemata where failure to understand at one level may be solved at a higher level of understanding;

(b) the identification of stereotyped sequences of actions, which the authors call scripts, which allow us to recover the implicit presence of default elements not explicitly mentioned, and to present recognisable variations of these default elements.

However, the framework also presents disadvantages which are found in

(a) the rigid character of the categorisations, as they do not account for schema change;

(b) in the overlap between the categories.

Also, as Semino (1994: 138) points out, some of the observations, such as the types and characteristics of goals, are typical of a very specific identity, that is, a white, male, middle-class American, so that they may not be valid for other groups. These disadvantages do not prevent the framework from having great explanatory power with regard to the way knowledge is stored and processed in communication, but I will complement it with Schank's (1982) *Dynamic Memory*, which focuses on the dynamic aspects of discourse processing.

4.2.5. Schank's (1982) Dynamic Memory[3]

The dynamic aspects of schema production and change, especially in learning about new situations, are the focus of Schank's (1982) work. He takes the notion of 'reminding' as a point of departure, and observes the way in which many events in our experience remind us of others, sometimes by establishing connections between apparently unconnected areas of experience. Thus, one kind of restaurant reminds us of another, even when there are changes in the sequences of actions. Schank (op. cit.: 23) provides the example of a restaurant where you are asked to pay before eating. In order to account for knowledge in these terms, Schank and Abelson's (1977) model proved insufficient, as the categories established were not flexible or general enough to account for changes in scripts such as the one mentioned above, or, how unrelated schemata may be connected through reminding. Schank provides an example where a situation where a man had been standing for a long time in a queue to buy only one stamp reminded him of the people who stop at petrol stations to buy only a few litres of petrol (op.cit.: 32). According to Schank, reminding is goal based, which means that we are reminded of other scenes by means of connected goals, in the case of the example, the lack of fit between the goal of purchasing something and the goal of being maximally efficient.

Reminding is very much failure driven, and a view of understanding and learning must account for this point. Schank (op. cit.: 46) argues for a view of memory and understanding where we have expectations about certain events and make

predictions about them, and when the expectations and predictions are defeated, we 'write down' the error and we remember. These variations from expectations are remembered when parts of the relevant scene are activated in other contexts. This accounts for a dynamic notion of script, which can change in response to new input (op. cit.: 82).

Schank (op. cit.: 15) makes an important distinction between two main types of schemata, which constitute the basis of the flexibility of his system: structures and organisers of structures.

The idea is that lower level schemata do not form part of fixed sequences, such as scripts in the sense used in the (1977) work, but they can be activated by different higher level units depending on the situation. These higher level units are organisers of structures. Thus, the RENT-A-CAR scene will be activated by means of a higher structure, for example TRIP, 'as in itself it does not contain the reasons for itself' (ibid.); furthermore, it will not belong to only one fixed sequence, as was the case with the restaurant script in Schank and Abelson (1977). A clearer example may be the HOTEL ROOM scene, which may belong to many different higher level structures. To this respect, the author points out that 'episodes are not remembered as wholes but as pieces' (op. cit.: 90).

There are two types of structures: scenes and scripts. Scenes are general in character and scripts are specific. The difference from the notions in the (1977) model is that neither scenes nor scripts 'exist in memory as a precompiled chunk'

(op. cit.: 16). Rather, the different parts may be reconstructed depending on the situation one is in. In this sense, if we talk, for example, about a visit to the dentist, we do not have a VISIT TO THE DENTIST fixed script,[4] but information of two kinds: information about what other scenes or general structures comprise a visit to the dentist, and specific information, or colorations, to each scene, which tells us the differences between aspects such as a dentist's waiting room versus a lawyer's waiting room.

There are two kinds of high level structures: Memory Organisation Packets (MOPs) and Thematic Organisation Packets (TOPs). High level structures in general are formed by making generalisations about related areas of experience. Thus, from a visit to a dentist we can make generalisations about doctors, and from doctors we can make generalisations about health care service. HEALTH CARE SERVICE can be an MOP. This unit is defined by Schank as follows: 'Information about how memory structures are ordinarily linked in frequently occurring combinations, is held in a memory organisation packet (MOP)' (op. cit.: 83). MOPs are both storing and processing structures, which allows us to provide place for new inputs and to provide expectations from which we can make predictions about future, related events. The differences betwen scenes and scripts on the one hand, and MOPs on the other have to do with the degree of generality that characterises the latter. Scenes and scripts are bound by the setting where they are activated, and by their stereotyped sequence of actions, MOPs cover

different settings and have a purpose that is not directly obtainable from the different scenes that comprise it.

MOPs typically come in threes: personal, societal and physical MOPs. For example, the dentist visit will cover: M-health protection, M-Professional Office visit, M-contract, respectively. The sharing of structures may lead to memory confusions, such as not being able to remember whether something happened at the dentist's waiting room or at some other waiting room. However, this is counterbalanced by the advantages of MOPs in processing different types of scenes. MOPs contain the following information, which they organise (op. cit: 90):

- a prototype
- a set of expectations organised in terms of the prototype
- a set of memories organised in terms of the previously failed expectations of the prototype
- a characteristic goal

MOPs may contain different kinds of scenes: physical (WAITING ROOM, AIRPORT LOUNGE), societal (CONTRACT), or personal (referring to private plans). Schank proposes a higher level structure which is used in organising or planning MOPs, it is called a meta-MOP. From this perspective, we may have a meta-MOP TRIP, covering the plans to carry out a series of goals (get resources, make arrangements, etc.). This meta-MOP is used to construct MOPs such as AIRPLANE, which is related to other sub-goals, such as, book ticket, check in, etc.

If we summarise what we have up to now, we can establish a hierarchy in the following way:

meta-MOPs

MOPS
scenes
scripts

The boundaries between the different levels may not always be clear, but this does not invalidate the operational value of the system.

Thematic Organisation Packets (henceforth, TOPs) are high level structures that store information which is independent from particular domains. In this sense, they are abstractions from actual events, which enable us to establish connections between different events and find similarities between them. This phenomenon lies behind our capacity to be creative in our understanding. Schank (op. cit. 11-112) provides the example of the word 'imperialism', which is used of countries in international relations. However, the term can be used to describe someone's attitude to land possession or other possessions, and we will easily understand what is being referred to. Schank provides several examples of how TOPs are organised, and I reproduce one below in table A., where *West Side Story* reminds us of *Romeo and Juliet* (op. cit.: 113):

REMINDING	GOAL	CONDITIONS	FEATURES
West S.S./ Romeo-Juliet	Mutual goal pursuit	outside oppositon	young lovers false report of death

Table A.

This pattern allows us to identify some of the main elements in TOPs, in particular the goal types and their

related problems. This view of understanding may be particularly interesting when applied to the understanding of literary texts, where reminding processes of this kind which involve the association of apparently disparate domains take place very frequently.[5] This is also true of humorous situations, which often arise precisely by means of establishing an unexpected connection between two different domains. The humorous potential of certain associations is mentioned by Schank (op. cit.) with regard to some of the examples provided.

4.3. Schema theory and literature

Approaches to literariness based on schema theoretic principles have developed by means of the influence of work in Artificial Intelligence and cognitive psychology. Findings in these fields have created an interest in literary works as text types that tend to violate existing schemata and may lead to schema change and the creation of new schemata.

I will be particularly interested in discussing Cook's (1994) approach to this issue, but I will first give a brief overview of work that has been carried out in this line. The following sections focus on a dynamic perspective of schema activation and use in literary discourse.

4.3.2. Schema theories of literariness

Schema theories dealing with literature have been concerned mainly with the fucntion of schemata in the

elaboration and processing of stories, called *story grammars*, from a schema theoretic perspective (see the special issue on this topic in *Text* 1982). Although these works have been extremely important in the development of artificial intelligence and its application to the understanding of text coherence, the applications to the nature of literariness are limited for several reasons. The texts used are typically simplified versions of popular stories which present easily recognisable structures and variations that can be handled by a computer. This means that complex literary works have not been analysed in this way, mainly because they could not be dealt with by a computer programme. Cook (1994) points out these deficiencies in schema theory as applied to literature and observes that it is necessary to develop a theory that may account for the way in which new schemata, or radical departures from already known schemata, interact with old schemata to yield complex literary works.

The way in which this may take place is outlined by de Beaugrande (1987), who observes that 'the most famous "literary" stories - those that survive, like *The Arabian Nights* and *The Decameron* - are those which offer stimulating mixtures of confirmation and violation of what people expect.' These expectations can be said to be organised in schematic units. More precisely, de Beaugrande points out (op. cit.: 56) that literature is a type of 'communicative domain in which certain top-level schemas (...) control the selection, activation or formation of lower-level ones.' In this view, the

highest level schema in literature is what de Beaugrande (ibid.) calls ALTERNATIVITY, which he describes as follows: 'the participants in the literary communication are free and willing to contemplate other worlds beside the accepted "real world"'. Interestingly, de Beaugrande's view brings together notions from text world theory, in his proposal of a theory where a literary work is said to present an alternative world, and schema theory, in the stress given to the role of the reader in the process of understanding the literary work by means of schema processing. For de Beaugrande (op. cit.: 60) fictionality is a relative notion that is established by comparison with actuality. There may be a great deal of variation regarding the degree of overlap between a fictional world and the real world, as between historical narratives and fantastic literature. However, according to the author (ibid.) all literary works 'are concerned with the pre-conditions of reality', in the sense that in order to understand both imitation of principles of reality and their violations we need some kind of reference to the characteristics of reality, of what is familiar to us. De Beaugrande's approach is particularly interesting because it proposes a way of combining the notion of alternativity typical of text world theory, and the hierarchy of schemata in text processing and understanding, typical of schema theory. Semino (1994, 1995) develops a model which precisely combines these two principles and applies them to the interpretation of poetry, a literary genre that tends to be overlooked by both schema theories and text world

theories, which tend to focus on fiction.

Other attempts to incorporate schema theoretic principles in an understanding of literary discourse are Miall and Kuiken (1994), who combine the notions of defamiliarisation and the role of the reader in text processing typical of schema theories, and Müske (1990) who defines literariness in terms of the notions of frame and superstructure.

Emmott (1994) uses the term 'frame' to stand for particular mental constructs used in the understanding of characters and locations in fictional works. In her framework (op. cit.), the frame is not a package of information, but is understood as 'a tracking system which monitors which particular characters are '"present" in the location at any one point.' (op. cit.: 158). What is important for my present discussion is that her argument is based on the observation that there are certain features of narrative discourse which need an explanation based on cognitive principles (1994: 157). In her study, she pays particular attention to how reference is assigned by readers in cases where the relation with an antecedent is not expressed explicitly. More interestingly for the present work, she also points out that cognitive modelling is basic in the construction of a fictional world and the processing of flashback (op. cit.: 157). The author provides an example where a flashback is introduced by means of the past perfect, although there is an immediate switch to simple past. Emmott (op. cit.: 161) explains this as follows: 'The reader knows, however, that these sentences denote flashback events

because on entry to the flashback s/he has set up a flashback frame.' Further, Emmott (op. cit.: 157) also establishes a distinction between what she calls 'general knowledge mental structures' and 'text-specific mental structures' (cf. Cook's world schemata and language and text schemata). According to Emmott (ibid.) more attention has been paid to the explanation of general knowledge mental structures, while text-specific ones have been little explored, although they should be of great interest to discourse analysis. In her study she proposes an analysis based on the notion of frame defined above as a means of accounting for certain text-specific phenomena, such as reference and flashback. Although the issues she deals with are not the direct concern of the present thesis, it is interesting to observe that her view reflects the same interests as those found in the frameworks I apply directly to my analysis, such as Cook (1994).

4.3.3. Cook's (1994) theory of 'discourse deviation' and the function of cognitive change in literature

Cook's (1994) framework is an attempt to bring together principles from stylistics in the formalist tradition and schema theory. From the former, he adopts the notion of *defamiliarisation*, which he adapts to a discourse theory which also accounts for the role of the reader.[6] This aspect is the most significant one adopted from schema theories in general. According to Cook (op. cit.: 65), some schemata are not mental representations built on different codes from language, but are

located in the language itself. From this perspective, defamiliarisation can apply at least at three levels of text understanding, which correspond to the three levels in the hierarchy of schemata in Cook's framework (op. cit: 181): language schemata, text schemata and world schemata. As explained above, language and text schemata correspond roughly to what in the literature is typically referred to as *content* schemata, while *world* schemata receive the same name, or, otherwise, are referred to as *content* schemata. The main concern in Cook's (op. cit.) model is to show how deviance at the levels of language and text may lead to deviance in world schemata, and cause restructuring and change of schemata.

The notion of deviance used by Cook (op. cit.) is borrowed from the formalists' notions of deviance, foregrounding and defamiliarisation. However, it is adapted in order to account for schema change in the reader as well. The author (op. cit.: 182) points out that certain types of discourse, typically literary texts, can be said to have the specific function of inducing schema challenge and, possibly, schema change in the reader. This is possible in literary texts because it is a discourse type that is not directly concerned with what are standardly understood to be more practical communicative uses in society. Literature is not bound by the need to be communicatively efficient. This is what enables it to be more challenging to established conventions. In this sense, literary texts can be said to display a function which cannot be included in either the ideational or interpersonal functions

of language in Halliday's model, nor can it be identified with Jakobson's poetic function. Cook puts forward a view where the main function of literary texts (though the function is by no means exclusive of this text type) is that of *cognitive change*. This function is described by the author as follows:

> some discourse is best interpreted as though it followed a maxim 'change the receiver' - though that may not necessrily have been the intention of the sender. Such discourse fulfils the need to rearrange mental representations: a process which can be best effected in the absence of pressing practical and social constraints. (...) In some discourses, in other words, language has a function not accounted for in the functional theories referred to above: the function of changing mental representations. (Cook, op. cit.: 44)

Although the idea that literature provides a new means of interpreting experience and idiosyncratic insights into human life and thought is not new, Cook's model is particularly interesting because it is concerned with the systematisation of how previous experience is reorganised by means of the influence of the schemata evoked by reading a text. This constitutes a significant contribution to previous discourse theories which have been concerned with the recovery of violations of text-structural principles by means of conversational implicature (See Pratt, 1977). Furthermore, the fact that the theory relies heavily on the notion of deviance, which has received a great deal of criticism in recent years (see, for example Carter and Nash 1990), does not invalidate the potential of the framework to account for the way in which particular texts strike us as unusual, challenging and difficult in different ways. The author is well aware that the notion of deviation is a relative one, as was discussed in the section devoted to this topic in chapter 1. The possible

weakness of the theory's reliance on the notion of deviation is compensated by the intuitively felt necessity to incorporate the notions of schema refreshment and cognitive change as basic categories in a theory of literariness.

4.3.3.1. The notion of 'schema refreshment'

According to Cook (op. cit.: 191), from the point of view of the effect on the schematic knowledge of a reader, discourse can be classified into three main types: schema reinforcing, schema preserving and schema disrupting, this last one leading to schema refreshment. Schema reinforcing and preserving discourse is discourse which confirms and reinforces already existing schemata, as in the examples of advertisements discussed by Cook. In these cases, even if there might be deviances at the levels of language use and text structure, the schemata that are evoked concerning behaviour in social relationships, including buying products, are extremely conventional.

Schema disrupting discourse, on the other hand, does not reinforce pre-existing schemata, but either destroys old schemata, constructs new ones or establishes new connections between already existing schemata. In these cases, the author establishes that they constitute processes of schema refreshment. The author (1994: 192-93) goes on to describe the characteristics of schema refreshment, which is presented as a relative concept subject to reader variation and change throughout time. This accounts for the fact that schema

disrupting texts at one point in time may be incorporated in the canon later and become schema preserving. The author gives the example of Jane Austen's novels, which, in her time were greatly innovative, but are now examples of conventional novels.

An important feature of schema refreshment is that it takes place in the interaction between levels and not at one particular level in isolation.[7] The author (1994: 197-98) describes it as a discourse phenomenon which is the basis of his notion of discourse deviation:

> Where there is deviation at one or both of the linguistic and text-structural levels, and the deviation interacts with a reader's existing schemata to cause schema refreshment, there exists the phenomenon which I term 'discourse deviation'. (Cook, 1994: 198)

Consequently, the task of a theory of discourse deviation is to make explicit the connections between the deviations at the text and language levels on the one hand, and the changes in the schematic representations of the world in the reader. The process of discourse deviation is a dynamic one where the reader maps his representations of language, text and world schemata against the corresponding ones evoked by the text. It is an ongoing process which involves a constant up-dating and restructuring of information (cf. Werth's version of dicourse processing in chapter 3). To illustrate the framework, the author analyses a series of texts and classifies them according to the types of deviance found in each of them. For example, William Blake's poem *The Tyger* is classified as containing deviations at the lexico-grammatical level, but with a conventional text structure corresponding to a ballad. The

deviations at the language level induce a restructuring of world schemata which have to do with the nature of God and evil, among other things. *The Turn of the Screw*, on the other hand, is described as having conventional language schemata and deviant textual schemata related to the presence of an unreliable narrator. This leads to schema refreshment by means of creating a deliberate ambiguity which makes the reader question previous assumptions about the reliability of narrators and the major themes of the work and how they are treated. A problematic example discussed by Cook is Bond's poem *First World War Poets*. The author (1994: 201) argues that in this case, discourse deviation is produced by means of a combination of 'ordinary language' and a conventional poetic layout:

> It is the absence of text-structural and linguistic deviation which, combined with the expectations set up by poetic form, 'represents' the schema-refreshment advocated by the poem. (ibid.)

In my opinion, this view overlooks the fact that there is something striking about the language of the poem, not only the schemata evoked by it. It seems to me that Cook's framework does not pay enough attention to the importance of the hierarchical nature of schemata and the dependency of the lower levels on the higher levels. By this I mean that the higher levels should be understood to determine the lower levels, so that the schema for a conventional poetic structure determines the following of certain conventions regarding the lexico-grammatical patterning of the poem. According to this, Bond's poem is deviant at the lower level of the lexico-grammatical schemata, precisely because the language goes against the expectations a reader has regarding what should be 'poetic language' and its content. This leads to a view of discourse deviation as hierarchically organised and truly reflecting the

relations between the different levels.

Finally, it has to be pointed out that more research needs to be carried out in order to specify more precisely how schema refreshment takes place. To this respect, Semino (1995: 104) observes that 'schema change is not only infrequent, but also hard to verify', and suggests a partial redefinition of the notion of schema refreshment so that it may be applied to less dramatically challenging texts than those analysed by Cook. Furthermore, other factors need to be explored, such as the motivation of different individuals according to criteria such as age, gender, race, cultural background and education, as they might prove to be crucial in the determination of schema change in an individual.

4.4. A schema theoretic analysis of the interpretation of humour

In the following sections I discuss the phenomenon of humour from a schema-theoretic perspective. In these sections, I deal with humour produced by specific uses of syntactic and lexical negation, some of which involve paradox. By paradoxical humour I mean utterances that a paradox of some type, by means of using syntactic or lexical negation, and where the result is the production of a humorous effect.[8] By paradox I will understand the creation of an opposition which involves the simultaneous acceptance of the opposing terms. The opposition may involve straightforward contradiction or contrariety (see the definitions and discussion of these terms in chapter 2). The determination of the humorous effect is, of course, totally subjective, so that I will rely on my own reactions to utterances as funny or not.

This discussion is meant to provide insights into the characteristics of some of the uses of negation in the corpus under analysis. As was pointed out in chapter 2, in *Catch-22*, negation is often used to create structures which in many cases are also funny. I wish to claim that humour is a form of schema refreshment, and that its recurrent use as a stylistic device

in *Catch-22* contributes to the challenging of a reader's schemata during the process of comprehension.

Below is an example from *Catch-22* which presents the paradoxical opposition between the terms *sane* and *crazy*, which in terms of polarity can be distinguished as the positive and the negative term respectively:

> (13) 'Do you really want some more codeine?' Dr. Stubbs asked. 'It's for my friend Yossarian. He's sure he's going to be killed.'
> 'Yossarian? Who the hell is Yossarian? What the hell kind of a name is Yossarian, anyway? Isn't he the one who got drunk and started that fight with Colonel Korn at the officers'club the other night?'
> 'That's right. He's Assyrian.'
> 'That crazy bastard.'
> 'He's not so crazy,' Dunbar said. 'He swears he's not going to fly to Bologna.'
> 'That's just what I mean,' Dr. Stubbs answered.' That crazy bastard may be the only sane one left.' (144)

As in the example discussed in chapter 2, this extract presents the simultaneous presence of two opposite properties (*sane-crazy*) which are said of the same entity (Yossarian). If we consider the opposition at a low processing level, that is, just as a contradictory attribution of two properties, the extract will be nonsensical. What I wish to argue in the following sections is that language uses of this kind require the interaction between this low level awareness of a contradiction or paradox and a higher level point of resolution, where the paradox is understood as having a meaning.

If we apply Fillmore's analysis to negation in terms of frame semantics, we may observe that CRAZY and SANE correspond to two frames that contrast as a form of within-frame negation. This view, however, is limited because it does not explain why the two terms co-occur in discourse. In order to account for

this, we need a model that will account for hierarchies of schemata. In general terms, the higher level meaning is recovered by means of establishing the domains where the attributes *sane* and *crazy* are applicable: Yossarian is crazy because he has dared to start a fight with one of the higher officers and he is sane because he refuses to fly to Bologna, where he fears he will be killed.

In the terms defined by Schank and Abelson's (1977) model, this can be interpreted by referring to different role themes and the corresponding goals expected in each role. From this perspective, Yossarian is crazy in his role as a soldier, because he goes against military orders and behaviour (a soldier must be respectful towards higher officers, a soldier must always be willing to go into combat; his main goal is an S-satisfaction goal, to defeat the enemy and win the war, by means of an I-instrumental goal, fight against the enemy). As a human being, however, he is sane, because his main goal is a P-preservation goal, to survive.[9] Schank and Abelson's (1977) model provides some examples of how complementary and even apparently conflicting roles may take place in the same situation, but the model does not provide a higher level structure which may enable us to understand in more general terms why those roles and their corresponding goals are conflictive.

At this point, Schank's notion of MOP as a higher-order structure which organises lower level goals, scenes and roles may be more useful. It may be argued that in this extract, as

in many others in *Catch-22*, a meta-MOP WAR is operative, with a series of connected MOPs which organise information regarding societal, personal and physical aspects about war. In this view, we have in this extract at least three relevant MOPs: a physical MOP, M-AIR MISSION, a societal MOP, M-BOMBARDIER, and a personal MOP, M-SURVIVAL. Each has prototypical goals, as indicated in Table B below:

meta-MOP: WAR

MOPs

MOPS	M-AIR MISSION	M-BOMBARDIER	M-SURVIVAL
goals:	*bomb city*	*S-bomb town* *S-win war*	*P-preserve life*
evaluation of goal		negative: crazy	positive: sane

Table B.

Again, we have conflictive goals manifested in the opposition between the societal and the personal aspects. However, it is important to realise that these roles are collected under the higher level structure which collects information about war in general terms, and allows us to infer that although a soldier must be willing to die for his country, as a human being he may have doubts, an aspect that is foregrounded in Yossarian's characterisation. Thus, we may say there is a priority given to the goal P-preservation of life, although the extract exploits the awareness that this priority obviously goes against the priorities set up by the military

system. The assignement of the terms *crazy* and *sane* is based precisely on which goal is given priority, and constitute the consequent evaluation of the goal depending on the priority chosen. This might suggest, as Semino (1994) points out, that a further category collecting affective and evaluative aspects may be necessary.

From the point of view of Cook's (1994) model, deviance at the lower level of language schemata produced by the contradictory presence of two opposing terms, produces discourse deviation and a challenge to assumptions in a reader regarding the assignment of contradictory properties to the same entity. The effect is schema disrupting, and it is schema refreshing because as readers, we become aware that one individual may be both crazy and sane at the same time, even if this would seem to be logically impossible. The acceptance of the simultaneous operation of the two properties leads us to reflect upon the reasons for the development of such a conflict, which leads to a critical view of a given situation. Under normal circumstances, it should be possible to assign the properties *crazy/sane* to an individual in such a way that one will exclude the other. The fact that both properties coexist in a given situation (war) may indicate there is something anomalous and, consequently, not desirable about that situation. There is something wrong about war and the roles imposed by means of military structures if these roles go against the basic goals of a human being, such as the preservation of one's life.

I wish to comment on an example of negation which also produces a humorous effect, but where there is no paradox.

> (15) Sharing a tent with a man who was crazy wasn't easy, but Nately didn't care. He was crazy, too, and had gone every free day to work on the officers' club that Yossarian had not helped build. Actually, there were many officers' clubs that Yossarian had not helped build, but he was proudest of the one on Pianosa. It was a sturdy and complex monument to his powers of determination. Yossarian never went there to help until it was finished- then he went there often, so pleased was he with the large, fine, rambling shingled building. It was truly a splendid structure, and Yossarian throbbed with a mighty sense of accomplishment each time he gazed at it and reflected that none of the work that had gone into it was his. (p. 28)

This extract presents a similar type of conflict to the one discussed with regard to extract (13) above. In both cases we can talk about conflicting goals related to incompatible societal and personal MOPs. Thus, we can postulate a societal MOP M-HELP BUILD OFFICERS' CLUB and a personal MOP M-REFUSE TO COOPERATE, where the former has the goal 'participate actively' and the latter 'do nothing'. Now, the situation is further complicated by the fact that Yossarian is proud of his attitude. This defeats the standard assumption held by a reader regarding the kinds of things one is usually proud of. People are usually proud of things they have done, not of things they haven't done. Thus, it can be argued that the negative form introduces a defeated expectation which creates the context where the above mentioned MOPs gather. The expectation that is not verbalised, that is denied linguistically would be realised by the affirmative. This conforms to the pattern proposed by Fillmore (1982, 1985) where the opposition between negative and affirmative can be accounted for as a frame contrast. Both the

affirmative and the negative may form a meta-MOP PRIDE where the prototype and the expectations usually associated with it are not fulfilled in the reading process. This can be represented as follows:

meta-MOP: PRIDE
prototype: one is proud of things one does, one's work one's friends, one's social skills, etc. expectation: with regard to M-BUILD OFFICERS' CLUB: be willing to cooperate.

Table C.

Thus, when reading extract (15), a reader's prototypical notion of pride and the expectations associated with it are not fulfilled. However, this analysis does not explain why a reader perceives this extract as funny and why it is perceived to be informative. Here, as in other examples where negation is schema refreshing but is not involved in paradox, we can account for the humorous effect of the extract by establishing an analogy with a similar experience. Schank's (1982) notion of TOP is useful for this purpose.[10] A TOP was defined above as a high level structure which establishes connections between apparently unconnected schemata. In this view, the extract above may remind us of the people who have been proud not to have co-operated with invaders of their countries during the occupation of their country by the enemy. Thus, we can establish a TOP in the terms shown in table D. below:

REMINDING	GOAL	CONDITIONS	FEATURES
Building club/ Cooperating with enemy	Achievement goal	Negative action; uncooperative ness, pride	war situation

Table D.

In this table, a connection is established between two war situations, one where an officers' club is built, another where cooperation with the enemy takes place. The goal is an achievement goal, which is to resist pressure to co-operate, the conditions are negative action, or that cooperation does not take place, and pride. Again, we need the evaluative component in order to establish a full connection between the schemata. By analogy with the negative character of cooperating with the enemy, cooperating in the building of an officers' club is also perceived as negative. However, the connections establish a striking analogy between the enemy and the higher officers, a parallelism that is recurrent in the novel and is explicitly pointed out by Yossarian and other characters:

> (16) The enemy is anybody who is going to get you killed, *no matter what side he's on.*

The analogy described in the terms outlined above can also help us account for the humorous character of the description. Thus, while cooperation with the enemy is a very serious matter, or, to put it in other words, it is something important, building an officers' club in comparison is a trivial matter. This reveals a process, which is repeated on other occasions in the novel, where trivial situations reveal a more dramatic background.

From the point of view of Cook's (1994) framework, we can interpret the phenomenon as an example of discourse deviation where the use of the negative in order to defeat a standardly held assumption based on a prototype of pride, is schema

refreshing. The process is understood by the reader by establishing an analogy with a similar situation, which reveals the higher level meaning of the apparent uninformativity of the passage.

It is obvious from this analysis that the schema theoretic model applied must take account of a hierarchy of schemata and a distinction between lower level schemata which provide information about particular scenes and scripts, and higher levels that organise the lower ones.

4.4.1. Humour as frame conflict

If we consider the description of negation given in chapter 2, where I argue for a cognitive approach to the phenomenon, in such a way that the understanding of a negative term involves the defeat of an expectation, we can see there is a close connection with the phenomenon of humour, which also works as the defeat of an expectation (see Freud 1976, Shultz 1976, Norrick 1986).[11] This becomes obvious when negation is involved in the creation of paradoxical structures, such as the ones discussed above. In this section I wish to discuss some important notions related to the view of humour as incongruity and the adequacy of schema theory to account for the phenomenon. For this purpose, I assume that specific uses of *negation in my corpus are invovled in the creation of paradoxes* and contradictions which have a humorous effect, as in example (14) above.

In the analysis of humorous effect, I am particularly

interested in two aspects, namely (a) the fact that the humorous effect arises as the defeat of an expectation, and (b) the fact that humour takes place when the incongruity is perceived to have a further meaning. I will discuss briefly each of these aspects, leaving aside other aspects of humour theories which would be a departure from the main objectives of the thesis. For this purpose, I concentrate on the view of humour as incongruity (see Freud 1976, 1960, Shultz 1976, Norrick 1986, Simpson 1989). Incongruity in jokes is defined by Shultz (op.cit.: 12) as follows: 'Incongruity is usually defined as a conflict between what is expected and what actually occurs in a joke.' This author provides several examples of how the humorous effect takes place in different text types by means of ambiguity in the lexicon, in phonetic or structural aspects, as in Groucho Marx's saying in (14):

(16) I ought to join a club, and beat you over the head with it.

In (16) incongruity and the humorous effect hinges upon the ambiguity of the word 'club', and the awareness that each of the two meanings is being projected in different parts of the sentence.

Similarly, the second part of the sentence may be said to defeat expectations created by uttering the first part, since in the second part of the sentence a different meaning of 'club' is introduced, thus producing a dramatic change in what the utterance is actually about.

Many theories of humour (see Freud 1976, Chapman and Foot 1976, Norrick 1986, Apter 1982) put forward a view of humour

which consists in the acceptance of the incongruity and its resolution at a higher level of processing. Indeed, Shulz points out (1976: 13) that the higher level resolution of incongruity in humour is what differentiates it from nonsense, where the conflict remains unresolved. The author observes that 'whereas nonsense can be characterised as pure or unresolvable incongruity, humour can be characterised as resolvable or meaningful incongruity.'(ibid.). The process is defined as one where the subject is first aware of the incongruity and subsequently searches for a resolution of the inconcongruity.

This view is also defended by Norrick (1986) in his analysis of humour, where he applies the notion of 'bisociation' taken from Koestler, and combines it with schema-theroetical principles in order to account for how humour is produced. According to Norrick (op. cit.: 226) humour involves the phenomenon of bisociation, which he describes, quoting Koestler (1964) as follows:

> the perceiving of a situation or idea L, in two self-consistent but habitually incompatible frames of reference M1 and M2. The event L, in which the two intersect, is made to vibrate simultaneously on two different wavelengths, as it were. While this unusual situation lasts, L is not merely linked to one associative context, but bisociated with two. (Koestler 1964: 35ff).

According to Norrick (ibid.), this phenomenon can be captured adequately by frame semantics, as each of the two frames of reference can be seen as conceptualisations which contain schematic knowledge (Norrick 1986: 229). The author considers schema theory particularly adequate to explain humour because the schema conflict that creates incongruity at a lower

level can be interpreted as being meaningful at a higher level of processing, an approach to understanding that is based on the notion of a hierarchy of schemata. The author (1986: 230) further specifies:

> This leads to a hypothesis associating funniness with schema congruence revealed at higher level. The idea of higher-level schema fit, in combination with lower-level schema conflict, lends substance to the traditional definiton of humor as "sense in nonsense" or "method in madness".

The idea that the conflict between two opposite parts gives rise to incongruity and humour is also present in the theory of cognitive synergies discussed in chapter 2. In this theory, humour can also be defined as a synergy, in that it constitutes a phenomenon where two incompatible terms are combined in such a way as to produce an unexpected effect which is different from the characteristics of the two terms in isolation. The unexpected effect may be termed the humorous effect. Humour may take place in two different ways, either through a transition from a state A to a state B, as in the example from Groucho Marx above, or in a context where the subject is aware from the beginning of the two conflicting meanings. The latter form of humour is typical of make-believe humorous situations, as when a male comedian pretends to be a woman and exaggerates his supposedly feminine attributes.

To sum up, for the purposes of my analysis, I am interested in considering humour as a phenomenon that involves the defeat of an expectation in such a way that a conflict arises between two opposing complex schemas. The conflict is manifested at a lower level of processing, but may be resolved at a higher level, where it yields the humorous effect and is

schema refeshing. The understanding of the resolution is not only variable across individuals but is also culture-dependent. This provides strong support for the thesis that the higher level resolution requires the activation of specific schemata related to knowledge of the world. This explains why some readers may find nonsensical what others find funny. To this respect, Freud (1976: 162) points out that not all human beings are capable of developing a sense of humour, which is a precious and rare gift.

4.6. Conclusions

In this chapter I have discussed the possibilities of applying schema theoretical models to the analysis of negation, paradox and humour, in particular, within the context of a literary work. I have considered the advantages of some schema theoretic models, such as Fillmore (1982, 1985), Shanon (1981) and Pagano (1994), which provide a point of departure for the analysis of negation in these terms. These frameworks have been complemented by two other more complex works, Schank and Abelson (1977) and Schank (1982), in order to be able to account for hierarchical relations of schemata and unexpected variations in schematic packages.

The most obvious advantage of using schema theories to account for negation is the possibility of making reference to different levels of processing, where failure of understanding at the lower levels may be compensated by understanding at a higher level. Lower level failure in the data discussed in this

chapter had to do mainly with the utterance of contradictory sentences or with the defeat of expectations in order to yield unusual situations. This phenomenon leads to a challenge of commonly held assumptions regarding situations such as war and behaviour in war, thus producing the effect that Cook (1994) describes as schema refreshment. Thus, we can explain the process of understanding the data discussed in this chapter as involving the following steps:

(a) one where an awareness develops of a conflict at a lower level, manifested linguistically by means of an unusual function of negation, either in contradictions or paradox, or by defeating standardly held assumptions about shared knowledge.

(b) this conflict is related to a conflict at a higher level, which involves goals of characters in a given situation, and where the goals are evaluated as positive or negative;

(c) the reader processes the expression of conflict at those levels by reference to a higher order structure of the types mentioned by Schank (1982). In an MOP higher structure which collects information about, for example, war, the awareness of the conflict within this area of experience makes us question our assumptions about experiences related to it. In TOP structures, we understand the significance of the deviant uses of negation by establishing an analogy with a similar experience which reveals key points about the description

where the negative is used.

Notes to chapter 4

1. See also the discussion of negation as subworld in Werth's (1995c) framework in chapter 3. Here, negation is accounted for as a subworld which changes the parameters established in the text world. Typically, the negative subworld also defeats expectations that have been created by means of the activation of frame knowledge in the discourse situation.

2. Some of the goals (like 'sex') may belong to different categories, such as *satisfaction* and *enjoyment*. It can be questioned which of the functions is primary. Furthermore, the classification need not represent universal needs, rather, it seems to reflect the goals of a particular group (white, middle-aged, Western men), as has been pointed out by several authors. The classification shopuld be understood as a guideline rather than a prescriptive classification.

3. For a different approach to schema change and learning, see Rumelhart (1980).

4. Schank (op. cit.) uses the term TRIP TO THE DENTIST, but it seems more adequate to talk about VISITS to dostors.

5. See Cook (1994) and Semino (1994) for an application of Schank and Abelson's (1977) model and Schank's (1982). Cook uses the frameworks as the point of departure of his theory of schema refreshment and cognitive change. Semino (1994) incorporates Schank's (1982) framework to the interpretation of poetry.

6. See Hall (1996) for a criticism of the notion of schema refreshment. According to Hall, Cook's (1994) framework has little to contribute to the Russian formalists' notion of *defamiliarisation*.

7. Schank (1982) also defends a view where schema change operates in the connections between different levels of schemata in a hierarchy.

8. See Nash (1985) for an approach to humour in literature based on stylistic principles. Nash devotes a chapter to the relation beteen faulty logic, nonsense and humour, and makes a brief mention of the importance of these aspects in *Catch-22*.

9. See Raskin (1985) for a theory of humour based on the notion of the simultaneous existence of two incompatible scripts.

10. See Semino (1994) for an application of Schank's (1982) notions of MOP and TOP to the interpretation of schematic relations in poetic worlds.

11. For further well-known discussions of humour theories applied to the interpretation of jokes see Freud (1960), Sacks (1974), Chapman and Foot (1976) and Norrick (1993). Sacks concentrates on the narrative aspects of a joke structure in a conversation. Norrick (1993) also deals extensively with conversational joking, by means of an analysis based on discourse-pragmatic principles.

Chapter 5: A proposal for a Text World approach to negation in discourse

'Chaplain, I once studied Latin.
I think it's only unfair to warn you of that
before I ask my next question.
Doesn't the word Anabaptist simply mean
that you're not a Baptist?'
'Oh, no, sir. There's much more.'
'Are you a Baptist?'
'No, sir.'
'Then you are not a Baptist, aren't you?'
'Sir?'
(from extract 125)

5.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I propose an approach to negation in discourse in the terms described by Werth's (1995c) text world theory but incorporating aspects from other frameworks discussed in the theoretical chapters, in particular, Givón's ontology of negative states and events,[1] Ryan's (1991b) notion of conflict in fictional worlds,[2] the notions of foregrounding and discourse deviation and certain notions from schema theory.[3]

In the analysis of the present chapter, I focus on the function of negative clauses with assertive communicative function[4] and on paradox created both by means of syntactic and lexical negation.

With regard to negative assertion or negative statement, I argue that this function is part of the more general function of negation as a term in the polarity system with characteristic ontological properties which differentiate it from the affirmative. In Halliday's (1994) terms, we may say this function is primarily ideational. However, the communicative function of negative assertion has to be distinguished from other speech acts or communicative functions perfomed by negative clauses, where the interpersonal

component, rather than the ideational, is primary. This is the case of commissives and directives. For reasons of space, I will make only passing remarks on this second type of communicative function of negative clauses, as I wish to concentrate on the cognitive, ontological and textual properties of negative assertion.[5]

The main objective in this chapter is to carry out a qualitative analysis of the data[6] and to explore the following issues:

(a) to identify recurring patterns of negation throughout the data which can be recognised as specific discourse functions of negation within a text world theoretical model.

(b) to point out those cases where specific linguistic functions of negation can be said to be marked and, thus, to contribute to the creation of discourse deviation and the triggering of schema refreshment.

(c) to identify the types of ontology created by negative subworlds.

(d) to identify the relation between the function of negation as subworld and the development of patterns of conflict within the fictional world of *Catch-22*.

(e) to describe the function of lexical negation and its contribution to the creation of paradox;

(f) to propose modifications to the frameworks applied in order to account for idiosyncratic aspects of the data.

Point (a) is of a descriptive theoretical nature, as it has to do with the description of the discourse functions of negation from a text world perspective. Point (b) is concerned with the verification of the general hypothesis I set up in the introduction of the present work:

HYPOTHESIS 1: Negation is a marked phenomenon in *Catch-22*.

Moreover, a theoretical link is established between the identification of negation as a foregrounding device and its contribution to an effect of discourse deviation. Point (c) has to do with the description of the ontological properties of the subworlds identified from a functional perspective. Point (d) has to do with the relation between the function of negation in text world terms and the development of conflict in the fictional world. Point (e) focuses on the specific function of lexical negation and paraodox; Point (f) is also of a theoretical nature, as it has to do with a discussion of the adequacy of the frameworks which have been applied to the interpretation of the data, and I suggest some modifications to the frameworks.

The chapter is divided into two main parts. In the first part, I apply Werth's text world framework to the analysis of negation in the discourse of *Catch-22*. Each of the sections deals with the different functions of negation within the text world framework, namely, (i) the function of rechannelling information, and (ii) the function of blocking the flow of information. Function (i) covers the two general types of negation mentioned by Werth (1995c) and discussed in chapter

3, namely, the prototypical function of negation as a denial of propositions which exist previously in the common ground of the discourse, and negative accommodation. Negative accommodation does not cancel information which exists previously in the common ground, rather, it introduces new information in order to deny it at the same time. In this sense it may be considered as a special subtype within the general function of negation which re-channells information and controls the topic of discourse. The second function mentioned above, that where negation blocks the flow of information, is not mentioned by Werth (1995c), and is usually overlooked by approaches to negation in general terms, as contradiction and paradox have standardly been regarded as anomalous uses of language.[7] Indeed, contradiction and paradox cannot be understood as taking part in the more general function of negation as re-channelling information, since they block the communicative process. However, in my data, paradox plays an important role, and, consequently, it has to be accounted for in some way. The main modification I propose to previous frameworks of negation is that of accounting for phenomena like contradiction and paradox as specific functions with a communicative purpose.

In the second part of the chapter, I try to make some generalisations regarding the types of ontology which are created by means of the the projection of negative subworlds. I argue that negation foregrounds negative states and events in the novel in such a way as to project two main types of

negative subworld with two different ontological properties: (i) negative subworlds which are empty, vacuous, and (ii) negative subworlds which are paradoxical. The two types of ontology correspond with the two main functions of negation as rechannelling information or blocking the flow of information.

The discussion of the present chapter will be complemented at specific points by Ryan's (1991b) notion of conflict in the fictional world. This view contributes to the analysis by establishing a link between the linguistic notion of negation as subworld and its function in discourse, on the one hand, and the literary notion of conflict within a fictional world, on the other. The interface between the two approaches may provide insights regarding the ultimate function of negation from the perspective of the processing and understanding of a literary work.

The analysis of the present chapter complements both the theoretical discussions in chapters 2 to 4, and the quantitative analysis of chapter 6. While the examples introduced in previous chapters have the main function of illustrating key theoretical issues with regard to the discourse functions of negation, the present sections are more practical. In this sense, the idea is to explore both what the theory has to contribute to the understanding of the novel as a whole and what the data can contribute to an evaluation of the theoretical frameworks as models of discourse. Furthermore, the present type of analysis, which is qualitatively oriented, is considered to be primary with respect to the quantitative

study of chapter 6, which provides empirical support to the intuitions explored and discussed in the present sections.[8] Additionally, chapter 6 provides the details regarding the classifications of negative items according to grammatical category and communicative function, which constitute the background information to the discussion of the present chapter.

In chapter 6, I establish a distinction between what is referred to as the general corpus, meaning the whole novel *Catch-22*, and the subcorpus, a selection of 134 extracts which constitutes the main target of my discussion both in the present chapter and in chapter 6.[9] The reasons for working with a subcorpus are explained in detail in chapter 6, and they are of a practical nature. Because of the length of the subcorpus, I will not analyse every extract in detail, but I will focus on those examples which I consider to be the most representative of the phenomena I discuss in each section of the present chapter. However, I will also make generalisations which will be applicable to groups of extracts. For a discussion of the criteria followed for the selection of the extracts in the subcorpus, and for a discussion of the problems in the classification of negative clauses from a discourse-pragmatic perspective, see chapter 6.

5.2. A text world approach to negation in discourse

The analysis in the following sections is based in general terms on Werth's approach to negation as a subworld.[10] As I

discussed in chapter 4, a text world approach to negation takes as a point of departure a series of theoretical assumptions which can be summarised as follows: from a discourse-pragmatic perspective, negation is a marked option which operates in discourse on the assumption that the affirmative term is expected or familiar to speaker and hearer. This is what Givón (1978, 1984, 1993) calls the *presuppositional nature* of negation. Negation is ontologically less salient than the affirmative, which makes it less informative. As a consequence, negation is a natural foregrounding device used when, more rarely in discourse, the non-event or the non-state are considered to be more informative than the event or the state.[11] This argument justifies the view of negation as typically expressed by an illocutionary act of denial, where the denied proposition corresponds to an assumption or expectation implicitly or explicitly present in the common ground of the discourse.

In text world theoretical terms, the ontological status of negation in discourse may be specified further as a conceptual domain which projects a subworld with two main functions:

> (a) a function of up-dating information in the text world by means of cancelling information in the text world, either deictic or subworld-building parameters, or frame knowledge; (b) a function whereby an item is both presented and denied at the same time, namely accommodation.

In addition to these general functions shared by negative utterances, I wish to argue that, in the data I am analysing, further categories may be established which are based on different ontological properties of the subworld. As explained above, paradox does not fit the functional description proposed in these terms, and for this reason, I propose an account of paradox and contradiction as discourse functions of negation which block the flow of information. The result is an apparent communicative short circuit, which, however, is resolved by means of inferencing procedures by the reader at a higher processing level.[12] This higher-level resolution of conflict at the textual level also takes place with other instances of marked uses of negation.[13]

A distinction is established between contradiction, on the one hand, and paradox, on the other. Contradiction always involves syntactic negation, and may be of two different types, depending on whether it leads to paradox or not. Paradox may be created by means of syntactic negation or by means of lexical negation. In the case of paradox created by lexical negation, we are no longer dealing with the definition of negation as subworld which I discuss in the first part of the chapter. Rather, we are dealing with a phenomenon that operates at a lexical level, but which reinforces an effect which exists also as a syntactic phenomenon. I will argue that both syntactic and lexical paradox contribute to the creation of a cognitive background which defines a particular type of ontology, a paradoxical type of ontology.

The consistent foregrounding of marked uses of negation, including paradox, leads to the creation of a pattern of *discourse deviation* which can be said to produce an effect of defamiliarisation, or *schema refreshment*, in a potential reader. The relationship between negation as a linguistic item and the effects of foregrounding, discourse deviation and schema refreshment or defamiliarisation is not a one-to-one relationship, which means it is not possible to identify specific negative utterances as the *locus* of any of the effects. Rather, we should talk about a discourse phenomenon where specific negative utterances trigger negative subworlds understood as semantic conceptual domains which stretch over a variable extension of discourse and have a particular effect.[14]

To sum up, I wish to present a text world approach to negation which encompasses pragmatic and semantic principles, which define its function in discourse, and cognitive factors, which determine the way in which it is processed by the reader. The types of functions of syntactic and lexical negation are summarised below:

1. the function of negation in rechannelling information.
    1.1. cancels deictic parameters in text world.
    1.2. cancels sub-world building parameters in text world.
    1.3. cancels frame knowledge.
    1.4. negative accommodation: introduces new information in order to deny it.
2. the function of negation in blocking the flow of information
    2.1. contradiction.
    2.2. paradox.
    2.3. lexical negation and paradox.

As I have explained above, in this classification we may

observe a distinction between syntactic negation, which is understood to be occurring in all functions except the last (lexical negation and paradox), and lexical negation, which refers to the negative value assigned to certain words which are opposed to another term typically classifed as positive (for example, crazy/sane).[15] Although the latter is a different phenomenon from those described in the previous sections, which have to do with the functions of syntactic negation, I have included it in the discussion because, in my view, paradox created by means of lexical oppositions is as significant as paradox created by means of syntactic negation in the data.

5.2.1. Negation as subworld which rechannells information

In these sections, I deal with negation whose function is to rechannel or up-date information. This function is carried out by altering information which is present in the common ground[16] in the form of an explicit or an implicit proposition (expectation, assumption or world knwoledge). The denied propositions may be understood to make reference to deictic information, world-building information and/or frame knowledge. Although the distinction between these three types is not clear cut, as one proposition may indeed deny more than one aspect at the same time, there is a tendency for one of the aspects to be the more prominent focus of the denial. From this perspective, we can classify the functions of negation as rechannelling information into three main types:

(a) negation which cancels deictic parameters;

(b) negation which cancels subworld-building parameters,

and (c) negation which denies the applicability of frame knowledge.

5.2.1.1. Negation which cancels deictic information of the text world

Negation that cancels deictic parameters of the text world is perhaps the most prototypical function of the negative subworld. When talking about the cancelling of deictic parameters, we mean that the information regarding the time or location of a situation, or the presence, existence or properties of entities has been altered in some way. This happens, typically, when something which was previously the case ceases to be applicable. In chapter 3, I discussed an example where a character called Major Major finds out his name is not Caleb, as he thought, but Major:

> (1) ...It was a harsh and stunning realization that was forced upon him at so tender an age, the realization that he was not, as he had always been led to believe, Caleb Major, but instead was some total stranger named Major Major about whom he knew absolutely nothing and about whom nobody else had heard before. (112)

The function of the negative clause *that he was not (...) Caleb Major...* is typically that of altering the information previously held to be true by the character and the reader, that an entity's property, his name, is so and so. In this sense, the function of negation has a strong corrective component. As explained above, the negated proposition may not be found in previous discourse, as in example (1), but may be

part of the reader's frame knowledge. With regard to what is understood exactly by the notion of subworld, we can distinguish between two meanings:

(i) each negative clause projects a semantic domain defined as a non-factual subworld; it describes a non-event or a non-state;

(ii) a subworld may be understood as a discourse phenomenon, in which case we consider negative subworlds as conceptual domains with the following characteristics:

(a) it is triggered by a negative clause, in example (1) above, *that he was not (...) Caleb Major...*
(b) it develops a non-factual world which contrasts to the status quo in the text actual world. In example (1), it includes the whole paragraph which describes the details of Major Major's realisation and other people's reaction.[17]
(c) it is characterised by continuity in topic, which makes it a coherent unit in itself. The coherence of the episode is also related to the identification of a humorous factor in the description, as in example (1) above.

Most extracts where negation is not involved in contradiction or paradox display the function of updating information.[18] In this section I discuss significant examples of uses of negation which may be considered to form a pattern of foregrounding of negative states and events which creates discourse deviation and may lead to an effect of defamiliarisation and to schema refreshment.

In its function of rechannelling information, negation may not only deny propositions which are present in previous discourse, but a previously held assumption or it may defeat an expectation created by previous discourse.[19] Below are two typical examples:

> (2) After he had made up his mind to spend the rest of the war in the hospital, Yossarian wrote letters to everyone he knew saying he was in the hospital but never mentioning why. One day he had a better idea. To everyone he knew he wrote he was going on a very dangerous mission. 'They asked for volunteers, but someone has to do it. I'll write you the instant I get back.' And he had not written anyone since. (14)

In extract (2) we find the two following negative clauses: (1) *but never mentioning why*, (2) *And he had not written anyone since*. Both clauses can be said to be prototypical examples of the function of negation as up-dating and rechannelling information, as the reader may be holding a wrong assumption or expectation about how the discourse will develop. Thus, if we are told that Yossarian is writing letters from hospital, an assumption or expectation is created that he should explain why he is in hospital. Similarly, if we are told that Yossarian writes that he will write back soon, we expect this to be true. Now, the negative clauses deny the applicability of the assumptions and expectations normally held by the reader, so that what would generally be the case, that one usually explains why he or she is in hospital, that one usually keeps one's word, is stated as false. This has the effect of foregrounding the negative term, the non-explanation, the non-reply. The negatives also provide information about the character described, Yossarian, as the deliberate omission of an explanation of why he is in hospital and his deliberate failure to keep his word are understood by the reader as provocative moves which are directed at producing anxiety and worry in the friends who receive the letters and who do not

know if Yossarian is ill or not, or even whether he is alive or dead. This provocative attitude is typical of Yossarian, who can be defined as the spirit of contradictoriness, which is obvious in extract (3) below:

> (3) But Yossarian couldn't be happy, even if the Texan didn't want him to be, because outside the hospital there was still nothing funny going on. The only thing going on was war and no one seemed to notice, except Yossarian and Dunbar. (25)

In extract (3), a complex contrast is established which defeats expectations which would normally be created in a reader, in particular with regard to the use of the linker *even if*, which requires an opposition. On a first reading, the expected opposition does not take place, as both terms linked by *even if* are negative. However, in previous discourse, we have been told that Yossarian believes firmly that the Texan does not want anybody to be happy, and we have also learnt that Yossarian has taken up contradiction and opposition as a standard way of relating himself to other people. With this information in mind, the reader is able to understand that the first negative clause *but Yossarian couldn't be happy*, denies the assumption that Yossarian will try to be happy, and the second negative clause *even though the Texan didn't want him to be*, identifies the adequate oppsite in Yossarian's terms - though not in the terms normally assumed to be valid by a reader. Thus, in Yossarian's way of doing things, which is by general rule the opposite of what should standardly be expected, if the Texan doesn't want him to be happy, he will

try as hard as possible to be so. Consequently, what is remarkable is that, in spite of the Texan not wanting him to be happy, he does not manage to achieve the opposite effect.

A different example is extract (4) below, where one of the Colonels at the base informs Major Major that he has been appointed new squadron commander:

> (4) 'You're the new squadron commander', Colonel Cathcart had shouted rudely across the railroad ditch to him. 'But *don't think it means anything, because it doesn't*. All it means is that you're the new squadron commander.' (116)

In extract (4), the negative clauses *but don't think it means anything, because it doesn't* can be said to deny the applicabilty or truth of inferences that could be recovered from the fact that Major Major is the new squadron commander, namely, the fact that being squadron commander will enable him to have more power. Thus, the fact that the new post is understood to *mean* something, implies that it normally carries with it added responsibility and power which go together with the higher rank. Colonel Cathcart wants to stress the fact that being in that post doesn't *mean* anything, in the sense that it does not imply any changes in added power.

In extract (5) below, negation can be said to defeat an expectation regarding what should be predicted to happen according to general assumptions about cause-effect. The extract refers to one of the soldiers who shares the hospital ward where Yossarian is during one of his stays at the hospital:

(5) With them this time was the twenty-four-year-old

> fighter-pilot captain with the sparse golden moustache who had been shot into the Adriatic Sea in midwinter and not even caught cold. Now the summer was upon them, the captain had not been shot down, and he said he had the grippe. (15)

In a typical process which is recurrent in the novel, cause-effect relations as we normally understand them are revealed to be inapplicable; negation in extract (5) denies the expectation that a certain effect should follow a cause: if one falls into the sea in midwinter, it is highly probable that he will catch a cold. This expectation is defeated by means of the negative clause *and not even caught cold*. The effect is reinforced by the parallel structure which follows, where the negative event, expressed in the clause *the captain had not been shot down*, implies the effect that in this case is not expected.

Other examples of the function of negation in up-dating information in general terms can be seen in extracts 39, 40, 41 in the appendix.

In the following discussion, I wish to focus on negative clauses which, by means of foregrounding negative events and states, contribute to the creation of a conflict between characters' domains and the status quo of the text actual world. This type of conflict is based upon games of deceit and pretense, two important phenomena in understanding *Catch-22*. From this perspective, we may classify negative clauses in the function of up-dating or re-channelling of information into two main groups: (a) one in which negation denies deictic information regarding entities, places or time which have

previously described a certain state of affairs in the text world, and which is now revealed as false; this is a case where something which was described as being true is now revealed as being false; (b) another where what is denied is deictic information describing states of affairs which are true but are taken to be false, even if there might be evidence proving they are true; this has the striking effect of denying the truth of what is real or actual. Both types are related to general strategies of deceit and pretense on the part of some characters, or, in more general terms, they are related to a conflict between characters' domains (knowledge about the status quo in the Text Actual World, wishes, beliefs, etc.) and the status quo of the Text Actual World. I deal with each type in turn.

An example of (a), where previously asserted discourse is revealed as being false, was already discussed in chapter 3, where I analysed the episode where Major Major learns that his name is not Caleb. Below I discuss further examples. Extract (6) is part of a longer description of Colonel Cathcart's stays at his farmhouse (see extract 81 in the appendix):

> (6) Officers' clubs everywhere pulsated with blurred but knowing accounts of lavish, hushed-up drinking and sexo rgies there and of secret, intimate nights of ecstasy with the most beautiful, the most tantalizing, the most readily aroused and most easily satisfied Italian courtesans, film actresses, models and countesses. No such private nights of ecstasy or hushed-up drinking and sex orgies ever occurred. They might have occurred if either General Dreedle or General Peckem had once evinced an interest in taking part in orgies with him, but neither ever did, and the colonel was certainly not going to waste his time and energy making love to beautiful women unless there was something in it for him. The colonel dreaded his dank lonely nights at his farmhouse and the dull, uneventful

> days. He had much more fun back at Group, browbeating everyone he wasn't afraid of. However, as Colonel Korn kept reminding him, there was not much glamour in having a farmhouse in the hills if he never used it. (268-69)

This is one of the typical examples where an appearance is set up in order to project an illusory domain which renders a previous assumption or assertion false. In this case, the sentence *No such private nights of ecstasy or hushed-up drinking and sex orgies ever occurred,* denies the truth of the preceding description. The entities described by the terms *private nights, hushed-up drinking, sex orgies,* which were assumed to exist, are the referential terms or deictic parameters which are cancelled by means of negation. The negative sentence triggers a non-factual domain or subworld which in conceptual terms may be identified with the appearance or illusion that is created by the Colonel. The negative sentence is reinforced by other negative clauses which stress the split between the facts and the illusion. Thus, we are told that there could have been orgies but *neither of the two generals* in the squadron are interested in them, and neither is Colonel Cathcart. This Colonel, however, is lured into going to the farmhouse periodically so as to keep up the illusion of the orgiastic weekends, as *there is no glamour if one does not make use of the house*. Unlike some of the extracts discussed in previous chapters, there is no problem in understanding what lies behind the denial, as the text itself points out explicitly that the objective is to create an illusion.

In my view, the particular function of this illusion can be adequately explained in terms of Ryan's (1991) model applied

to conflict in fiction. Thus, we can understand this episode as a conflict between opposing wishes within Colonel Cathcart's domain. On the one hand, there is a wish to be admired and accepted, which leads him to play the game of pretending to take part in the orgies. This conflicts with his distaste for the activity in itself, so that he has to pretend that those things take place. The consequence is a deceitful state of affairs projected against the facts of the text actual world, which only the reader knows are different. The extract as a whole may be said to induce schema refreshment because it directly reveals deceitful behaviour in the military officers, thus making the reader question the reliability of people belonging to this institution.

The deceitful nature of the higher officers shows, as already pointed out above, an exaggerated desire to be admired, to stand out above the rest at whatever cost. This leads each of the colonels and generals into petty power struggles among themselves. One of the experts in finding ways of standing out and being admired is General Peckem. The extract below refers to the term *bomb pattern*, which he has invented:

> (7) Colonel Scheisskopf was all ears, 'What are bomb patterns?' 'Bomb patterns?' General Peckem repeated, twinkling with self-satisfied good humor. 'A bomb pattern is a term I dreamed up just several weeks ago. It means nothing, but you'd be surprised at how rapidly it's caught on. Why, I've got all sorts of people convinced I think it's important for the bombs to explode close together and make a neat aerial photograph. There's one colonel in Pianosa who's hardly concerned any more with whether he hits the target or not. (411)

This extract already shows the dangers of the higher officers' obsessions with the appearance of things, rather than

the things themselves. This is particularly threatening when the things they are dealing with have to do with war. This problem can be said to be expressed again by a definition in negative terms supported by other attributes: *It means nothing, but you'd be surprised at how rapidly it's caught on*. By uttering this sentence, the general is correcting the assumption that an entity should have a basic property, to be meaningful. We can say that this is a prototypical example of a marked foregrounding of a negative state: the general defines a term precisely by its lack of informativity. The second part of the sentence reveals why the term is significant, even if it is not informative: it has caught on quickly. Again, it is the predominance of the appearance over the fact that is the focus of attention. This, however, can have disastrous consequences, as another colonel takes it so seriously that he is convinced that the appearance (the bomb pattern on the aerial photograph) is primary with respect to the reality (where the bombs actually fall). The effect of this extract is reinforced by what is said about the village the bombardiers have to bomb on a mission, described in extract (8), reproduced below:

> (8) They'll be bombing a tiny undefended village, reducing The whole community to rubble. I have it from Wintergreen. Wintergreen's an ex-sergeant now, by the way - that the mission is entirely unnecessary. Its only purpose is to delay German reinforcements at a time when we aren't even planning an offensive. But that's the way things go when you elevate mediocre people to positions of authority.' He gestured languidly toward his gigantic map of Italy. 'Why, this tiny mountain village is so insignificant that it isn't even there. (412)

The strategy displayed here is a similar to the one

described above, and it also relies on the appearance, rather than on the reality. Thus, it is said that *the mission is entirely unnecessary* (one of the examples where morphological negation has a clear foregrounding function), that it is a moment when they *are not even planning an offensive*, and that the village to be bombed *is so insignificant that it isn't even there* (meaning it is not on the map). The first negative clause denies the assumption that, in war, action is carried out either because you need to attack or because you need to organise a defence; it also denies the subworld-building word *plan*, thus cancelling the intentional component. The second negative clause foregrounds a non-state, by pointing out that the village *is not on the map*. As in the other examples discussed in this section the foregrounding of the negative events and states is explained explicitly. The aim of attacking unnecessarily an insignificant village is to delay German reinforcements, which is also a minor objective. The absurdity of the whole enterprise is made evident by the general's words about the plans made by mediocre people. It constitutes a blatant exposure of the inefficiency and ineptitude of the higher officers.

The questioning of military operations becomes a recurrent theme and is particularly disturbing when the reader is told that the military apparatus continues even if the enemy is no longer there. This can be seen, for example, in extract (9) below, where Yossarian wishes he could make use of a machine gun instead of being inside a bombardier plane:

> (9) Actually, there was not much he could do with that powerful machine gun except load it and test-fire a few rounds. It was no more use to him than the bombsight. He could really cut loose with it against attacking German fighters, but there were no German fighters any more, and he could not even swing it all the way around into the helpless faces of pilots like Huple and Dobbs and order them back down carefully to the ground, as he had once ordered Kid Sampson back down... (419)

An interesting aspect in this extract is that certain negative sentences correct assumptions that were up to this point held by the reader, namely, that there was an enemy. By saying *but there were no more German fighters any more*, the assumption of the presence of the entity *enemy* is denied, and this leads to a questioning of what the Americans are doing there if there are no more enemies left.

The manipulation of facts in order to create an illusory and deceitful appearance becomes more threatening towards the end of the novel, where the arbitrariness of power in the hands of the higher officers becomes more obvious and more dangerous. The following extract tells how Yossarian finds out that the famous catch-22 does not exist, and that the higher officers use it as an excuse to carry out all sorts of unjust actions.

> (10) Yossarian left money in the old woman's lap - it was odd how many wrongs leaving money seemed to right and strode out of the apartment, cursing Catch-22 vehemently as he descended the stairs, even though he knew there was no such thing. Catch-22 did not exist, he was positive of that, but it made no difference. What did matter was that everyone thought it existed, and that was much worse, for there was no object or text to ridicule or refute, to accuse, criticize, attack, amend, hate, revile, spit at, rip to shreds, trample upon or burn up. (516)

From the text world perspective of Werth's model, negation in this extract carries out the function of altering information that has been previously introduced in the text

world, in this case, regarding the existence of the catch-22 as an accepted entity in the fictional world. In this extract, something that was introduced as real, the catch-22, is revealed to be an illusion, so the truth regarding its existence is denied. This shows a deeper conflict which pervades the whole novel, summarised in two crucial sentences: *Catch-22 did not exist, he was positive of that, but it made no difference. What did matter was that everyone thought it existed, and that was much worse, for there was no object or text to ridicule or refute...* The negative clause *Catch-22 did not exist* denies what has been described above, while *but it made no difference*, denies the assumption or expectation that the revelation that the catch-22 is non-existent should make things change. This is explained in the affirmative sentence which follows, *What did matter was that everyone thought it did*. The process of foregrounding the non-object acquires dramatic proportions, as we are told that there is *no object or text to ridicule or refute...* The non-object is not only taken for an existing object, but also, being nonexistent, it *lacks a fixed definition, it does not refer to a fixed entity* with specific properties in the world; this makes it an easy instrument of arbitrary abuse of power on the part of evil people.

The conflict is similar to those discussed above. Something that was accepted as real is revealed as illusory to the reader, while the fact that it is still accepted as real by most of the characters in the fictional world is stressed

(this is expressed in the second part of the extract). In terms of Ryan's (1991) model applied to conflict in fiction, we can interpret it as a conflict based on a deceitful state of affairs which leads to an erroneous or false K-world on the part of the characters with no power (the population in general and the soldiers). This is contrasted with the fact that the persons with power (the higher ranking officers) know the truth, thus their K-world corresponds with the state of affairs in the fictional world.

The fact that the persons with power deliberately manipulate facts to their advantage is manifested explicitly towards the last pages of the novel, where the chaplain tells Yossarian he is a hero for defending the colonels' lives fron a Nazi assassin. Yossarian tells him the story is false:

(11) *You know, Yossarian, we're all very proud of you.*
'Proud?'
'Yes, of course. For risking your life to stop that *Nazi assassin. It was a very noble thing to do.*'
'What Nazi assassin?'
'The one that came here to murder Colonel Cathcart and Colonel Korn. And you saved them. He might have stabbed you to death as you grappled with him on the balcony. It's a lucky thing you're alive!'
Yossarian snickered sardonically when he understood.
'That was no Nazi assassin.'
'Certainly it was. Colonel Korn said it was.'
'That was Nately's girl friend. And she was after me not Colonel Cathcart and Colonel Korn. She's been trying to kill me ever since I broke the news to her that Nately was dead.'
'But how could that be?' the chaplain protested in livid and resentful confusion. 'Colonel Cathcart and Colonel Korn both saw him as he ran away. The official report says you stopped a Nazi assassin from
killing them.'
'Don't believe the official report,' Yossarian advised dryly. 'It's part of the deal.' (546-47)

Again, by means of negation in its function of correction

of previous discourse, the reader comes to know that the officers have invented a deceitful version of an episode where Nately's girl-friend has tried to kill Yossarian. The officers have spread the version that it was a Nazi assassin trying to kill the colonels. Yossarian denies the truth of this statement (*That was no nazi assassin*) and tells the true version. As in the examples above, the manipulation on the part of the officers induces a deceitful state of affairs which creates false K-worlds in other characters except Yossarian, who knows the truth. Again, this is a strategy of arbitrary display of power with regard to Yossarian, who has no way of proving that their version is not true. As in previous examples, the reader is explicitly told that the higher officers are doing something wrong by falsifying facts, which leads to a critical attitude on the part of the reader towards them.[20]

The exploitation of illusory worlds is also a speciality of Milo, the mess officer. Below is an example where Yossarian refuses to continue helping Milo on one of his commercial 'missions', even if Milo has offered him and Orr the company of two virgins:

> (12) 'To hell with my mission,' Yossarian responded indifferently. 'And to hell with the syndicate too, even though I do have a share. I don't want any eight-year-old virgins, even if they are half Spanish.'
> 'I don't blame you. But these eight-year-old virgins are really only thirty-two. And they're not really half Spanish but only one-third Estonian.'
> 'I don't care for any virgins.'
> 'And they're not even virgins,' Milo continued persuasively. 'The one I picked out for you was married for a short time to an elderly schoolteacher who slept with her only on Sundays, so she's really almost as good as new.' (297)

In extract (12), as in (11), the illusory or false character of previous discourse is revealed. In this extract, Milo confesses that the girls he has found for Yossarian and Orr are not really virgins, as he had assured them. Little by little he reveals the series of lies he has told them: *And they're not really half Spanish but only one-third Estonian', 'And they're not even virgins,'*. As in example (11) above, the correction of previous propositions reveals the deceitful nature of Milo. As in example (11) above, this leads to a questioning of commercial procedures and to the honesty of professionals in this field. This takes place by means of a process of generalisation, where the properties said of Milo are applied to commerce in general terms.

The setting up of pretense, however, pervades other professional areas, such as medicine. Below is an example where Yossarian, during one of his stays in hospital, is obliged to pretend he is the dying son of a couple who have come to visit their son, who is already dead.

> (13) 'There are some relatives here to see you. Oh, don't worry,' he added with a laugh. 'Not your relatives. It's the mother, father and brother of that chap who died. They've traveled all the way from New York to see a dying soldier, and you're the handiest one we've got.'
> 'What are you talking about?' Yossarian asked suspiciously. 'I'm not dying.'
> 'Of course you're dying. We're all dying. Where the devil else do you think you're heading?' (234)

While the extracts commented on above are an invitation to criticise the procedures of military officers, this extract questions the humanity of doctors in a war situation. The negative clause *Oh, don't worry (...) Not your relatives*, deny

the commonsense assumption Yossarian has made that his relatives are there to visit him. Yossarian is later blackmailed into pretending he is the dying soldier, thus putting up a scene where he pretends to be somebody else. The absurdity of the situation is reinforced by the fact that the relatives do not seem to notice he is not their son, or, if they do, they do not mind. As in previous examples, it is the appearance that matters, that the relatives are able to see *some* dying soldier, and not the reality, that it is not their son.

To end this section, I wish to comment briefly on one of the symbolic images of the novel, which appears strategically at different points. It has to do with the figure of the soldier in white, a soldier who is entirely covered with plaster, so that he cannot move or talk. The soldier apparently dies at some point in the story, but he comes back, causing panic in the hospital ward. This leads Dunbar, one of the soldiers, to think that there is actually nobody inside the bandages, that the plaster case is empty:

> (14) There's no one inside!' Dunbar yelled out at him unexpectedly. Yossarian felt his heart skip a beat and his legs grow weak. 'What are you talking about?' he shouted with dread, stunned by the haggard, sparking anguish in Dunbar's eyes and by his crazed look of wild shock and horror. 'Are you nuts or something? What the hell do you mean there's no one inside?'
> 'They've stolen him away!' Dunbar shouted back. 'He's hollow inside, like a chocolate soldier. They took him away and left those bandages there.'
> 'Why should they do that?'
> 'Why should they do anything?' (462)

The negative utterance *There's no one inside!* cancels the previously introduced information that beneath the plaster

cover there is a wounded soldier, thus denying the existence of an entity who has previously been introduced as alive. The apparently absurd observation that there might be no one inside the plaster, however, produces terror in the soldiers in the ward, which seems to indicate that the claim may be true.

I wish to bring together all the extracts in this section and point out how they form part of a pattern that may be perceived throughout the novel. This pattern may be summarised as one where WHAT IS NOT takes over WHAT IS. In the extracts discussed here, 'what is not' is an illusory appearance that is imposed on reality by means of deceit. The means whereby we perceive the different extracts as connected may be accounted for by using Schank's notion of TOP. A TOP is a high level schema organising structure which enables us to find similarities between apparently disparate experiences.[21] We can say that each of the situations described in the extracts above evoke schemata which, although not directly connected, present similarities which enable us to collect them under one single TOP. This is illustrated in table 1 below.

The category labelled *reminding* collects the episodes which are perceived as being connected, in this case, the extracts I have been discussing in the present section. We can observe that the different images or schemata have an underlying *goal* which shows evil intent, in the sense that its aim is to deceive. The goal is an achievement goal because it has to do with the display and abuse of power. The *condition* is that the appearance is always perceived to be more important that the

reality,[22] and the *features* are related to the general war situation depicted in the novel, but concentrating on the behaviour of people with power, the higher officers, the doctors, the businessmen.

REMINDING	GOAL	CONDITIONS	FEATURES
soldier in white/ colonel's farmhouse/ bomb patterns/ bombing village/ plane attack/ catch-22/ nazi assassin/ virgins/ dying soldier	achievement goal: deceit; manipulate power	the apparent is more important than the real	war situation; officers' behaviour; doctors' behaviour;

Table 1.

The second type of negative subworld which alters parameters set up in the text world is used to deny a fact directly observable from reality, or information which describes states of affairs which are true but are taken to be false or ignored. Below I comment on some representative examples. Extract (15) is an episode where Yossarian is wounded during an air mission. He asks one of the other men for help, but he is unable to do so:

(15) 'I'm hit, Aarfy! Help me!'
Aarfy grinned again and shrugged amiably, 'I can't hear you,' he said.
'Can't you see me?' Yossarian cried incredulously and he pointed to the deepening pool of blood he felt splashing down all around him and spreading out underneath.
'I'm wounded! Help me, for God's sake! Aarfy, help me!'

> 'I still can't hear you,' Aarfy complained tolerantly, cupping his podgy hand behind the blanched corolla of his ear. 'What did you say?' (367)

Aarfy's inability to perceive (literally) that Yossarian needs help is expressed by reference to two of the senses: Aarfy excuses himself by saying *I can't hear you*, by which he rejects the responsibility of helping Yossarian, even when Yossarian cannot believe that Aarfy does not see him: *Can't you see me?* The extract reveals the (deliberate?) incapacity of a character to react to an external fact, from which he shields himself by means of denying his ability to perceive it through the senses. The situation is absurd, for it is obvious to the reader, as it is to Yossarian, that Aarfy must be able to see that Yossarian is wounded, even if he can't hear what he's saying.

As in the examples of the denial of previous discourse, the denial of what is true in the text actual world acquires threatening proportions towards the end of the novel. This can be observed in extract (16) below, where the chaplain is being accused of having forged his own handwriting:

> (16) 'This isn't your handwriting.'
> The chaplain blinked rapidly with amazement. 'But of course it's my handwriting.'
> 'No it isn't, Chaplain. You're lying again.'
> 'But I just wrote it!' the chaplain cried in exasperation.
> 'You saw me write it.'
> 'That's just it,' the major answered bitterly. 'I saw you write it. You can't deny that you did write it. A person who'll lie about his own handwriting will lie about anything.' (481-82)

In this extract, we have a denial of a fact that is obviously true for one of the characters (here, the chaplain)

and for the reader: *This isn't your handwriting*. The absurdity of the claim that the chaplain's handwriting is not his handwriting is taken to an extreme by the officer who interrogates him, as he argues that the fact that he just wrote the words is evidence in favour of the fact that he is lying. The explanation to this scene is found elsewhere in the novel, where we are told that both Yossarian and Major Major have been forging documents which have been signed with the names of the chaplain and of Washington Irving. What is important here is that the higher officers are more eager to believe that the chaplain is lying about his identity (and his hadwriting), than to believe someone else may have been forging the signatures.

Linguistically, we may explain the absurdity of the utterance *This isn't your handwriting* as being ambiguous, since the reference of the possessive *your* is not clear.[23] It seems that the officers believe that the chaplain is actually Washington Irving, and are expecting him to use the handwriting they have in previous documents signed by the name of Washington Irving. Conversely, they may believe he is the chaplain, but even then they are expecting him to use the handwriting of the other documents where his name has been forged by somebody else.

Actually, the chaplain himself seems to have great difficulties in interpreting real facts as real, as is shown in his long reflections about dejà vu and other extraordinary perceptual phenomena (see extracts 93, 98). He is particularly obsessed with the episode of Snowden's funeral, where he thinks

he has a vision of a man sitting on a tree.[24]

> (17) There was no mistaking the awesome implications of the chaplain's revelation: it was either an insight of divine origin or a hallucination; he was either blessed or losing his mind. Both prospects filled him with equal fear and depression. It was neither déja vu, presque vu nor jamais vu. It was possible that there were other vus of which he had never heard and that one of these other vus would explain succinctly the baffling phenomenon of which he had been both a witness and a part; it was even possible that none of what he thought had taken place, really had taken place, that he was dealing with an aberration of memory rather than of perception, that he never really had thought he had seen, that his impression now that he once had thought so was merely the illusion of an illusion, and that he was only now imagining that he had ever once imagined seeing a naked man sitting in a tree at the cemetery. (341)

This extract displays a complex rationalisation process where the real is given the proportions of the extraordinary. The chaplain is trying to make sense of the episode where Yossarian is sitting on the branch of a tree during Snowden's funeral. The interpretation of this fact as something extraordinary is indicated from the beginning, where the chaplain tries to identify the 'phenomenon' by an elimination process: *it was either an insight of divine origin or a hallucination; he was either blessed or losing his mind.* The system of binary contrasts which mutually exclude each other is a clear example of the tendency to categorise experience in terms of binary oppositions in a relation of contradictoriness, rather than contrariety.[25] This means that, even if there are other terms in between the opposite extremes, this is not perceived as such by the chaplain. Quite significantly, one of the options left out, ironically identified as one of *other vus*, is reality itself, the fact that the vision did actually

take place. Thus, the chaplain continues his search of extraordinary sensorial perception in his obsession to find an answer to the enigma of the man on the tree: *It was neither déja vu, presque vu nor jamais vu.*

The sentence introduced by *it was even possible that...* introduces a counterfactual domain in which the subsequent that-clauses are embedded. With regard to the embedding of negative clauses within other subworlds, I discuss this topic in detail in section 5.2.1.3. below. Here, I wish to point out that the chaplain's perception that the vision may have been real loses ground progressively.

Linguistically, this loss of touch with the perception of facts is reflected in a distancing by means of an increasingly more complex counterfactual domain; here, I am particularly interested in the function of negation, although the affirmative clauses carry out a similar function: *it was even possible that none of what he thought had taken place, really had taken place,* and *that he never really had thought he had seen*. The negative clauses carry counterfactuality to an extreme by denying even the possibility of the existence of the fact referred to, which now becomes *the illusion of an illusion*. This self-reflective process is a recurrent image in the novel, analogous to the soldier in white's image and the cacth-22 itself. All of them constitute circular closed systems which seem to have an independent status from reality.

The fact that the chaplain is unable to identify the episode as real is indicated explicitly:

> (18) The possibility that there really had been a naked man in the tree - two men, actually, since the first had been joined shortly by a second man clad in a brown mustache and sinister dark garments from head to toe who bent forward ritualistically along the limb of the tree to offer the first man something to drink from a brown goblet never crossed the chaplain's mind. (346)

To sum up the comments made in this section, prototypical negative subworlds carry out a discourse function in which they up-date or re-channell information. In the examples discussed, it was observed that this function is mainly corrective, in the sense that the negative corrects a wrongly held assumption derived from information stated in previous discourse, or it denies states of affairs proved previously to be true. In the first case, I argued that a domain of appearance is imposed on the actual domain, while in the second case, an actual fact is denied existence or acceptability.

5.2.1.2. Negation which cancels world-building parameters

The type of negation discussed in this section cancels subworld-building parameters, that is, it denies the validity or applicability of information regarding epistemic, cognitive or hypothetical domains.

Pagano (1994: 264) has already pointed out that negative clauses introduced by modal verbs seem to constitute a special category of negative function. This author provided the following example:

(19) *Saabs may not look large*. Yet the Saab 9000 is the only imported car in the USA rated 'large' by the Environmental Protection Agency.
(*Business Week International*, 12 March 1990: 1)

Pagano (ibid.) argues that by means of the denial, the author is making a concession that *the Saabs actually do not look large*, followed by a *but*.... She points out that 'The writer admits something but then presents an alternative which reduces the effect of the denial.' (ibid.). In my opinion, this phenomenon is easily understood if we have in mind the notions of the presuppositional nature of negation and of the world-building character of modal verbs and certain other predicates. In the case of the example provided by Pagano, we may argue that the combination of the modal *may* together with the negation introduces a property (*the Saab looks large*) in order to deny it. In my data there are numerous examples of this kind. Their function falls in general terms within the broad category defined above, where the negative rechannells information. However, the negation of world-building predicates presents idiosyncratic characteristics that makes it different from the rest of the subworlds discussed so far and makes it similar to negative accommodation. I discuss the following types of denial of world-building parameters:

(a) denial of epistemic domains, such as *not+possible, certain, perhaps*, etc.
(b) negative hypothetical domains, such as *if..not, had...not*, etc.
(c) denial of cognitive domains, such as *not+know, hope, seem, believe, realise*.

I now consider each in turn. Below is an example of a denial of an epistemic domain introduced by the modal *will*,

indicating certainty and projection in the future. The extract describes an episode where an announcement has been put up postponing the celebration of a parade:

> (20) 'What's so different about this Sunday. I want to know?'
> Hungry Joe was demanding vociferously of Chief White Halfoat.
> 'Why won't we have a parade this Sunday when we don't have a parade every Sunday? Huh?'
> Yossarian worked his way through to the front and let out a long, agonized groan when he read the terse announcement there:
> *Due to circumstances beyond my control, there will be no big parade this Sunday afternoon.*
> *Colonel Scheisskopf.* (403)

In extract (20) above, the negative term *not* is attached to the modal *will* (*Why won't we have a parade this Sunday, there will be no big parade this Sunday afternoon*). The combination of both terms creates a subworld which has the characteristics of a counter-factual projection in the future. It seems that negative *will* or *won't* presupposes that the action described by the main verb following the modal has taken place before, and that in the future it will no longer be the case. This is perceived by Hungry Joe on reading the notice, as he doesn't understand the communicative value of a notice where an activity which has not happened before is presented as if it had. The property of *won't* to presuppose the affirmative is exploited consciously by the higher officers, as is explained in extract (21) below:

> (21) 'What do you know about?' he asked acidly.
> 'Parades,' answered Colonel Scheisskopf eagerly, 'Will I be able to send out memos about parades?'
> 'As long as you don't schedule any.' General Peckem returned to his chair still wearing a frown. 'And as long as they don't interfere with your main assignment of recommending that the authority of Special Services be

> expanded to include combat activities.'
> 'Can I schedule parades and then call them off?'
> General Peckem brightened instantly. 'Why, that's a wonderful idea! But just send out weekly announcements postponing the parades. Don't even bother to schedule them. That would be infinitely more disconcerting.'
> General Peckem was blossoming spryly with cordiality again. 'Yes, Scheisskopf,' he said, 'I think you've really hit on something. After all, what combat commander could possibly quarrel with us for notifying his men that there won't be a parade that coming Sunday? We'd be merely stating a widely known fact. But the implication is beautiful. Yes, positively beautiful. We're implying that we could schedule a parade if we chose to. I'm going to like you, Scheisskopf. Stop in and introduce yourself to Colonel Cargill and tell him what you're up to. I know you two will like each other.' (410)

In this extract, we are shown the process by which General Peckem realises the advantages of allowing Scheisskopf to postpone parades. In this way, Sheisskopf is satisfied, and so is he, since putting up notices postponing something implies they *could* take place. General Peckem seems to perceive the presuppositional nature of *won't* and uses it to his own advantage, as a means of displaying power in the face of other generals. As in previous examples, the maneouvre is just an appearance, an illusion, but it is certainly extremely effective.

With regard to the projection of negative hypothetical domains, conditionals are used to create counterfactual domains which seem to compete with the status quo of reality. An example is from extract 61:

> (22) 'I really can't believe it,' Clevinger exclaimed to Yossarian in a voice rising and falling in protest and wonder. 'It's a complete reversion to primitive superstition. They're confusing cause and effect. It makes as much sense as knocking on wood or crossing your fingers. They really believe that we wouldn't have to fly that mission tomorrow if someone would only tiptoe up to the map in the middle of the night and move the bomb line

> over Bologna. Can you imagine? You and I must be the only rational ones left.'
> In the middle of the night, Yossarian knocked on wood, crossed his fingers, and tiptoed out of his tent to move the bomb line up over Bologna. (156)

In a process typical of the world of *Catch-22* a possible domain is projected (*if someone would only tiptoe up to the map in the middle of the night and move the bomb line over Bologna)*, and an unacceptable consequence (*we wouldn't have to fly that mission tomorrow*). As Clevinger points out, the relation between the hypothesis and its consequence actually inverts the ordinary cause-effect relation between events. Instead of assuming that, once the city is conquered, the bomb line will be moved over the city, the soldiers assume that the inverse process may also be true: if one moves the bomb line over the city, it will be conquered, and, consequently, it will not be necessary to fly the mission. The role of negation in this process is precisely that of creating a non-factual domain which is the consequence of a premise which does not describe the state of affairs of the text actual world, but only the state of affairs in a pretended domain, that of a map. As in previous examples, there is a conflict between a pretended domain, that created on the map, and reality, what is the case in the fictional world. Even more striking is the fact that Yossarian does move the bomb line over the city on the map, and, as a consequence, causes everybody to believe the city has been won. This process can be described as a kind of negative determinism where events which are initially presented as NOT LIKELY/NOT POSSIBLE (it is not possible for the town to be won

only by moving the bomb line over the city on the map) is taken AS IF it were ACTUAL (the city has been won); in other words, we may express is as a process where what CANNOT BE becomes WHAT IS.[26] This process provides a different view of the relation between the apparent and the real which I have been discussing. The phenomenon is certainly not restricted to the presence of negative clauses; rather, it is found in a combination of different linguistic structures which express possibility and consequence. Significantly, there are several episodes where we can recognise this pattern, as in the deaths of Hungry Joe and Chief White Half-Oat. Hungry Joe dreams every night that a cat is suffocating him, and ends up suffocated by a cat in his sleep, while Chief White Halfoat is convinced he will die of pneumonia, and he does.[27]

Yossarian seems to believe in the possibility of inverting cause effect relations, and thus change the course of events, as we have seen in extract (22) above. This can also be observed in extract (23) below, about the supposed death of the soldier in white (part of extract 72):

> (23) Now that Yossarian looked back, it seemed that Nurse Cramer rather than the talkative Texan, had murdered the soldier in white; if she had not read the thermometer and reported what she had found, the soldier in white might still be lying there alive exactly as he had been lying there all along, encased from head to toe in plaster and gauze with both strange, rigid legs elevated from the hips and both strange arms strung up perpendicularly, all four bulky limbs in casts, all four strange, useless limbs hoisted up in the air by taut wire cables and fantastically long lead weights suspended darkly above him. Lying there that way might not have been much of a life, but it was all the life he had, and the decision to terminate it, Yossarian felt, should hardly have been Nurse Cramer's. (214-15)

In this extract we have the projection of a negative hypothetical domain which describes a counterfactual state of affairs (*if she had not read the thermometer and reported what she had found*). The consequence, however, is unacceptable (*the soldier in white might still be lying there alive exactly as he had been lying there all along*). It is unacceptable because it is based on the assumption that, if a person is not known to be dead by other people, consequently, that person cannot be dead. There is an unacceptable cause-effect relation established between the act of perception, of realisation of a state of affairs in the actual world that someone is dead, and the result of an independent natural process, the death of a soldier for other reasons which the reader does not know.

The fact that Yossarian does intervene actively in the modification of the course of events is mentioned explicitly in extract (24) reproduced below. This passgae summarises the sudden realisation that apparently absurd actions carried out by Yossarian, like forging signatures in the censoring of letters (see extract 2) and moving the bomb line over the map have had dramatic consequences.

> (24) In a way it was all Yossarian's fault, for if he had not moved the bomb line during the Big Siege of Bologna, Major - de Coverley might still be around to save him, and if he had not stocked the enlisted men's apartment with girls who had no other place to live, Nately might never have fallen in love with his whore as she sat naked from waist down in the room full of grumpy blackjack players who ignored her. (363)

In this extract we have two hypothetical negative clauses which project counterfactual domains: *if he had not moved the bomb line during the Big Siege of Bologna, if he had not*

*stocked the enlisted men's apartment with girls....*The consequence is *Nately might never have fallen in love with his whore.* Each of these clauses presupposes a proposition with the contrary truth value, that is, Yossarian did move the bomb line, Major de Coverley did stock the apartment with girls and Nately did fall in love with the whore. The ultimate consequence of this process is not mentioned here, but the reader finds out later that Nately decides to stay in Italy instead of going back to the US and is killed on a mission. Nately's death symbolically represents the loss of the little hope that was left, as virtually all of Yossarian's friends have died or disappeared.

To sum up, negative hypothetical subworlds have the function of projecting counterfactual domains which describe impossible or unlikely states of affairs, from which an unacceptable consequence is inferred. However, the consequence is accepted as actual and valid by the characters in the world of *Catch-22* . This leads to the creation of further pretended worlds which have dramatic consequences on the development of events in the story.

To end this section, I wish to mention some examples of negation of a cognitive domain, as they is also relevant for the understanding of the function of negation in the corpus. There are several episodes which describe the inability of some characters to determine their knowledge of what is happening around them or to themselves even in cases where they should be expected to know what is going on. An example is Major

Major, about whom it is said

> (25) He had been made squadron commander but had no idea what he was supposed to do as squadron commander unless all he was supposed to do was forge Washington Irving's name to official documents and listen to the isolated clinks and thumps of Major - de Coverley's horseshoes falling to the ground outside the window of his small office in the rear of the orderly-room tent. (119)

Here we are told that Major Major *had no idea* what it means to be squadron commander, that is, what his duties are exactly. In particular, Major Major is concerned about his relative status with regard to Major - de Coverley, a mysterious and charismatic character who everybody respects without knowing exactly what his rank is (see extract 43).

> (26) Major Major wondered about his relationship to Major - de Coverley and about Major - de Coverley's relationship to him. He knew that Major - de Coverley was his executive officer, but he did not know what that meant, and he could not decide whether in Major - de Coverley he was blessed with a lenient superior or cursed with a delinquent subordinate. He did not want to ask Sergeant Towser, of whom he was secretly afraid, and there was no one else he could ask, least of all Major - de Coverley. Few people ever dared approach Major - de Coverley about anything and the only officer foolish enough to pitch one of his horseshoes was stricken the very next day with the worst case of Pianosan crud that Gus or Wes or even Doc Daneeka had ever seen or even heard about. Everyone was positive the disease had been inflicted upon the poor officer in retribution by Major - de Coverley, although no one was sure how. (120)

Major Major does not know the status of Major de Coverley, and this is also unknown to the rest of the soldiers, who seem to believe Major de Coverley has extraordinary powers, as is expressed in the last sentence of the extract.

The lack of knowledge of characters with regard to their work is also a characteristic of the doctors of *Catch-22*, as is observed in the two extracts below:

(27) 'It's not my business to save lives,' Doc Daneeka retorted sullenly.
'What is your business?'
'I don't know what my business is. (from extract 73)

In this extract, Doc Daneeka, quite surprisingly, states he does not know what his business is. This goes against general world knowledge regarding the professional and moral commitment of doctors to their work. See also extract 74 for a humorous example of the inability of doctors to identify a disease.

Finally, it is the chaplain who has most difficulties in knowing what is going on, as he seems to be completely unable to differentiate between reality and illusion. This doubt is expressed several times (see extracts 93 and 94) and has already been mentioned in the comments on extract (17) above. Here I will provide two further examples:

> (28) Perhaps he really was Washington Irving, and perhaps he really had been signing Washington Irving's name to those letters he knew nothing about. Such lapses of memory were not uncommon in medical annals, he knew. There was no way of really knowing anything. (339)

The chaplain's doubt about what is real and what is not real is encapsulated in the negative sentence *There was no way of really knowing anything*. This uncertainty partly reflects the general uncertainty about the outcome of events in the world of *Catch-22*, since, as we have seen in previous episodes, it is extremely difficult to make predictions about how things will happen, as the world of *Catch-22* seems to develop rules of its own. However, it is also obvious that the chaplain has succumbed to this pattern of uncertainty and is not able to state his own identity. In a typically schizophrenic attitude

he claims the possibility that he might be someone else (Washington Irving). The pressure of the external rules has become too strong for the chaplain, who seems to be on the verge of believing the wrong assumptions others have of him. The uncertainty affects not only his recognition of his own identity and the distinction between real and illusory states of affairs, but also the difference between moral values, what is good and what is bad, what is monstruous and what is not monstruous:

> (29) So many monstrous events were occurring that he was no longer positive which events were monstrous and which were really taking place. (354) (extract 98)

Significantly, this observation is closely connected to the chaplain's definition of the phenomenon of *jamais vu*, a process where unfamiliar events acquire a feeling of familiarity (see extract 17 above). This seems to refer to the process mentioned in examples 10, 13, 22, 28, above where illusory, non-factual and counterfactual domains seems to take over the actual, reality, in such a way that what is unexpected and unusual becomes the generally accepted rule. In linguistic terms, we can define it as a process whereby what is usually expressed in marked terms (by means of negative clauses, counterfactuals, etc.) becomes the unmarked more usual option.

5.2.1.3. Negative subworlds embedded in other subworlds

In certain cases, negative subworlds are embedded within other subworlds, creating also peculiar effects. I wish to

focus on the examples where negative subworlds are embedded within *when-* questions. The reader may find other examples in the subcorpus, such as negatives embedded in a subworld triggered by the verb *pretend* (see extracts 49, where Major Major's friends pretend not to recognise him under his disguise, and extract 51, where Major Major reflects about the pretended attitude of higher officers towards the soldiers). The following extract from Clevinger's trial illustrates the idiosyncratic use of negatives within temporal subworlds:

The higher officers proceed by questioning Clevinger on things he has not said or done (part of extract 34, see also extract 35).

(30) 'When didn't you say we couldn't punish you? Don't you understand my question?'
'No, sir. I don't understand.'
'You've just told us that. Now suppose you answer my question.'
'But how can I answer it?'
'That's another question you're asking me.'
'I'm sorry, sir. But I don't know how to answer it. I never said you couldn't punish me.'
'Now you're telling us when you did say it. I'm asking you to tell us when you didn't say it.'
Clevinger took a deep breath. 'I always didn't say you couldn't punish me, sir.' (101)

The officer asks Clevinger the uninformative question *When didn't you say we couldn't punish you?* which, of course, is not understood by Clevinger. The reasons for the difficulty in understanding the point of this question are several. A *when-* question is an open-ended question which requires specification regarding the particular moment or period in time in which some activity took place. Negation, however, lacks the necessary specificity that should enable us to describe a particular

moment or period in time, unless the range upon which the negative operates is provided by other means. In other words, a negative clause is typically uninformative, as it describes the general background norm upon which events stand out as salient. The number of times when Clevinger didn't say they couldn't punish him is infinite.[28] Consequently, a question which requests information about the background norm is uninformative and apparently pointless.

Furthermore, it may be observed that the *wh-* element falls within the scope of negation, following the tendency mentioned by several authors[29] for adjuncts to attract the scope of negation. In this respect, Kuno (1992b: 4) argues that a question such as *When didn't you say we couldn't punish you?* violates the 'Ban on extraction of the target of negation' and the 'Ban on questions that solicit uninformative answers'. The former establishes that

> An element that is the Target of Negation cannot be extracted out of the scope (i.e. the C-command domain) of the negative element. (...) When negated sentences involve adjuncts that may or may not be the targets of negation, the semantic contrast is much clearer. (...) The ban applies only to adjuncts in negative clauses which are the targets of negation. (op. cit.: 4-7)

In such cases, it is argued that negation creates a *negative island* from which an adjunct cannot be extracted (Kuno, 1992a: 1). The reasons are both structureal and pragmatic, as the question may be paraphrased by the paradoxical *! What is the moment in time when you didn't say that?* A question of this type would be acceptable only when it is presupposed that there is one single moment when the action was not done. In this case, the negative becomes more

informative than the affirmative.

The 'Ban on questions that solicit uninformative answers' requires not to ask questions that 'have excessively many correct answers' (1992a: 14). From a communicative point of view, it would make more sense to ask about things Clevinger has said or done. The situation is taken to an extreme when the officer obliges Clevinger to answer in the same terms posed by the question, that is, by expressing explicitly when something *was not said.* The expression *I never said,* is taken to be affirmative, as the verb does not carry the negative marker.

The effect of this use of the negative is bewildering, and has the function of foregrounding the negative event in a critical situation, that of a trial. This may trigger a pattern of discourse deviation which may lead the reader to question legal procedures in trials as a reflection of the situation described in this scene. The officers are not interested in the truth, in whether Clevinger is guilty or not, they are only interested in proving he is guilty, at whatever cost. This is stated explicitly at the beginning and the end of the trial.[30]

5.2.1.4. Negation of frame knowledge

The examples of negation belonging to this type constitute marked uses of negation, in the sense that they deny standardly accepted assumptions about how things are in our world. They are examples of schema refreshment, as the challenging of these taken-for-granted assumptions leads the reader to reflect upon

the issue that is challenged. Below I discuss some representative examples:

> (31) His specialty was alfalfa, and he made a good thing out of not growing any. The government paid him well for every bushel of alfalfa he did not grow. The more alfalfa he did not grow, the more money the government gave him, and he spent every penny he didn't earn on new land to increase the amount of alfalfa he did not produce. Major Major's father worked without rest at not growing alfalfa. On long winter evenings he remained indoors and did not mend harness, and he sprang out of bed at the crack of noon every day just to make certain that the chores would not be done. He invested in land wisely and soon was not growing more alfalfa than any other man in the county. (110)

In extract (31) the negative sentences foreground the non-event of not growing alfalfa and related activities in this non-productive process (*he spent every penny he didn't earn..., alfalfa he did not produce, did not mend harness, that the chores would not be done*). The sequence of negative clauses creates a negative discourse subworld which describes a non-factual domain. We are provided details regarding how the usual procedure by means of which someone earns his money by doing something is substituted by the negative version of earning his living by *not doing* something. In general terms, this denies the commonly held assumption, which is culturally based, that people earn their living by doing things, and much less frequently by not doing doing them. In text world terms, the negative sentences project a negative subworld which creates a non-factual domain by means of denying the applicability of a standardly accepted frame of world knowledge. In Schank's (1982) model, we can interpret the extract as involving a Meta-MOP (Memory Organisation Packet) Mm-EARN A LIVING, where the

prototype and the expectations are not fulfilled.[31] This is shown in table 2 below:

Mm-MOP Mm-EARN A LIVING	
prototype:	one earns a living by doing something, by working.
expectation:	to earn a living with alfalfa, one usually plants alfalfa in order to sell it.

Table 2.

This view confirms the view of negation as defeating an expectation or assumption which is typically associated to the expression of an affirmative proposition. This leads us to establish parallels between the expected utterance and its defeated version in the negative. This is illustrated in table 3 below. The foregrounding of the negative produces a striking relation between the expected affirmative utterance and the expressed negative. In a way, this process may also be described as one of reminding in Schank's terms, since the negative terms reminds us of the affirmative, which is the more usual, the one we typically have stored in memory. [32]

Expectation (expressed typically in the affirmative)	Defeated expectation: expressed by a negative clause
he made a good thing out of growing a lot of it.	he made a good thing out of not growing any.
for every bushel of alfalfa he grew.	for every bushel of alfalfa he did not grow.
the more alfalfa he grew...	The more alfalfa he did not grow, the more money the government gave him,
and he spent every penny he earned	and he spent every penny he didn't earn on new land
to increase the amount of alfalfa he produced	to increase the amount of alfalfa he did not produce.
Major Major's father worked without rest at growing alfalfa.	Major Major's father worked without rest at not growing alfalfa. etc.

Table 3.

Now, taken literally, this extract, like the others of this type, is not informative, as it indulges in a long description of the things a character doesn't do. At this point, Schank's (1982) notion of TOPs (Thematic Organisation Packets) will prove useful in order to explain why uses of negation of this kind are interpreted as meaningful and informative by the reader.[33] In chapter 4, I described TOPs, following Schank (1982) as high order schematic structures which organise and establish connections between schemata belonging to different domains or fields. It was pointed out that the notion of TOP relies heavily on the idea of reminding, as a TOP brings together structures which recall each other. I wish to argue that this extract is interpreted as meaningful

because a similarity may be found with standard practices in economic policies of the developed countries, for example, how the EEC pays Spanish agriculturers to uproot their vines, or fishermen to stop fishing. This practice has been a long established agricultural policy in the U.S. too, so as to prevent disastrous price drops.[34]

In Schank's (1982) model, this can be accounted for as a TOP which establishes a connection between Major Major's father's 'occupation' of not growing alfalfa and the Spanish agriculturers who uproot their vines. The structure of the TOP can be represented in table 4 below.

By means of this process of reminding, which connects the ideas of not growing alfalfa and being paid for uprooting vines, and by establishing the analogies between the goals (possession goal=earn money), the conditions (the money is given as a reward for negative action) and features (both have to do with agricultural policies), a reader can interpret the passage as meaningful and informative. The interpretation requires that the reader evaluates the reminded term as negative, that is, that being paid to uproot vines is not good, and that being paid not to grow something, by analogy, rather than absurd, is reformulated as being bad too. This is what leads a reader to question previously held assumptions about how economy works at present in the Western countries. It is in this sense that negation, as a foregrounded linguistic feature, leads to discourse deviation and schema refreshment as defined by Cook (1994).

REMINDING	GOAL	CONDITIONS	FEATURES
not growing alfalfa/ uprooting vines	Possession goal	Negative action required	agricultural policies in developed countries

Table 4.

A similar interpretation may be carried out with regard to extract (32) below, which is the second part of extract A.54. in the corpus:

> (32) Nothing we do in this large department of ours is really very important, and there's never any rush. On the other hand, it is important that we let people know we do a great deal of it. Let me know if you find yourself shorthanded. I've already put in a requisition for two majors, four captains and sixteen lieutenants to give you a hand. While none of the work we do is very important, it is important that we do a great deal of it. Don't you agree? (406)

In this example we find the following negative clauses: *Nothing we do in this large department of ours is really very important, and there's never any rush, While none of the work we do is very important.* The negative clauses project a discourse subworld which denies the applicability of the culturally shared assumption that in work, as in many other things, quality (what we do) is more highly valued than quantity (how much we do). As in example (1) above, we may interpret the effect of this extract by means of establishing an analogy between the attitude of the higher officer to work and that of another person's. This situation may remind us of the prototypical description of a bureaucrat, that is, a person who works in an office writing and signing lots of papers which

have no apparent practical utility. As in example (1), we may establish a table (table 5) which collects the features that connect the two experiences by means of a TOP:

REMINDING	GOAL	CONDITIONS	FEATURES
higher military officers/ bureaucrats	achievement goal	produce unimportant work	work in offices

Table 5.

In this case, the achievement goal shared involves producing a great amount of work, while the condition is that the work should not be important, and the features are the situation in an office environment. As in example (31), the reminded situation is evaluated negatively, that is, it is bad to give priority to quantity rather than to quality. By analogy, we interpret the extract as a description where such a situation type leads to a negative judgement, that is, it leads us to question and criticise behaviour of that kind.

Similarly, extract (33) below foregrounds the apparent lack of interest of pennants won as prizes in parades:

> (33) To Yossarian, the idea of pennants was absurd. No money went with them, no class privileges. Like Olympic medals and tennis trophies, all they signified was that the owner had done something of no benefit to anyone more capably than anyone else. (95)

In this extract, we may identify the following negative clauses: *No money went with them, no class privileges, ...that the owner had done something of no benefit to anyone...* The

subworld described by the negative terms referes to the prestige associated with prizes. Negation is denying the commonly accepted assumption that the winning of prizes is rewarding because it gives status, prestige and glory, even if it is not economically productive. Yossarian rejects this value system, implying that in his set of priorities money is on a higher level than status or prestige. In terms of Schank's (1982) model, we can explain this extract as a conflict within a meta MOP Mm-PRIZES where there are two MOPs with conflicting goals: a societal MOP M-achieve status, and a personal MOP M-earn money. Clearly, giving priority to one of the MOPs leads to a negative evaluation of the other, as expressed in the extract. To end this section, I wish to comment on an extract where negation also denies previously held assumptions about knowledge of the world. The extract is a good example of how syntactic negation and lexical negation both contribute to the creation of a common effect, that of defeating expectations about how things are usually done in business. This effect is striking and humorous:

> (34) Colonel Cargill, General Peckem's troubleshooter, was a forceful, ruddy man. Before the war he had been an alert, hard-hitting, aggressive marketing executive. He was a very bad marketing executive. Colonel Cargill was so awful a marketing executive that his services were much sought after by firms eager to establish losses for tax purposes. Throughout the civilized world, from Battery Park to Fulton Street, he was known as a dependable man for a fast tax write-off. His prices were high, for failure often did not come easily. He had to start at the top and work his way down, and with sympathetic friends in Washington, losing money was no simple matter. It took months of hard work and careful misplanning. A person misplaced, disorganized, miscalculated, overlooked everything and opened every loophole, and just when he thought he had it made, the government gave him a lake or

> a forest or an oilfield and spoiled everything. Even with such handicaps, Colonel Cargill could be relied on to run the most prosperous enterprise into the ground. He was a self-made man who owed his lack of success to nobody. (40).

We can identify the following negative clauses: *His prices were high, for failure often did not come easily. losing money was no simple matter. He was a self-made man who owed his lack of success to nobody*. Each of the negative clauses defeats an expectation created by the frame knowledge previously activated in the discourse. Thus, we expect failure to be something easy to achieve, while success is more difficult, and, similarly, losing money should be easy. Finally, the last negative clause is a pun on the expression *to owe your success to somebody*. By making all its terms negative (*lack of sucess, to nobody*) the idiom is inverted and becomes apparently nonsensical. The negative clauses interact with a high number of negative lexical items, which reinforce the effect produced, where a familiar situation is described in detail in a sort of negative mirror image (for example, *bad, misplaced, disorganized, miscalculated, overlooked*, etc.) The negative clauses are good examples of what Givón (1979, 1984) calls the *presuppositional nature* of negation, which referes to the property of negation to evoke the corresponding affirmative term. The humour of the present extract lies precisely in the interface between the expected affirmative term and its negation in the discourse. The effect is striking and humorous for two reasons: first, because it defeats what is expected and foregrounds the unexpected, and, second, because it reveals a

procedure in the business world which is not at all unusual, although it is not usually described in these terms. As in the previous examples, we may establish an analogy with other familiar situations, which leads us to a questioning of the validity and sincerity of well-known businesses and businessmen. This is shown in table 6.

REMINDING	*GOAL*	*CONDITION*	*FEATURES*
Col. Cargill/ dishonest businessmen	possession goal: earn money	negative action	business world

Table 6.

This extract presents several similarities with extract (11) above, as there is a possession goal with evil intent, to earn money with the condition that it is by negative action, and, implicitly, by deceit. However, the deceit is not in Colonel Cargill himself, but in the persons who deliberately hire his services.

To sum up, we can say that denial of frame knowledge is exploited in *Catch-22* in order to foreground deceitful procedures in the worlds of business, economy and work. This is done by means of projecting negative subworlds which create discourse domains which invert or defeat expectations about how things usually take place in our society.

5.2.2. Negative accommodation

By accommodation, Werth (1995c: 404) describes a

phenomenon where new information is presented in an unconventional way, that is, by means of subordinate clauses, NPs or other elements which are normally the vehicle for background information.[35] Werth (ibid.) observes that in these cases 'the so-called presuppositional content does not reflect backgrounded information, and therefore has to be regarded as assertive'. Negation may be a vehicle for unconventional assertion when it does not carry out the function of rechannelling information as described in the previous sections, but when it is used to introduce an item which is simultaneously denied. The identification of accommodation in a long stretch of discourse, such as a novel, is not always easy, as there are cases when it is not possible to establish a clear cut distinction between old and new information according to grammatical units such as clauses. However, there are cases which seem to illustrate clearly what Werth has described as negative accommodation, understood as a function of negation where an item was simultaneously introduced in the discourse and denied. Below I reproduce two significant examples (see also extract 54 discussed in chapter 3, and extracts 67, 70 and 101 in the appendix). Extract is part of extract 70 in the appendix, an extremely long description of how people *do not die* in the hospital, thus describing how they die outside the hospital, in the war or in other violent situations:

> (35) There was none of that crude, ugly ostentation about dying that was so common outside the hospital. They did not blow up in mid-air like Kraft or the dead man in Yossarian's tent, or freeze to death in the blazing

> summertime the way Snowden had frozen to death after spilling his secret to Yossarian in the back of the plane. 'I'm cold,' Snowden had whimpered. 'I'm cold.'
> 'There, there,' Yossarian had tried to comfort him. 'There, there.' They didn't take it on the lam weirdly inside a cloud the way Clevinger had done. They didn't explode into blood and clotted matter. They didn't drown or get struck by lightning, mangled by machinery or crushed in landslides. They didn't get shot to death in hold-ups, strangled to death in rapes, stabbed to death in saloons, bludgeoned to death with axes by parents or children or die summarily by some other act of God. Nobody choked to death. People bled to death like gentlemen in an operating room or expired without comment in an oxygen tent. There was none of that tricky now-you-see-me *now-you-don't business so much in vogue outside* the hospital, none of that now-I-am-and-now-I-ain't. ... (212-13)

The negative clauses in this extract clearly carry out the function of introducing an item (how people die, for example, by blowing up or freezing to death) and denying its truth within the domain of the hospital. However, given the presuppositional nature of negation, by which it is assumed that a corresponding affirmative term is applicable as a general norm, the term which is introduced and denied is understood to be applicable, or true, in another domain, namely the world outside the hospital.[36] This world includes, not only war, but also other violent situations which are described in detail so as to provide a complete list of possible violent deaths people face every day.

The extract is significant because one of the themes of the novel, death, is not dealt with directly or explicitly, but, rather, it is mentioned indirectly, by a strategy of exclusion. In this strategy, the function of negation as introducing and denying an item at the same time plays a crucial role. A similar argument was followed when analysing

extract 54 in chapter 3. In this extract, the German enemy is described by means of negation in the same way as death in war is described by means of negation in eaxtract (35) above.

As a reader, one may wonder the reason why such important themes, as death, war, and the definition and description of the enemy, are not dealt with by means of straightforward linguistic descriptions, but, rather, by means of an indirect presentation by negating their applicability in different situations. In my view, this strategy is one more within a general strategy to deal by indirect means with a tragic subject. It is precisely this indirectness, which places a heavy load of interpretation on the reader, which makes the tragic aspect of the novel seem greater once it has become clear. We will see that the indirect presentation of a tragic content is also a strategy observable in the recurrent use of contradiction and paradox, which I discuss in the following sections.

To end this section, I wish to comment briefly on an extract where negative accommodation is used in order to satirise the professionality of psychiatrists. Extract 36 is part of an interview between Yossarian and a psychiatrist during one of his stays at hospital (see extract 101 in the appendix):

> (36) He smiled ostentatiously to show himself reasonable and nice. 'I'm not saying that to be cruel and insulting,' he continued with cruel and insulting delight. 'I'm not saying it because I hate you and want revenge. I'm not saying it because you rejected me and hurt my feelings terribly. No, I'm a man of medicine and I'm being coldy objective. I have very bad news for you. Are you man enough to take it?'

'God, no!' screamed Yossarian. 'I'll go right to pieces.' (384)

In example (36), as in (35) negative accommodation is a strategy which presents and denies information at the same time. The psychiatrist denies a series of aspects which, on the other hand, are perceived as describing exactly what he feels. The double nature of the denials is revealed explicitly by the narrator: *'I'm not saying that to be cruel and insulting,' he continued with cruel and insulting delight.* The double nature of the psychiatrist's statements reveals the untrustworthiness of this professional and may lead to a questioning of the validity of psychiatrict procedures in treating their patients.

In brief, we can observe that negative accommodation is an effective strategy in the presentation of information by indirect means, and that it can be a dangerous weapon which may turn against the speaker who is using it, due to its double-faced nature in its presentation and denial of an item at the same time.[37]

5.2.3. Paradox: Negation as subworld which blocks the flow of information

In the following sections I discuss the second general function of negation, that of blocking the communicative flow of information. I wish to argue that negation in these examples does not carry out the function of rechannelling information and changing parameters in the text world. Rather, a communicative short circuit is produced in such a way that a situation is described in paradoxical terms and has to be

accepted as such. Both syntactic and lexical negation contribute to the creation of paradoxes which require additional inferencing processes for a resolution and an understanding by the reader.[38] I distinguish between two main types:

(i) contradiction, which is expressed by means of syntactic negation, as in *Yossarian is crazy and he is not crazy;*

(ii) paradox in general terms, which may involve oppositions of different kinds, such as contrariety, as in *Yossarian is crazy but he is also sane.*[39]

I wish to argue that contradiction may be of two types, depending on whether it involves paradox or not. The former case requires an acceptance of both terms in the contradiction, while the latter is rather a special type of denial of previously asserted discourse. A further type of contradiction may be observed in circular logic arguments, which I discuss in a separate section, and which are paradoxical. Finally, the last two sections are devoted to paradox created both by means of syntactic and lexical negation, especially in extracts where both strategies are combined.

5.2.3.1. Contradiction

As outlined above, contradiction may be of two types in *Catch-22*. The first type I will discuss is the one where a negative clause denies previously expressed discourse. In this case, it can be said that negation carries out the function of

rechannelling information described above. However, the cases I discuss in this section differ from those in the previous sections because the present examples lead to some type of contradiction, typically within the domain of a character's thoughts. Strictly speaking, we are not dealing with logical negation, that is, a compound proposition where one of the conjoins contradicts the other, but with what may be called *discourse contradiction*. By this I mean a function of a negative clause where a speaker denies the truth of a proposition he or she has previously asserted as true. This obviously reveals some kind of inconsistency, which is justified or explained, or inferred from the context of utterance. Below are some examples. Extract 15, from which the following passage is taken, is a conversation between Orr and Yossarian which shows Orr's peculiar way of understanding conversational rules and maxims. The passage is long, but it is crucial for the understanding of key aspects of the novel.

> (37) 'I wanted apple cheeks,' Orr repeated. 'Even when I was a kid I wanted apple cheeks someday, and I decided to work at it until I got them, and by God, I did work at it until I got them, and that's how I did it, with crab apples in my cheeks all day long.' He giggled again. 'One in each cheek.'
> 'Why did you want apple cheeks?'
> 'I didn't want apple cheeks,' Orr said. 'I wanted big cheeks. I didn't care about the color so much, but I wanted them big. I worked at it just like one of those crazy guys you read about who go around squeezing rubber balls all day long just to strengthen their hands. In fact, I was one of those crazy guys. I used to walk around all day with rubber balls in my hands, too.'
> 'Why?'
> 'Why what?'
> 'Why did you walk around all day with rubber balls in your hands?'
> 'Because rubber balls -' said Orr.
> '- are better than crab apples?'

> Orr sniggered as he shook his head. 'I did it to protect my good reputation in case anyone ever caught me walking around with crab apples in my cheeks. With rubber balls in my hands I could deny there were crab apples in my cheeks. Every time someone asked me why I was walking around with crab apples in my cheeks, I'd just open my hands and show them it was rubber balls I was walking around with, not crab apples, and that they were in my hands, not my cheeks. It was a good story. But I never knew if it got across or not, since it's pretty tough to make people understand you when you're talking to them with two crab apples in your cheeks.' (34-36)

This conversation, of which the present extract is only a part, is a good example of what I have defined as *discourse contradiction*. Orr first tells Yossarian he wants apple cheeks, an assertion he later denies or contradictics by saying it's not really apple cheeks he wants, but big cheeks. The function of negation in these clauses can be described as contradictory in discoursive terms because each of the clauses denies the truth of a previously asserted proposition. Neither Yossarian nor the reader can infer the implied meaning of the apparent contradiction till the end of the novel, when Yossarian is told that Orr has reached Sweden by rowing in a small boat after he disappeared in a plane crash. This knowledge enables us to understand retrospectively the meaning of Orr's criptic conversations, where we see that he is trying to say that by doing something (carrying rubber balls in his hands; crashing his plane) he is actually aiming at something else (trying to have big cheeks; escaping to Sweden).

Other examples are found in example (60) discussed in chapter 2 (extract 19 in the appendix), and in extracts 44, 46, 53, 54, 59 and 92. I reproduce 53 and 92 below.

In extract 54, Major Major is trying to find something to

tell Yossarian about the increase in the number of missions:

> (38) What could you possibly say to him? Major Major wondered forlornly. One thing he could not say was that there was nothing he could do. To say there was nothing he could do would suggest he would do something if he could and imply the existence of an error of injustice in Colonel Korn's policy. Colonel Korn had been most explicit about that. *He must never say there was nothing he could do.*
> 'I'm sorry,' he said. 'But there's nothing I can do.' (135)

Major Major's words to Yossarian contradict his thoughts, thus leading to a reformulation of what was assumed to be the conclusion of his thought process. It is interesting to observe that Major Major is aware of the implications of using a negative, as negating something presupposes the corresponding affirmative: *To say there was nothing he could do would suggest he would do something if he could.*

A similar example can be observed in extract 92 below, where Milo, the mess officer, is trying to find a way of getting rid of a harvest of cotton he has bought. Yossarian suggests he should ask the government for help.

> (39) 'It's a matter of principle,' he explained firmly. 'The government has no business in business, and I would be the last person in the world to ever try to involve the government in a business of mine. But the business of government is business,' he remembered alertly, and continued with elation. (337)

In his argument, Milo changes from asserting that the government has no business in business to asserting the contrary, that the government's business is business. The difference here lies in the domain where each of the two assertions is applicable; in the first case, it is understood that the government should not take part in business matters;

in the second case, that the governement should interfere in order to solve problems like the one Milo is facing.

To sum up the observations made so far, contradiction may be used as a discourse function which leads to a reformulation of a previous proposition, with the general effect of rechannelling the information in the same way as we have seen for other examples.

In other cases, however, contradiction involves paradox, that is, it does not reflect a two stage process where the contradictory statement is the ultimate conclusion,[40] but, rather, the two contradictory terms are presented as equally acceptable from the beginning. I deal with this second type in the section on paradox below.

5.2.3.2. Circular logic as a communicative short circuit

Syntactic negation typically produces paradox in the examples of circular logic arguments typical of the world of *Catch-22*. The catch itself is defined by means of a circular argument. Below I reproduce part of extract 22 (see also extracts 27, 59 and 127, for further examples of circular logic), a conversation between Doc Daneeka and Yossarian where Yossarian is enquiring about the possibilities of being grounded and being sent back home. Doc Daneeka answers he can be grounded if he's crazy, but there is a catch:

> (40) There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified that a concern for one's own safety in the face of dangers that were real and immediate was the process of a rational mind. Orr was crazy and could be grounded. All he had to do was ask; and as soon as he did, he would no longer be crazy and would have to fly more missions.

> Orr would be crazy to fly more missions and sane if he didn't, but if he was sane he had to fly them. If he flew them he was crazy and didn't have to; but if he didn't want to he was sane and had to. Yossarian was moved very deeply by the absolute simplicity of this clause of Catch-22 and let out a respectful whistle.
> (62-63)

I have already described the catch-22 in the introduction, but I will comment on it briefly once more by focusing on how it is described in this passage. The description is clearly paradoxical, as we face a sequence of propositions where the relation between a proposition and the one that precedes it is paradoxical (b is paradoxical with respect to a, c is paradoxical with respect to b, d is paradoxical with respect to c).

a. Orr would be crazy to fly more mission and sane if he didn't,
b. but if he was sane he had to fly them.
c. If he flew them he was crazy and didn't have to;
d. but if he didn't want to he was sane and had to.

The process is circular because each proposition in the sequence negates one of the terms which have been introduced in the previous proposition. As I explained in the introduction, the catch-22 can be summarised as a circular logic process as shown below:

a. if you are crazy you can be grounded.
b. if you want to be grounded you have to apply.
c. if you apply you are not crazy.

A similar reasoning pattern seems to be adopted systematically by Luciana, the Italian girl Yossarian meets one night and with whom he falls in love. Yossarian asks her to marry him, and the conversation develops as shown in extract (40) below, which is part of extract 68 in the appendix:

(41) 'Tu sei pazzo,' she told him with a pleasant laugh.
'Why am I crazy?' he asked.
'Perche non posso sposare.'
'Why can't you get married?'
'Because I am not a virgin,' she answered.
'What has that got to do with it?'
'Who will marry me? No one wants a girl who is not a virgin.'
'I will. I'll marry you.'
'Ma non posso sposarti.'
'Why can't you marry me?'
'Perche sei pazzo. '
'Why am I crazy?'
'Perche vuoi sposarmi.'
Yossarian wrinkled his forehead with quizzical amusement. 'You won't marry me because I'm crazy, and you say I'm crazy because I want to marry you? Is that right?'
'Si'
'Tu sei pazz '! ' he told her loudly. (205-206)

As in the example from the catch-22 above, Luciana's argument is circular and, consequently, leads nowhere beyond the internal self-referentiality of the system, as each of its parts leads circularly to the next. Nash (1985: 111) points out that this type of reasoning is typical of certain psychiatric patients.

The catch-22 can be said to represent symbolically the closed system of the world of *Catch-22* itself. The soldiers are caught in this trap which prevents them from leaving the island and going back home. The reader is told that Colonel Cathcart has successively increased the number of missions the men have to fly as a way of displaying power. When he decides to send the men back, it is too late, since sending the whole squadron back and asking for replacements would be suspicious. As a consequence, the men are doomed to a certain death, and little by little Yossarian sees how his friends are killed or disappear. The only escape is to opt out of the system, as Orr

does by rowing to Sweden, or as Yossarian does at the end of the book, by deserting and running away.

5.2.3.3. Lexical negation and paradox

In this section I will comment on extracts which present further examples of paradoxes, created by means of an opposition between affirmative and negative clauses, or by means of an opposition between lexical opposites. By paradox I mean, then, a description of an entity, place, situation, etc. by means of opposite properties (contrary, contradictory or polar opposites). I argue that the paradoxes discussed in this section may be interpreted as meaningful by means of identifying the domain within which each of the opposite terms may be said to apply.[41] For this purpose, I adopt a schema theoretic approach to the conflict created by paradoxes, and suggest, as I have already done in chapter 4, that each term in an opposition may be understood as a frame or schema. This approach may be incorporated into Werth's (1995c) text world model in order to provide a detailed and systematic account of how frame knowledge is processed in discourse.

Examples of paradoxes may be found in the following extracts: 4, 5, 10, 12, 13, 18, 20, 24, 25, 26, 28, 31, 57, 64, 65, 67, 78, 80, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 120, 129, 134. I will only comment on some of these extracts, as the mechanism can be said to be the same. Unfortunately, each example of paradox is unique, in the sense that it creates a particular effect that is different from the other examples. Each case refers to a

particular topic or subtopic of the novel, such as madness, power, personality, business deals, war, etc.

Below is an example which involves the paradoxical attribution of the predicates DEAD and ALIVE to one entity, a soldier who was killed on a mission and whose belongings have not been removed from Yossarian's tent (see extract 13 in the appendix).

> (42) Actually, no one was around when Yossarian returned from the Hospital but Orr and the dead man in Yossarian's tent. The dead man in Yossarian's tent was a pest, and Yossarian didn't like him, even though he had never seen him. Having him lying around all day annoyed Yossarian so much that he had gone to the orderly room several times to complain to Sergeant Towser, who refused to admit that the dead man even existed, which, of course, he no longer did. It was still more frustrating to try to appeal directly to Major Major, the long and bony squadron commander, who looked a little bit like Henry Fonda in distress and went jumping out the window of his office each time Yossarian bullied his way past Sergeant Towser to speak to him about it. The dead man in Yossarian's tent was simply not easy to live with. (33)

This is a quite complex example involving two conflicting frames associated with the polysemy of 'exist' as (a) being ALIVE and (b) being PRESENT. The play with the two frames produces the impression that the man is both dead and alive at the same time, since his death is not accepted bureaucratically by the officer but his presence is felt as bothering Yossarian. Moreover, the situation is even more tragically absurd because it is not the dead body that bothers Yossarian, it is his belongings, which Yossarian refers to as if they stood for the owner himself.

Paradoxes are a vehicle for parody and criticism of

attitudes and behaviour in our society. Extract (43) (extract 21 in the appendix) below is about racism:

> (43) Some of those invitations were mighty generous, but we couldn't accept any because we were Indians and all the best hotels that were inviting us wouldn't accept Indians as guests. Racial prejudice is a terrible thing, Yossarian. It really is. It's a terrible thing to treat a decent, loyal Indian like a nigger, kike, wop or spic.' Chief White Halfoat nodded slowly with conviction. (60)

In this extract there is a double paradox, the first one being the contradiction between the hotels inviting Indians and their refusal to accept them because they are Indians, and the second one, Chief White Halfoat's criticism of racism and his racist attitude towards other races.

Extract (44) below is a paradox which regards the petty struggles for power on the part of the higher officers. For general Peckem, the enemy are not really the Germans, but, rather, the other general on the island, general Dreedle. General Peckem spends his time planning *'offensives'* against general Dreedle i order to have all the power in his hands.

> (44) 'Yes, I know I understand. Our first job is to capture Dreedle away from the enemy. Right?' General Peckem laughed benignly, 'No, Scheisskopf. Dreedle's on our side, and Dreedle is the enemy. (498-409)

The paradox in (44) confirms Yossarian's suspicions that the enemy is anybody who wants to kill him and the rest of the soldiers, no matter what side they're on. Indirectly, this seems to suggest that the higher officers are on an equal status with the nazis.

Paradox reveals conflicts regarding some characters' incapacity to distinguish between moral values. An example is extract (45) below, about Hungry Joe (see extract 24 in the

appendix):

> (45) Every time Colonel Cathcart increased the number of missions and returned Hungry Joe to combat duty, the nightmares stopped and Hungry Joe settled down into a normal state of terror with a smile of relief. Yossarian read Hungry Joe's shrunken face like a headline. It was good when Hungry Joe looked bad and terrible when Hungry Joe looked good. Hungry Joe's inverted set of responses was a curious phenomenon to everyone but Hungry Joe, who denied the whole thing stubbornly. (73)

Hungry Joe is described as having an inverted set of responses, in such a way that when the number of missions is increased he looks good, while when he's not on combat duty he looks awful. This leads to an inversion of the equations that GOOD = GOOD and BAD = BAD, which are substituted by GOOD = BAD, BAD = GOOD. A similar process can be said to take place in Captain Flume, who is unable to distinguish between his dreams and his waking states. Captain Flume tries hard to stay awake all night because Chief White Halfoat has threatened to kill him during the night (see extract 26 in the appendix):

> (46) Each night after that, Captain Flume forced himself to keep awake as long as possible. He was aided immeasurably by Hungry Joe's nightmares. Listening so intently to Hungry Joe's maniacal howling night after night, Captain Flume grew to hate him and began wishing that Chief White Halfoat would tiptoe up to his cot one night and slit his throat open for him from ear to ear. Actually, Captain Flume slept like a log most nights and merely dreamed he was awake. So convincing were these dreams of lying awake that he woke from them each morning in complete exhaustion and fell right back to sleep. (76-77)

In this extract, the distinction between DREAMING/BEING ASLEEP and BEING AWAKE becomes blurred by measn of of a recurring pattern of dreams within dreams, where the captain dreams he is awake and never gets enough rest.

Below are further examples of paradoxes involving lexical

opposites:

(47) 'Oh, shut up,' Dunbar told Clevinger. Dunbar liked Clevinger because Clevinger annoyed him and made the time go slow. (29) (extract 12)

(48) Dunbar loved shooting skeet because he hated every minute of it and the time passed so slowly. 'I think you're crazy,' was the way Clevinger had responded to Dunbar's discovery. (52) (extract 20)

(49) Ordinarily, Yossarian's pilot was McWatt, who, shaving in loud red, clean pajamas outside his tent each morning was one of the odd, ironic, incomprehensible things surrounding Yossarian. McWatt was the craziest combat man of them all probably, because he was perfectly sane and still did not mind the war. (80) (extract 28)

(50) He woke up blinking with a slight pain in his head and opened his eyes upon a world boiling in chaos in which everything was in proper order. (186) (extract 66)

(51) Colonel Cathcart was not superstitious, but he did believe in omens. (267) (extract 80)

(52) You see, Italy is really a very poor and weak country, and that's what makes us so strong. (309) (extract 86)

(53) This sordid, vulturous, diabolical old man reminded Nately of his father because the two were nothing at all alike. (311) (extract 87)

(54) The chaplain was sincerely a very helpful person who was never able to help anyone. (346) (extract 96)

(55) 'My only fault,' he observed with practiced good humor, watching for the effect of his words, 'is that I have no faults.' (405) (extract 104)

The opposites presented in the extracts above are the following: LIKE/ANNOY (weak opposites or contraries), LOVE/HATE (polar opposites), CRAZY/SANE (polar opposites), CHAOS/ORDER (polar opposites), NOT SUPERSTITIOUS/BELIEVES IN OMENS (weak opposites or contraries), WEAK/STRONG (polar opposites), REMIND/DIFFERENT (weak oppsoites or contraries), HELPFUL/NOT HELPFUL (contradictories), HAVE FAULTS/NOT HAVE FAULTS

(contradictories). Each of the paradoxes may be resolved at a higher level of interpretation by determining the domain in which each of the terms is applicable. As I argued in chapter 3, we can understand the higher-level schematic structure as a meta-MOP (Memory Organisation Packet) in Shank's terms. This higher-level structure would collect information about lower level schematic packets regarding societal, personal and situational information. Inconsistencies between the differnt domains may lead to paradoxes of the types we have seen above. I will not go into details of the description here, but the reader may wish to read chapter 3 for a discussion of how this type of analysis may be carried out.

Other paradoxes are created by means of what Fillmore (1985: 243) calls across-frame negation, or opposition by means of contrasting apparently disparate terms. According to the classification followed above (see also chapter 2 for a discussion), the type of opposition between these terms is that of contrariety or weak opposition. Below are two examples:

> (56) Kraft was a skinny, harmless kid from Pennsylvania who wanted only to be liked, and was destined to be disappointed in even so humble and degrading an ambition. Instead of being liked, he was dead. (74) (extract 25)

> (57) In short, Clevinger was one of those people with lots of intelligence and no brains, and everyone knew it except those who soon found it out. (90-91) (extract 31)

The two extracts above present unusual oppositions between terms that would not normally be related as opposites: in extract (55) we have the opposition between BE LIKED and BE DEAD, and in (56) BE INTELLIGENT/HAVE NO BRAINS. The unusual contrasts make the extracts slightly humorous.

Paradox may be produced by means of contradiction, as in example (58) below:

> (58) The only one with any right to remove his belongings from Yossarian's tent, it seemed to Major Major, was Yossarian himself, and Yossarian, it seemed to Major Major, had *no right*. (132)

The apparent contradiction may be resolved, as in other cases, by determining in what way each of the terms may be applicable. We can argue that Yossarian has the right to remove Mudd's belongings from his tent because they are in Yossarian's tent; however, Yossarian has no right to remove them because he lacks the authority to decide over those belongings.

However, a contradiction may lead to an apparently unresolvable paradox, as in extract (59) below:

> (59) Most of the official documents that came to Major Major's desk *did not concern him at all*. The *vast majority* consisted of allusions to prior communications which Major Major had never seen or heard of. There was never any need to look them up, for the instructions were invariably to disregard. In the space of a single productive minute, therefore, he might endorse twenty separate documents each advising him to pay absolutely no attention to any of the others. (121) (extract 44)

In this case, the paradox involved in the fact that each document Major Major receives advises him to pay no attention to the rest of the documents is not resolvable unless we interpret a higher level meaning of the situation described, for example, if we understand it as a criticism of bureaucracy in general terms.

Similarly, paradox is used as a means of power abuse on the part of higher officers. Below is part of an extract (extract 119) where some officers are interrogating Nately's whore. They do so by obliging her to say *uncle*:

> (60) 'You still don't understand, do you? We can't really make you say uncle unless you don't want to say uncle. Don't you see? Don't say uncle when I tell you to say uncle. Okay? Say uncle.'
> 'Uncle,' she said.
> 'No, don't say uncle. Say uncle.'
> She didn't say uncle.
> 'That's good!' (445)

This apparently nonsensical exchange reveals the sadist side of higher officers, as they seem to enjoy trying to make somebody confess something when that person does not want to confess. The girl doesn't understand, and does not mind 'confessing', or saying 'uncle', which obviously annoys the officers, who do not enjoy the interrogation.

The pervasive character of inverted values in society is revealed towards the end of the novel, where the narrator clearly questions the reliability of so many apparent values we take for granted, without questioning the sincerity of the act behind them. This is summarised in extract (61) below:

> (61) How many winners were losers, successes failures, rich men poor men? How many wise guys were stupid? How many happy endings were unhappy endings? How many honest men were liars, brave men cowards, loyal men traitors, how many sainted men were corrupt, how many people in positions of trust had sold their souls to blackguards for petty cash, how many had never had souls? How many straight-and-narrow paths were crooked paths? How many best families were worst families and how many good people were bad people? (520-21) (extract 129)

What has been suggested more or less implicitly previously in the novel is now questioned directly, thus revealing a kind of world where nobody and nothing can be trusted, since anything we may have valued positively may turn out to be the opposite. This has been shown to be the case for many situations in the novel, which I have discussed under various

headings in the present chapter. The process by which values are inverted is described as being discovered by the chaplain in the following way (extract 120):

> (62) The chaplain had sinned, and it was good. Common sense told him that telling lies and defecting from duty were sins. On the other hand, everyone knew that sin was evil, and that no good could come from evil. But he did feel good; he felt positively marvelous. Consequently, it followed logically that telling lies and defecting from duty could not be sins. The chaplain had mastered, in a moment of divine intuition, the handy technique of protective rationalization, and he was exhilarated by his discovery. It was miraculous. It was almost no trick at all, he saw, to turn vice into virtue and slander into truth, impotence into abstinence, arrogance into humility, plunder into philanthropy, thievery into honor, blasphemy into wisdom, brutality into patriotism and sadism into justice. Anybody could do it- it required no brains at all. It merely required no character. (459)

To sum up the observations made in the preceding sections, paradox is a recurrent discoursive strategy in *Catch-22*, and it may be carried out either by means of syntactic negation or by means of lexical opposites. In both cases, the effect in discourse is that of creating a block in the communicative flow which has the form of an apparently unresolvable paradox. I have suggested that the paradoxes may be resolved at a higher level of interpretation because each of the terms may be interpreted as meaningful in a different domain, or because the paradox in itself leads to a questioning of procedures we may observe in our society. In both cases, paradox contributes to the development of discourse deviation and may be said to lead to a questioning of taken-for-granted assumptions about how things are in our world. In this sense, paradox may have a schema-refreshing function.

5.3. Conclusions: Towards an ontology of negative states and events in *Catch-22*

In this section, I would like to bring together the observations made in previous sections regarding the function of negation in *Catch-22*. I wish to argue that negation, in the two main functions discussed in this chapter, contributes to the creation of what may be called two different types of ontology or conceptual domain: the first type of ontology, triggered by syntactic negation in the function of rechannelling information, is characterised by its vacuity, its emptiness; the second type of ontology, which may be created by means of syntactic negation or by lexical opposition, is characterised by its paradoxical nature.

As we have seen from the examples discussed in the initial sections of the chapter, the ontology of the first type is created by means of a consistent and systematic recursion of situations which foreground the non-event or the non-state. We saw that these situations could be said to represent, in some cases, a conflict between an illusory appearance set up by means of deceit, and the status quo in the fictional world. In terms of Ryan's (1991b) model of conflict in the fictional world, we said it reflected a conflict between characters' wish worlds to be perceived by others in a certain way, and the reality behind the appearance. I have also argued that there seems to be a progression in the novel in such a way that the appearance, no matter whether true or false, progressively takes over reality, or becomes a reality, as it is interpreted

as such by the characters (see the comments on the non-existence of the catch-22 in extract 10 above).[42] I summarised this phenomenon by means of two processes where WHAT IS is substituted by WHAT IS NOT, and WHAT CANNOT BE becomes WHAT IS.

In other cases, the conflict expressed by means of negatives reflects, rather, an oppostion between the wishes of different characters, typically, between the higher officers' interests and those of the common soldiers, who want to go home once they have completed their number of missions. The possibility of leaving combat duty proves to be impossible, due to the existence of a *catch-22*, a paradoxical argumentation which prevents soldiers from being grounded. This leads to the second type of ontology, one created by means of paradox.[43] While in the first type of ontology events and properties that are not real are presented *as if* they were real, in the case of paradoxical ontologies the distinction between opposites is blurred.[44]

I have also argued that the function of negation described in these terms contributes to the development of a pattern of discourse deviation which leads to a questioning of taken-for-granted assumptions about the way in which things are done in well-known areas of our society, such as the military, religion, law and justice, business, economy and war, to provide the more prominent examples. Such a questioning can be said to be a potential trigger for schema refreshment in a reader, although I have also pointed out that schema

refreshment is reader and culture dependent.

The ontological characteristics of the world of *Catch-22*, both in its tendency to accept the non-factual as factual and in its recurring paradoxes, seem to depict the features of a closed system which has developed rules of its own, independent from reality as we know it. Indeed, several critics have observed that the world of *Catch-22* displays the characteristics which define some of the major images of the novel:[45] the circularity of the catch-22 and the closed system (also circular) of the soldier in white, who is kept alive by means of two glass jars connected to different parts of his body and which are exchanged as soon as one of them is full (see extract 72). As a closed system, the world of *Catch-22* is a system in a partial state of entropy (See Tucker 1973, Bernárdez 1995). Bernárdez (1995: 121-122) describes the notions of *entropy* and *closed system* as follows:

> la entropía es el equilibrio perfecto, y todos los fenómenos de la naturaleza, incluyendo la información, tienden a ese estado de equilibrio entrópico. (...) Un estado de equilibrio - parcial, pues no hablamos de la entropía final - se caracteriza porque, aunque posee su dinámica interna, no recibe influencia exteriores. Es decir, es un *sistema cerrado*.

If we consider *Catch-22* in the light of this quotation, we may argue that the recurrent use of negation in the discourse of the novel contributes to the foregrounding of the ontological characteristics of a fictional world which tends to *termic death*, to *total entropy*. In this sense, the processes mentioned above, namely, the process whereby WHAT IS is replaced by WHAT IS NOT, and the process whereby the distinction between opposites becomes blurred,

are both signs of a self-reflective, closed system with its own rules and which is not modified by external influences. Thus, none of the soldiers leave the island alive, and none of the scandalous events carried out in the squadron may be modified by means of action from an external agent. This leads to the conclusion that the world of *Catch-22* seems to have no escape other than opting out of the system altogether, for instance, by means of desertion, as Orr and Yossarian do in different ways.

In brief, I have proposed an approach to negation in *Catch-22* based on text world theoretical principles which may help identify the main functions of negation and their contribution to a pattern of discourse deviation which foregrounds significant themes in the novel.

Notes to chapter 5

1. See chapter 2.

2. See the second part of chapter 3 for a discussion of Ryan's model of narrative discourse.

3. See chapter 4.

4. See chapter 6 for a discussion of the classification into negation types.

5. For more details regarding the types of negation in the corpus, see chapter 6.

6. See chapter 6 for a description of the corpus and the subcorpus. The extracts which constitute the subcorpus are in the appendix.

7. However, see Givón (1984) and Escandell (1990) and my discussion of contradiction in chapter 2 for a defense of contradiciton as meaningful in a context.

8. For a discussion of the contributions and limitations of a quantitative study, see the introductory sections of chapter 6.

9. The extracts are reproduced in the appendix.

10. See chapter 6 for an exact definition of negative words and the classification according to category and function. The discussion of chapter 5 is based on the notion of negation adopted in the quantitative study.

11. See the discussion of the examples in the last sections of chapter 2 as illustrations of this view of negation in the discourse of *Catch-22*.

12. See chapter 4 for a discussion of how humour can be distinguished from nonsense because of the possibility of a higher level resolution of incongruity, which in nonsense remains unresolved.

13. By marked negation I mean negative utterances which are grammatical but which sound odd because they deny commonly held assumptions about how things are in our world. For further details, the reader is directed to chapter 6.

14. See Werth's (1994) analysis of negatives in connection to the notion of extended metaphor in an extract from Forster's *A Passage to India*. Werth argues that a metaphorical correspondence may be observed in such a way that POVERTY IS NEGATIVE and

NEGATIVE IS DOWN, and he observes: 'But there is no single location where these conclusions are expressed; they are cumulative, and, crucially, achieved by way of text and discourse processes, rather than sentence processes.' Werth (1994: 85). See also the similar notion of *semantic prosody* by Louw (1993), which is discussed in chapter 6.

15. For a definition of syntactic negation and lexical negation, and for a discussion of different classifications of categories of negative words, see chapter 2.

16. For a definition of *common ground* see the discussion of Werth's model in chapter 3.

17. See the discussion in chapter 3.

18. For the percentages of these negation types see the discussion on the quantitative analysis of the data in chapter 6.

19. I have tried to classify denials depending on the type of implicit proposition they negated, whether it was an assumption or an expectation. However, I have reached the conclusion that in discourse, speakers and readers both hold assumptions and develop expectations about what will come next at the same time, so that it is extremely difficult to separate both aspects when describing a denial. A denied proposition may both be defined as the denial of an assumption and the defeat of an expectation in a reader. The former definition is static, as an assumption is held until something is said which denies its applicability, while the expectation is dynamic, in the sense that it projects forward in the form of a prediction about what is going to be said.

20. Notice the use of negation in the speech act of advice in *Don't believe the official report*.

21. See chapter 5 for a discussion of Schank's (1982) model.

22. See Apter's (1989) observation that in order for humour to take place, it is necessary to have a clash between an illusory and a factual domain, what he calls 'the appearance' and 'the reality'. It is also necessary that the appearance seems to be *more than* the reality.

23. This was pointed out to me by Chris Butler (p.c.).

24. This is one of the main scenes in the novel, and is loaded with deliberate symbolism. Yossarian has refused to put on his uniform for the funeral, as it was stained with the blood of the dead bombardier. The death of this soldier has made Yossarian aware of what death (and life) is, and he sits on the tree, naked, watching the ceremony. Milo approaches him in order to talk to him, and Yossarian says it's the tree of life he's

sitting on. Milo, with his innate pragmatism, rejects this view, and says it is not the tree of life but a chestnut tree.

25. In chapter 2, I discussed the distinction between contraries, like black/white and contradictories black/not black, and I pointed out the tendency to categorise in terms of contradictoriness, rather than contrariety.

26. See also extract 69 for a different example of the 'negative determinism' described here.

27. See also extract 69 in the appendix, where Luciana, the girl Yossarian picks up one night in Rome, asks him to ask her to write her telephone number for him. When he does so, she replies angrily 'Why, so you can tear it up into little pieces as soon as I leave?' Her attitude seems to form part of what I have defined as *negative determinism*, in that she projects the possibility of a non-factual state of affairs becoming actual by introducing it into the conversation, when it was completely unnecessary. The striking thing is that what is presented as crazy and absurd actually takes place. Thus, Yossarian tears up her telephone number into little pieces, something he later regrets, but it's too late.

28. For an account of the uninformativeness of negative clauses, see Leech's (1983: 100-102) *Principle of negative uninformativeness* and *Sub-maxim of negative uninformativeness*. The former describes the general uninformative character of negative propositions as compared to their positive counterparts. The latter establishes that 'a negative sentence will be avoided if a positive one can be used in its place' (Leech, ibid.). Horn (1989: 201) further develops an approach to negative uninformativeness based on the assumption that the Gricean maxims of Quantity and Relation are flouted so as to create an implicature which has become conventionalised for all negative utterances. This implicature is precisely the uninformative character of the negative with respect to the affirmative. Thus, Horn (ibid.) observes that

> Negative propositions are typically, but not necessarily, less specific and less informative than positive propositions. (...) However, the real asymmetry is located, not in the relation to positive propositions, but in the relation of speaker denials to assertions.

See also Kuno (1992a: 14) and (1992b: 4-6) for the *Ban on questions that solicit uninformative answers*, and Givón (1993: 191-193).

29. See Givón (1993: 197), and the discussion in section 2.2.3. in chapter 2 of the present work.

30. See also extract 38 for Major Major's requirement that people should visit him only *when he's not there*. In this case, the clause is informative, but is as bewildering as the examples from

Clevinger's trial. Why should the squadron commander request people to see him when he is not willing to receive them? We can account for this paradox by means of Ryan's model of conflict: in order to satisfy two opposing wishes, to be left alone and to do his duty, Major Major concedes that people may come and visit him; the condition is that they must wait until he has left.

31. See the discussion of Schank's (1982) model and the application to selected extracts from the appendix in chapter 4.

32. This view of negation fits in with Givón's notion of the presuppositional nature of negation in discourse.

33. See the discussion of Schank's (1982) model in chapter 4; see also Semino's (1994) application of the model to poetic worlds.

34. This was pointed out to me by JoAnne Neff (p.c.).

35. See chapter 3 for a detailed description of the phenomenon.

36. See chapter 2 for a discussion of how negation is understood to affirm in psychological experiments.

37. Clark and Clark (1977) and Hodge and Kress (1994) mention the double nature of negation in general terms, as it seems to work on the background assumption of the affirmative counterpart. Clark and Clark provide the example of Nixon saying 'I'm not a rogue', which immediately leads his interlocutors to wonder whether he actually *is or is not a rogue*. This would have been avoided if he had used an affirmative statement, such as 'I'm an honest man'. While the negative presuposes the affirmative, the opposite is not true. See Also Givón's discussion on this matter.

38. In chapter 4 I presented a view of paradox and humour which is based on the assumption that they are phenomena which lead to nonsense at a literal level of interpretation. However, they have a higher level resolution achieved by the reader by means of inferencing based on schematic knowledge of the world and of the discourse.

39. For a definition of contradiction, contrariety and other types of opposition between polar opposites, see chapter 2.

40. See Sperber and Wilson (1986) for an account of contradiction in these terms. These authors argue that in contradiction, each of the contradictory terms has to be evaluated for contextual effects, and the one for which there is more evidence should be assumed to be predominant.

41. For a discussion of this view from a schema theoretic perspective, see chapter 4.

42. See Greenberg (1966) and Tucker (1984) for a discussion of how the vacuity or emptiness which characterises the world of *Catch-22* may be explained in terms of entropy and information theory. According to these authors, the progression of the story in
Catch-22 is a process of disintegration which leads to inertia, and, metaphoricvally, to 'termic death'. Hence the recurrent use of images which have to do with cold, rain and snow; when the soldiers lose their hope of ever leaving the island, we are told the weather changes and there are no more beautiful days. Snowden is the character who symbolically represents the human vulnerability and mortality, and his death haunts Yossarian throughout the novel.

43. See Aguirre (1990) for a discussion of how the violation of the Law of the Excluded Middle is a characteristic of postmodern fiction. Without being strictly speaking postmodern, *Catch-22* presents a world where the entities that inhabit it may be defined in paradoxical terms. The novel is not truly postmodern because the paradoxes are resolvable by inferencing.

44. The blurring between opposites is particularly significant in the case of certain oppositions, such as ALIVE/DEAD and CRAZY/SANE. The paradoxes on madness lead to a reflection on the difficulties in defining the boundaries between sanity and craziness. See Rosenhan (1973) for a description of an experiment carried out by a team of psychologists who managed to be registered as psychiatric patients in several mental institutions, but had great difficulties in proving that they were sane and being released.
In linguistics, it has traditionally been observed that opposites in some way 'attract each other'. See, for instance, Cruse's (1986: 197).

45. See, for example, Tucker (1973) for an account of *Catch-22* in terms of information theory and the notion of *entropy*.

Chapter 6: A quantitative approach to the analysis of the data

> Catch-22 did not exist, he was positive of that, but it made no difference. What did matter was that everyone thought it existed, and that was much worse, for there was no object or text to ridicule or refute, to accuse, criticize, attack, amend, hate, revile, spit at, rip to shreds, trample upon or burn up.

6.1. Aims and methodology

6.1.1. Aims and limitations of the quantitative study

This chapter is a brief quantitative study of negation in *Catch-22*. As such, it offers a complementary approach to the main discussion carried out in qualitative terms in chapter 5. The main objective is that of providing empirical evidence for the two related intuitions that, in my corpus, (a) negation is a marked phenomenon and (b) the frequency of negative items is unusually high.[1] The first intuition was formulated as a hypothesis in the following terms:

HYPOTHESIS 1: Negation is a marked phenomenon in *Catch-22*.

As I argued in the introductory chapter, in order to confirm the validity of this hypothesis, it was necessary to tackle the crucial question whether the foregrounding effect of negation in the corpus and its contribution to an effect of discourse deviation was quantitatively or qualitatively based, or both. The main objective of my analysis, then, has been that of identifying the reasons for the marked character of negation. Throughout the work, my main intuition has been that the marked character of negation in the corpus is of a qualitative rather than a quantitative nature, but I have also felt that the qualitative aspect could possibly be backed by

an unusually high frequency of negative items in quantitative terms. This second intuition was formulated as a hypothesis in the following terms:

> HYPOTHESIS 3: the frequency of negative words is higher in *Catch-22* than it is in other similar text types (fictional works).

This hypothesis provides the basis for a quantitative study of the frequencies of negative words according to grammatical category and pragmatic function. A study of this kind may provide insights regarding

(a) the characteristics of *Catch-22* as compared to other similar text types.

and (b) the function of negation within the work itself.

The conclusions with regard to point (a) are significant, first, because they enable us to determine whether the frequency of negation in *Catch-22* in comparison with other fictional text types is higher or not than average. Moreover, the study can also contribute to research on negation in fictional texts by providing information about the particular features of this novel and the author's stylistic choice in this particular work. With regard to point (b), the results should provide information regarding the relative frequency of negative terms with respect to positive ones within *Catch-22*. However, further aspects need to be analysed, such as the pragmatic function carried out by negative clauses and the marked or unmarked character of the negative options, in order to establish the significance of negation as an option within the text itself. I deal with these aspects in the analysis

below.

In the present chapter, I deal with the following different aspects of negation: (i) the frequencies of negative items in the corpus and subcorpus; (ii) the types and frequencies of negatives according to grammatical category in the subcorpus; (iii) the types and frequencies of negatives according to communicative functions and subfunctions in the subcorpus; (iv) the differences between frequencies of negatives in dialogue and narrative in the subcorpus; and (v) the types and frequencies of the ontological functions of negation in the subcorpus.

The categories I have used are based mainly on Tottie's (1982, 1991) work on negation. The results in my analysis are compared, first, to Tottie's results for English speech and writing. Second, because Tottie does not include fictional texts in her study, I compare my results with those obtained for fictional texts by Biber (1990) and Watson (1996); finally, I compare my results with the frequencies of negative words in the fictional texts of the LOB and Brown corpora. The comparison between the results from my data and the frequencies shown in the three other studies are considered to be sufficient in order to reach some general conclusions regarding the significance of negation as a quantitative phenomenon in *Catch-22*. The analysis of functional categories is carried out only in the subcorpus, as the corpus of the whole novel was too extense to be covered by a work like the one in hand. The limitations of an analysis of this kind are described below.

The quantitative study in general terms has necessary limitations: first, regarding the adequacy of a quantitative approach to the data under analysis; second, regarding the impossibility of analysing (i) the communicative functions of negation in the whole corpus and (ii) the frequencies of negative lexical items. The first reason is of a theoretical nature, while the second is practical. I wish to comment briefly on each aspect in turn.

As I have pointed out before, the main concern of the present work is a description of the functions and marked character of negation in *Catch-22* by means of a discussion of the applicability of a text world theoretical framework to the analysis of the data. An attempt to quantify the classifications established in chapter 5, regarding the discourse functions of negation, proved virtually impossible, for several reasons: (i) the effect of negation could not be delimited within the boundaries of the sentence or clause which contained the negative word. As I argued in chapter 5, negation is seen, rather, as a subworld-creating option which triggers the projection of a domain within the text world. This domain may stretch over a variable extension of discourse, from a clause, to a short paragraph, or a long episode. (ii) The functions described in chapter 5 are not clear cut categories. This has to do with the fact that, for some categories, there are no formal indicators that help us identify a function as belonging to a specific class. This is particularly true with regard to the denial of frame knowledge. The decision that a

certain extract contains denial of frame knwoledge, rather than the denial of a text world parameter or a subworld-building parameter[2] can only be established by exclusion of the other options and on intuitive grounds. Furthermore, the same negative clause may well belong to two categories at the same time. This is particularly true of negative accommodation, which can be said to be a specific type of denial of frame knowledge.[3] Because no previous systematisation of these categories has been proposed, I have had to take the decisions myself, proposing a classification which would adequately conform to the theoretical assumptions of negation as subworld and which would adequately account for my data. Unfortunately, Werth's (1994, 1995, 1996) works do not provide sufficient information regarding how a classification of this kind should be carried out, and there is no other study of negation that I know of which adopts this framework for negation. (iii) There is an obvious connection between what I have called the *marked* use of negation, on the one hand, and the creation of a humorous effect, and what Cook calls *schema refreshment*, on the other. However, it is not possible to quantify the relation between negation and the two effects in a basic sudy like the one I am developing in the present chapter, again, because the perception of the effects themselves and the link between them and the negative terms are reader dependent.[4] Furthermore, the perception of the effect may vary within the same reader at different moments in time. Finally, the marked character of negation and its effect, as explained above, cannot be pinned

down to specific parts of the text, such as clauses or constitutents within clauses which could correspond to the delimitation of the scope of the negative; rather, it tends to stretch over discourse units, such as paragraphs.[5] Very often, the particular effect of a negative, or several negatives in combination, is not perceived in its full strength until the reader has reached the end of a paragraph. It is only at this point that the reader can perceive the whole paragraph as a dynamic unit which has lead him or her to a particular climax which would not be reached if parts of the text were skipped. Significantly, the effect of negation in these terms can hardly be *analysed in isolation, but should be understood to be* contributing to a general process of foregrounding and discourse deviation where negation plays a primary role, but where it is supported by other significant textual elements, such as key lexical items and also affirmative clauses.

With regard to the second difficulty mentioned above, namely, the impossibility of carrying out a complete analysis of the functional subtypes in the whole novel, the second part of the study is necessarily limited in that the frequencies for negation types are not carried out on randomly selected extracts of the novel. As I explain in 1.2.2. below, the extracts are selected precisely because of their adequacy as significant examples of the qualitative phenomenon I am discussing. The reason I have included the quantitative analysis is that it can provide a general idea of the main functions of negation in the subcorpus, with the awareness that

the results cannot be extrapolated to the whole novel. It was not possible either to quantify the occurrences of negative lexical items, for reasons discussed in chapter 2, and which have to do with the lack of formal indicators of polarity in lexical items; these are often assigned their polar value on an apparently arbitrary basis.[6] This limitation affected greatly the quantification of negative terms which create oppositions involving contradiction or other paradoxical phenomena, as there were numerous examples where lexical opposites were used for this purpose.

To sum up, a quantitative study of the data under analysis has proved difficult for several reasons: first, because the characteristics of the functions of negation as proposed in chapter 5 cannot be classified in quantitative terms, since the functions of negation in discourse are described as dynamic processes which cannot be identified only with the negative terms under analysis. Second, the limitation in time and the characteristics of the present work in general terms have obliged me to carry out a selection of extracts, which constitutes the subcorpus. As I have explained above, the selection of extracts was oriented to the qualitative aspects of the discussion, rather than to the quantitative ones. However, a basic quantitative study may contribute to the general perspective of negation in *Catch-22* by providing the means of establishing to what extent the main foregrounding function of negation and its role in discourse deviation is quantitative-based or not. Furthermore, it provides the means

of systematising the information about negation regarding the frequencies of negation types in the corpus and subcorpus under analysis.

6.1.2. The corpus and subcorpus

In this section I describe the characteristics of the corpus and subcorpus which are the object of analysis of the present work.

6.1.2.1. The corpus

The corpus dealt with in the present work is the novel *Catch-22*. Being a novel, it is identified as literary language presenting instances both of narrative (mainly indirect speech) and fictional dialogue (direct speech).

Although this distinction is relevant with regard to the distribution of negation types, I have not considered it to be of primary importance from the perspective from which I am working. This means that, while it is predictable to state that there will be no *no* pragmatic signals in reported speech (see Tottie, 1991), the discourse-pragmatic functions of describing negative states and events and of paradox need not be more frequent in one type than in the other. Consequently, I will be working with instances of both direct and indirect speech.

Because of the size of the corpus for the purposes of a discourse pragmatic analysis, a subcorpus of 134 extracts has been made and is described below.

6.1.2.2. The subcorpus

A subcorpus of 134 extracts (18,339 words) from the novel *Catch-22* was created according to the following criteria:

(1) the extract as a unit is based on the notions of *episode* in van Dijk (1977) and Erhlich (1990), and the notion of *subworld* in Werth (1996).[7] Following these authors, I have made a selection of extracts following the general criterion of providing a unit that is coherent in itself and whose structural and/or semantic boundaries can be identified by means of any of the following strategies:

a. deictic shift in time
b. deictic shift in place
c. deictic shift in person
d. shift in possible world
e. shift in speech presentation type
f. topic change
g. paragraph boundary

(2) The selection of extracts was made according to the relative relevance of the extracts chosen to the main themes of the novel.

(3) The selection was also made taking into account practical aspects, such as the length of the episodes that were potentially interesting for analysis. Several episodes which could have been considered relevant were left out because of their length, since they occupied three or more pages.

(4) The extracts selected can be defined to some extent as *semantic prosodies*, to use Louw's term (1993). By semantic prosody, the author refers to a unit of meaning stretching over discourse which is defined by the fact that the discourse surrounding an instance of irony is 'imbued by its collocates' (op. cit.: 157). In my data, I use it to stand for a stretch

of discourse where a marked use of negation triggers discourse deviation.

(5) The selection is intended to cover the whole variety of uses of negation I am discussing in the present work, and thus to provide relevant examples for each type. The most interesting examples are discussed in the sections devoted to this purpose in chapter 7.

The criteria outlined above were considered to be sufficient for the creation of a subcorpus whose main function is that of providing a varied range of illustrations of the functions of negation which I have discussed from a qualitative standpoint in chapter 5. Since the quantitative analysis of the present chapter is of secondary importance with respect to the the discussion in chapter 5, I have not considered it appropriate to adopt other methods for the selection of the extracts, such as random selection, which would undoubtedly be necessary for a quantitatively oriented work.

6.1.3. The classifications of negation types

In this section I propose a model of negation which will be the instrument of analysis for a classification of negation types according to criteria that can be quantified. There are two general classifications. The first one is computer-based, that is, a specific computer programme (Micro-Concord) was used in order to identify and count the negative words in the corpus and subcorpus (see the deatils in the sections below). I have carried out two operations: (a) a classification of negative

items according to the grammatical category they to which they belong and (b) the identification of affixal negation in lexical items. The second classification is a discourse-pragmatic classification based on the identification of the functional characteristics of negative clauses according to (a) communicative functions and subfunctions, (b) differences between dialogue and narrative and (c) ontological functions and subfunctions. Since neither the corpus nor the subcorpus were tagged, it was not possible to carry out this second classification by means of a computer programme; consequently, each function was identified and assigned to a specific class manually.

The first classification, which identifies negative items, both lexical and syntactic, and assigns them to grammatical categories, and the first part of the second classification, which assigns discourse-pragmatic functions to negative clauses is inspired in previous work on discourse negation (Tottie 1982 and 1991). However, the last section, which classifies negative clauses according to the marked and unmarked character of the negative terms and according to their ontological functions, is my own contribution to the present study, as these categories are not envisaged by other previous works on negation. The purpose of these categories is to provide a general idea of the relative frequencies of these specific negation types within the present study.

6.1.3.1. Classification according to grammatical category

The following sections describe the theoretical criteria used for the identification of syntactic and lexical negation in the corpus and subcorpus. A distinction is established between syntactic, affixal and inherent negation. While syntactic and affixal negation were searched by means of Micro Concord, it was not possible to carry out this task with inherent negation, since words that are inherently negative are not marked for polarity in any overt way, either syntactic or morphological. For this reason, the analysis of inherent negation is carried out only in chapter 5.[8]

6.1.3.1.1. Syntactic negation

By SYNTACTIC NEGATION, I mean the use of explicitly negative items (see Clark 1976: 32-33, and the discussion in chapter 2 of the present work); that is, words that are identified by means of criteria such as the need to combine them with non-assertive forms (*any*). Such criteria distinguish them from words that are usually described as being implicitly negative (Clark, ibid.), such as *absent, forget*, which cannot combine with non-assertive forms in the affirmative (cf.: ? There is anybody absent). As I stated in chapter 2, this includes the following negative words: *no, not, n't, never, neither, nor, no-one, nowhere, nobody, nothing*, and the broad negatives *hardly, scarcely, seldom, barely, few.*

6.1.3.1.2. Morphological negation

Morphological negation is indicated by the presence of affixes with add a negative meaning to the word, although this does not make the word explicitly negative, as is the case of syntactic negation. This kind of negation is called *affixal negation* by Tottie (1991). Morphological negation can be formed by adding prefixes such as *-il, -im, ir, -dis*, etc. or suffixes such as *-less*.

6.1.3.1.3. Inherent negation

Inherent negation is indicated neither syntactically nor morphologically, but rather corresponds to the negative value that is assigned to a lexical item by means of its relation of antonymy with a 'positive' term (good/bad, dead/alive, crazy/sane, etc.). (see the discussion in chapter 5).

6.1.3.2. Classification of negative items according to communicative function

In the second classification, the clause, be it matrix or subordinate clause, is taken as the unit of analysis for the pragmatic classification. The reason for chosing the clause as unit of analysis, rather than the sentence or the utterance, is that there are cases where the relevant negative example appears in a subordinate rather than a matrix clause. This initially might have posed a problem, since functional classifications in pragmatics usually take matrix clauses as the unit of analysis (cf. speech act theory). However, it can

be said that any clause can have a communicative function independently from its syntactic status (Werth 1995c: 404) and, from a formal point of view, this justifies the use of the clause as a unit. From the functional perspective, as I said above, it enables us to account for interesting cases which would otherwise be left out. This is particularly important when discussing the phenomenon of negative accomodation.[9]

The classification is based on the function performed by the negative clause in the context of the fictional world, according to the three following criteria mentioned: (i) pragmatic function, (ii) by differences between dialogue and narrative,[10] (iii) by ontological function.

6.1.3.2.1. By pragmatic function

A classification of clauses according to speech act function posed several problems for the purposes of my analysis. As I have explained above, the usual unit of analysis in speech act theory is the matrix clause, however, I was also interested in identifying the communicative function of subordinate and embedded clauses. This not only affected the unit of analysis itself but the notion of communicative function. Accordingly, while *assertion* is understood in the literature in general (see for example Vanderveken 1991), as a function of a matrix clause, in the present study, however, it is used in a more general way. I have adopted a more flexible interpretation of the notion of assertion in order to cover the general notion of 'statement' (including denials),

as opposed to directive and commissive. It also covers the notion of assertiveness understood as carrying new information (see Werth 1995c: 404). This allows us to apply the notion to those subordinate clauses that carry new information and are defined by Werth (ibid.) as types of accomodation.

Assertives cover both direct and indirect assertions, and so do directives. The purpose of this classification is to identify the number of assertions with respect to other speech act types, since assertion is intuitively felt to be the most recurrent category. The results show this to be the case, which is probably related to the descriptive use of negative utterances both in the desciption of negative events and states and of paradoxical states of affairs. The classifications that deal with these communicative functions correspond to the following distinctions (From Vanderveken, 1991):

1.1. Assertives: negative statement, denial, disclaim, agreement, disagreement, polite hedge.

1.2. Commissives: refusal, rejection, threat.

1.3. Directives: question, order, command, prohibition, request, advice, warning.

1.4. Expressives: lament, complaint, protest.

This classification is based on the idea that a negative sentence can carry out many types of discourse-pragmatic functions, even agreements and confirmations, and not exclusively denials and other negative speech act types. Although Givón does not consider this possiblity, other authors point it out (Tottie 1991, Downing 1995) and provide relevant examples.

6.1.3.2.2. Functional subtypes

The general functional types described above were explored further in order to identify specific subfunctions. For this purpose, I have adopted Tottie's (1991:37) classification of negation discourse types. Tottie does not establish a difference between negative statements and denials, but treats them both as denials, either implicit or explicit. For practical reasons, I follow her approach in the classification of functional subtypes.

Tottie (1991:37) classifies the discourse functions of negation into the following classes:[11] denials (explicit and implicit), rejections (which include both rejections and refusals), questions, supports, imperatives and repetitions. The data collected in my analysis have led me to adapt her classification of discourse functions, for both theoretical and practical reasons. From a theoretical point of view, (a) I thought it more adequate to present first a general classification of discourse functions by speech act, thus subsuming rejections, refusals and others under commissives and questions and imperatives under directives. This provides a first general impression of the distribution by speech act function. (b) There are other functions that are not considered by Tottie, but which are relevant to my study. For example, not all directives are orders or questions, and, although these are indeed the most widespread functions within the directive type, I have included others such as request and advice. I have not followed Tottie's terminology, since I have found it more

adequate to use the speech act term throughout (directive, order) instead of the mood function (imperative). However, the changes are not drastic enough to prevent a comparison between my results and Tottie's.

From a practical point of view, the changes described above are justified because they adapt the instrument of analysis to the particular occurrences of negation in the corpus I am analysing, thus covering cases which would otherwise remain unaccounted for.

Table 8 shows the frequency of discourse types of negation distributed under the headings denial, directive, commissive, pragmatic marker and repetition. The results in this table complement those from table 7, in the sense that, while the classes of directive and commissive are kept unchanged, assertions and the pragmatic signal *no* are distributed between denials and repetitions.[12]

6.1.3.3. Classification of negative items according to ontological function of negation

With regard to the ontological function of negative clauses, I have been inspired mainly by Givón's (1993) observations about the characteristics of negative clauses as compared to the affirmative. It can be said that the functional types discussed in chapter 5 can be subsumed under the two general types discussed here, the foregrounding type and the paradoxical type. In chapter 3, it was pointed out that negation carries out a foregrounding function by means of which

it points out the negative state or event in those cases where, exceptionally, they are more informative than events or states expressed in positive terms. In these sections, I am interested in analysing the ontological properties of negative clauses in *Catch-22* with regard to two main aspects: (a) the marked or unmarked character of the clauses in their context of use, and (b) the distinction into two main types of ontology created in the fictional world: empty ontologies, where the foregrounding effect is predominant, and paradoxical ontologies, where the contradictory or illogical effect is primary. The distinction between marked and unmarked uses of negation is somewhat subjective, as it relies on the reader's or hearer's perception of acceptability or oddity of the utterance. I will illustrate the difference with an example from the corpus which was discussed in chapter 3:

> (1) Sharing a tent with a man who was crazy wasn't easy, but Nately didn't care. He was crazy too, and he had gone every free day to work on the officers' club that Yossarian had not helped build. (p. 28)[13]

In this brief extract we have two typical occurrences of each of the types of negation outlined above. The first two negative clauses, (1) *Sharing a tent with a man who was crazy wasn't easy*, and (2) *but Nately didn't care*, are examples of unmarked negation; (1) foregrounds the fact that *it is not easy* to share a tent with a crazy man, thus denying the contrary assumption; it is informative because it points out that something that is not the case is relevant. (2) denies the assumption which can be inferred from clause (1) that someone should mind living with a crazy person; thus, it is also

informative, as it is relevant to point out that Nately does not mind. The third clause, however, is marked: (3) *the officers' club that Yossarian had not helped build*. This clause stands out as odd, and its oddity is probably related to the fact that it denies an assumption about how things are in the world we inhabit, and how people normally behave. This marked use of negation is closely related to Cook's (1994) function of schema refreshment, as it challenges previously held assumptions about how things are or should be. Thus, although it is difficult to define exactly what is meant by a marked use of negation, I will use it to refer to negative clauses that sound odd because they question taken-for-granted assumptions about the world. In this sense, this clause is odd because there is apparently no interest in knowing what a character has not done. A superficial reading would make us consider these type of clauses as uninformative and irrelevant. As I argued in chapter 5, however, it can be said that uses of this type are informative and meaningful at a higher processing level, where it produces the effect of schema refreshment. More problematic cases will be mentioned in the sections on the discussion below.

The second distinction mentioned, that between empty ontologies and paradoxical ontologies, is, in principle, easier to draw, although it may be argued that a paradoxical ontology is a subtype of the foregrounding function of negation. Empty ontologies foreground negative states or events, as example 1 above, where the non-building of an officers' club is

foregrounded. Paradoxical ontologies may be created by means of contradiction or circular logic. Chapter 5 contains numerous examples of both types.

6.1.4. Methodology

This chapter is devoted to an analysis of the frequency of negation types in the corpus and subcorpus described in 1.2. and 1.2.2. above. First, I have classified negation types according to the grammatical category they belong to. For this purpose, the novel was first scanned in order to obtain a computer accessible format; then a search was made of the whole novel (171, 235 words) in order to identify the number and frequency of different negation types. This is intended to show the frequency of negative items in the novel in comparison with other discourse types studied by other linguists (see Tottie 1982, 1991, Biber, 1990) and other corpora (LOB and Brown). The programme used was MicroConcord, which searched for specific items which are listed below. The programme was ordered to search for syntactic negative items, which were then classified according to their grammatical type, and for lexical negative items marked by affixal negation. For the purpose of identifying these items the programme searched for the following words: *no, not, *n't, nobody, nothing, nowhere, none, never, neither/nor, hardly, barely, scarcely, seldom and items with the prefixes: a*, non*, mal*, dis*, un*, il*, ir*, im*, in* and the suffix *less.* The items were contextually checked in order to exclude non-negative items, such as *affect, under,*

etc. Items which are apparently formed by negative prefixes but which are not clearly negative in meaning have not been considered (examples: *disappointment, disgruntled*). The procedure for this search and the selection of the items to be searched are inspired in work carried out by Tottie (1982 and 1991) and Watson (1996). The search for affixal negation was carried out in the corpus but not in the subcorpus; the reason for this is that affixal negation was felt to be of secondary importance from a functional point of view.

The subcorpus was also searched by means of the Micro Concord Programme in order to establish the frequencies of negation types according to their grammatical category. Additionally, a second classification was made according to the pragmatic function that can be assigned to the clause carrying the negative item. For the reasons explained in section 1.3. above, this classification is not computer based but an application of theoretical issues to the interpretation of the function of negation in the discourse of the novel under analysis.

While the classifications according to grammatical categories were straightforward, the pragmatic classification was problematic for several reasons. In the first place, the categories proposed by authors who have studied negation in discourse (Tottie 1982, 1991) are designed for non-fictional discourse, and, consequently, are not completely adequate for the analysis of fiction. One of the peculiarities of fiction is that it presents instances of both narration and dialogue.

Second, to my knowledge, there is no study on the frequencies and types of negative clauses or utterances involved in the description of non-events and in paradox. This means that the results cannot be compared with previous similar studies. The classification that is proposed below has been created for the purpose of identifying negation types that are functionally relevant in the corpus I am working on, and, for this reason, it is meant to provide insights regarding the use of the different types in the novel. Additionally, the functions of negation that have been identified are not clear cut categories that are easily identifiable. On the contrary, there are, for example, cases that are typically marked, while others are not, and there are cases which perform two or more functions at the same time. For instance, a negative clause might be used both to describe a non-event and to contradict a previous utterance. For these reasons, the classification should be seen as a reference or guide to the more significant discussion of chapter 5, rather than the main objective of the study.

6.2. Discussion of the results from the quantitative analysis

The following sections are devoted to the discussion of the results form the quantitative analysis of the corpus and subcorpus. The first sections deal with data from the corpus and the results discussed appear in tables 1 to 4, while the following sections offer a more detailed analysis of the subcorpus from different perspectives. The results appear in tables 5 to 16. Where relevant, the results will be compared

to previous studies on the subject.

The quantitative analysis of negation in the present work is inspired in Tottie's (1982 and 1991) work on negation in English speech and writing. Although some of the categories used by Tottie are adapted for my own purposes (see section 1.3.2.2. above), in general terms, I have followed her observations regarding negation, so that I could establish a comparison with her data. I have also compared my data with the frequencies for negation in general fiction in Biber's (1990) corpus, and in the LOB-Brown corpora. For this purpose, I carried out a search of the two corpora by means of MonoConcord, in order to identify the negative terms and compare them with the results from my corpus.

6.2.1. Analysis of the results from the corpus

In this section I discuss briefly the results from the quantitative analysis of the whole novel. The analysis shows the total number of negatives (table 1.), the frequencies of negative items according to grammatical types (table 2.), the frequencies of negative items in *Catch-22*, in Biber's fictional texts and in the LOB and Brown corpora (table 3.), and the percentages of syntactic and lexical negation (table 4.).

6.2.1.1. Frequencies of negative items

The total number of negative items in the whole novel is shown in table 1 below, 4,276 negative items in a corpus of 171,235 words. The total includes both syntactic and lexical

negation.

Total number of negative items

Total number of words	Total number of negatives
171,235	4,276 (24.9 per 1000 wds.)

Table 1.

The average number of negative items per 1000 words is 24.3, which shows a percentage that comes close to the figures cited by Tottie (1982:90) and (1991:32) for the spoken language. In these studies, the percentage of negative items per 1000 words in the spoken language is 27.6, against 12.8 percent of negative items in written texts. With regard to the corpus I am analysing, the high percentage of negative items can be partly explained by the fact that the novel presents a combination of narrative and dialogue (this distinction is reflected in tables 12, 13 and 14). This makes it possible to have specific uses of negation that are typical of spontaneous speech, such as the pragmatic signal *no*. However, as Tottie points out (1982:91), this is not the only reason for having more negatives in conversation than in writing. The specific reasons for having a high number of negatives in the present corpus will be discussed in the sections on the communicative functions of negative items, since it is also connected to the marked use of negation in certain contexts.

If we compare my results with those obtained by Watson (1996) in Mudoroo's fiction, we can observe that the percentage

of negatives in *Catch-22* is slightly higher than the percentages obtained by Watson (24.3 in my data, versus 16.8 in Mudoroo's fiction.) However, it must be pointed out that the frequency of negatives in Mudoroo varies from novel to novel, and it ranges from 12 in *Ghost*, to 22 in *Wildcat* (Watson, 1996), which shows again that there tends to exist great variation from work to work in fiction in general terms.

6.2.1.2. Frequencies of negative items according to grammatical category

The distribution of negation types according to grammatical category is represented in table 2 below, and shows a predominance of VP- negation (not/n't) with 66% occurrences, considering only syntactic negation types, and 52.9%, considering the total number of negative items, including lexical negation. The figures in table 2 fit in with the results obtained by Watson (1996) in his study of Mudoroo's novels, where the percentage of *not* is of 52.4. The rest of the negation types show lower frequencies, ranging, from higher to lower, from *no* as a modifier (10.5), *never* (8.1), *no*-compounds (6.8), *no* as pragmatic signal (5.9), broad negation[14] (1.4) and *neither/nor* (0.8).

Frequencies of negative items according to grammatical category

Negation type	Figures and Percentage syntactic negation	Percentage total negatives	Percentage per 1000 words
not\n't	2,205 66%	52.9%	12.87
no modifier	353 10.5	8.4%	2.06
never	273 8.1	6.5%	1.32
no-compounds	227 6.8%	5.4%	1.59
no Pragmatic signal	199 5.9%	4.7%	1.16
broad negation	48 1.4%	1.1%	0.28
neither\nor	28 0.8%	0.6%	0.16
other (Italian)	5 0.1%	0.1%	0.02
Total	3,338 99.6	4,276	19.49

Table 2.

If we compare the results in table 2 to those obtained by Tottie (1991:194) in a study on the frequencies of analytic negation (*not*) and synthetic negation (an equivalent version with *no*), we can conclude that the data from the present corpus show figures that are closer to what is typical in the spoken language, according to Tottie's study. In her article (op.cit.), the percentage for *not* is much higher than that of *no* in the spoken samples (66.4 versus 33.5), while in the written samples it is the other way round (36.8 versus 63.1).

In *Catch-22*, the percentage of *not* negation compared to *no* negation is 79.1 versus 21, which shows an even higher frequency of *not* than in the figures shown by Tottie. This can be accounted for by the high number of dialogues or forms of speech presentation that are closer to direct, spontaneous speech than to indirect, premeditated speech. In any case, it should be pointed out that a novel is an idiosyncratic world in itself, which is not easy to compare either to written or to spoken language, since it shares characteristics of both types.

In order to compare these results to those obtained by Biber (1990), we need to consider only those categories of negative words which this author has taken into consideration. The author establishes a distinction between analytic and synthetic negation (1990: 245), where analytic negation refers to *not/n't* and synthetic negation refers to *no+QUANT/ADJ/N* and to *neither/nor*. What is not clear in Biber's work is whether synthetic negation also includes *no-compounds*. The recount is carried out as percetages per 1000 words, which is shown in the right most column of table 2 above. In my data, the sum of *not* (12.8%), *no* as modifier (2.06%) and *neither/nor* (0.16) gives a total of 15.12% of negative words per 1000 words. The mean for general fiction in Biber is 10.4, although works range from frequencies as low as 3 to others as high as 17. This seems to reflect great variation depending on the author and the work itself. In any case, the frequencies of negative terms in *Catch-22* are certainly closer to the higher end and they are

above the mean. The results would be even higher in my data if we considered the *no*-compounds, as the total frequency per 1000 words would be 16.34, bringing *Catch-22* to the extreme with a high frequency of negative items.

When we compare the results of the present corpus to those obtained by searching the files containing general fiction in the LOB and Brown corpora, we may observe that the frequencies of negative items in *Catch-22* is higher than in the two other corpora. The results are shown in table 3. For each corpus, the figures on the left indicate the total number of negative items, while the figures on the right indicate the frequency per 1000 words.

Frequencies of negative items in three different corpora

Corpus/ category	Catch-22 171,235 words		LOB-K 58,000 words		Brown-K 58,000 words	
not/n't	2,210	12.9	674	11.6	533	9.1
no	779	4.5	245	4.2	161	2.7
never	273	1.5	97	1.6	72	1.2
neither/nor	28	0.16	32	0.5	19	0.3
Total	3,290	19.21	1,048	18.0	785	13.5

Table 3.

From the results in table 3, we observe that, while the mean for negatives in *Catch-22* is of 19.21, in LOB it is slightly lower, (18.0), and in Brown it is considerably lower (13.5). The percentages for each of the negation types are also proportionally higher in *Catch-22* than in the two other

corpora. Thus, the percentages for *not/n't* are 12.9 in *Catch-22*, 11.6 in Brown and 9.1 in LOB. The percentages of *no* are 4.5. in *Catch-22*, 4.2 in Brown and 2.7 in LOB. The percenteages for *never* are very similar in the three corpora, with 1.5 in *Catch-22*, 1.6 in Brown and 1.2 in LOB. Finally, the frequencies of *neither/nor* are the lowest in the three corpora (0.16, 0.5 and 0.3 respectively). It is significant to point out that the frequencies of negatives in *Catch-22* are considerably higher than the frequencies of negatives in the American corpus (Brown), while, they are only slightly higher than the British corpus (LOB).

To sum up, the frequency of negative items in *Catch-22* can be said to be relatively high in general terms when compared to the results of the searches in the LOB-Brown corpora and in Biber's work. While the percentage of negatives in *Catch-22* is lower than the percentage of negatives in spoken discourse, as shown by Tottie, it is considerably higher than the frequencies of negative items in corpora which contain fictional texts (the Brown and LOB corpora). However, it can also be observed that there tends to be a great deal of variation within the genre of fiction, so that the frequencies of negatives may change greatly from work to work. The general results seem to confirm the hypothesis that the frequency of negative items is higher in *Catch-22* than the average for fictional works in general terms. However, as was observed from the results of Biber's study, there are works of fiction which could have even higher frequencies than *Catch-22*.

6.2.1.3. Frequencies of affixal and syntactic negation

The total number of lexical negative items identified as affixal negation is 938, that is, 21.9 percent of all negatives in the corpus. The presence of syntactic negation (78%) is definitely much higher and is intuitively felt to be more relevant to the discourse function of negation in general terms. This is due to the fact that there are negative lexical items which clearly are not related to the main themes of the novel. For this reason, these figures are only meant to contribute to the total figures of negative items in order to facilitate a closer comparison with Tottie's (1982 and 1991) and Watson's (1996) account of negation mentioned above, which include lexical items.

Total figures including both syntactic and lexical negation

Syntactic negation	Lexical negation	Total
3,338	938	4,276
78%	21,9%	99,9%

Table 4.

6.2.2. Analysis of the results from the subcorpus

In this section I discuss the results collected in tables 5 to 16, which deal with the analysis of the subcorpus. The different sections deal with the classifications discussed in section 1.3. above.

6.2.2.1. Frequencies of negative items (syntactic negation)

The figures for the number of negative items in the subcorpus can be seen in table 5. The total number of negative items in the subcorpus (18,339 words) is 633; the total percentage of negatives per 1000 words is 32.9 (see table 5.). The recount shows a much higher percentage than the figures obtained from the whole novel (19.49). Consequently, they cannot be taken to be representative of the whole novel. This discrepancy between the figures obtained for the corpus and those obtained for the subcorpus can be explained, (a), because the extracts are selected precisely because they are interesting from the point of view of the use of negation, and (b) because of the predominance of dialogue over narrative in the extracts selected (see tables 12, 13 and 14).

Total number of negative items

Total number of words	Total number of negative items
18,339	633

Table 5.

6.2.2.2. Frequencies of negative items according to grammatical category

The same procedure followed for the corpus for the identification of syntactic negation types was repeated in the subcorpus. The results are shown in table 6. The figures are close to those obtained from searching the whole novel; consequently, the selection of extracts can be said to be

representative regarding the presence and frequency of the different negation types. In both cases, there is a predominance of analytic negation (*not*, with 63.8 and 66 percent of all negation types in both cases). The remaining frequencies do not present differences greater than one point.

Frequencies of negative items according to grammatical category

Negation type	Figures and Percentage syntactic negation		Percentage per 1000 words
not\n't	404	63.8	22.02
no modifier	71	11.2	3.8
never	47	8.1	2.5
no-compounds	34	7.4	1.8
no Pragmatic signal	32	5.0	1.7
broad negation	9	1.4	0.4
neither\nor	10	1.5%	0.5
other (Italian)	5	0.7	0.2
Total	633	99.1	32.9

Table 6.

Ellipted negative elements have also been considered. 16 cases of ellipsis were identified involving ellipsis of the verbal negation *not/n't* after the coordinator *or*, one involving

ellipted *no* as modifier, and two involving *nor*.

6.2.2.3. Type of communicative function of the clause

In this section, I discuss the results shown in tables 6 to 14. Tables 6 to 11 classify negative clauses in the subcorpus according to the communicative function or subfunction carried out in the discourse. Where possible, the results are compared to the results obtained by Tottie (1991:37) in her classification of discourse functions.

Type of communicative function of the clause

Types of communicative function	Percentages	
assertive	492	77.7%
directive	94	14.8%
commissive	15	2.3%
pragmatic marker	32	5%
total	633	99.8%

Table 7.

Table 7 shows the frequencies of communicative functions in the following terms: assertives are the most frequent type with 77.7 of the occurrences. They are followed by directives (14.8), commissives (2.3) and the pragmatic marker *no* (5). Although this classification is not used by Tottie (1982, 1991), the general distribution of the communicative function types follows the same tendencies in my study as in Tottie's (1991:37). There is a predominance of assertion (Tottie deals with denials, which are a subtype of assertion) with 77.7 of

the cases, followed by directives (14.8), commissives (2.3) and the pragmatic marker (5). This progression is also followed in Tottie's study, though with different percentages. These results show that assertion is the most frequent communicative function type of negation. Below I reproduce two examples of commissives as illustrations of these less frequent types:

> (2) From now on I'm going to make every son of a bitch who comes to my intelligence tent sign a loyalty oath. And I'm *not going to let that bastard Major Major sign one* even if he wants to. (147)
>
> (3) 'Why aren't you wearing clothes, Yossarian?'
> 'I don't want to.' (277)

In (2) and (3) we have examples of a promise and a refusal respectively. The status of *And I'm not going to let that bastard Major Major sign one...* is possibly arguable, but I believe it has a clear commissive force, in that the speaker publicly undertakes to follow a course of action in relation to someone else. In (9) *I don't want to* is clearly a refusal, and typically reveals Yossarian's reluctance to be cooperative with the military apparatus.

6.2.2.3.1. Subypes of communicative function

Table 8 shows the percentages of subtypes of discourse functions performed by negatives. They are divided into denials, directives, commissives and repetitions.

Subypes of communicative function

denial		directive		commissive		repetition		pragmatic sign	total
468	73.9	94	14.8	15	2.3	24	3.7	32 5.0	633

Table 8.

The results are consistent with those obtained by Tottie (1991:37), since in both cases there is an overwhelming predominance of denials (73.8 in my study and 77.9 in Tottie's), followed by directives (14.8 in my study; in Tottie, 8 for questions) and commissives (2.3 in my study; in Tottie 2 for rejections). The frequencies of repetitions are also similar (3.7 and 4 respectively). These results confirm the results from table 7, in the sense that it is negative assertion that predominates as a discourse function.

6.2.2.3.2. Subtypes of denial

Tottie (1982:94-95) establishes a distinction between explicit and implicit denials, where explicit denials deny a proposition that 'has been explicitly asserted' (ibid.) and implicit denials deny 'something which might merely have been expected, or which can be contextually inferred but which has not been asserted by anyone.' Examples (4) and (5) illustrate this distinction:

(4) A: I think John left very early yesterday.
B: Actually, he didn't leave so early, it was past 8.

(5) A: What happened at the meeting?
B: I don't want to talk about it.

Example (4) illustrates explicit denial, since B's utterance explicitly denies the proposition previously uttered by A. Example (5) illustrates implicit denial; B denies the assumption implicit in A's question that B is willing to talk about the meeting.

Table 9 shows the frequencies of implicit and explicit denials in *Catch-22*.

Implicit denial is by far the most frequent, with 94.0 in my study and 81 in Tottie's (ibid.), versus 4.4 and 18.9 of explicit denials respectively. The high number of implicit denials in my corpus is due to the mixture of narrative and dialogue, while Tottie analyses spoken language only.

Subtypes of denial

explicit denial*	28	4.4
implicit denial	440	94.0
total	468	98.4

Table 9. * Of these, 10 are metalinguistic negations.

If we compare these general results to those shown in table 14. for dialogue and narrative separately, we can observe that explicit denial is virtually not used in narrative (0.3), while it is more usual in dialogue (21). The results of these tables are further discussed in section 2.2.4. below.

6.2.2.3.3. Subtypes of directive and commissive

Tables 10 and 11 show the percentages for the subtypes of directives and commissives. Within directives, the most usual subfunction is the question (72.3), followed by order (13.8), suggestion (10.6) and advice and request, which are not significant. In Tottie's study of the spoken language (1991: 37) questions are also the most frequent type of negative directive. Within commissives, refusals are the most frequent (60), followed by rejections (26.6) and accusation and promise (not significant).

Subtypes of directive

question	68	72.3%
order	13	13.8%
suggestion	10	10.6%
request	1	1%
advise	2	2.1%
total	94	99.8%

Table 10.

Subtypes of commissive

refusal	9	60%
rejection	4	26.6%
accusation	1	6.6%
promise	1	6.6%
total	15	99.8%

Table 11.

Both directives and commissives will be expected to appear almost exclusively in the fictional dialogues. This can be observed in tables 12 to 14, which establish differences between functions of negation depending on whether they appear in the narrative or the dialogues. They are discussed in the following section.

6.2.2.4. Distinctions between dialogue and narrative

Table 12 shows the percentages of negative clauses that belong to narrative sections and to dialogues in the subcorpus. A majority of clauses belongs to fictional dialogue (55.7), while those in narrative are slightly less frequent (44.2). Here it should be remembered that both matrix and subordinate negative clauses have been analysed, so that a recount based on the notion of sentence or utterance might yield different results. However, the predominance of dialogue confirms the results of previous tables, especially those which deal with the total number of negative items. As was explained above, conversation and dialogue tend to have a higher frequency of negative items than written language.

Total number of negative items in dialogues and narrative

dialogue	353	55.7
narrative	280	44.2
total	633	99.9

Table 12.

The frequencies of functions of negative clauses in

narrative and dialogue are shown in table 13 below.

With regard to the frequencies of functions in dialogue and narrative, there is a predominance of assertion in both varieties (61.2 and 99.2 respectively), although it is almost exclusive in narrative. In this variety, there are only two instances of indirect orders and no occurrences of commissives or pragmatic signals. In dialogue, assertion is followed by directives (25.6), pragmatic signals (8.9) and commissives (4.1).

Distribution of functions in dialogue and narrative

Function	dialogue		narrative	
assertive	220	61.2	272	99.2%
directive	92	25.6	2	0.7%
commissive	15	4.1	-	-
pragmatic signal	32	8.9	-	-
total	359 (56.7%)	99.8	274 (43.2%)	99.9%

Table 13.

The frequencies of implicit and explicit denials in dialogue and narrative are shown in table 14.. There is a predominance of implicit denials (78.5 and 99.6 respectively), with the difference that in narrative the number of explicit denials is much lower than in dialogue (0.3 versus 7.45). This probably has to do with the fact that dialogue is an interactional process, while narrative is not in such an obvious way. This makes it more probable to have an explicit denial between two or more different speakers than within one

speaker in a narration.

Distribution of denials in dialogue and narrative

Function	dialogue		narrative	
explicit denial	17	7.45	1	0.3
implicit denial	179	78.5	271	99.6
total	228	85.9	272	99.8

Table 14.

6.2.2.5. Negation types by ontological function

While the discussion in the previous sections is useful because it proves that fiction can be analysed by using the same categories that are used for other types of discourse, the categories used are not sufficient in the sense that they do not account for some of the most interesting phenomena taking place in the novel under analysis and clearly connected to the presence of negation. For this reason, I propose further categories inspired in the theoretical frameworks described in section 1.3. above and designed for the purpose of accounting for the following aspects: (a) marked and unmarked uses of negative clauses; and (b) types of ontology developed through negation.

6.2.2.5.1. Marked and unmarked uses of negative clauses

Table 15 shows the different frequencies of marked and unmarked negative clauses.

The ontological function of negation: marked and unmarked types[15]

Function of negation	Frequencies	
Unmarked	343	57.0
Marked	258	42.9
Total	601	99.9

Table 15.

The results in table 15 show a higher frequency of unmarked forms (57.0). This might indicate that the intuition regarding the markedness of negation in the corpus may be a qualitative phenomenon, rather than a quantitative one. In any case, the frequency of marked forms is relatively high (42.9), although, unfortunately, I cannot compare it to the results from other texts.

6.2.2.5.2. Types of ontology created: empty ontologies and paradoxical ontologies

Table 16 shows the percentages of marked negatives describing a negative state or event and negatives involved in paradox. These are the two main ontological functions of negation that can be identified in the novel under analysis.

Subtypes of marked ontological functions of negation

Marked ontological functions	Frequencies	
Foregrounding negative events and states	98	37.9
Paradox	160	62.0
Total	258	99.9

Table 16.

The distinction between the foregrounding of negative events and paradox is not clear cut. Strictly speaking, it is not possible to make a distinction between these terms, since it can be argued that (1) negation is inherently paradoxical, given its presuppositional nature, (2) the literary discourse situation is also paradoxical, as argued in chapter 1, and (3) all negative utterances foreground a negative state or event in some way or other, which would imply that this phenomenon is also present in paradox.

The distinction I have established here is based on the identification of the primary function shown in the clause and extract. If the extract contains contradictions or circular logic, it will be classified as carrying out a primary paradoxical function. If the paradoxical function is not present, it will be considered as foregrounding of negative states or events. Table 16 shows that the occurrences of negation as involved in paradox are higher than the occurrences of negation which foregrounds negative states and events (62.0 versus 37.9). However, it should be remembered that the table reflects results of marked uses of negation only, which means that the unmarked uses standardly foreground a negative state or event, while paradox is always marked. If we consider the results from table 15 and 16 in combination, we can conclude that the function of foregrounding is the most frequent, while, within the marked uses, paradox is the preferred function. In qualitative terms, the two functions are intuitively felt to be equally effective, as was discussed in chapter 5.

6.3. Conclusions

In this chapter I have carried out a quantitative analysis of the corpus and subcorpus with the aim of providing empirical support for the intuitions discussed in chapter 5. More particularly, I have tried to confirm the hypothesis that the marked character of negation as discussed in chapter 5 could be supported by an unusual frequency of negative items in quantitative terms. The analysis showed that the number of negative items in the corpus is higher than the average for fictional texts in three other corpora analysed (Biber, LOB and Brown). This seems to indicate that negation has a prominent role in the novel in some way. However, I have also explained the difficulties involved in trying to specify in quantitative terms why negation plays such a prominent role, and have reached the conclusion that a full explanation can only be carried out in qualitative terms, as has been done in chapter 5.

I have also compared the pragmatic functions of negative clauses in my subcorpus to the results obtained by Tottie in her analysis of negation in English speech and writing. My data showed that the frequency of negative items in general terms was closer to the frequencies of spoken language, which may be related to the fact that there is a predominance of dialogue in the subcorpus. However, when comparing the frequencies of negation types according to grammatical category and pragmatic function the frequencies of my subcorpus followed closely those shown by Tottie. This seems to indicate that the distribution

of negation types in the corpus is within the general tendency presented by Tottie.

While the initial part of the analysis had the aim of comparing the data with other previous studies, the last sections presented a classification which I have established for my corpus, and which I cannot compare with previous studies. Here, I was interested in calculating the frequecies of negative clauses according to the type of ontological function they were involved in, whether it was a marked or an unmarked use of negation, and whether it was an empty ontology or a paradoxical ontology. The results showed that (a) unmarked uses of negation were more frequent, thus indicating that the perception of negation as prominently marked is probably related to qualitative aspects, rather than to the frequency of the negative items; (b) both the paradoxical and the foregrounding function of negation were approximately of equal significance. However, I also pointed out that this significance was also felt to be a qualitative, rather than quantitative, phenomenon.

Notes to chapter 6

1. The usefulness of quantitative approaches in stylistics can be observed in studies such as those by Burrows (1992) and Short, Semino and Culpeper (1996). Quantitative methods provide the means of systematising information, although this is not always possible, as I argue in the present chapter.

2. Text world parameters were identified as deictic terms, while subworld parameters were identified as modalisations and, also, certain deictic terms (mainly, time shifts, like flashbacks introduced by a character, not by the narrator). Frame knowledge, however, may be triggered by any lexical item at any point of time in the text. More importantly, frame knowledge is reader dependent.

3. See Werth (1995b) for an explanation of how a text from E.M. Forster's *A Passage to India* is understood by means of the interpretation of the function of negative accomodation as introducing frame knowledge in the text which is simultaneously denied.

4. A study could be carried out on the lines of those by van Peer (1986) and Miall and Kuiken (1994) in order to identify the links between the foregrounding of negation and the perception by the reader of a certain effect which would include schema refreshment. Unfortunately, a study of this kind lies beyond the objectives of the present work.

5. See also the notion of *semantic prosody* in Louw (1993). The phenomenon is described by the author as follows with regard to irony: (Louw, 1993: 157):

> In order for a potential collocative clash to attract the ironist's interest, there must be a sufficiently consistent background of expected collocations against which the instantiation of irony becomes possible. *A consistent aura of meaning with which a form is imbued by its collocates is referred to in this paper as a semantic prosody.* (my italics)

The similarity between this phenomenon and the characteristics of negation in my data was pointed out to me by Chris Butler (p.c.). The notion of semantic prosody seems to share certain features with the notion of subworld projected by a marked instance of negation, in the sense that, in the cases of discourse negation I am analysing, a stretch of discourse is *imbued*, to use Louw's term, by the marked nature of the negative term used.

6. See chapter 2 for a discussion of the assignement of a positive of negative value to lexical opposites.

7. See also the notion of *semantic prosody*, in Louw (1993). The notion is described in note 3 of the present chapter.

8. See chapter 2 for a discussion of lexical negation and the difficulties in identifying it.

9. See the theoretical discussion regarding this topic in chapter 4, and the discussion of examples in chapter 5.

10. Although the differences between dialogue and narrative are not considered to be significant from the point of view of the qualitative analysis carried out in chapter 5, I have considered it relevant to include the distinction in the present quantitative study. This makes it possible to establish a closer comparison between my data and Tottie's (1991) study, which distinguishes between negation in speech and writing.

11. See chapter 2 for a discussion.

12. By *denial* I mean the term used by Tottie to cover all types of negative statements, which I am also calling negative assertion. It contrasts with other functions, such as question or order. It is subdivided into implicit denial and explicit denial.

13. See chapter 5 for a discussion of this extract from the point of view of schema theory.

14. See chapter 2 for a definition of the syntactic types of negation. By *broad negatives* I have referred to the subclass of words which are not negative in form but which share the syntactic properties of explicitly negative items. This class includes the following words: *hardly, seldom, barely, scarcely, few, little*.

15. In this table, only pragmatic markers have been excluded, as there were marked uses of negation within the class of directive, in addition to assertives.

Chapter 7: Conclusions

> The non-event is pragmatically - and indeed grammatically - the oddest. This must be so because if an event did not occur *at all*, why should one bother to talk about a specific individual who 'participated' in that non-event?'
> Givón (1993: 191)

> It has been said more than once that in a text negation blocks the flow of information (...). But negation does just the opposite: it rechannels information into a different, but usually not totally unexpected, direction.
> Leinfeller (1994: 79)

> ...negation is used to create a counterworld.
> Leinfeller (1994: 95)

The conclusions of the present work are organised into three different sections which cover, respectively, (i) the theoretical issues regarding the identification and description of the functions of negation in discourse, together with the contributions of the present work to theories of negation and previous works on *Catch-22*; (ii) the discussion of the hypotheses in the light of the results obtained from the qualitative analysis of chapter 5 and of the quantitative analysis of chapter 6; (iii) final remarks and suggestions for further research.

7.1. Discussion of the theoretical frameworks

The discussion of the theoretical frameworks in chapters 2 to 4 has developed as a research into the explanatory possibilities of various approaches to negation when considering this phenomenon from a discourse perspective. While I have argued that it is necessary to bear in mind the logical, semantic and psychological properties of negation, I have

pointed out that, in themselves, they do not account for the functions of negation in discourse. I have argued for an approach to negation in discourse which incorporates cognitive and pragmatic principles.

I have considered negation from two main perspectives:

(i) syntactic negation and its functions in discourse, and

(ii) syntactic and lexical negation involved in paradox.

I wish to comment on each of the aspects in turn.

7.1.1. Limitations of traditional theories of negation

Current research on negation in functionally oriented studies seems to be divided among several trends; one major line of research is the continuation of the philosophy of language tradition, with studies on aspects such as the relation between negation and presupposition, especially metalinguistic negation (See Horn 1984, Carston 1996) or the supposed ambiguity of negation (see Atlas and Levinson 1981). The research on negation in this area is extremely significant within the field of pragmatics in general terms; however, researchers tend to use isolated sentences or brief exchanges as examples, so that the observations made on negation tend to be of a theoretical nature and do not deal with aspects that are observable only when dealing with negation in actually occurring speech. A similar limitation may be observed in speech act approaches to negation, since most research has focused on the classifications of types of denial or negative statements (see Vanderveken 1991, van der Sandt 1991, Tottie

1991). Nevertheless, studies of this kind have also given rise to research on the types of negatives in actually occurring discourse, and here Tottie's monograph on the functions of negation in English speech and writing is the best example. Tottie's (1991) work is extremely useful as a reference guide for studies on variation of negation types in speech and writing; yet, like the approaches mentioned above, it is limited when dealing with a qualitatively oriented work, in that it does not investigate in depth what it is that negation *does* in discourse. In order to explore what negation does in discourse, or, rather, what a speaker does when using a negative in discourse, we need a cognitive approach as a point of departure.

Such a cognitive basis is found in Givón's (1978, 1979, 1984, 1993) model of negation. This model has the merit of exploring in depth the ontological properties of negative utterances and negative lexical items, a crucial aspect when dealing with negation as a discourse phenomenon. Givón's framework is not the first and only one to deal with the cognitive and ontological properties of negation, which, of course, are topics which have been the object of study in psychology (see Wason 1965, Clark and Clark 1977) and philosophy (see Russell 1905), and which have been mentioned previously by other linguists (Lyons 1977, Leech 1983). However, Givón is probably the first author to systematise the observations regarding these aspects of negation within a more elaborate linguistic framework of negation. The limitations of

Givón's model have to do with the lack of specificity regarding the discourse functions of negation, in spite of the details about its cognitive and ontological properties. Thus, many authors, including Givón, point out that negation typically denies a previous assumption or expectation, or cultural knowledge, which provides a classification of the types of denial depending on the relationship between the negative and the denied affirmative proposition. However, this does not explain what the function of negation is *within* a stretch of discourse in general terms, apart from considering the relation between the negative and the affirmative.

I have argued that Werth's (1995c) text world approach to negation in discourse may provide the means of combining a cognitively and pragmatically based account of negation along the lines described above with an account of the discourse functions of negation as subworld, which have to do with the organisation of information in the text and with the way in which linguistic items create semantic and conceptual domains in texts.[1] I discuss this framework in section 7.1.1. below.

Considering now the approaches to syntactic and lexical negation involved in paradox, it must be pointed out that the point of departure for most present theories is also found in philosophy (Russell 1905) and psychology (see Clark and Clark 1977, Apter 1989). Paradox and contradiction are not envisaged by Werth, although contradiction is mentioned as a function of negation by several authors (Lyons 1977, Givón 1984, Sperber and Wilson 1986, Escandell 1990). In the present thesis, I

propose an approach to paradox induced by negative words based on frame semantic and schema theoretic principles (see Fillmore 1986, Shanon 1981, Pagano 1994 for schema theoretic approaches to negation). Since the authors who propose a schema theoretic approach to negation do not develop sufficiently complex frameworks, I propose an application of Schank and Abelson's (1977) model and Schank's (1982) model in order to account for the complexities of paradox. I describe this approach in further detail in section 7.1.1. below, together with the other functions of negation.

7.1.2. The functions of negation in discourse

Throughout the present thesis, I have considered the functions of negation from two different points of view, which I discuss below: (i) the function of negation as a linguistic item within a stretch of discourse; a definition of this kind requires an analysis based on linguistic principles; (ii) the function of negation as an item within a literary work; the specification that we are dealing with fiction requires a further level of interpretation, which, I have argued, may be dealt with by means of a theory of stylistics.

In chapter 5 I have argued for an approach to the functions of negation in discourse based on a text world perspective. In Werth's (1995c) model of text worlds, negation is a subworld which contributes to the general discourse fucntion of rechannelling or up-dating information. In this sense, negation cancels parameters previously introduced in the

text world, either deictic information about places, time or entities, or about other subworlds, such as hypothetical domains, or about frame knowledge. Additionally, a second, less typical function may be identified, which Werth (op. cit.) calls *negative accommodation*. In this function, negation does not cancel previously existing parameters, but it introduces a new item in order to deny it. In my analysis of chapter 5, I explore each of the subfunctions mentioned above and illustrate each type by means of examples.

Now, while the description of negation in these terms enables us to identify the discoursive functions of negation, that is, its contribution to the general function of organising and updating information, the notion of subworld also enables us to consider the ontological properties of negative clauses and lexical items. Thus, a subworld is defined as a conceptual and semantic domain which is triggered by a negative clause, but which may stretch over a piece of discourse. In this sense, we may say that several related negative clauses may create a non-factual domain which contrasts with the factual information presented in the text world. An approach which combines the discoursive and the ontological properties of negation in this way is particularly adequate for the study of fictional discourse, since the negative clause or term carries out a specific function within the pattern of the novel as a whole. The relation between the negative and a pattern of discourse deviation, however, is not the object of analysis of a linguistic theory such as Werth's text world theory, but,

rather, it is the competence of a theory of stylistics or of literary theory. For this reason, Werth's model is complemented by Ryan's model of ficitonal text worlds, which I discuss below, and is further situated within a broader framework based on stylistic principles.

In addition to a function where negation updates and rechannells information by cancelling parameters of the text world, I argue that negation also carries out a function where it blocks the flow of information, producing a sort of communicative short circuit. This is the case of a certain type of contradiction and of paradox in general terms. I have suggested that the apparent communicative block requires a higher level interpretation on the part of the reader, and that the process whereby the further meaning of the paradox is ultimately processed and understood by the reader may be accounted for in terms of schema theory. In the analysis, I have made use in particular of Schank's (1982) model of dynamic memory, as it provided the necessary multi-levelled framework with schematic structures which enable us to understand the coexistence of apparently paradoxical terms by means of identifying and understanding the different domains where each of the term is applicable.

The text world theoretical model based on Werth (1995c) has been complemented by Ryan's (1991) approach to conflict in fiction. This framework has provided a complementary view of the function of negation in *Catch-22* from a literary perspective. Thus, in certain parts of the analysis, it has

been particularly interesting to observe that negation, as a linguisitc device, was used to express some kind of conflict in the terms described by Ryan, either a conflict between characters' different domains, or a conflict between the domain of a character and the status quo in the fictional world, or a conflict between conflictive subdomains within one character. Although I have not developed in depth the analysis from this perspective, since this task is beyond the ultimate aim of the present work, it was clear that an anlysis of negation could be illuminating in order to understand certain types of conflict which arise in the fictional world of *Catch-22*.

The approach to negation in the lines described above has been situated within a broader stylistic perspective, in order to explore the connections between the functions of negation as a linguistic item and its contribution to a stylistic effect perceived by a potential reader. I chapters 1 and 4, I have discussed the contributions of various theories, such as systemic linguistics, pragmatics, discourse analysis, possible world theory and schema theory to the interpretation of literary discourse. I have argued for an approach based on the notions of foregrounding, discourse deviation and defamiliarisation of the Russian formalists, which would incorporate certain key aspects from the above mentioned linguistic models: the need of systematic linguistic procedures from the systemicists, the notion of a fiction as a possible world from possible world theory and the importance of the reader from schema theory. The result is a model of stylistics

based on rigorous linguistic analysis which will investigate the relation between the foregrounding of a linguistic feature and the creation of discourse deviation and its perception as defamiliarising by the reader.

The theoretical models outlined above have been applied to the interpretation of negation in the discourse of *Catch-22* with the aim of providing insights regarding the role played by negation in the novel. The aims of the research in this respect were systematised in the form of three hypotheses, which are discussed below in the view of the results obtained in the analyses of chapters 5 and 6.

7.2. Discussion of the hypotheses

In the introduction to the thesis, I set up three hypotheses which were the point of departure for the research and analysis of the present work. The hypotheses have been discussed in chapters 5 and 6, and are reproduced below:

HYPOTHESIS 1: negation is a marked phenomenon in *Catch-22*.

HYPOTHESIS 2: negation carries out a foregrounding function which creates a pattern of discourse deviation.

HYPOTHESIS 3: the frequency of negative words is predicted to be higher in *Catch-22* than it is in other similar text types (fictional works).

While hypothesis 1 is of a general kind, hypotheses 2 and 3 single out specific aspects related to the markedness of negation in the discourse of *Catch-22*. Thus, hypothesis 2 has determined the orientation of the qualitative study, which has been directed towards the exploration of how negation, as a

foregrounded feature, contributes to the creation of discourse deviation. Hypothesis 3 has determined the aim of the quantitative study of chapter 6, which has been that of investigating to what extent the marked character of negation was connected to quantitative factors, such as a higher frequency of negative words in the corpus. I wish to make some concluding remarks about the verification of the hypotheses in the analyses of chapters 5 and 6.

If we consider the results from the qualitative and the quantitative studies together, it can be concluded that negation is a marked option in *Catch-22*, because it does create a pattern of discourse deviation and because the frequency of negative items in *Catch-22* is higher than the frequency of negative items in other similar text types. The next significant questions are, of course, (i) what do we understand by negation as a foregrounded feature and how is the pattern of discourse deviation created, and (ii) what has the higher frequency of negatives in *Catch-22* to contribute to the intuition that negation is marked in the corpus. These questions are addressed by means of hypotheses 2 and 3, which I discuss below.

Negation can be said to be a natural foregrounding device, as it constitutes the marked option in the polarity system, where the affirmative is the unmarked term. This fact in itself may be said to account for an apparent strikingness in discourse when the frequency of negative items is felt to be particularly high, as in *Catch-22*. I have argued that, in

Catch-22, negation is foregrounded and contributes to the creation of a pattern of discourse deviation for several reasons, which include mostly qualitative arguments, but which are supported by quantitative data. Thus, in chapter 5, I have described the functions of negation in the discourse of *Catch-22* and have pointed out the way in which the negative is often used to defeat expectations regarding commonly accepted forms of behaviour in our society. The defeat of expectations in this way is triggered by a negative clause which sounds odd, although it does not incur in ungrammaticality. I have also argued that the oddity of negatives in *Catch-22* may be perceived as a foregrounding of two recurrent ontological domains in the novel: an empty or vacuous ontology induced by uninformative negatives, or negatives which foreground the non-event and the non-state; and a paradoxical ontology, triggered by a recurrent use of negative clauses and negative lexical items in order to create paradoxes.

The systematic recurrence of negative clauses and negative lexical items in order to produce the particular stylistic effects described above, i.e. the defeat of commonly held assumptions and expectations and the creation of empty and paradoxical ontologies within the fictional world, may be defined as a pattern of discourse deviation. As such, it can be seen as *defamiliarising* experiences which are well known or familiar to people in Western capitalist societies, who, as readers, may recognise the distorted mirror image of their own society in the world of *Catch-22*. In terms of Cook's (1994)

theory of literariness, the uses of negation described above were schema refreshing, as they lead to a questioning of taken-for-granted forms of behaviour in our society.

I have also argued that, in many cases, the defamiliarising effect of negation in the discourse of *Catch-22* was accompanied by a humorous effect, in particular in the case of paradoxes. The presence of this humorous effect supports the claim that there is a pattern of discourse deviation.

With regard to the claim that the high frequency of negatives in *Catch-22* supports the general hypothesis that negation is a marked phenomenon in the corpus, the results from the study in chapter 6 confirm the hypothesis, as *Catch-22* presents a higher frequency of negatives than other corpora searched for this purpose. However, in chapter 6, I have mentioned not only the advantages but also the limitations of quantitative studies in research in stylistics. Thus, I have argued that, while the quantitative study is useful in order to systematise the types and frequencies of the negative items, there is a great part of the analysis which cannot be quantified in terms of frequencies. This was the case of the analysis of negation understood as a subworld which creates a conceptual and semantic non-factual domain which stretches over a piece of discourse.

7.3. Final remarks and suggestions for further research

The present thesis provides the following contributions to existing works on negation and to previous works on

Catch-22:

I have explored in depth the explanatory possibilities of a text world approach to negation in discourse and have classified and defined the specific functions of negation and the features of negative subworlds. In this sense, I have expanded on Werth's (1995c) approach to negation as subworld by providing further details regarding the theoretical concepts and by applying the notions to a whole work, the novel *Catch-22*. In general terms, I have argued for an approach to negation within a text world model, because it provides the necessary theoretical background in order to deal with the cognitive, pragmatic and discourse-functional aspects of negation.

The modifications or additions to the text world theoretical model can be summarised in the following points: (a) the incorporation of a paradoxical function of negation, (b) the incorporation of a complex approach to schemata or frames within the text world, by adopting Schank's (1982) model of dynamic memory[2], and (c) the specification of how a recurrent pattern of marked uses of negation creates a pattern of discourse deviation which leads to defamiliarisation.

I have been particularly interested in showing that the two main functions of negation in rechannelling and blocking the flow of information are responsible for the ontological properties of two different kinds of subworld, one which focuses on illusory, non-factual states of affairs, and another which focuses on paradoxical states of affairs. I have argued that the ontological characteristics of the negative subworlds

reveal a marked use of the negative forms, since they consistently defeat expectations previously exisiting in the common ground of the discourse and lead to the development of two patterns: (a) one where WHAT IS NOT replaces WHAT IS, and WHAT CANNOT BE becomes WHAT IS, and (b) a second one where the boundaries between opposites, such as crazy/sane, alive/dead, is blurred. The constant foregrounding of negative states and events and of paradoxical states of affairs has been described as a defamiliarising process where, in linguistic terms, the marked term in the polarity system, negation, paradoxically becomes the unmarked option. In more informal terms, it reflects the process described by a character in the novel as *jamais vu*, a kind of cognitive illusion where the unfamiliar acquires a strange feeling of familiarity.

During the discussion of the different approaches to negation and in the analysis of the data, I have touched upon various interesting issues which, for reasons of space, have not been dealt with more in depth in the present work, but which could be the point of departure for further research. For example, a more detailed study may be carried out regarding the types of negative lexical items and kinds of opposites, together with their functions in discourse, an aspect which has occupied a secondary place with regard to the analysis of the functions of syntactic negation in the present work. Similarly, the intuitions regarding the connections between the perceived markedness of negation and a possible defamiliarising or schema refreshing effect may be explored further by means of an

experimental study in the line of van Peer's (1986) investigation into the nature of foregrounding and discourse deviation. A study of this type would provide the means of indicating how differnt readers perceive and react to the pattern of discourse deviation.

There is more work to be carried out in the study of the discourse properties of negation. The present work is a proposal for a line of research in the field of negation as a discourse notion. In this sense, the arguments put forward in the theoretical and applied chapters constitute a possible point of departure for future studies on the discousive, pragmatic and cognitive properties of negation within a text world framework. As such, this model may be applied to the analysis of negation within other discourse types, so as to develop a broader perspective on the functions of negation, always elusive to close analysis and systematisation, but always challenging and fascinating.

Notes

1. The aspect of negation as contributing to the function of organising information in the discourse (either by rechannelling it or blocking it) is found also in other authors, such as Leinfeller (1994). However, Werth's (1995c) model is more complex and thorough.

2. The idea of combining a text world model with a schema theoretic model comes from Semino's (1994, 1995) work on text worlds in poetry.

APPENDIX: THE SUBCORPUS

1. After he had made up his mind to spend the rest of the war in the hospital, Yossarian wrote letters to everyone he knew saying he was in the hospital but never mentioning why. One day he had a better idea. To everyone he knew he wrote he was going on a very dangerous mission. 'They asked for volunteers, but someone has to do it. I'll write you the instant I get back.'And he had not written anyone since. (14)

2. Most letters he didn't read at all. On those he didn't read at all he wrote his own name. On those he did read he wrote, 'Washington Irving.' When that grew monotonous he wrote, 'Irving Washington.' (15)

3. With them this time was the twenty-four-year-old fighter-pilot captain with the sparse golden mustache who had been shot into the Adriatic Sea in midwinter and not even caught cold. Now the summer was upon them, the captain had not been shot down, and he said he had the grippe. (15)

4. Next to Dunbar was the artillery captain with whom Yossarian had stopped playing chess. The captain was a good chess player, and the games were always interesting. Yossarian had stopped playing chess with him because the games were so interesting they were foolish. (15-16)

5. The Texan turned out to be good-natured, generous and likeable. In three days no one could stand him. (16)

6. Dunbar was lying motionless on his back again with his eyes staring up at the ceiling like a doll's. He was working hard at increasing his life span. He did it by cultivating boredom. Dunbar was working so hard at increasing his life span that Yossarian thought he was dead. (16)

7. But Yossarian couldn't be happy, even though the Texan didn't want him to be, because outside the hospital there was still nothing funny going on. The only thing going on was a war, and no one seemed to notice but Yossarian and Dunbar. (25)

8. Clevinger had stared at him with apoplectic rage and indignation and, clawing the table with both hands, had shouted, 'You're crazy!'
'Clevinger, what do you want from people?' Dunbar had replied wearily above the noises of the officers' club. 'I'm not joking,' Clevinger persisted.
'They're trying to kill me,' Yossarian told him calmly.
'No one's trying to kill you,' Clevinger cried.
'Then why are they shooting at me?' Yossarian asked.
'They're shooting at everyone,' Clevinger answered. 'They're trying to kill everyone.'
'And what difference does that make?' (26)

9. Clevinger really thought he was right, but Yossarian had proof, because strangers he didn't know shot at him with cannons every time he flew up into the air to drop bombs on them, and it wasn't funny at all. And if that wasn't funny, there were lots of things that weren't even funnier. (26)

10. Everything Appleby did, he did well. Appleby was a fairhaired boy from Iowa who believed in God, Motherhood and the American Way of Life, without ever thinking about any of them, and everybody who knew him liked him.
'I hate that son of a bitch,' Yossarian growled. (28)

11. Sharing a tent with a man who was crazy wasn't easy, but Nately didn't care. He was crazy, too, and had gone every free day to work on the officers' club that Yossarian had not helped build. Actually, there were many officers' clubs that Yossarian had not helped build, but he was proudest of the one on Pianosa. It was a sturdy and complex monument to his powers of determination. Yossarian never went there to help until it was finished- then he went there often, so pleased was he with the large, fine, rambling shingled building. It was truly a splendid structure, and Yossarian throbbed with a mighty sense of accomplishment each time he gazed at it and reflected that none of the work that had gone into it was his. (28)

12. 'Oh, shut up,' Dunbar told Clevinger. Dunbar liked Clevinger because Clevinger annoyed him and made the time go slow. (29)

13. Actually, no one was around when Yossarian returned from the Hospital but Orr and the dead man in Yossarian's tent. The dead man in Yossarian's tent was a pest, and Yossarian didn't like him, even though he had never seen him. Having him lying around all day annoyed Yossarian so much that he had gone to the orderly room several times to complain to Sergeant Towser, who refused to admit that the dead man even existed, which, of course, he no longer did. It was still more frustrating to try to appeal directly to Major Major, the long and bony squadron commander, who looked a little bit like Henry Fonda in distress and went jumping out the window of his office each time Yossarian bullied his way past Sergeant Towser to speak to him about it. The dead man in Yossarian's tent was simply not easy to live with. (33)

14. He even disturbed Orr, who was not easy to live with, either, and who, on the day Yossarian came back was tinkering with the faucet that fed gasoline into the stove he had started building while Yossarian was in the hospital. (33)
(...)

15. 'When I couldn't get crab apples,' Orr continued, 'I used horse chestnuts. Horse chestnuts are about the same size as crab apples and actually have a better shape, although the shape doesn't matter a bit.'

'Why did you walk around with crab apples in your cheeks?' Yossarian asked again. 'That's what I asked.'
'Because they've got a better shape than horse chestnuts,' Orr answered. 'I just told you that.'
'Why,' swore Yossarian at him approvingly, 'you evil eyed, mechanically-aptituded, disaffiliated son of a bitch, did you walk around with anything in your cheeks?'
'I didn't,' Orr said, 'walk around with anything in my cheeks. I walked around with crab apples in my cheeks. When I couldn't get crab apples I walked around with horse chestnuts. In my cheeks.' (...)
Yossarian knew. 'Jesus Christ! Why did you want -'
'- apple cheeks.'
'- apple cheeks?' Yossarian demanded.
'I wanted apple cheeks,' Orr repeated. 'Even when I was a kid I wanted apple cheeks someday, and I decided to work at it until I got them, and by God, I did work at it until I got them, and that's how I did it, with crab apples in my cheeks all day long.' He giggled again. 'One in each cheek.'
'Why did you want apple cheeks?'
'I didn't want apple cheeks,' Orr said. 'I wanted big cheeks. I didn't care about the color so much, but I wanted them big. I worked at it just like one of those crazy guys you read about who go around squeezing rubber balls all day long just to strengthen their hands. In fact, I was one of those crazy guys. I used to walk around all day with rubber balls in my hands, too.'
'Why?'
'Why what?'
'Why did you walk around all day with rubber balls in your hands?'
'Because rubber balls -' said Orr.
'- are better than crab apples?'
Orr sniggered as he shook his head. 'I did it to protect my good reputation in case anyone ever caught me walking around with crab apples in my cheeks. With rubber balls in my hands I could deny there were crab apples in my cheeks. Every time someone asked me why I was walking around with crab apples in my cheeks, I'd just open my hands and show them it was rubber balls I was walking around with, not crab apples, and that they were in my hands, not my cheeks. It was a good story. But I never knew if it got across or not, since it's pretty tough to make people understand you when you're talking to them with two crab apples in your cheeks.'
Yossarian found it pretty tough to understand him then, and he wondered once again if Orr wasn't talking to him with the tip of his tongue in one of his apple cheeks. (34-36)

16. Colonel Cargill, General Peckem's troubleshooter, was a forceful, ruddy man. Before the war he had been an alert, hard-hitting, aggressive marketing executive. He was a very bad marketing executive. Colonel Cargill was so awful a marketing executive that his services were much sought after by firms eager to establish losses for tax purposes. Throughout the

civilized world, from Battery Park to Fulton Street, he was known as a dependable man for a fast tax write-off. His prices were high, for failure often did not come easily. He had to start at the top and work his way down, and with sympathetic friends in Washington, losing money was no simple matter. It took months of hard work and careful misplanning. A person misplaced, disorganized, miscalculated, overlooked everything and opened every loophole, and just when he thought he had it made, the government gave him a lake or a forest or an oilfield and spoiled everything. Even with such handicaps, Colonel Cargill could be relied on to run the most prosperous enterprise into the ground. He was a self-made man who owed his lack of success to nobody. (40)

17. Hungry Joe was crazy, and no one knew it better than Yossarian, who did everything he could to help him. Hungry Joe just wouldn't listen to Yossarian. Hungry Joe just wouldn't listen because he thought Yossarian was crazy. (45)

18. Doc Daneeka hated to fly. He felt imprisoned in an airplane. In an airplane there was absolutely no place in the world to go except to another part of the airplane. Doc Daneeka had been told that people who enjoyed climbing into an airplane were really giving vent to a subconscious desire to climb back into the womb. He had been told this by Yossarian, who made it possible for Doc Daneeka to collect his flight pay each month without ever climbing back into the womb. Yossarian would persuade McWatt to enter Doc Daneeka's name on his flight log for training missions
or trips to Rome.
'You know how it is,' Doc Daneeka had wheedled, with a sly, conspiratorial wink. 'Why take chances when I don't have to?'
'Sure,' Yossarian agreed.
'What difference does it make to anyone if I'm in the plane or not?'
'No difference.'
'Sure, that's what I mean,' Doc Daneeka said. 'A little grease is what makes this world go round. One hand washes the other. Know what I mean? You scratch my back, I'll scratch yours.'
Yossarian knew what he meant.
'That's not what I meant,' Doc Daneeka said, as Yossarian began scratching his back. 'I'm talking about co-operation. Favors. You do a favor for me, I'll do one for you. Get it?'
'Do one for me,' Yossarian requested.
'Not a chance,' Doc Daneeka answered.
There was something fearful and minute about Doc Daneeka as he sat despondently outside his tent in the sunlight as often as he could, dressed in khaki summer trousers and a short-sleeved summer shirt that was bleached almost to an antiseptic gray by the daily laundering to which he had it subjected. He was like a man who had grown frozen with horror once and had never come completely unthawed. He sat all tucked up into himself, his slender shoulders huddled halfway around his head, his suntanned hands with their luminous silver fingernails

massaging the backs of his bare, folded arms gently as though he were cold. Actually, he was a very warm, compassionate man who never stopped feeling sorry for himself.
'Why me?' was his constant lament, and the question was a good one. (45-46)

19. Group Headquarters was alarmed, for there was no telling what people might find out once they felt free to ask whatever questions they wanted to. Colonel Cathcart sent Colonel Korn to stop it, and Colonel Korn succeeded with a rule governing the asking of questions. Colonel Korn's rule was a stroke of genius, Colonel Korn explained in his report to Colonel Cathcart. Under Colonel Korn's rule, the only people permitted to ask questions were those who never did. Soon the only people attending were
those who never asked questions, and the sessions were discontinued altogether, since Clevinger, the corporal and Colonel Korn agreed that it was neither possible nor necessary to educate people who never questioned anything. (49)

20. Dunbar loved shooting skeet because he hated every minute of it and the time passed so slowly. 'I think you're crazy,' was the way Clevinger had responded to Dunbar's discovery. (52)

21. 'Every time another White Halfoat was born,' he continued, 'the stock market turned bullish. Soon whole drilling crews were following us around with all their equipment just to get the jump on each other. Companies began to merge just so they could cut down on the number of people they had to assign to us. But the crowd in back of us kept growing. We never got a good night's sleep. When we stopped, they stopped. When we moved, they moved, chuckwagons, bulldozers, derricks, generators. We were a walking business boom, and we began to receive invitations from some of the best hotels just for the amount of business we would drag into town with us. Some of those invitations were mighty generous, but we couldn't accept any because we were Indians and all the best hotels that were inviting us wouldn't accept Indians as guests. Racial prejudice is a terrible thing, Yossarian. It really is. It's a terrible thing to treat a decent, loyal Indian like a nigger, kike, wop or spic.' Chief White Halfoat nodded slowly with conviction. (60)

22. It was a horrible joke, but Doc Daneeka didn't laugh until Yossarian came to him one mission later and pleaded again, without any real expectation of success, to be grounded. Doc Daneeka snickered once and was soon immersed in problems of his own, which included Chief White Halfoat, who had been challenging
him all that morning to Indian wrestle, and Yossarian, who decided right then and there to go crazy.
'You're wasting your time,' Doc Daneeka was forced to tell him.

'Can't you ground someone who's crazy?'

'Oh, sure. I have to. There's a rule saying I have to ground anyone who's crazy.' 'Then why don't you ground me? I'm crazy. Ask Clevinger.'
'Clevinger? Where is Clevinger? You find Clevinger and I'll ask him.'
'Then ask any of the others. They'll tell you how crazy I am.'

'They're crazy.'
'Then why don't you ground them?'
'Why don't they ask me to ground them?'
'Because they're crazy, that's why.'
'Of course they're crazy,' Doc Daneeka replied. 'I just told you they're crazy, didn't I? And you can't let crazy people decide whether you're crazy or not, can you?'
Yossarian looked at him soberly and tried another approach. 'Is Orr crazy?'
'He sure is,' Doc Daneeka said.
'Can you ground him?'
'I sure can. But first he has to ask me to. That's part of the rule.'
'Then why doesn't he ask you to?'
'Because he's crazy,' Doc Daneeka said. 'He has to be crazy to keep flying combat missions after all the close calls he's had. Sure, I can ground Orr. But first he has to ask me to.'
'That's all he has to do to be grounded?'
'That's all. Let him ask me.'
'And then you can ground him?' Yossarian asked.
'No. Then I can't ground him.'
'You mean there's a catch?'
'Sure there's a catch,' Doc Daneeka replied. 'Catch-22. Anyone who wants to get out of combat duty isn't really crazy.'
There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified that a concern for one's own safety in the face of dangers that were real and immediate was the process of a rational mind. Orr was crazy and could be grounded. All he had to do was ask; and as soon as he did, he would no longer be crazy and would have to fly more missions. Orr would be crazy to fly more mission and sane if he didn't, but if he was sane he had to fly them. If he flew them he was crazy and didn't have to; but if he didn't want to he was sane and had to. Yossarian was moved very deeply by the absolute simplicity of this clause of Catch-22 and let out a respectful whistle.
'That's some catch, that Catch-22,' he observed.
Yossarian saw it clearly in all its spinning reasonableness. There was an elliptical precision about its perfect pairs of parts that was graceful and shocking, like good modern art, and at times Yossarian wasn't quite sure that he saw it at all, just the way he was never quite sure about good modern art or about the flies Orr saw in Appleby's eyes. He had Orr's word to take for the flies in Appleby's eyes. (61-63)

23. 'Oh, they're there, all right,' Orr had assured him about the flies in Appleby's eyes after Yossarian's fist fight with Appleby in the officers' club, 'although he probably doesn't

even know it. That's why he can't see things as they really are.' (63)

24. Every time Colonel Cathcart increased the number of missions and returned Hungry Joe to combat duty, the nightmares stopped and Hungry Joe settled down into a normal state of terror with a smile of relief. Yossarian read Hungry Joe's shrunken face like a headline. It was good when Hungry Joe looked bad and terrible when Hungry Joe looked good. Hungry Joe's inverted set of
responses was a curious phenomenon to everyone but Hungry Joe, who denied the whole thing stubbornly.
'Who dreams?' he answered, when Yossarian asked him what he dreamed about. 'Joe, why don't you go see Doc Daneeka?' Yossarian advised.
'Why should I go see Doc Daneeka? I'm not sick.'
'What about your nightmares?'
'I don't have nightmares,' Hungry Joe lied.
'Maybe he can do something about them.'
'There's nothing wrong with nightmares,' Hungry Joe answered. 'Everybody has nightmares.'
Yossarian thought he had him. 'Every night?' he asked.
'Why not every night?' Hungry Joe demanded.
And suddenly it all made sense. Why not every night, indeed? It made sense to cry out in pain every night. (73)

25. Kraft was a skinny, harmless kid from Pennsylvania who wanted only to be liked, and was destined to be disappointed in even so humble and degrading an ambition. Instead of being liked, he was dead, a bleeding cinder on the barbarous pile whom nobody had heard in those last precious moments while the plane with one wing plummeted. He had lived innocuously for a little while and then had gone down in flame over Ferrara on the seventh day, while God was resting, when McWatt turned and Yossarian guided him in over the target on a second bomb run because Aarfy was confused and Yossarian had been unable to drop his bombs the first time. (74)

26. Each night after that, Captain Flume forced himself to keep awake as long as possible. He was aided immeasurably by Hungry Joe's nightmares. Listening so intently to Hungry Joe's maniacal howling night after night, Captain Flume grew to hate him and began wishing that Chief White Halfoat would tiptoe up to his cot one night and slit his throat open for him from ear to ear.
Actually, Captain Flume slept like a log most nights and merely dreamed he was awake. So convincing were these dreams of lying awake that he woke from them each morning in complete exhaustion and fell right back to sleep.
Chief White Halfoat had grown almost fond of Captain Flume since his amazing metamorphosis. Captain Flume had entered his bed that night a buoyant extrovert and left it the next morning a brooding introvert, and Chief White Halfoat proudly regarded the new Captain Flume as his own creation. He had never

intended to slit Captain Flume's throat open for him from ear to ear. Threatening to do so was merely his idea of a joke, like dying of pneumonia, busting Colonel Moodus in the nose or challenging Doc Daneeka to Indian wrestle. All Chief White Halfoat wanted to do when he staggered in drunk each night was go right to sleep, and Hungry Joe often made that impossible. Hungry Joe's nightmares gave Chief White Halfoat the heebie-jeebies, and he often wished that someone would tiptoe into Hungry Joe's tent, lift Huple's cat off his face and slit his throat open for him from ear to ear, so that everybody in the squadron but Captain Flume could get a good night's sleep. (76-77)

27. 'I still don't get it,' Yossarian protested. 'Is Doc Daneeka right or isn't he?' 'How many did he say?'
'Forty.'
'Daneeka was telling the truth,' ex-P.F.C. Wintergreen admitted.
'Forty missions is all you have to fly as far as Twenty-seventh Air Force Headquarters is concerned.'
Yossarian was jubilant. 'Then I can go home, right? I've got forty-eight.'
'No, you can't go home,' ex-P.F.C. Wintergreen corrected him.
'Are you crazy or something?'
'Why not?'
'Catch-22.'
'Catch-22?' Yossarian was stunned. 'What the hell has Catch-22 got to do with it?'
'Catch-22,' Doc Daneeka answered patiently, when Hungry Joe had flown Yossarian back to Pianosa, 'says you've always got to do what your commanding officer tells you to.'
'But Twenty-seventh Air Force says I can go home with forty missions.'
'But they don't say you have to go home. And regulations do say you have to obey every order. That's the catch. Even if the colonel were disobeying a Twentyseventh Air Force order by making you fly more missions, you'd still have to fly them, or you'd be guilty of disobeying an order of his. And then Twenty-seventh Air Force Headquarters would really jump on you.' (77-78)

28. Ordinarily, Yossarian's pilot was McWatt, who, shaving in loud red, clean pajamas outside his tent each morning was one of the odd, ironic, incomprehensible things surrounding Yossarian. McWatt was the craziest combat man of them all probably, because he was perfectly sane and still did not mind the war. (80)

29. McWatt wore fleecy bedroom slippers with his red pajamas and slept between freshly pressed colored bedsheets like the one Milo had retrieved half of for him from the grinning thief with the sweet tooth in exchange for none of the pitted dates Milo had borrowed from Yossarian. (80-81)

30. 'A letter like this,' Milo mumbled despondently, 'could ruin any mess officer in the world.' Milo had come to Yossarian's tent just to read the letter again, following his carton of lost provisions across the squadron like a mourner.
'I have to give you as much as you ask for. Why, the letter doesn't even say you have to eat all of it yourself.'
'And it's a good thing it doesn't,' Yossarian told him 'because I never eat any of it. I have a liver condition.'
'Oh, yes, I forgot,' said Milo, in a voice lowered deferentially. 'Is it bad?'
'Just bad enough,' Yossarian answered cheerfully.
'I see,' said Milo. 'What does that mean?'
'It means that it couldn't be better . . .'
'I don't think I understand.'
'....without being worse. Now do you see?'
'Yes, now I see. But I still don't think I understand.'
'Well, don't let it trouble you. Let it trouble me. you see, I don't really have a liver condition. I've just got the symptoms. I have a Garnett-Fleischaker syndrome.'
'I see,' said Milo. 'And what is a Garnett-Fleischaker syndrome?'
'A liver condition.'
'I see,' said Milo, and began massaging his black eyebrows together wearily with an expression of interior pain, as though waiting for some stinging discomfort he was experiencing to go away.
'In that case,' he continued finally, 'I suppose you do have to be very careful about what you eat, don't you?'
'Very careful indeed,' Yossarian told him. 'A good Garnett-Fleischaker syndrome isn't easy to come by and I don't want to ruin mine. That's why I never eat any fruit.'
'Now I do see,' said Milo. 'Fruit is bad for your liver?'
'No, fruit is good for my liver. That's why I never eat any.'

'Then what do you do with it? ' demanded Milo, plodding along doggedly through his mounting confusion to fling out the question burning on his lips. 'Do you sell it?'
'I give it away.' (81)

31. Clevinger knew so much because Clevinger was a genius with a pounding heart and blanching face. He was a gangling, gawky, feverish, famish-eyed brain. As a Harvard undergraduate he had won prizes in scholarship for just about everything, and the only reason he had not won prizes in scholarship for everything else was that he was too busy signing petitions, circulating petitions and challenging petitions, joining discussion groups and resigning from discussion groups, attending youth congresses, picketing other youth congresses and organizing student committees in defense of dismissed faculty members. Everyone agreed that Clevinger was certain to go far in the academic world.
In short, Clevinger was one of those people with lots of intelligence and no brains, and everyone knew it except those who soon found it out. (90-91)

32. To Yossarian, the idea of pennants as prizes was absurd. No money went with them, no class privileges. Like Olympic medals and tennis trophies, all they signified was that the owner had done something of no benefit to anyone more capably than everyone else. (95)

33. 'In sixty days you'll be fighting Billy Petrolle,' the colonel with the big fat mustache roared. 'And you think it's a big fat joke.'
'I don't think it's a joke, sir,' Clevinger replied.
'Don't interrupt.'
'Yes, sir.'
'And say "sir" when you do,' ordered Major Metcalf.
'Yes, sir.'
'Weren't you just ordered not to interrupt?' Major Metcalf inquired coldly.
'But I didn't interrupt, sir,' Clevinger protested.
'No. And you didn't say "sir," either. Add that to the charges against him,' Major Metcalf directed the corporal who could take shorthand. 'Failure to say "sir' to superior officers when not interrupting them. (99-100)
(...)

34. 'All right,' said the colonel. 'Just what the hell did you mean?'
'I didn't say you couldn't punish me, sir.'
'When?' asked the colonel.
'When what, sir?'
'Now you're asking me questions again.'
'I'm sorry, sir. I'm afraid I don't understand your question.'
'When didn't you say we couldn't punish you? Don't you understand my question?'
'No, sir. I don't understand.'
'You've just told us that. Now suppose you answer my question.'

'But how can I answer it?'
'That's another question you're asking me.'
'I'm sorry, sir. But I don't know how to answer it. I never said you couldn't punish me.'
'Now you're telling us when you did say it. I'm asking you to tell us when you didn't say it.'
Clevinger took a deep breath. 'I always didn't say you couldn't punish me, sir.'
'That's much better, Mr. Clevinger, even though it is a barefaced lie. Last night in the latrine. Didn't you whisper that we couldn't punish you to that other dirty son of a bitch we don't like? What's his name?'
'Yossarian, sir,' Lieutenant Scheisskopf said.
'Yes, Yossarian. That's right. Yossarian. Yossarian? Is that his name? Yossarian? What the hell kind of a name is Yossarian?' Lieutenant Scheisskopf had the facts at his finger tips. 'It's Yossarian's name, sir,' he explained.
'Yes, I suppose it is. Didn't you whisper to Yossarian that we couldn't punish you?'

'Oh, no, sir. I whispered to him that you couldn't find me guilty-' 'I may be stupid,' interrupted the colonel, 'but the distinction escapes me. I guess I am pretty stupid, because the distinction escapes me.'
'W...'
'You're a windy son of a bitch, aren't you? Nobody asked you for clarification and you're giving me clarification. I was making a statement, not asking for clarification. You are a windy son of a bitch, aren't you?'
'No, sir.'
'No, sir? Are you calling me a goddam liar?'
'Oh, no, sir.'
'Then you're a windy son of a bitch, aren't you? '
'No, sir.'
'Are you trying to pick a fight with me? '
'No, sir.'
'Are you a windy son of a bitch?'
'No, sir.'
'Goddammit, you are trying to pick a fight with me. For two stinking cents I'd jump over this big fat table and rip your stinking, cowardly body apart limb from limb.' (102-103)
(...)

35. Cadet Clevinger, will you please repeat what the hell it was you did or didn't whisper to Yossarian late last night in the latrine?'
'Yes, sir. I said that you couldn't find me guilty-'
'We'll take it from there. Precisely what did you mean, Cadet Clevinger, when you said we couldn't find you guilty?'
'I didn't say you couldn't find me guilty, sir.'
'When?'
'When what, sir?'
'Goddammit, are you going to start pumping me again?'
'No, sir. I'm sorry, sir.'
'Then answer the question. When didn't you say we couldn't find you guilty?'
'Late last night in the latrine, sir.'
'Is that the only time you didn't say it?'
'No, sir. I always didn't say you couldn't find me guilty, sir. What I did say to Yossarian was -'
'Nobody asked you what you did say to Yossarian. We asked you what you didn't say to him. We're not at all interested in what you did say to Yossarian. Is that clear?'
'Yes, sir.'
'Then we'll go on. What did you say to Yossarian?'
'I said to him, sir, that you couldn't find me guilty of the offense with which I am charged and still be faithful to the cause of . . .'
'Of what? You're mumbling.'
'Stop mumbling.'
'Yes, sir.'
'And mumble "sir" when you do.'
'Metcalf, you bastard!'
'Yes, sir,' mumbled Clevinger. 'Of justice, sir. That you

couldn't find -'
'Justice?' The colonel was astounded. 'What is justice?'
'Justice, sir -'
'That's not what justice is,' the colonel jeered, and began pounding the table again with his big fat hand. 'That's what Karl Marx is. I'll tell you what justice is. Justice is a knee in the gut from the floor on the chin at night sneaky with a knife brought up down on the magazine of a battleship sandbagged underhanded in the dark without a word of warning. Garroting. That's what justice is when we've all got to be tough enough and rough enough to fight Billy Petrolle. From the hip. Get it?'
'No, sir.'
'Don't sir me!'
'Yes, sir.'
'And say "sir" when you don't,' ordered Major Metcalf.
Clevinger was guilty, of course, or he would not have been accused, and since the only way to prove it was to find him guilty, it was their patriotic duty to do so. He was sentenced to walk fifty-seven punishment tours. (104-106)

36. Yossarian had done his best to warn him the night before. 'You haven't got a chance, kid,' he told him glumly. 'They hate Jews.'
'But I'm not Jewish,' answered Clevinger.
'It will make no difference,' Yossarian promised, and Yossarian was right. 'They're after everybody.'
Clevinger recoiled from their hatred as though from a blinding light. These three men who hated him spoke his language and wore his uniform, but he saw their loveless faces set immutably into cramped, mean lines of hostility and understood instantly that nowhere in the world, not in all the fascist tanks or planes or submarines, not in the bunkers behind the machine guns or mortars or behind the blowing flame throwers, not even among all the expert gunners of the crack Hermann Goering Antiaircraft Division or among the grisly connivers in all the beer halls in Munich and everywhere else were there men who hated him more. (106-107)

37. His specialty was alfalfa, and he made a good thing out of not growing any. The government paid him well for every bushel of alfalfa he did not grow. The more alfalfa he did not grow, the more money the government gave him, and he spent every penny he didn't earn on new land to increase the amount of alfalfa he did not produce. Major Major's father worked without rest at not growing alfalfa. On long winter evenings he remained indoors and did not mend harness, and he sprang out of bed at the crack of noon every day just to make certain that the chores would not be done. He invested in land wisely and soon was not growing more alfalfa than any other man in the county. (110)

38. On Major Major himself the consequences were only slightly less severe. It was a harsh and stunning realization that was

forced upon him at so tender an age, the realization that he was not, as he had always been led to believe, Caleb Major, but instead was some total stranger named Major Major Major about whom he knew
absolutely nothing and about whom nobody else had ever heard before. What playmates he had withdrew from him and never returned, disposed, as they were, to distrust all strangers, especially one who had already deceived them by pretending to be someone they had known for years. Nobody would have anything to do with him. He began to drop things and to trip. He had a shy and hopeful manner in each new contact, and he was always disappointed. Because he needed a friend so desperately, he never found one. He grew awkwardly into a tall, strange, dreamy boy with fragile eyes and a very delicate mouth whose tentative, groping smile collapses instantly into hurt disorder at every fresh rebuff. (112)

39. 'You're the new squadron commander', Colonel Cathcart had shouted rudely across the railroad ditch to him. 'But don't think it means anything, because it doesn't. All it means is that you're the new squadron commander.' (116)

40. Almost on cue, everyone in the squadron stopped talking to him and started staring at him. He walked through life self-consciously with downcast eyes and burning cheeks, the object of contempt, envy, suspicion, resentment and malicious innuendo everywhere he went. People who had hardly noticed his resemblance to Henry Fonda before now never ceased discussing it, and there were even those who hinted sinisterly that Major Major had been elevated to squadron commander because he resembled Henry Fonda. Captain Black, who had aspired to the position himself, maintained that Major Major really was Henry Fonda but was too chickenshit to admit it. (117)

41. Alone with Milo later, Major Major felt protest stir for the first time and said he would prefer to continue eating with the other officers. Milo told him it wouldn't work.
'I don't see what there is to work,' Major Major argued.
'Nothing ever happened before.'
'You were never the squadron commander before.'
'Major Duluth was the squadron commander and he always ate at the same table with the rest of the men.'
'It was different with Major Duluth, sir.'
'In what way was it different with Major Duluth?'
'I wish you wouldn't ask me that, sir,' said Milo.
'Is it because I look like Henry Fonda?' Major Major mustered the courage to demand.
'Some people say you are Henry Fonda,' Milo answered.
'Well, I'm not Henry Fonda,' Major Major exclaimed, in a voice quavering with exasperation. 'And I don't look the least bit like him. And even if I do look like Henry Fonda, what difference does that make?'
'It doesn't make any difference. That's what I'm trying to tell you, sir. It's just not the same with you as it was with Major

Duluth.' (118)

42. Major Major began forging Washington Irving's name to official documents after the first C.I.D. man showed up to interrogate him about somebody at the hospital who had been doing it and gave him the idea. He had been made squadron commander but had no idea what he was supposed to do as squadron commander unless all he was supposed to do was forge Washington Irving's name to official documents and listen to the isolated clinks and thumps of Major■de Coverley's horseshoes falling to the ground outside the window of his small office in the rear of the orderly-room tent. (119)

43. Major Major wondered about his relationship to Major■de Coverley and about Major■de Coverley's relationship to him. He knew that Major■de Coverley was his executive officer, but he did not know what that meant, and he could not decide whether in Major - de Coverley he was blessed with a lenient superior or cursed with a delinquent subordinate. He did not want to ask Sergeant Towser, of whom he was secretly afraid, and there was no one else he could ask, least of all Major■ de Coverley. Few people ever dared approach Major■ de Coverley about anything and the only officer foolish enough to pitch one of his horseshoes was stricken the very next day with the worst case of Pianosan crud that Gus or Wes or even Doc Daneeka had ever seen or even heard about. Everyone was positive the disease had been inflicted upon the poor officer in retribution by Major■de Coverley, although no one was sure how. (120)

44. Most of the official documents that came to Major Major's desk did not concern him at all. The vast majority consisted of allusions to prior communications which Major Major had never seen or heard of. There was never any need to look them up, for the instructions were invariably to disregard. In the space of a single productive minute, therefore, he might endorse twenty separate documents each advising him to pay absolutely no attention to any of the others. (121)

45. He had sinned, and it was good, for none of the documents to which he had signed Washington Irving's name ever came back! Here, at last, was progress, and Major Major threw himself into his new career with uninhibited gusto. Signing Washington Irving's name to official documents was not much of a career, perhaps, but it was less monotonous than signing 'Major Major Major.' When Washington Irving grew monotonous, he could reverse the order and sign Irving Washington, until that grew monotonous. And he was getting something done, for none of the documents signed with either of these names ever came back to the squadron. (122)

46. What did come back, eventually, was a second C.I.D. man, masquerading as pilot. The men knew he was a C.I.D. man because he confided to them he was and urged each of them not to reveal his true identity to any of the other men to whom he had

already confided that he was a C.I.D. man. (122)

47. Major Major had lied, and it was good. He was not really surprised that it was good, for he had observed that people who did lie were, on the whole, more resourceful and ambitious and successful than people who did not lie. Had he told the truth to the second C.I.D man, he would have found himself in trouble. Instead he had lied and he was free to continue his work. (127)

48. Major Major bought the dark glasses and false mustache in Rome in a final, futile attempt to save himself from the swampy degradation into which he was steadily sinking. First there had been the awful humiliation of the Great Loyalty Oath Crusade, when not one of the thirty or forty people circulating competitive loyalty oaths would even allow him to sign. Then, just when that was blowing over, there was the matter of Clevinger's plane disappearing so mysteriously in thin air with every member of the crew, and blame for the strange mishap centering balefully on him because he had never signed any of the loyalty oaths. (128)

49. The dark glasses had large magenta rims. The false black mustache was a flamboyant organ grinder's, and he wore them both to the basketball game one day when he felt he could endure his loneliness no longer. He affected an air of jaunty familiarity as he sauntered to the court and prayed silently that he would not be recognized. The others pretended not to recognize him, and he began to have fun. Just as he finished congratulating himself on his innocent ruse he was bumped hard by one of his opponents and knocked to his knees. Soon he was bumped hard again, and it dawned on him that they did recognize him and that they were using his disguise as a license to elbow, trip and maul him. They did not want him at all. And just as he did realize this, the players on his team fused instinctively with the players on the other team into a single, howling, bloodthirsty mob that descended upon him from all sides with foul curses and swinging fists. They knocked him to the ground, kicked him while he was on the ground, attacked him again after he had struggled blindly to his feet. He covered his face with his hands and could not see. They swarmed all over each other in their frenzied compulsion to bludgeon him, kick him, gouge him, trample him. He was pummeled spinning to the edge of the ditch and sent slithering down on his head and shoulders. At the bottom he found his footing, clambered up the other wall and staggered away beneath the hail of hoots and stones with which they pelted him until he lurched into shelter around a corner of the orderly room tent. His paramount concern throughout the entire assault was to keep his dark glasses and false mustache in place so that he might continue pretending he was somebody else and be spared the dreaded necessity of having to confront them with his authority. (128)

50. 'From now on,' Major Major said to the middle-aged enlisted

man who took care of his trailer. 'I don't want you to come here while I'm here to ask me if there's anything you can do for me. Is that clear?'
'Yes, sir,' said the orderly. 'When should I come here to find out if there's anything you want me to do for you?'
'When I'm not here.'
'Yes, sir. And what should I do?'
'Whatever I tell you to.'
'But you won't be here to tell me. Will you?'
'No.'
'Then what should I do?'
'Whatever has to be done.'
'Yes, sir.'
'That will be all,' said Major Major.
'Yes, sir,' said the orderly. 'Will that be all?'
'No,' said Major Major. (e) 'Don't come in to clean, either. 'Don't come in for anything unless you're sure I'm not here.'

'Yes, sir. But how can I always be sure?'
'If you're not sure, just assume that I am here and go away until you are sure. Is that clear?'
'Yes, sir.'
'I'm sorry to have to talk to you in this way, but I have to. Goodbye.'
'Goodbye, sir.'
'And thank you. For everything.'
'Yes, sir.' (130)

51. The last person in the squadron Major Major wanted to be brought down with a flying tackle by was Yossarian. There was something inherently disreputable about Yossarian, always carrying on so disgracefully about that dead man in his tent who wasn't even there and then taking off all his clothes after the Avignon mission and going around without them right up to the day General Dreedle stepped up to pin a medal on him for his heroism over Ferrara and found him standing in formation stark naked. No one in the world had the power to remove the dead man's disorganized effects from Yossarian's tent. Major Major had forfeited the authority when he permitted Sergeant Towser to report the lieutenant who had been killed over Orvieto less than two hours after he arrived in the squadron as never having arrived in the squadron at all. The only one with any right to remove his belongings from Yossarian's tent, it seemed to Major Major, was Yossarian himself, and Yossarian, it seemed to Major Major, had no right. (132)

52. What could you do? Major Major asked himself again. What could you do with a man who looked you squarely in the eye and said he would rather die than be killed in combat, a man who was at least as mature and intelligent as you were and who you had to pretend was not? What could you say to him? (134)

53. What could you possibly say to him? Major Major wondered

forlornly. One thing he could not say was that there was nothing he could do. To say there was nothing he could do would suggest he would do something if he could and imply the existence of an error of injustice in Colonel Korn's policy. Colonel Korn had been most explicit about that. He must never say there was nothing he could do.
'I'm sorry,' he said. 'But there's nothing I can do.' (135)

54. Clevinger was dead. That was the basic flaw in his philosophy. Eighteen planes had let down through a beaming white cloud off the coast of Elba one afternoon on the way back from the milk run to Parma; seventeen came out. No trace was ever found of the other, not in the air or on the smooth surface of the jade waters below. There was no debris. Helicopters circled the white cloud till sunset. During the night the could blew away, and in the morning there was no more Clevinger. (136)

55. 'It's not a bad life,' he would observe philosophically. 'And I guess somebody has to do it.'
He had wisdom enough to understand that digging holes in Colorado was not such a bad assignment in wartime. Since the holes were in no great demand, he could dig them and fill them up at a leisurely pace, and he was seldom overworked. On the other hand, he was busted down to buck private each time he was courtmartialed. He regretted this loss of rank keenly. (137)

56. Almost without realizing it, Sergeant Towser had fallen into the habit of thinking of the dead man in Yossarian's tent in Yossarian's own terms - as a dead man in Yossarian's tent. In reality, he was no such thing. He was simply a replacement pilot who had been killed in combat before he had officially reported for duty. He had stopped at the operations tent to inquire the way to the orderly-room tent and had been sent right into action because so many men had completed the thirty-five missions required then that Captain Piltchard and Captain Wren were finding it difficult to assemble the number of crews specified by Group. Because he had never officially gotten into the squadron, he could never officially be gotten out, and Sergeant Towser sensed that the multiplying communications relating to the poor man would continue reverberating forever. (140)

57. 'Do you really want some more codeine?' Dr. Stubbs asked. 'It's for my friend Yossarian. He's sure he's going to be killed.' 'Yossarian? Who the hell is Yossarian? What the hell kind of a name is Yossarian, anyway? Isn't he the one who got drunk and started that fight with Colonel Korn at the officers' club the other night?'
'That's right. He's Assyrian.'
'That crazy bastard.'
'He's not so crazy,' Dunbar said. 'He swears he's not going to fly to Bologna.' 'That's just what I mean,' Dr. Stubbs answered.

'That crazy bastard may be the only sane one left.' (144)

58. 'They're taking over everything,' he declared rebelliously. 'Well, you fellows can stand around and let them if you want to, but I'm not going to. I'm going to do something about it. From now on I'm going to make every son of a bitch who comes to my intelligence tent sign a loyalty oath. And I'm not going to let that bastard Major Major sign one even if he wants to.' (147)

59. Milo was not convinced and absolutely refused to deprive Major Major of food, even if Major Major was a Communist, which Milo secretly doubted. Milo was by nature opposed to any innovation that threatened to disrupt the normal course of affairs. Milo took a firm moral stand and absolutely refused to participate in the Glorious Loyalty Oath Crusade until Captain Black called upon him with his delegation and requested him to.
'National defense is everybody's job,' Captain Black replied to Milo's objection. 'And this whole program is voluntary, Milo - don't forget that. The men don't have to sign Piltchard and Wren's loyalty oath if they don't want to. But we need you to starve them to death if they don't. It's just like Catch-22. Don't you get it? You're not against Catch-22, are you?' Doc Danneka was adamant. 'What makes you so sure Major Major is a Communist?' 'You never heard him denying it until we began accusing him, did you? And you don't see him signing any of our loyalty oaths.'
'You aren't letting him sign any.'
'Of course not,' Captain Black explained. 'That would defeat the whole purpose of our crusade. Look, you don't have to play ball with us if you don't want to. But what's the point of the rest of us working so hard if you're going to give Major Major medical attention the minute Milo begins starving him to death? (149-50)

60. Their only hope was that it would never stop raining, and they had no hope because they all knew it would. When it did stop raining in Pianosa, it rained in Bologna. When it stopped raining in Bologna, it began again in Pianosa. If there was no rain at all, there were freakish, inexplicable phenomena like the epidemic of diarrhea or the bomb line that moved. Four times during the first six days they were assembled and briefed and then sent back. Once, they took off and were flying in formation when the control tower summoned them down. The more it rained, the worse they suffered. The worse they suffered, the more they prayed that it would continue raining. All through the night, men looked at the sky and were saddened by the stars. All through the day, they looked at the bomb line on the big, wobbling easel map of Italy that blew over in the wind and was dragged in under the awning of the intelligence tent every time the rain began. The bomb line was a scarlet band of narrow satin ribbon that delineated the forwardmost position of the Allied ground forces in every sector of the

Italian mainland. (155)
61.'I really can't believe it,' Clevinger exclaimed to Yossarian in a voice rising and falling in protest and wonder. 'It's a complete reversion to primitive superstition. They're confusing cause and effect. It makes as much sense as knocking on wood or crossing your fingers. They really believe that we wouldn't have to fly that mission tomorrow if someone would only tiptoe up to the map in the middle of the night and move the bomb line over Bologna. Can you imagine? You and I must be the only rational ones left.' In the middle of the night Yossarian knocked on wood crossed his fingers, and tiptoed out of his tent to move the bomb line up over Bologna. (156)

62. Colonel Cathcart was overjoyed, for he was relieved of the embarassing commitment to bomb Bologna without blemish to the reputation for the valor he had earned by volunteering his men to do it. Headquarters was also pleased and decided to award a medal to the officer who captured the city. There was no officer who had captured the city, so they gave the medal to General Peckem instead, because General Peckem was the only officer with sufficient initiative to ask for it. (157)

63. Clevinger sat for a moment as though he'd been slapped. 'Congratulations!' he exclaimed bitterly, the thinnest milk-white line enclosing his lips tightly in a bloodless squeezing ring. 'I can't think of any other attitude that could be depended upon to give greater comfort to the enemy.'
'The enemy', retorted Yossarian with weighted precision, 'is anybody who's going to get you killed, no matter which side he's on, and that includes Colonel Cathcart. And don't you forget that, because the longer you remember it, the longer you might live.' (162)

64. 'Why don't we give him a medal?' Colonel Korn proposed.
'For going around twice? What can we give him a medal for?'

'For going around twice,' Colonel Korn answered with a reflective, self-satisfied smile. 'After all, I suppose it did take a lot of courage to go over that target a second time with no other planes around to divert the antiaircraft fire. And he did hit the bridge. You know, that might be the answer - to act boastfully about something we ought to be ashamed of. That's a trick that never seems to fail.'
'Do you think it will work?'
'I'm sure it will. And let's promote him to captain, too, just to make certain.' 'Don't you think that's going a bit farther than we have to?'
'No, I don't think so. It's best to play safe. And a captain's not much difference.'
'All right,' Colonel Cathcart decided. 'We'll give him a medal for being brave enough to go around over the target twice. And we'll make him captain too.' (180)

65. By the time of the mission to Bologna, Yossarian was brave

enough not to go around over the target even once, and when he found himself aloft finally in the nose of Kid Sampson's plane, he Pressed in the button of his throat mike and asked,
'Well? What's wrong with the plane?'
Kid Sampson let out a shriek. 'Is something wrong with the plane?
What's the matter?'
Kid Sampson's cry turned Yossarian to ice. 'Is something the matter?' he yelled in horror. 'Are we bailing out?'
'I don't know!' Kid Sampson shot back in anguish, wailing excitedly. 'Someone said we're bailing out! Who is this, anyway?
Who is this?'
'This is Yossarian in the nose! Yossarian in the nose. I heard you say there was something the matter. Didn't you say there was something the matter?' 'I thought you said there was something wrong. Everything seems okay. Everything is all right.' Yossarian's heart sank. Something was terribly wrong if everything was all right and they had no excuse for turning back. (181)

66. He woke up blinking with a slight pain in his head and opened his eyes upon a world boiling in chaos in which everything was in proper order. He gasped in utter amazement at the fantastic sight of the twelve flights of planes organized calmly into exact
formation. The scene was too unexpected to be true. (186)

67. He gasped in utter amazement at the fantastic sight of the twelve flights of planes organized calmly into exact formation. The scene was too unexpected to be true. There were no planes spurting ahead with wounded, none lagging behind with damage. No distress flares smoked in the sky. No ship was missing but his own. For an instant he was paralyzed with a sensation of madness. Then he understood and almost wept at the irony. The explanation was simple: clouds had covered the target before the planes could bomb it, and the mission to Bologna was still to be flown. He was wrong. There had been no clouds. Bologna had been bombed. Bologna was a milk run. There had bean no flak there at all. (186)

68. 'Tu sei pazzo,' she told him with a pleasant laugh.
'Why am I crazy?' he asked.
'Perche non posso sposare.'
'Why can't you get married?'
'Because I am not a virgin,' she answered.
'What has that got to do with it?'
'Who will marry me? No one wants a girl who is not a virgin.'

'I will. I'll marry you.'
'Ma non posso sposarti.'
'Why can't you marry me?'
'Perche sei pazzo. '
'Why am I crazy?'

'Perche vuoi sposarmi.'
Yossarian wrinkled his forehead with quizzical amusement. 'You won't marry me because I'm crazy, and you say I'm crazy because I want to marry you? Is that right?'
'Si'
'Tu sei pazz '! ' he told her loudly.
'Perche?' she shouted back at him indignantly, her unavoidable round breasts rising and falling in a saucy huff beneath the pink chemise as she sat up in bed indignantly. 'Why am I crazy?'
'Because you won't marry me.'
'Stupido!' she shouted back at him, and smacked him loudly and flamboyantly on the chest with the back of her hand. 'Non posso sposarti! Non capisci? Non posso sposarti.'
'Oh, sure, I understand. And why can't you marry me?' 'Perche sei pazzo!'
'And why am I crazy?'
'Perche vuoi sposarmi.'
'Because I want to marry you. Carina, ti amo,' he explained, and he drew her gently back down to the pillow. 'Ti amo molto.'

'Tu sei pazzo, ' she murmured in reply, flattered.
'Perche?'
'Because you say you love me. How can you love a girl who is not a virgin?'
'Because I can't marry you.'
She bolted right up again in a threatening rage. 'Why can't you marry me?' she demanded, ready to clout him again if he gave an uncomplimentary reply. 'Just because I am not a virgin?'

'No, no, darling. Because you're crazy.' (205-206)

69. 'Why don't you ask me to let you write my name and address on a piece of paper so that you will be able to find me again when you come to Rome?' she suggested.
'Why don't you let me write your name and address down on a piece of paper?' he agreed.
'Why?' she demanded belligerently, her mouth curling suddenly into a vehement sneer and her eyes flashing with anger. 'So you can tear it up into little pieces as soon as I leave?'
'Who's going to tear it up?' Yossarian protested in confusion. 'What the hell are you talking about?'
'You will,' she insisted. 'You'll tear it up into little pieces the minute I'm gone and go walking away like a big shot because a tall, young, beautiful girl like me, Luciana, let you sleep with her and did not ask you for money.'
'How much money are you asking me for?' he asked her.
'Stupido!' she shouted with emotion. 'I am not asking you for any money!' She stamped her foot and raised her arm in a turbulent gesture that made Yossarian fear she was going to crack him in the face again with her great pocketbook. Instead, she scribbled her name and address on a slip of paper and thrust it at him.
'Here,' she taunted him sardonically, biting on her lip to

still a delicate tremor. 'Don't forget. Don't forget to tear it into tiny pieces as soon as I am gone.'
Then she smiled at him serenely, squeezed his hand and, with a whispered regretful 'Addio,' pressed herself against him for a moment and then straightened and walked away with unconscious dignity and grace.
The minute she was gone, Yossarian tore the slip of paper up and walked awav in the other direction, feeling very much like a big shot because a beautiful young girl like Luciana had slept with him and did not ask for money. He was pretty pleased with himself until he looked up in the dining room of the Red Cross building and found himself eating breakfast with dozens and dozens of other servicemen in all kinds of fantastic uniforms, and then all at once he was surrounded by images of Luciana getting out of her clothes and into her clothes and caressing and haranguing him tempestuously in the pink rayon chemise she wore in bed with him and would not take off. Yossarian choked on his toast and eggs at the enormity of his error in tearing her long, lithe, nude, young vibrant limbs into tiny peices of paper so impudently and dumping her down so smugly into the gutter from the curb. He missed her terribly already. (209-210)

70. There were usually not nearly as many sick people inside the hospital as Yossarian saw outside the hospital, and there were generally fewer people inside the hospital who were seriously sick. There was a much lower death rate inside the hospital than outside the hospital, and a much healthier death rate. Few people died unnecessarily. People knew a lot more about dying inside the hospital and made a much neater, more orderly job of it. They couldn't dominate Death inside the hospital, but they certainly made her behave. They had taught her manners. They couldn't keep Death out, but while she was in she had to act like a lady. People gave up the ghost with delicacy and taste inside the hospital. There was none of that crude, ugly ostentation about dying that was so common outside the hospital. They did not blow up in mid-air like Kraft or the dead man in Yossarian's tent, or freeze to death in the blazing summertime the way Snowden had frozen to death after spilling his secret to Yossarian in the back of the plane.
'I'm cold,' Snowden had whimpered. 'I'm cold.'
'There, there,' Yossarian had tried to comfort him. 'There, there.' They didn't take it on the lam weirdly inside a cloud the way Clevinger had done. They didn't explode into blood and clotted matter. They didn't drown or get struck by lightning, mangled by machinery or crushed in landslides. They didn't get shot to death in hold-ups, strangled to death in rapes, stabbed to death in saloons, bludgeoned to death with axes by parents or children or die summarily by some other act of God. Nobody choked to death. People bled to death like gentlemen in an operating room or expired without comment in an oxygen tent. There was none of that tricky now-you-see-me now-you-don't business so much in vogue outside the hospital, none of that now-I-am-and-now-I-ain't. There were no famines or floods.

Children didn't suffocate in cradles or iceboxes or fall under trucks. No one was beaten to death. People didn't stick their heads into ovens with the gas on, jump in front of subway trains or come plummeting like dead weights out of hotel windows with a whoosh!, accelerating at the rate of sixteen feet per second to land with a hideous plop! on the sidewalk and die disgustingly there in public like an alpaca sack full of hairy strawberry ice cream, bleeding, pink toes awry. (213-14)

71. The soldier in white was constructed entirely of gauze, plaster and a thermometer, and the thermometer was merely an adornment left balanced in the empty dark hole in the bandages over his mouth early each morning and late each afternoon by Nurse Cramer and Nurse Duckett right up to the afternoon Nurse Cramer read the thermometer and discovered he was dead.
Now that Yossarian looked back, it seemed that Nurse Cramer rather than the talkative Texan, had murdered the soldier in white; if she had not read the thermometer and reported what she had found, the soldier in white might still be lying there alive exactly as he had been lying there all along, encased from head to toe in plaster and gauze with both strange, rigid legs elevated from the hips and both strange arms strung up perpendicularly, all four bulky limbs in casts, all four strange, useless limbs hoisted up in the air by taut wire cables and fantastically long lead weights suspended darkly above him. Lying there that way might not have been much of a life, but it was all the life he had, and the decision to terminate it, Yossarian felt, should hardly have been Nurse Cramer's. (214-15)

72. 'How the hell do you know he's even in there?' he asked her. 'Don't you dare talk to me that way!' she replied indignantly.
'Well, how do you? You don't even know if it's really him.'

'Who?'
'Whoever's supposed to be in all those bandages. You might really be weeping for somebody else. How do you know he's even alive?'
'What a terrible thing to say!' Nurse Cramer exclaimed. 'Now, you get right into bed and stop making jokes about him.'
'I'm not making jokes. Anybody might be in there. For all we know, it might even be Mudd.'
'What are you talking about?' Nurse Cramer pleaded with him in a quavering voice.
'Maybe that's where the dead man is.'
'What dead man?'
'I've got a dead man in my tent that nobody can throw out. His name is Mudd.' Nurse Cramer's face blanched and she turned to Dunbar desperately for aid. 'Make him stop saying things like that,' she begged.
'Maybe there's no one inside,' Dunbar suggested helpfully. 'Maybe they just sent the bandages here for a joke.'

She stepped away from Dunbar in alarm. 'You're crazy,' she cried, glancing about imploringly. 'You're both crazy.'
Nurse Duckett showed up then and chased them all back to their own beds while Nurse Cramer changed the stoppered jars for the soldier in white. Changing the jars for the soldier in white was no trouble at all, since the same clear fluid was dripped back inside him over and over again with no apparent loss. When the jar feeding the inside of his elbow was just about empty, the jar on the floor was just about full, and the two were simply uncoupled from their respective hoses and reversed quickly so that the liquid could bedripped right back into him. Changing the jars was no trouble to anyone but the men who watched them changed every hour or so and were baffled by the procedure.
'Why can't they hook the two jars up to each other and eliminate the middleman?' the artillery captain with whom Yossarian had stopped playing chess inquired. 'What the hell do they need him for?' (218)

73. Doc Daneeka flared up angrily. 'Yeah? Well, at least I'm going to come out of this war alive, which is a lot more than you're going to do.'
'That's just what I'm trying to tell you, goddammit. I'm asking you to save my life.
'It's not my business to save lives,' Doc Daneeka retorted sullenly.
'What is your business?'
'I don't know what my business is. All they ever told me was to uphold the ethics of my profession and never give testimony against another physician. Listen. You think you're the one whose life is in danger? What about me? Those two quacks I've got working for me in the medical tent still can't find out what's wrong with me.' (224)

74. 'It's meningitis,' he called out emphatically, waving the others back. 'Although Lord knows there's not the slightest reason for thinking so.'
'Then why pick meningitis?' inquired a major with a suave chuckle.
'Why not, let's say, acute nephritis?'
'Because I'm a meningitis man, that's why, and not an acute-nephritis man,' retorted the colonel. 'And I'm not going to give him up to any of you kidney birds without a struggle. I was here first.'
In the end, the doctors were all in accord. They agreed they had no idea what was wrong with the soldier who saw everything twice, and they rolled him away into a room in the corridor and quarantined everyone else in the ward for fourteen days. (228)

75. He broke his sacred oath the very next year when he spent the holiday in a hotel room instead in intellectual conversation with Lieutenant Scheisskopf's wife who had Dori Duz's dog tags on for the occasion and who henpecked Yossarian

sententiously for being cynical and callous about Thanksgiving, even though she didn't believe in God just as much as he didn't. (229)

76. 'What the hell are you getting so upset about?' he asked her bewilderedly in a tone of contrite amusement. 'I thought you didn't believe in God.'
'I don't,' she sobbed, bursting violently into tears. 'But the God I don't believe in is a good God, a just God, a merciful God. He's not the mean and stupid God you make Him out to be.'

Yossarian laughed and turned her arms loose. 'Let's have a little more religious freedom between us,' he proposed obligingly. 'You don't believe in the God you want to, and I won't believe in the God I want to. Is that a deal?' That was the most illogical Thanksgiving he could ever remember spending... (231)

77. 'There are some relatives here to see you. Oh, don't worry,' he added with a laugh. 'Not your relatives. It's the mother, father and brother of that chap who died. They've traveled all the way from New York to see a dying soldier, and you're the handiest one we've got.'
'What are you talking about?' Yossarian asked suspiciously. 'I'm
not dying.'
'Of course you're dying. We're all dying. Where the devil else do you think you're heading?'(234)

78. Colonel Cathcart was a slick, successful, slipshod, unhappy man of thirty-six who lumbered when he walked and wanted to be a general. He was dashing and dejected. poised and chagrined. He was complacent and insecure, daring in the administrative stratagems he employed to bring himself to the attention of his superiors and craven in his concern that his schemes might all backfire. He was handsome and unattractive, a swash buckling, beefy, conceited man who was putting on fat and was tormented chronically by prolonged seizures of apprehension. Colonel Cathcart was conceited because he was a full colonel with a combat command at the age of only thirty-six; and Colonel Cathcart was dejected because although he was already thirty-six he was still only a full colonel. (239)

79. Déja vu. The subtle, recurring confusion between illusion and reality that was characteristic of paramnesia fascinated the chaplain, and he knew a number of things about it. He knew, for example, that it was called paramnesia, and he was interested as well in such corollary optical phenomena as jamais vu, never seen, and presque vu, almost seen. There were terrifying, sudden moments when objects, concepts and even people that the chaplain had lived with almost all his life inexplicably took on an unfamiliar and irregular aspect that he had never seen before and which made them totally strange: jamaïs vu. And there were other moments when he almost saw

absolute truth in brilliant flashes of clarity that almost came to him: presque vu. The episode of the naked man in the tree at Snowden's funeral mystified him thoroughly. It was not déja vu, for at the time he had experienced no sensation of ever having seen a naked man in a tree at Snowden's funeral before. It was not jamais vu, since the apparition was not of someone, or something, familiar appearing to him in an unfamiliar guise. And it was certainly not presque vu, for the chaplain did see him.
A jeep started up with a backfire directly outside and roared away. Had the naked man in the tree at Snowden's funeral been merely a hallucination? Or had it been a true revelation? The chaplain trembled at the mere idea. He wanted desperately to confide in Yossarian, but each time he thought about the occurrence he decided not to think about it any further, although now that he did think about it he could not be sure that he ever really had thought about it. (261)

80. Colonel Cathcart was not superstitious, but he did believe in omens, and he sat right back down behind his desk and made a cryptic notation on his memorandum pad to look into the whole suspicious business of the Yossarians right away. He wrote his reminder to himself in a heavy and decisive hand, amplifying it sharply with a series of coded punctuation marks and underlining the whole message twice.
Yossarian!!!(?)! (267)

81. All Colonel Cathcart knew about his house in the hills was that he had such a house and hated it. He was never so bored as when spending there the two or three days every other week necessary to sustain the illusion that his damp and drafty stone farmhouse in the hills was a golden palace of carnal delights. Officers' clubs everywhere pulsated with blurred but knowing accounts of lavish, hushed-up drinking and sex orgies there and of secret, intimate nights of ecstasy with the most beautiful, the most tantalizing, the most readily aroused and most easily satisfied Italian courtesans, film actresses, models and countesses. No such private nights of ecstasy or hushed-up drinking and sex orgies ever occurred. They might have occurred if either General Dreedle or General Peckem had once evinced an interest in taking part in orgies with him, but neither ever did, and the colonel was certainly not going to waste his time and energy making love to beautiful women unless there was something in it for him. The colonel dreaded his dank lonely nights at his farmhouse and the dull, uneventful days. He had much more fun back at Group, browbeating everyone he wasn't afraid of. However, as Colonel Korn kept reminding him, there was not much glamour in having a farmhouse in the hills if he never used it. He drove off to his farmhouse each time in a mood of self-pity. He carried a shotgun in his jeep and spent the monotonous hours there shooting it at birds and at the plum tomatoes that did grow there in untended rows and were too much trouble to harvest. (268-69)

82. 'Well, I'll be damned,' mumbled General Dreedle, and his ruddy monolithic face softened with amusement. 'Why aren't you wearing clothes, Yossarian?'
'I don't want to.'
'What do you mean you don't want to? Why the hell don't you want to?'
'I just don't want to, sir.'
'Why isn't he wearing clothes?' General Dreedle demanded over his shoulder of Colonel Cathcart.
'He's talking to you,' Colonel Korn whispered over Colonel Cathcart's shoulder from behind, jabbing his elbow sharply into Colonel Cathcart's back.
'Why isn't he wearing clothes?' Colonel Cathcart demanded of Colonel Korn with a look of acute pain, tenderly nursing the spot where Colonel Korn had just jabbed him.
'Why isn't he wearing clothes?' Colonel Korn demanded of Captain Piltchard and Captain Wren.
'A man was killed in his plane over Avignon last week and bled all over him,' Captain Wren replied. 'He swears he's never going to wear a uniform again.'
'A man was killed in his plane over Avignon last week and bled all over him,' Colonel Korn reported directly to General Dreedle.
'His uniform hasn't come back from the laundry yet.' (277)

83. As soon as Major Danby began to cry, Colonel Moodus, who had been vacillating wretchedly on the sidelines, could restrain himself no longer and stepped out diffidently toward General Dreedle with a sickly air of self-sacrifice. 'I think you'd better wait a minute, Dad,' he suggested hesitantly. 'I don't think you can shoot him.' General Dreedle was infuriated by his intervention.
'Who the hell says I can't?' he thundered pugnaciously in a voice loud enougb to rattle the whole building. Colonel Moodus, his face flushing with embarrassment, bent close to whisper into his ear. 'Why the hell can't I?' General Dreedle bellowed. Colonel Moodus whispered some more. 'You mean I can't shoot anyone I want to?' General Dreedle demanded with uncompromising indignation. He pricked up his ears with interest as Colonel Moodus continued whispering. 'Is that a fact?' he inquired, his rage tamed by curiosity.
'Yes, Dad. I'm afraid it is.'
'I guess you think you're pretty goddam smart, don't you?' General Dreedle lashed out at Colonel Moodus suddenly. (283)

84. 'To hell with my mission,' Yossarian responded indifferently. 'And to hell with the syndicate too, even though I do have a share. I don't want any eight-year-old virgins, even if they are half Spanish.'
'I don't blame you. But these eight-year-old virgins are really only thirty-two. And they're not really half Spanish but only one-third Estonian.'
'I don't care for any virgins.'

'And they're not even virgins,' Milo continued persuasively. 'The one I picked out for you was married for a short time to an elderly schoolteacher who slept with her only on Sundays, so she's really almost as good as new.' (297)

85. Milo had been elected mayor of Palermo - and of nearby Carini, Monreale, Bagheria, Termini Imerese, Cefali, Mistretta and Nicosia as well - because he had brought Scotch to Sicily.

Yossarian was amazed. 'The people here like to drink Scotch that much?'
'They don't drink any of the Scotch,' Milo explained 'Scotch is very expensive, and these people here are very poor.'
'Then why do you import it to Sicily if nobody drinks any?'

'To build up a price. I move the Scotch here from Malta to make more room for profit when I sell it back to me for somebody else.
I created a whole new industry here. Today Sicily is the largest exporter of Scotch in the world and that's why they elected me Major.' (298-99)

86. 'But Italy was occupied by the Germans and is now being occupied by us. You don't call that doing very well, do you?'
'But of course I do,' exclaimed the old man cheerfully. 'The Germans are being driven out, and we are still here. In a few years you will be gone, too, and we will still be here. You see, Italy is really a very poor and weak country, and that's what makes us so strong. Italian soldiers are not dying any more. But American and German soldiers are. I call that doing extremely well. Yes, I am quite certain that Italy will survive this war and still be in existence long after your own country has been destroyed.' (309)

87. This sordid, vulturous, diabolical old man reminded Nately of his father because the two were nothing at all alike. Nately's father was a courtly white-haired gentleman who dressed impeccably; this old man was an uncouth bum. Nately's father was a sober, philosophical and responsible man; this old man was fickle and licentious. Nately's father was discreet and cultured; this old man was a boor. Nately's father believed in honor and knew the answer to everything; this old man believed in nothing and had only questions. Nately's father had a distinguished white mustache; this old man had no mustache at all. Nately's father - and everyone else's father Nately had ever met - was dignified, wise and venerable; this old man was utterly repellent, and Nately plunged back into debate with him, determined to repudiate his vile logic and insinuations with an ambitious vengeance that would capture the attention of the bored, phlegmatic girl he had fallen so intensely in love with and win her admiration forever. (311)

88. 'The real trick lies in losing wars, in knowing which wars can be lost. Italy has been losing wars for centuries, and just

see how splendidly we've done nonetheless. France wins wars and is in a continual state of crisis. Germany loses and prospers. Look at our own recent history. Italy won a war in Ethiopia and promptly
stumbled into serious trouble. Victory gave us such insane delusions of grandeur that we helped start a world war we hadn't a chance of winning. But now that we are losing again, everything has taken a turn for the better, and we will certainly come out on top again if we succeed in being defeated.' Nately gaped at him in undisguised befuddlement. 'Now I really don't understand what you're saying. You talk like a madman.'
'But I live like a sane one.' (312)

89. Nately was a sensitive, rich, good-looking boy with dark hair, trusting eyes, and a pain in his neck when he awoke on the sofa early the next morning and wondered dully where he was. His nature was invariably gentle and polite. He had lived for almost twenty years without trauma, tension, hate, or neurosis, which was proof to Yossarian of just how crazy he really was. His childhood had been a pleasant, though disciplined, one. He got on well with his brothers and sisters, and he did not hate his mother and father, even though they had both been very good to him. (315-16)

90. Nately's father brimmed continually with sage and sophisticated counsel of that kind. He was as ebullient and ruddy as mulled claret, and Nately liked him a great deal, although he did not like mulled claret. (317)

91. Once the contracts were signed, there seemed to be no point in using the resources of the syndicate to bomb and defend the bridge, inasmuch as both governments had ample men and material right there to do so and were perfectly happy to contribute them, and in the end Milo realized a fantastic profit from both halves of his project for doing nothing more than signing his name twice. The arrangements were fair to both sides. Since Milo did have freedom of passage everywhere, his planes were able to steal over in a sneak attack without alerting the German antiaircraft gunners; and since Milo knew about the attack, he was able to alert the German antiaircraft gunners in sufficient time for them to begin firing accurately the moment the planes came into range. It was an ideal arrangement for everyone but the dead man in Yossarian's tent, who was killed over the target the day he arrived. (324)

92. 'It's a matter of principle,' he explained firmly. 'The government has no business in business, and I would be the last person in the world to ever try to involve the government in a business of mine. But the business of government is business,' he remembered alertly, and continued with elation. 'Calvin Coolidge said that, and Calvin Coolidge was a President, so it must be true. And the government does have the responsibility of buying all the Egyptian cotton I've got that

no one else wants so that I can make a profit, doesn't it?' Milo's face clouded almost as abruptly, and his spirits descended into a state of sad anxiety.
'But how will I get the government to do it?'
'Bribe it,' Yossarian said.
'Bribe it!' Milo was outraged and almost lost his balance and broke his neck again. 'Shame on you!' he scolded severely, breathing virtuous fire down and upward into his rusty mustache through his billowing nostrils and prim lips. 'Bribery is against the law, and you know it. But it's not against the law to make a profit, is it? So it can't be against the law for me to bribe someone in order to make a fair profit, can it? No, of course not!' (337)

93. Perhaps he really was Washington Irving, and perhaps he really had been signing Washington Irving's name to those letters he knew nothing about. Such lapses of memory were not uncommon in medical annals, he knew. There was no way of really knowing anything. (339)

94. Yossarian shook his head and explained that déja vu was just a momentary infinitesimal lag in the operation of two coactive sensory nerve centers that commonly functioned simultaneously. The chaplain scarcely heard him. He was disappointed, but not inclined to believe Yossarian, for he had been given a sign, a secret, enigmatic vision that he still lacked the boldness to divulge. There was no mistaking the awesome implications of the chaplain's revelation: it was either an insight of divine origin or a hallucination; he was either blessed or losing his mind. Both prospects filled him with equal fear and depression. It was neither déja vu, presque vu nor jamais vu. It was possible that there were other vus of which he had never heard and that one of these other vus would explain succinctly the baffling phenomenon of which he had been both a witness and a part; it was even possible that none of what he thought had taken place, really had taken place, that he was dealing with an aberration of memory rather than of perception, that he never really had thought he had seen, that his impression now that he once had thought so was merely the illusion of an illusion, and that he was only now imagining that he had ever once imagined seeing a naked man sitting in a tree at the cemetery. (341)

95. He had no real friends. Before meeting Yossarian, there was no one in the group with whom he felt at ease, and he was hardly at ease with Yossarian, whose frequent rash and insubordinate outbursts kept him almost constantly on edge and in an ambiguous state of enjoyable trepidation. The chaplain felt safe when he was at the officers' club with Yossarian and Dunbar, and even with just Nately and McWatt. When he sat with them he had no need to sit with anyone else; his problem of where to sit was solved, and he was protected against the undesired company of all those fellow officers who invariably welcomed him with excessive cordiality when he approached and

waited uncomfortably for him to go away. He made so many people uneasy. Everyone was always very friendly toward him, and no one was ever very nice; everyone spoke to him, and one one ever said anything. Yossarian and Dunbar were much more relaxed, and the chaplain was hardly
uncomfortable with them at all. (342)

96. The chaplain was sincerely a very helpful person who was never able to help anyone, not even Yossarian when he finally decided to seize the bull by the horns and visit Major Major secretly to learn if, as Yossarian had said, the men in Colonel Cathcart's group really were being forced to fly more combat missions than anyone else. (346)

97. He would remember them forever for they were all part and parcel of the most extraordinary event that had ever befallen him, an event perhaps marvelous, perhaps pathological - the vision of the naked man in the tree. How could he explain it? It was not already seen or never seen, and certainly not almost seen; neither déja vu, jamais vu nor presque vu was elastic enough to cover it. Was it a ghost, then? The dead man's soul? An angel from heaven or a minion from hell? Or was the whole fantastic episode merely the figment of a diseased imagination, his own, of a deteriorating mind, a rotting brain? The possibility that there really had been a naked man in the tree - two men, actually, since the first had been joined shortly by a second man clad in a brown mustache and sinister dark garments from head to toe who bent forward ritualistically along the limb of the tree to offer the first man something to drink from a brown goblet never crossed the chaplain's mind. (346)

98. So many monstrous events were occurring that he was no longer positive which events were monstrous and which were really taking place. He wanted to find out about the madman in the woods as quickly as possible, to check if there ever really had been a Captain Flume, but his first chore, he recalled with reluctance, was to appease Corporal Whitcomb for neglecting to delegate enough responsibility to him. (354)

99. In a way it was all Yossarian's fault, for if he had not moved the bomb line during the Big Siege of Bologna, Major■de Coverley might still be around to save him, and if he had not stocked the enlisted men's apartment with girls who had no other place to live, Nately might never have fallen in love with his whore as she sat naked from waist down in the room full of grumpyblackjack players who ignored her. Nately stared at her covertly from his over-stuffed yellow armchair, marveling at the bored, phlegmatic strength with which she accepted the mass rejection. She yawned, and he was deeply moved. He had never witnessed such heroic poise before. (363)

100. 'I'm hit, Aarfy! Help me!'

Aarfy grinned again and shrugged amiably, 'I can't hear you,' he said.
'Can't you see me?' Yossarian cried incredulously and he pointed to the deepening pool of blood he felt splashing down all around him and spreading out underneath.
'I'm wounded! Help me, for God's sake! Aarfy, help me!'
'I still can't hear you,' Aarfy complained tolerantly, cupping his podgy hand behind the blanched corolla of his ear. 'What did you say?' (367)

101. He smiled ostentatiously to show himself reasonable and nice. 'I'm not saying that to be cruel and insulting,' he continued with cruel and insulting delight. 'I'm not saying it because I hate you and want revenge. I'm not saying it because you rejected me and hurt my feelings terribly. No, I'm a man of medicine and I'm being coldy objective. I have very bad news for you. Are you man enough to take it?'
'God, no!' screamed Yossarian. 'I'll go right to pieces.'
Major Sanderson flew instantly into a rage. 'Can't you even do one thing right?' he pleaded, turning beet-red with vexation and crashing the sides of both fists down upon his desk together. 'The trouble with you is that you think you're too good for all the conventions of society. You probably think you're too good for me too, just because I arrived at puberty late. Well, do you know what you are? You're a frustrated, *unhappy, disillusioned, undisciplined, maladjusted young* man!' (384)

102. Orr nodded very intelligently. 'I won't take the valve apart now,' he said, and began taking it apart, working with slow, tireless, interminable precision, his rustic, ungainly face bent very close to the floor, picking painstakingly at the minute mechanism in his fingers with such limitless, plodding concentration that he seemed scarcely to be thinking of it at all. Yossarian cursed him silently and made up his mind to ignore him. (394)

103. 'What's so different about this Sunday. I want to know?' Hungry Joe was demanding vociferously of Chief White Halfoat. 'Why won't we have a parade this Sunday when we don't have a parade every Sunday? Huh?'
Yossarian worked his way through to the front and let out a long, agonized groan when he read the terse announcement there:

Due to circumstances beyond my control, there will be no big parade this Sunday afternoon.
Colonel Scheisskopf (403)

104. 'My only fault,' he observed with practiced good humor, watching for the effect of his words, 'is that I have no faults.' (405)

105. 'Just pass the work I assign you along to somebody else and trust to luck. We call that delegation of responsibility.

Somewhere down near the lowest level of this Coordinated organization I run are people who do get the work done when it reaches them, and everything manages to run along smoothly without too much effort on my part. I suppose that's because I am a good executive. Nothing we do in this large department of ours is really very important, and there's never any rush. On the other hand, it is important that we let people know we do a great deal of it. Let me know if you find yourself shorthanded. I've already put in a requisition for two majors, four captains and sixteen lieutenants to give you a hand. While none of the work we do is very important, it is important that we do a great deal of it. Don't you agree?' (406)

106. 'Don't be such an ass, Scheisskopf. People have a right to do anything that's not forbidden by law, and there's no law against lying to you. Now, don't ever waste my time with such sentimental platitudes again. Do you hear?'
'Yes, sir,' murmured Colonel Scheisskopf. (407)

107. Colonel Scheisskopf, squinting, moved very close to the map. and for the first time since he entered the room a light of comprehension shed a dim glow over his stolid face. 'I think I understand,' he exclaimed. 'Yes, I know I understand. Our first job is to capture Dreedle away from the enemy. Right?' General Peckem laughed benignly, 'No, Scheisskopf. Dreedle's on our side, and Dreedle is the enemy. General Dreedle commands four bomb groups that we simply must capture in order to continue our offensive. Conquering General Dreedle will give us the aircraft and vital bases we need to carry our operations into other areas. And that battle, by the way, is just about won.' (408-9)

108. 'What do you know about?' he asked acidly.
'Parades,' answered Colonel Scheisskopf eagerly, 'Will I be able to send out memos about parades?'
'As long as you don't schedule any.' General Peckem returned to his chair still wearing a frown. 'And as long as they don't interfere with your main assignment of recommending that the authority of Special Services be expanded to include combat activities.'
'Can I schedule parades and then call them off?'
General Peckem brightened instantly. 'Why, that's a wonderful idea! But just send out weekly announcements postponing the parades. Don't even bother to schedule them. That would be infinitely more disconcerting.' General Peckem was blossoming spryly with cordiality again. 'Yes, Scheisskopf,' he said, 'I think you've really hit on something. After all, what combat commander could possible quarrel with us for notifying his men that there won't be a parade that coming Sunday? We'd be merely stating a widely known fact. But the implication is beautiful. Yes, positively beautiful. We're implying that we could schedule a parade if we chose to. I'm going to like you, Scheisskopf. Stop in and introduce yourself to Colonel Cargill and tell him what you're up to. I know you two will like each

other.' (410)

109. Colonel Scheisskopf was all ears, 'What are bomb patterns?' 'Bomb patterns?' General Peckem repeated, twinkling with self-satisfied good humor. 'A bomb pattern is a term I dreamed up just several weeks ago. It means nothing, but you'd be surprised at how rapidly it's Caught on. Why, I've got all sorts of people convinced I think it's important for the bombs to explode close together and make a neat aerial photograph. There's one colonel in Pianosa who's hardly concerned any more with whether he hits the target or not. (411)

110. They'll be bombing a tiny undefended village, reducing the whole community to rubble. I have it from Wintergreen. Wintergreen's an ex-sergeant now, by the way - that the mission is entirely unnecessary. Its only purpose is to delay German reinforcements at a time when we aren't even planning an offensive. But that's the way things go when you elevate mediocre people to positions of authority.' He gestured languidly toward his gigantic map of Italy. 'Why, this tiny mountain village is so insignificant that it isn't even there. (412)

111. Yossarian no longer gave a damn where his bombs fell, although he did not go as far as Dunbar, who dropped his bombs hundreds of yards past the village and would face courtmartial if it could ever be shown he had done it deliberately. Without a word even to Yossarian, Dunbar had washed his hands of the mission. The fall in the hospital had either shown him the light or scrambled his brains; it was impossible to say which. (418)

112. Actually, there was not much he could do with that powerful machine gun except load it and test-fire a few rounds. It was no more use to him than the bombsight. He could really cut loose with it against attacking German fighters, but there were no German fighters any more, and he could not even swing it all the way around into the helpless faces of pilots like Huple and Dobbs and order them back down carefully to the ground, as he had once ordered Kid Sampson back down... (419)

113. Aarfy never went swimming. The other men wore swimming trunks in deference to Nurse Duckett, and in deference also to Nurse Cramer, who accompanied Nurse Duckett and Yossarian to the beach every time and sat haughtily by herself ten yards away. No one but Aarfy ever made reference to the naked men sun-bathing in full view farther down the beach or jumping and diving from the enormous white-washed raft that bobbed on empty oil drums out beyond the silt sand. Nurse Cramer sat by herself because she was angry with Yossarian and disappointed in Nurse Duckett. (423-24)

114. Even people who were not there remembered vividly exactly what happened next. There was the briefest, softest tsst!

filtering audibly through the shattering overwhelming howl of the plane's engines, and then there were just Kid Sampson's two pale, skinny legs, still joined by strings somehow at the bloody truncated hips standing stock-still on the raft for what seemed a fuli minute or two before they toppled over backward into the water finally with a faint, echoing splash and turned completely upside down so that only the grotesque toes and the plaster-white soles of Kid Sampson's feet remained in view. (428)

115. 'Two more to go,' said Sergeant Knight. 'McWatt and Doc Daneeka.'
'I'm right here, Sergeant Knight,' Doc Daneeka told him plaintively. 'I'm not in the plane.' (430)

116. The first person in the squadron to find out that Doc Daneeka was dead was Sergeant Towser, who had been informed earlier by the man in the control tower that Doc Daneeka's name was down as a passenger on the pilot's manifest McWatt had filed before taking off. Sergeant Towser brushed away a tear and struck Doc Daneeka's name from the roster of squadron personnel. With lips still quivering, he rose and trudged outside reluctantly to break the bad news to Gus and Wes, discreetly avoiding any conversation with Doc Daneeka himself as he moved by the flight surgeon's slight sepulchral figure roosting despondently on his stool in the late-afternoon sunlight between the orderly room and the medical tent. Sergeant Towser's heart was heavy; now he had two dead men on his hands - Mudd the dead man in Yossarian's tent who wasn't even there, and Doc Daneeka, the new dead man in the squadron, who most certainly was there and gave every indication of proving a still thornier administrative problem for him. (431)

117. 'Just look how cold I am right now. You're sure you're not holding anything back?'
'You're dead, sir,' one of his two enlisted men explained.
Doc Daneeka jerked his head up quickly with resentful distrust.
'What's that?'
'You're dead, sir,' repeated the other. 'That's probably the reason you always feel so cold.'
'That's right, sir. You've probably been dead all this time and we just didn't detect it.'
'What the hell are you both talking about?' Doc Daneeka cried shrilly with a surging, petrifying sensation of some onrushing unavoidable disaster.
'It's true, sir,' said one of the enlisted men. 'The records show that you went up in McWatt's plane to collect some flight time. you didn't come down in a parachute, so you must have been killed in the crash.'
'That's right, sir,' said the other. 'You ought to be glad you've got any temperature at all.'
Doc Daneeka's mind was reeling in confusion. 'Have you both gone crazy?' he demanded. 'I'm going to report this whole insubordinate incident to Sergeant Towser. '

Sergeant Towser's the one who told us about it,' said either Gus or Wes. 'The War Department's even going to notify your wife.' (432)

118. Everyone in the squadron knew that Kid Sampson's skinny legs had washed up on the wet sand to lie there and rot like a purple twisted wishbone. No one would go to retrieve them, not Gus or Wes or even the men in the mortuary at the hospital; everyone made believe that Kid Sampson's legs were not there, that they had bobbed away south forever on the tide like all of Clevinger and Orr. Now that bad weather had come, almost no one ever sneaked away alone any more to peek through bushes like a pervert at the moldering stumps.
There were no more beautiful days. There were no more easy missions. There was stinging rain and dull, chilling fog, and the men flew at week-long intervals, whenever the weather cleared. (437)

119. The middle-aged big shots would not let Nately's whore leave until they made her say uncle.
'Say uncle,' they said to her.
'Uncle,' she said.
'No, no. say uncle.'
'Uncle,' she said.
'She still doesn't understand.'
'You still don't understand, do you? We can't really make you say uncle unless you don't want to say uncle. Don't you see? Don't say uncle when I tell you to say uncle. Okay? Say uncle.'

'Uncle,' she said.
'No, don't say uncle. Say uncle.'
She didn't say uncle.
'That's good!'
'That's very good.'
'It's a start. Now say uncle.'
'Uncle,' she said.
'It's no good.'
'No, it's no good that way either. She just isn't impressed with us. There's just no fun making her say uncle when she doesn't care whether we make her say uncle or not.' (445)

120. The chaplain had sinned, and it was good. Common sense told him that telling lies and defecting from duty were sins. On the other hand, everyone knew that sin was evil, and that no good could come from evil. But he did feel good; he felt positively marvelous. Consequently, it followed logically that telling lies and defecting from duty could not be sins. The chaplain had mastered, in a moment of divine intuition, the handy technique of protective rationalization, and he was exhilarated by his discovery. It was miraculous. It was almost no trick at all, he saw, to turn vice into virtue and slander into truth, impotence into abstinence, arrogance into humility, plunder into philanthropy, thievery into honor, blasphemy into wisdom, brutality into patriotism and sadism into justice.

Anybody could do it- it required no brains at all. It merely required no character.
(459)

121. The chaplain had entered the hospital with a pain in his heart that the doctors thought was gas in his stomach and with an advanced case of Wisconsin shingles.
'What in the world are Wisconsin shingles?' asked Yossarian.

'That's just what the doctors wanted to know!' blurted out the chaplain proudly, and burst into laughter. No one had ever seen him so waggish, or so happy. 'There's no such thing as Wisconsin shingles. Don't you understand? I lied. I made a deal with the doctors. I promised that I would let them know when my Wisconsin shingles went away if they would promise not to do anything to cure them. I never told a lie before. Isn't it wonderful?' (459)

122. Milo had been caught red-handed in the act of plundering his countrymen, and, as a result, his stock had never been higher. (466)

123. There's no one inside!' Dunbar yelled out at him unexpectedly. Yossarian felt his heart skip a beat and his legs grow weak. 'What are you talking about?' he shouted with dread, stunned by the haggard, sparking anguish in Dunbar's eyes and by his crazed look of wild shock and horror. 'Are you nuts or something? What the hell do you mean there's no one inside?'
'They've stolen him away!' Dunbar shouted back. 'He's hollow inside, like a chocolate soldier. They took him away and left those bamdages there.'
'Why should they do that?'
'Why should they do anything?' (462)

124. 'This isn't your handwriting.'
The chaplain blinked rapidly with amazement. 'But of course it's my handwriting.'
'No it isn't, Chaplain. You're lying again.'
'But I just wrote it!' the chaplain cried in exasperation. 'You saw me write it.'
'That's just it,' the major answered bitterly. 'I saw you write it. You can't deny that you did write it. A person who'll lie about his own handwriting will lie about anything.'
'But who lied about my own handwriting?' demanded the chaplain, forgetting his fear in the wave of anger and indignation that welled up inside him suddenly. 'Are you crazy or something? What are you both talking about?'
'We asked you to write your name in your own handwriting. An you didn't do it.'
'But of course I did. In whose writing did I write it if not my own?'
'In somebody else's.'
'Whose?'
'That's just what we're going to find out', threatened the

colonel. (481-82)

125. 'Chaplain,' he asked casually, 'of what religious persuasion are you?'
'I'm an Anabaptist, sir.'
'That's a pretty suspicious religion, isn't it?'
'Suspicious?' inquired the chaplain in a kind of innocent daze. 'Why, sir?'
'Well, I don't know a thing about it. You'll have to admit that, won't you? Doesn't that make it pretty suspicious? '
'I don't know, sir,' the chaplain answered diplomatically, with an uneasy stammer. He found the man's lack of insignia disconcerting and was not even sure he had to say 'sir.' who was he? And what authority had he to interrogate him?
'Chaplain, I once studied Latin. I think it's only unfair to warn you of that before I ask my next question. Doesn't the word Anabaptist simply mean that you're not a Baptist?'
'Oh, no, sir. There's much more.'
'Are you a Baptist?'
'No, sir.'
'Then you are not a Baptist, aren't you?'
'Sir?'
'I don't see why you're bickering with me on that point. You've already admitted it. Now, Chaplain, to say you're not a Baptist doesn't really tell us anything about what you are, does it? You could be anything or anyone. He leaned forward slightly and his manner took on a shrewd and significant air. 'You could even be,' he added, 'Washington Irving, couldn't you?'
'Washington Irving?' the chaplain repeated with surprise.
'Come on, Washington,' the corpulent colonel broke in irascibly. 'Why don't you make a clean breast of it? We know you stole that plum tomato.'
After a moment's shock, the chaplain giggled with nervous relief. 'Oh, is that it!' he exclaimed. 'Now I m beginning to understand. I didn't steal that plum tomato, sir. Colonel Cathcart gave it to me. You can even ask him if you don't believe me.' (483)

126. He began walking slowly, pushing uphill. Soon he came to a quiet, cozy, inviting restaurant with red velvet drapes in the windows and a blue neon sign near the door that said: TONY'S RESTAURANT: FINE FOOD AND DRINK. KEEP OUT. The words on the blue neon sign surprised him mildly for only an instant. Nothing warped seemed bizarre any more in his strange, distorted surroundings. (511)

127. 'There must have been a reason,' Yossarian persisted, pounding his fist into his hand. 'They couldn't just barge in here and chase everyone out.'
'No reason,' wailed the old woman. 'No reason.'
'What right did they have?'
'Catch-22.'
'What?' Yossarian froze in his tracks with fear and alarm and felt his whole body begin to tingle. 'What did you say?'

'Catch22' the old woman repeated, rocking her head up and down. 'Catch22. Catch-22 says they have a right to do anything we can't stop them from doing.'
'What the hell are you talking about?' Yossarian shouted at her in bewildered, furious protest. 'How did you know it was Catch-22? Who the hell told you it was Catch22?'
'The soldiers with the hard white hats and clubs. The girls were crying. "Did we do anything wrong?" they said. The men said no and pushed them away out the door with the ends of their clubs. "Then why are you chasing us out?" the girls said. "Catch-22," the men said. "What right do you have?" the girls said. "Catch-22," the men said. All they kept saying was "Catch22, Catch22."
'What does it mean, Catch-22? What is Catch-22?'
'Didn't they show it to you?' Yossarian demanded, stamping about in anger and distress. 'Didn't you even make them read it?' 'They don't have to show us Catch22,' the old woman answered. 'The law says they don't have to.'
'What law says they don't have to?'
'Catch22.'
'Oh, God damn!' Yossarian exclaimed bitterly. 'I bet it wasn't even really there.' He stopped walking and glanced about the room disconsolately. (514-15)

128. Yossarian left money in the old woman's lap - it was odd how many wrongs leaving money seemed to right and strode out of the apartment, cursing Catch-22 vehemently as he descended the stairs, even though he knew there was no such thing. Catch-22 did not exist, he was positive of that, but it made no difference. What did matter was that everyone thought it existed, and that was much worse, for there was no object or text to ridicule or refute, to accuse, criticize, attack, amend, hate, revile, spit at, rip to shreds, trample upon or burn up. (516)

129. How many winners were losers, successes failures, rich men poor men? How many wise guys were stupid? How many happy endings were unhappy endings? How many honest men were liars, brave men cowards, loyal men traitors, how many sainted men were corrupt,how many people in positions of trust had sold their souls to blackguards for petty cash, how many had never had souls? How many straight-and-narrow paths were crooked paths? How many best families were worst families and how many good people were bad people? (520-21)

130. 'We're going to send him home, I'm afraid.' Colonel Korn was chuckling triumphantly when he turned away from Colonel Cathcart to face Yossarian. 'Yossarian, the war is over for you. We're going to send you home. You really don't deserve it, you know, which is one of the reasons I don't mind doing it. Since there's nothing else we can risk doing to you at this time, we've decided to return you to the States. We've worked out this little deal to -' (533)

131. 'Won't you fight for your country?' Colonel Korn demanded, emulating Colonel Cathcart's harsh, selfrighteous tone. 'Won't you give up your life for Colonel Cathcart and me?'
Yossarian tensed with alert astonishment when he heard Colonel Korn's concluding words. 'What's that?' he exclaimed. 'What have you and Colonel Cathcart got to do with my country? You're not
the same.'
'How can you separate us?' Colonel Korn inquired with ironical tranquillity.
'That's right,' Colonel Cathcart cried emphatically. 'You're either for us or against us. There's no two ways about it.'

'I'm afraid he's got you,' added Colonel Korn. 'You're either for us or against your country. It's as simple as that.'
'Oh, no, Colonel. I don't buy that.'
Colonel Korn was unruffled. 'Neither do I, frankly, but everyone else will. So there you are.' (534)

132. 'You can't operate on him until I admit him,' said a clerk. 'You can't admit him until I clear him,' said a fat, gruff colonel with a mustache and an enormous pink face that pressed down very close to Yossarian and radiated scorching heat like the bottom of a huge frying pan. (542)

133. He bent forward impulsively with awkward solicitude. 'Yossarian, is there anything I can do for you while you're here, anything I can get you?'
Yossarian teased him jovially. 'Like toys, or candy, chewing gum?' The chaplain blushed again, grinning self-consciously, and then turned very respectful. 'Like books, perhaps or anything at all. I wish there was something I could do to make you happy. You know, Yossarian, we're all very proud of you.

'Proud?'
'Yes, of course. For risking your life to stop that Nazi assassin. It was a very noble thing to do.'
'What Nazi assassin?'
'The one that came here to murder Colonel Cathcart and Colonel Korn. And you saved them. He might have stabbed you to death as you grappled with him on the balcony. It's a lucky thing you're alive!' Yossarian snickered sardonically when he understood. 'That was no Nazi assassin.'
'Certalinly it was. Colonel Korn said it was.'
'That was Nately's girl friend. And she was after me not Colonel Cathcart and Colonel Korn. She's been trying to kill me ever since I broke the news to her that Nately was dead.'

'But how could that be?' the chaplain protested in livid and resentful confusion. 'Colonel Cathcart and Colonel Korn both saw him as he ran away. The official report says you stopped a Nazi assassin from killing them.'
'Don't believe the official report,' Yossarian advised dryly. 'It's part of the deal.' (546-47)

134. 'Danby, must I really let them send me home?' Yossarian inquired of him seriously.
Major Danby shrugged. 'It's a way to save yourself.'
'It's a way to lose myself, Danby. You ought to know that.'

'You could have lots of things you want.'
134. 'I don't want lots of things I want,' Yossarian replied, and then beat his fist down against the mattress in an outburst of rage and frustration. 'Goddammit, Danby! I've got friends who were killed in this war. I can't make a deal now. Getting stabbed by that bitch was the best thing that ever happened to me.' (562)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adams, M. and A. Collins (1979) A schema-theoretical view of reading, in Freedle (ed.). 1-22.

Aguirre, M. (1991) Some commonsense notions on postmodernism, *Studia Patricia Shaw Oblata*, vol. III, Publicaciones de la Universidad de Oviedo. 3-13.

Allén S. (ed.) (1989) *Possible Worlds in the Humanities, Arts and Sciences*. Proceedings of the Nobel Symposium 65. New York and Berlin.

Allwood et. al (1974) *Logic in Linguistics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Anderson, J.R. (ed.) (1981) *Cognitive Skills and their Acquisition*. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlabum.

Apter, M. J. (1982) *The Experience of Motivation: The Theory of Psychological Reversals*. London: Academic Press.

Atlas, J. D. (1977) Negation, ambiguity and presupposition, *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 1, 321-336.

Atlas, J. D. and S. Levinson (1981) Negation and implicature: A problem for the standard version of radical pragmatics, in It-clefts, informativeness and logical form: Radical pragmatics (revised version), in P. Cole (ed.). 32-37.

Austin, J.K. (1962) *How to do Things with Words*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Baker, M., G. Francis and E. Tognini-Bonelli (eds.) (1993) *Text and Technology*. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: J. Benjamins.

Bartlett, F.C. (1932) *Remembering*. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Bateson, G. (1972) A theory of play and fantasy, in G. Bateson (ed) (1972). 177-193.

Bateson G., D. D. Jakson, J. Haley and J. H. Weakland (1972) Towards a theory of schizophrenia, in G. Bateson (ed.). 201-227.

Bateson G., (ed) (1972) *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*. London: Intertext Books.

Bauman R., and J. Sherzer (eds.) (1974) *Explorations in the Ethnography of Speaking*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univesity Press.

de Beaugrande, R. (1980) *Text, Discourse and Process*. Norwood: Ablex Publishing Co.

de Beaugrande, R. (1987) Schemas for Literary communication in Halász L. (ed.) *Literary Discourse*.

Biber, D. (1988) *Variation across Speech and Writing*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bernárdez, E. (1995) *Teoría y Epistemología del Texto*. Madrid: Cátedra.

Birch, D. (1989) *Language, Literature and Critical Practice*. London: Routledge.

Blues, T. (1971) The moral structure of *Catch-22*, *Studies in the Novel*, 3. 64-79.

Bockting, I. (1994) Mind style as an interdisciplinary approach to characterisation in Faulkner, *Language and Literature*, 3, 3. 157-174.

Bolinger, D. (1977) *Meaning and Form*. London: Longman. 37-65.

Bradley, R. and N. Swartz (1979) *Possible Worlds: An Introduction to Logic and Its Philosophy*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Breuer, R. (1980) Irony, Literature and Schizophrenia, *New Literary History*, 12, 1. 107-118.

Brown G. & G. Yule (1983) *Discourse Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brown, R. (1973) *A First Language*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Budick, S. and W. Iser (eds.) (1989) *Languages of the Unsayable: The Play of Negativity in Literature and Literary Theory*. New York/Oxford: Columbia University Press.

Budick, S and W. Iser (1989) Introduction: The Critical turn: Toward negativity and the 'unsayable', in S. Budick and W. Iser (eds.). xi-xxv.

Burnham, C. S. (1974) 'Spindrift and the Sea: Structural Patterns and Unifying Elements in *Catch-22*' in Nagel (ed) (1974b). 40-50.

Burrows, J.F. (1992) Computers and the study of literature, in C. Butler (ed.).

Burton, D. (1980) *Dialogue and Discourse*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Burton. D. (1982) Through glass darkly: Through dark glasses, in Carter (ed.) 195-216.

Butler, C. (ed.) (1992) *Computers and Written Texts*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Calvo, C. (1991) Pronouns of address and social negotiation in *As You Like it*. *Language and Literature*. 1, 1. 5-28.

Carrell, P., J. Devine and D. Eskey (eds.) (1988) *Interactive Approaches to Second Language Reading*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Carroll, J.B. (ed.) (1956) *Language, Thought and Reality. Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf*. New York: Wiley.

Carston, R. (1996) Metalinguistic negation and echoic use, *Journal of Pragmatics* 25, 309-330.

Carter, R. A. (ed.) (1982) *Language and Literature*. London: Allen and Unwin.

Carter R. A. and P. Simpson (eds.) (1989) *Language, Discourse and Literature*. London: Unwin Hyman.

Carter R. A. and W. Nash (1990) *Seeing Through Words*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Chapman, A.J. and H.C. Foot (eds.) (1976) *Humour and Laughter: Theory, Research and Applications*. London: Wiley.

Clark, H. H. (1976) *Semantics and Comprehension*. Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter. 18-57.

Clark, H. H. and E. Clark (1977) *Psychology and Language: An Introduction to Psycholinguistics*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovic.

Cole, P. (ed) (1978) *Syntax and Semantics 9: Pragmatics*. New York: Academic Press.

Cole P. (ed.) (1981) *Radical Pragmatics*, New York: Academic Press.

Cole, P. and J. Morgan (eds.) (1975) *Syntax and Semantics 3:*

Speech Acts. London: Academic Press.

Cook, G. (1994) *Discourse and Literature: the Interplay of Form and Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Coulthard, M. (ed) (1994) *Advances in Written Text Analysis*. London: Routledge.

Cruse, D.A. (1986) *Lexical Semantics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Davis, G. W. (1984) *Catch-22* and the Language of Discontinuity in Nagel J. (ed) (1984) *Critical Essays on Joseph Heller*. 62-73.

Derks, P., J. Palmer, E. Safer, L. Sherman & S. Svebak (1994) A Multidisciplinary Approach to Joseph Heller's *Catch-22* - A Symposium, International Society of Humor Studies Conference, Ithaca, New York, 1994.

van Dijk T. A. (1977) *Text and Context: Explorations in the Semantics and Pragmatics of Discourse*. London: Longman.

van Dijk T. A. (ed.) (1982) *New Developments in Cognitive Models of Discourse Processing* (special issue of *Text* 2-1/3). Amsterdam: Mouton.

van Dijk, T. A. (1985) *Discourse and Literature.* Amsterdam/Philadelphia: J. Benjamins.

van Dijk T. A. and W. Kintsch (1983) *Strategies of Discourse Comprehension*. New York: Academic Press.

Dolezel, L. (1976) Narrative modalities, *Journal of Literary Semantics*, 5, 1. 5-14.

Dolezel, L. (1989) Possible Worlds and Literary Fictions, in S. Allén (ed.). 321-342.

Downing, A. and P.L. Locke (1992) *A University Course in English Grammar*. Hemel Hempstead: Prentice-Hall. 179-182.

Downing, A. (1995) A functional grammar for students of English: An extended review of Givón (1993), *Functions of Language*, 2, 2, 229-247.

Dummett, M. (1981) *Frege - Philosophy of Language*. London: The Trinity Press.

Eco, U. (1989) Report on session 3: Literature and the arts, in Allén (ed.) 343-355.

Ehrlich, S. (1990) *Point of View: A Linguistic Analysis of Literary Style*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Emmott, C. (1994) Frames of reference: contextual monitoring and the interpretation of narrative discourse, in M. Coulthard (ed) 157-166.

Empson, W. (1995) *Seven Types of Ambiguity*. Harmosworth: Penguin. [1930].

Enkvist, N. E. (1989) Connexity, interpretability, universes of discourse, and text worlds, in Allén (ed.). 162-186.

Escandell Vidal, M.V. (1990) Estrategias en la interpretación de enunciados contradictorios, *Actas del Congreso de la Sociedad Española de Lingüística, XX Aniversario*. Madrid, Gredos. 923-936.

Fairclough, N. (1989) *Language and Power*. London: Longman.

Fillmore, C. (1982) 'Frame semantics' in The Linguistic Society of Korea (eds.) *Linguistics in the Morning Calm*. 11-137.

Fillmore, C. (1985) 'Frames and the semantics of understanding' *Quaderni di Semantica*, 6, 2, 222-254.

Fish, S. (1980) *Is There a Text in this Class?* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Fodor, J.A. and J.J. Katz (eds.) (1964) *The Structure of Language: Readings in the Philosophy of Language*. Hemel Hempstead: Prentice Hall.

Fowler, R. (1977) *Linguistics and the Novel*. London: Methuen.

Fowler, R. (1986) *Linguistic Criticism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Freedle, R. (1979) *New Directions in Discourse Processing*. Norwood: Ablex Publishing Co.

Freud, S. (1976a.) La negación, in *Obras Completas*, vol. 21. Translated from James Strachey (ed). Buenos Aires: Amorrotu. [1927].

Freud, S. (1976b.) El humor, in *Obras Completas*, vol. 21. Translated from James Strachey (ed.). Buenos Aires: Amorrotu. 153-162. [1927].

Freud, S. (1966) *Six Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Garvin, P. L.(ed.) (1964) *A Prague School Reader on Esthetics, Literary Structure and Style*. Transl. Washington D.C. Georgetown University Press.

Gaukroger, D. (1970) Time Structure in *Catch-22*, *Critique*, 12, 2. 70-85. Repreinted in Nagel (ed) (1974b).

Givón, T. (1978) Negation in Language: Pragmatics, function, ontology, in P. Cole (ed). 69-112.

Givón, T. (1979) *On Understanding Grammar*. New York: Academic Press. 91-142.

Givón, T. (1984) *Syntax: A Functional-Typological Introduction.* Amsterdam: J.Benjamins. 321-351.

Givón, T. (1989) *Mind, Code and Context: Essays in Pragmatics.* Hillsdale, N.J.: L.Erlbaum Associates. 127-172.

Givón, T. (1993) *English Grammar: A Function-Based Approach.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 187-208.

Goffman, E. (1974) *Frame Analysis.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Green, K. (1995) *New Essays in Deixis.* Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Greenberg, A. (1966) The Novel of Disintegration: Paradoxical Impossibility in Contemporary Fiction, *Wisconsin Studies in Contemporary Literature,* 7, 1, 103-124.

Grice, H.P. (1975) Logic and Conversation, in Cole and Morgan (eds) 41-57.

Halász L. (ed.) (1987) *Literary Discourse.* Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter.

Hall, G. (1996) A review of G. Cook's (1994) *Discourse and Literature: The Interplay of Form and Mind,* in *Language and Literature* 5, 1. 74-77.

Halliday, M.A.K. (1973) *Exploration in the Functions of Language.* London: Arnold.

Halliday, M.A.K. (1978) *Language as Social Semiotic.* London: Arnold. 164-182.

Halliday, M.A.K.(1994) *An Introduction to Functional Grammar,* 2nd edition. London: Arnold. 88-92.

Halliday, M.A.K. and R. Hasan (1985) *Language, Text and Context: Aspects of Language in a Social Semiotic Perspective.* London: Arnold.

Havránek, B. (1964) The functional differentiation of the standard language, in P. L. Garvin (ed.). 3-16.

Heller, J. (1961) *Catch-22*. London: Johnathan Cape, (1986).

Hodge R. and G. Kress (1994) *Language as Ideology*. 2nd edition. London: Routledge.

Horn, L. (1989) *A Natural History of Negation*. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.

Huddleston, R. (1984) *An Introduction to the Grammar of English*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 419-432.

Hunt, J. W. (1974) Comic escape and anti-vision: Joseph Heller's *Catch-22*, in Nagel J.(ed) (1974b). 125-130.

Iser, W. (1989) The play of the text, in S. Budick and W. Iser (eds.). 325-339.

Jackendoff, R. (1983) *Semantics and Cognition*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Jakobson, R. (1964) Closing statement: Linguistics and poetics, in T. Sebeok (ed.) *Style in Language*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 350-377.

Jespersen, O. (1917) *Negation in English and in Other Languages*. 2nd edition. Copenhaguen: Ejnar Munksgaard Publishers. 1966.

Just, M.A. and H. H. Clark (1973) Drawing inferences from the presuppositions and implications of affirmative and negative sentences, *Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior*, 12, 21-31.

Keegan, B. M. (1978) *Joseph Heller: A Reference Guide*. Boston: G.K. Hall.

Kempson, R. (1975) *Presupposition and the delimitation of Semantics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Klima, E. S. (1964) Negation in English, in Fodor and Katz (eds.). 246-323.

Krassner, P. (1962) An Impolite Interview with Joseph Heller, in Sorkin A.J. (ed) (1993). 6-29.

Kripke, S. (1971) Semantic considerations of modal logic, in Linsky (ed.). 63-73.

Kuno, S. (1992a) 'Negation and Extraction', paper read at the 'Seminario de Semántica Cognitiva y Gramática Funcional' University of Seville, December 1993. Manuscript copy.

Kuno, S. (1992b) 'Remarks on Negative Islands', paper read at the 'Seminario de Semántica Cognitiva y Gramática Funcional' University of Seville. December 1993. Manuscript copy.

Kurrick, M. J. (1979) *Literature and Negation*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Labov, W. (1972) The Transformation of Experience in Narrative Syntax, in *Language in the Inner City*. Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 354-397.

Labov, W. and D. Fanshel (1977) *Therapeutic Discourse*. New York: Academic Press. 334-343.

Leech, G. (1974) *Semantics*. Harmonsworth: Penguin.

Leech G. (1983) *Principles of Pragmatics*. London: Longman.

Leech G. & Short M. (1981) *Style in Fiction*. London: Longman.

Leinfeller, E. (1994) The broader perspective of negation, *Journal of Literary Semantics*, 13, 2. 77-98.

Lemon, L.T. and M.J. Reis (1965) *Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Levinson S. (1983) *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lewis, D. (1979) Possible worlds, in Loux (ed.) 182-189.

Linsky, L. (ed.) (1971) *Reference and Modality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

LOB and Brown corpora.

Louw, B. (1993) Irony in the text or insincerity in the writer? The diagnostic potential of semantic prosodies, in Baker *et al*. (eds).

Loux, M. J. (1979) *The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphisics of Modality*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Lyons, J. (1977) *Semantics*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Lyons, J. (1981) *Language, Meaning and Context*. Suffolk: Fontana.

Lyons, J. (1995) *Linguistic Semantics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marsh, R. C. (ed.) (1988) *Bertrand Russell: Logic and Knowledge*. London: Unwin Hyman.

McCawley, J.D. (1981) *Everything that Linguists Wanted to Know about Logic but Were Afraid to Ask*. Oxford: Blackwell.

McCawley, J. D. (1995) Jespersen's 1917 monograph on negation, *Word*, 46, 1, 29-40.

McHale, Brian (1987) *Postmodernist Fiction*. London: Methuen.

Mellard, James M. (1968) *Catch-22*: Dejà vu and the Labyrinth of Memory, *Bucknell Review*, 16, 2, 29-44.

Merrill, R. (1987) *Joseph Heller*. Boston, Mass.: Twayne Publishers.

Merrill, S. (1975) *Playboy* Interview, in Sorkin (ed) (1993) 144-176.

Miall, D. S. and D. Kuiken (1994) Beyond text theory: Understanding literary response, *Discourse Processes*, 17. 337-352.

Minsky, M.L. (1975) A framework for representing knowledge, in P. Winston (ed.). 211-27.

Mukarowsky, J. (1964) Standard language and poetic language, in Paul L. Garvin (ed.). 17-30.

Müske, E. (1990) Frame and literary discourse, *Poetics*, 19. 433-461.

Nagel, J. (1974a) *Catch-22* and Angry Humor: A Study of the Normative Values of Satire, *Studies in American Humor*, 1, 2, 99-106.

Nagel, J. (1974b) *Critical Essays on Catch-22*. Encino: Dickenson.

Nagel, J. (1984) *Critical Essays on Joseph Heller*. Boston: J.K. Hall.

Nash, W. (1985) *The Language of Humour*. London: Longman.

Nelson, T.A. (1971) Theme and structure in *Catch-22*, *Renascence*, 23, 4. 173-182.

Norrick, N. (1986) A frame-theoretical analysis of verbal humor: Bisociation as schema conflict, *Semiotica* 60/3-4.

225-245.

Norrick, N. (1993) *Conversational Joking*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Ochs, E. and B.B. Schieffelin (eds.) (1979) *Developmental Pragmatics*. New York: Academic Press. 281-321.

Oh, C. and D.A. Dinneen (eds.) (1979) *Syntax and Semantics 11: Presupposition*. New York, Academic Press.

Pagano, A. (1994) Negatives in written text in M. Coulthard (ed.) 250-265.

Partee, B. H. (1989) Possible worlds in model-theoretic semantics: A linguistic perspective, in Allén (ed.) 93-123.

Pavel, T. (1985) Literary narratives, in T.A. van Dijk (ed.). 85-103.

Pavel, T. (1986) *Fictional Worlds*. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press.

Pavel, T. (1989) Fictional worlds and the economy of the imaginary, in Allén (ed) 249-259.

van Peer, W. (1986) *Stylistics and Psychology: Investigations of Foregrounding*. London: Croom Helm.

van Peer, W. (1988) *The Taming of the Text*. London: Routledge.

Petrey, S. (1990) *Speech Acts and Literary Theory*. London: Routledge.

Petöfi, J. (1989) Possible worlds - Text worlds: Quo vadis linguistica? in Allén (ed.) 209-218.

Pilkington, A. (1996) Relevance theory and literary style, *Language and Literature*, 5, 3. 157-163.

Pinsker, S. (1991) *Understanding Joseph Heller.* Columbia: the University of South Carolina Press.

Pratt, M. L. (1977) *Towards a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Protherough, R. (1971) The sanity of *Catch-22, The Human World*, 3. 59-70.

Quirk, R. *et al* (1985) *A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language*. London: Longman. 775-799.

Quirk R., and S. Greenbaum (1990) *A Student's Grammar of the English Language*. London: Longman. 223-230.

Ramsey, V. (1968) From here to absurdity: Heller's *Catch-22*, in T.B. Whitbread (ed). 99-118.

Raskin, V. (1985) *Semantic Mechanisms of Humour*. Dordrecht/Boston: Reidel Publishing Co. [1944].

Rescher, N. (1979) The ontology of the possible, in Loux (ed.) 166-181.

Rosenhan D.L. (1973) Estar sano en lugares insanos, *Science*, n. 179, 250-258. Translation by Carmelo Vázquez.

Rosch, E. (1973) Natural Categories, *Cognitive Psychology* 4, 328-506.

Ruderman, J. (1991) *Joseph Heller: Criticism and Interpretation.* New York: The Continuum Publishing Company.

Rumelhart, D.E. (1980) Schemata: the building blocks of cognition, in R.J. Spiro et al. (eds.). 33-58.

Rumelhart, D.E. and D. A. Norman (1981) Analogical processes in learning, in Anderson (ed.), 335-360.

Russell, B. (1988) On denoting, in Marsh (ed.) 39-57. [1905].

Ryan, M.L. (1985) The modal structure of narrative universes, *Poetics Today*, 6:4. 717-755.

Ryan, M.L. (1991a) Possible worlds and accessibility relations: a semantic typology of fiction, *Poetics Today* 12:3. 553-576.

Ryan, M.L. (1991b) *Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence and Narrative Theory*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Sacks, H. (1974) An analysis of the course of a joke's telling in conversation, in R. Bauman and J. Sherzer (eds.). 337-353.

Schank, R.C. (1982) *Dynamic Memory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schank, R.C. and R. Abelson (1977) *Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding*. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Searle, J.R. (1969) *Speech Acts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Searle, J.R. (1975) The logical status of fictional discourse, *New Literary History*, 6. 319-332.

Seed, D. (1989) *The Fiction of Joseph Heller: Against the Grain*. New York: St.Martin's Press.

Sell, R. and P. Verdonk (1994) *Literature and the New Interdisciplinarity*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Semino, E. (1993) A Review of Ryan's (1991) *Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence and Literary Theory*. *Language and Literature* 2, 2. 146-148.

Semino, E. (1994) *Poems, Schemata and Possible Worlds: Text*

Worlds in the Analysis of Poetry. Unpublished Phd. Dissertation. Lancaster University.

Semino, E. (1995) Schema Theory and the Analysis of Text Worlds in Poetry, *Language and Literature*, 4, 2, 79-108.

Shklovsky, V. B. [1917] (1965) Art as technique in L. T. Lemon and M. J. Reis: 3-24.

Short, M. H. (1989) *Reading, Analysing and Teaching Literature*. London: Longman.

Short, M., E. Semino, and J. Culpeper (1996) Using a corpus for stylistics research: speech and thought presentation, in J. Thomas and M. Short (eds.). 110-131.

Shulz, T.R. (1976) A cognitive-developmental analysis of humour, in A.J. Chapman and H.C. Foot (eds.). 11-36.

Simpson, P. (1989) Politeness phenomena in Ionesco's *The Lesson*, in Carter and Simpson (eds.) (1989). pps. 171-194.

Simpson, P. (1993) *Language, Ideology and Point of View*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Solomon, E. (1969) From Christ in Flanders to *Catch-22*: An approach to war fiction, *Texas Studies in Literature and Language*, 11, 1. 852-866.

Solomon, J. (1974) The Structure of Joseph Heller's *Catch-22*, in Nagel (ed) (1974b). 78-88.

Sorkin, Adam J. (ed) (1993) *Conversations with Joseph Heller*. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi.

Sperber, D. & D. Wilson (1986) *Relevance*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Spiro, R.J. *et.al.* (eds.) (1980) *Theoretical Issues in Reading Comprehension*. Hillsdale N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Tannen, D. (ed) (1993) *Framing in Discourse*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tanner, T. (1971) *City of Words: American Fiction 1950-1970*. New York/London: Harper and Row Publishers.

Teleman, U. (1989) The world of words - and pictures, in Allén (ed.) 199-208.

Thomas J., and M. Short (eds.) (1996) *Using Corpora for Language Research*. London: Longman.

Thorndyke P.W. and F.R. Yekovich (1980) A critique of schema-based theories of human story memory, *Poetics*, 9. 23-49.

Toolan M. (1988) *Narrative, a Critical Linguistic Introduction*. London: Routledge.

Toolan, M. (ed.) (1992) *Language, Text and Context: Essays in Stylistics*. London: Routledge.

Tottie, G. (1982) Where do negative sentences come from? *Studia Linguistica*, 36, 1, 88-105.

Tottie, G. (1991) *Negation in English Speech and Writing: A Study in Variation*. San Diego: Academic Press.

Tucker, L. (1984) Entropy and information theory in *Something Happened, Contemporary Literature*, XXV, 3. 323-340.

Van der Sandt, R. A. (1991) Denial, *Papers from the 27th Regional Meeting of the CLS: Parasession on Negation*. 331-344.

Vanderveken, D. (1991) *Meaning and Speech Acts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Verdonk, P. and J. J.Weber (eds.) (1995) *Twentieth-Century Fiction: From Text to Context*. London: Routledge.

Waldmeir, J. J. (1964) Two Novelists of the Absurd: Heller and Casey, in Nagel (ed) (1974b), 150-154.

Walsh, J. (1982) *American War Literature, 1914 to Vietnam*. New York: St. Martn's Press.

Wason, P.C. (1965) The contexts of plausible denial, *Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior*, 4, 7-11.

Watson, G. (1996) Something will come of nothing: An empirical model of negation for prose literature. Paper presented at the 1996 PALA Conference, Belfast.

Weixlmann, J. (1974) A Bibliography of Joseph Heller's *Catch-22*, in *Bullettin of Bibliography*, 31, 1. 32-35.

Werlich, E. (1983) *A Text Grammar of English*. Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer.

Werth, P. (1976) Roman Jakobson's verbal analysis of poetry *Journal of Linguistics*, 12, 21-73.

Werth, P. (1984) *Focus, Coherence and Emphasis*. London: Croom Helm.

Werth, P. (1993) Accomodation and the myth of presupposition: the view from discourse, *Lingua* 89, 39-95.

Werth, P. (1994) Extended metaphor - A text-world account, *Language and Literature*, 3, 2, 79-104.

Werth, P. (1995a.) How to build a world (in a lot less than six days, using only what's in your head), in Green (ed.), 49-80.

Werth, P. (1995b.) 'World enough, and time': Deictic space and the interpretation of prose. in P. Verdonk and J. J. Weber (eds.). 181-205.

Werth, P. (1995c) *Text Worlds: Representing Conceptual Space in Discourse*. Pre-publication manuscript copy.

Widdowson H. (1975) *Stylistics and the Teaching of Literature*. London: Longman.

Widdowson, H. (1992) *Practical Stylistics*. London: Longman.

Winston, P. (1975) *The Psychology of Computer Vision*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID

FACULTAD DE FILOLOGIA

Departamento de Filología Inglesa

Memoria-Resumen en castellano
de la Tesis Doctoral titulada:

A Discourse-Pragmatic Approach to Negation in J. Heller's *Catch-22*

Una interpretación pragmático-discursiva de la negación en la novela *Catch-22*, de J. Heller

Presentada por: Laura Hidalgo Downing

Directora: Dra. JoAnne Neff

1997

INDICE

INTRODUCCION

1. Objetivos de la tesis

El principal objetivo de esta tesis es el de analizar las funciones pragmático-discursivas de la negación en la novela *Catch-22*, de Joseph Heller. El planteamiento del trabajo surge de la intuición de que la negación juega un papel significativo en el discurso de la novela; dicha intuición se formaliza por medio de una hipótesis que he utilizado como punto de partida para mi investigación:

HIPÓTESIS 1: La negación es un fenómeno marcado en *Catch-22*.

La verificación de esta hipótesis requiere que se establezca una correspondencia entre la intuición, por una parte, y la observación y sistematización de los datos lingüísticos, por otra. Un planteamiento de este tipo concuerda con los objetivos generales del análisis estilístico lingüístico, tal y como se ha desarrollado en la escuela británica (véase Carter (1982), Carter y Simpson (1989), Leech y Short (1981), Toolan (1988, 1992), Widdowson (1992), Verdonk y Weber (1995)).

Dentro de este marco teórico general, la clasificación e interpretación de las funciones de la negación se realiza desde dos puntos de vista diferentes y complementarios: (a) desde un punto de vista cualitativo, como un estudio del fenómeno de la negación dentro del modelo lingüístico de los mundos del texto (*Text World Theory*) (Werth, 1995c); (b) desde un punto de vista cuantitativo, como un estudio de los tipos y la frecuencia de la negación en el corpus. El estudio cualitativo es primordial en esta tesis, lo que significa que el análisis cuantitativo

constituye solamente un apoyo empírico que respalda y complementa las observaciones realizadas en el estudio cualitativo.

La argumentación fundamental de la tesis se centra en la observación de que la negación en *Catch-22* presenta rasgos idiosincráticos que le confieren un carácter marcado (*foregrounded*), cuya recursividad a lo largo de la obra contribuye a la creación de un patrón de desviación discursiva que lleva a un cuestionamiento de esquemas cognitivos en el lector referentes a temas fundamentales de la obra, como son la guerra, la economía, la religión, el comercio y otros. La percepción de dicho patrón de desviación en un posible lector produce el efecto de *desfamiliarización* descrito por los formalistas rusos (véase Shklovsky 1917). El efecto de desfamiliarización es siempre subjetivo y, por tanto, las observaciones referentes al patrón de desviación discursiva y sus efectos se corresponden con mi percepción del fenómeno lingüístico como lectora.

El análisis cualitativo tiene dos objetivos principales: (a) la clasificación y descripción de la funciones discursivas y de las propiedades ontológicas de la negación, y (b) la descripción de la correspondencia entre estas funciones, y la creación del patrón de desviación discursiva y el efecto de desfamiliarización. Estos objetivos se formulan según la hipótesis 2:

HIPÓTESIS 2: La negación tiene un carácter marcado que conduce a la creación de un patrón de desviación discursiva.

El análisis cuantitativo tiene el objetivo de sistematizar y clasificar los datos lingüísitcos y, asimismo, tiene la función de complementar el análisis cualitativo por medio de una observación empírica de la frecuencia de los tipos de negación en el corpus. La cuestión fundamental en el análisis cuantitativo es si el carácter marcado de la negación en *Catch-22* responde exclusivamente a factores cualitativos, o si puede explicarse también en virtud de una frecuencia superior a la norma de los tipos de negación. Este objetivo se formula según la hipótesis 3:

HIPÓTESIS 3: La frecuencia de las palabras negativas en *Catch-22* es superior a la media en textos del mismo tipo (ficción).

La comparación entre la frecuencia de las palabras negativas en *Catch-22* y la frecuencia en otros *corpora* nos permite establecer si la naturaleza marcada de la negación como fenómeno discursivo en *Catch-22* tiene una base cuantitativa o no. Sin embargo, el estudio cuantitativo tiene una serie de limitaciones que se detallan en el capítulo 6, y que hacen que dicho estudio tenga un carácter secundario con respecto al análisis cualitativo.

2. El corpus y los métodos de análisis

El corpus objeto de análisis es la novela *Catch-22*. En el capítulo 6 se establece una distinción entre dicho corpus, que incluye la totalidad de la novela, y el *subcorpus*, una selección de 134 extractos (unas 171.235 palabras) ordenados alfabéticamente en el apéndice. Los criterios adoptados para la

selección de los extractos del subcorpus se explican en detalle en el capítulo 6, pero aquí quisiera simplemente señalar que dicha selección se ha realizado por motivos prácticos, ya que el análisis de los tipos de negación en la novela completa superaba los objetivos de un trabajo de las características de esta tesis. Asimismo, la selección de los extractos se ha realizado según criterios fundamentalmente cualitativos, es decir, relacionados con el interés de los extractos como ejemplos de los tipos de negación. Esto significa que soy consciente de que un trabajo con orientación cuantitativa exigiría una selección de extractos según otros criterios diferentes.

Los análisis cualitativo y cuantitativo de los capítulos 5 y 6 se basan en clasificaciones diferentes de los datos y se describen en detalle en los capítulos correspondientes. En el capítulo 5, se parte de la teoría de mundos del texto de Werth (1995c) para la clasificación y descripción de las funciones pragmáticas y discursivas de la negación, mientras que en el capítulo 6 se parte de la clasificación de funciones comunicativas de la negación en el modelo de Tottie (1991), que está adaptado a un análisis de la negación por ordenador.

3. Marcos teóricos

En esta tesis se establece una distinción entre dos niveles de análisis diferentes y la consiguiente diferenciación entre los marcos teóricos que se aplican en cada caso. (a) Un primer nivel general de análisis, en el que el estudio del texto se sitúa

dentro del marco de la investigación de la estilística lingüística. Por estilística se entiende la labor realizada en las últimas décadas en las líneas iniciadas por los estructuralistas rusos y posteriormente desarrolladas y complementadas por teorías del discurso, como por ejemplo la teoría sistémica, y teorías pragmáticas. (Véase, por ejemplo, Pratt, 1977 y Petrey, 1990). De estas teorías he adoptado las nociones de carácter marcado (*foregrounding*), desviación discursiva (*discourse deviation*) y desfamiliarización (*defamiliarisation*), que he considerado útiles para la explicación del fenómeno según el cual el carácter marcado de la negación se asocia a un efecto determinado que percibe el lector.

(b) Un segundo nivel de análisis más específico, que incluye los marcos teóricos adoptados en el análisis de las funciones de la negación. Los modelos principales utilizados en el análisis de los capítulos 5 y 6 son el modelo de mundos del texto de Werth (1995c), y el modelo de negación en el discurso hablado y escrito de Tottie (1991). El modelo de Werth (1995c) propone un planteamiento de la negación que incorpora nociones cognitivas, semánticas y pragmáticas dentro de un marco discursivo más amplio. La negación contribuye, en el discurso, a una función general de actualización y canalización de la información. La función específica de la negación consiste en cancelar parámetros que se han introducido previamente en el discurso y que ya no son válidos. Hay también un tipo de submundo negativo no prototípico que Werth (op. cit.) define como acomodación negativa (*negative accommodation*), fenómeno que consiste en la presentación y

negación simultánea de un parámetro. El modelo de Werth (op. cit.), sin embargo, no nos permite analizar los enunciados negativos paradójicos. Se propone una extensión al modelo de mundos del texto al incluir el análisis de los enunciados paradójicos, y se argumenta que, en estos casos, la negación no contribuye a la función de actualización de la información, sino que crea una especie de cortocircuito de información que debe resolverse mediante un procesamiento en un nivel superior de comprensión. La paradoja también puede desarrollarse a partir de la creación de oposiciones entre opuestos léxicos. Se propone un análisis lingüístico de la paradoja según las teorías de marcos semánticos y esquemas cognitivos que se describen en el capítulo 4.

4. Organización de la tesis

La tesis está dividida en dos partes que contienen, en total, 7 capítulos. La primera parte, que comprende los capítulos 1 a 4, es teórica, mientras la segunda parte, que incluye los capítulos 5 y 6, es la aplicación de marcos teóricos al análisis de los datos. El capítulo 7 es la conclusión.

El capítulo 1 es una revisión de conceptos básicos en el campo de la estilística como, por ejemplo, la importancia de las nociones de texto y contexto, la importancia del lector en el proceso de comprensión lectora, y la contribución de teorías como los mundos posibles y marcos o esquemas semánticos a la interpretación del texto literario como tipo de discurso. Las

últimas secciones constituyen una introducción al mundo de *Catch-22*, su situación dentro de la literatura contemporánea y una breve revisión de trabajos anteriores realizados sobre la novela.

El capítulo 2 es una revisión detallada de teorías de la negación. Las secciones iniciales parten de una discusión de los problemas tradicionales de la filosofía del lenguaje, la lógica y la psicología con respecto a la definición de la negación como fenómeno lingüístico. La mayor parte del capítulo, sin embargo, se centra en una descripción crítica de los planteamientos lingüísticos de la negación en el marco de las teorías gramaticales descriptivas y de las teorías pragmático-funcionales. Se hace hincapié en la contribución realizada por Givón (1978, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1993), puesto que sus observaciones sobre las propiedades pragmáticas, cognitivas y ontológicas de la negación son fundamentales para la comprensión de la *función* discursiva de la negación.

En el capítulo 3 se explora la caracterización de la negación como fenómeno discursivo dentro del marco de mundos del texto. La primera parte es una descripción crítica de la teoría de Werth (1995c), mientras que la segunda parte complementa a la primera por medio de un estudio de la contribución de la idea de *conflicto* dentro de mundos de ficción según la propuesta de Ryan (1991b) para el discurso narrativo.

El capítulo 4 complementa los capítulos anteriores al proponer un planteamiento de la negación según la teoría de esquemas y marcos semánticos, en particular según las propuestas de Fillmore (1986), Schank y Abelson (1977) y Schank (1982). Este

tipo de análisis será especialmente productivo para el estudio de las paradojas creadas por medio de opuestos irreconciliables.

Los capítulos 5 y 6 son, respectivamente, el análisis cualitativo y el análisis cuantitativo de los datos. Para terminar, el capítulo 7 recoge las conclusiones generales de la investigación.

CAPITULO 1: NOCIONES BÁSICAS

Este capítulo es una introducción a las nociones básicas del análisis estilístico lingüístico. Como tal, constituye el marco teórico general dentro del cual debe situarse el estudio de la negación como rasgo lingüístico.

1.1. Los objetivos del análisis estilístico

He explicado en la introducción que por estilística me refiero al trabajo realizado en las últimas décadas por lingüistas y literatos que han adoptado las pautas de análisis de los formalistas rusos como, por ejemplo, los sistemicistas en la línea de investigación iniciada por Halliday (1973). El principio general que subyace en este tipo de investigación es que el procedimiento de análisis e interpretación del texto literario debe de tener una base lingüística (véase Jakobson 1964, Carter 1982). Sin embargo, el análisis lingüístico no se considera una disección del texto, sino un instrumento dirigido a la sistematización de las intuiciones que un lector pueda tener sobre un texto. En este sentido, el análisis lingüístico debería

entenderse como un estudio que conduce a una profundización en la comprensión del texto literario.

1.2. Texto, contexto y lector

Los formalistas rusos inician una escuela poética en la que el análisis lingüístico juega un papel primordial. Asimismo, introducen nociones fundamentales, como *el carácter marcado o destacado, el patrón de desviación discursiva* y *la desfamiliarización* (véase Havránek 1964 y Shklovsky 1917). Sin embargo, su obra también ha sido criticada por dos motivos principales: primero, por la afirmación de que se puede establecer una conexión entre la función poética del lenguaje y la presencia de determinados rasgos lingüísticos en un texto; segundo, por la limitación del análisis formalista a los rasgos estructurales del texto, excluyendo así la profundización en aspectos semánticos relacionados con el contenido del texto. La primera crítica conduce a una línea de investigación que pretende demostrar que los rasgos estructurales, que según los formalistas caracterizan al texto literario, se encuentran también en otros tipos de texto (véase Werth 1976).

La segunda crítica implica una profundización en aspectos lingüísticos y psicológicos que complementen el análisis estructural. Así, Werth (1976) propone que el análisis estructural debe ir acompañado de (a) un análisis semántico, (b) de información sobre aspectos estadísticos de frecuencias de rasgos lingüísticos y (c) de información sobre el proceso psicológico que subyace en la comprensión del texto literario.

Una línea de investigación del discurso literario con estas características se inicia en la escuela de lingüística sistémica. Así Halliday (1973), en su famoso artículo sobre el estilo de la obra de William Golding *The Inheritors*, sienta las bases para un análisis estilístico que tiene en cuenta los siguientes factores: (a) la elección de un rasgo lingüístico frente a otros tiene una finalidad comunicativa, estableciendo así una conexión entre las nociones de *carácter destacado o marcado* y *desviación discursiva* y el contenido semántico; (b) *el carácter destacado* puede producirse tanto como fenómeno cualitativo (por ejemplo, la elección de un rasgo lingüístico marcado frente a uno no marcado) como cuantitativo (un índice de frecuencias de un rasgo lingüístico superior a la media es también un fenómeno marcado); (c) el análisis estilístico debe entenderse en líneas generales como la interpretación de un texto en su contexto. Estas pautas constituyen la base del análisis del texto como discurso.

El análisis del texto como discurso se ha visto beneficiado por la contribución de otras teorías lingüísticas, como la pragmática, las teorías de marcos semánticos, esquemas cognitivos y de mundos posibles. Las contribuciones de las teorías pragmáticas (véase, por ejemplo Pratt 1977) han reforzado el planteamiento del análisis del texto literario como discurso, iniciando así líneas de investigación que han permitido la aplicación de marcos teóricos generales, como la teoría de implicatura conversacional de Grice (1975), la teoría de actos de habla, o las teorías de la cortesía y la relevancia, a la

interpretación del texto literario.

Las teorías de marcos semánticos y esquemas cognitivos (véase Schank y Abelson, 1977, Schank 1982, Rumelhart, 1980) han aportado la perspectiva del proceso de comprensión e interpretación del texto desde el punto de vista del lector. Como señala Cook (1994), el procesamiento del texto por parte del lector es un aspecto que las teorías pragmáticas y discursivas no han tenido en cuenta; por tanto, la contribución de las teorías cognitivas es fundamental para un entendimiento más profundo del proceso de interpretación del texto literario. Así, por medio de una teoría que incorpore las nociones de marcos cognitivos puede establecerse una relación entre la presencia de rasgos lingüísitcos en el texto y su percepción y procesamiento por el lector. Este planteamiento es fundamental para la comprensión del fenómeno de *desfamiliarización* mencionado anteriormente. La contribución de esta teoría se explica más detalladamente en el capítulo 4.

La teoría de los mundos posibles proporciona una solución a algunos de los problemas filosóficos relacionados con la cuestión de qué es exactamente el discurso literario y qué *status* ontológico tienen los enunciados que son parte de una ficción. Estas preguntas están relacionadas con la tradicional definición del discurso literario como paradójico ya que, por un lado, imita a la realidad y, por otro, crea una realidad nueva simultáneamente. Esta paradoja ha llevado a que el discurso literario se considere como una forma 'debilitada' de un enunciado (véase Searle 1975). Según la teoría de mundos

posibles, tal y como la entienden autores como Kripke (1971), Dolezel (1989) y Ryan (1991b), el considerar el mundo ficticio como un mundo posible nos permite dar cuenta del carácter paradójico de la ficción sin tener que establecer que es una forma 'debilitada' de realidad. Este planteamiento se explica más detalladamente en el capítulo 3.

Para terminar, cabe señalar que el carácter ambiguo del discurso literario lo convierte en un vehículo natural para la expresión de la crítica ideológica, un aspecto que también se ha desarrollado a partir de la labor de lingüistas con formación sistémica (véase Fowler, 1986, Fairclough 1989). Este planteamiento resulta interesante al analizar una obra como *Catch-22*, puesto que la novela tiene un indudable componente satírico.

1.3. Introducción a *Catch-22*

La novela *Catch-22* es un clásico contemporáneo que difícilmente se encasilla en un género. En principio es una novela bélica que narra las desventuras de un destacamento de bombarderos americanos en una pequeña isla italiana durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial. La historia se centra en los intentos del protagonista, Yossarian, de ser dado de baja y enviado de vuelta a casa. Esto resulta imposible, tanto para él como para el resto de los aviadores, por la existencia de una claúsula 22 en el reglamento militar. Según la claúsula 22, un soldado puede ser dado de baja si está loco. Para ser dado de baja debe de formular

una petición. Sin embargo, el formular la petición es señal de cordura, con lo cual no podrá ser dado de baja. La claúsula 22 se convierte en una trampa que da libertad a los oficiales de alto rango para hacer lo que les viene en gana. La novela en líneas generales no es solamente una novela bélica, sino más bien una crítica de la sociedad americana de la época (los años cincuenta) y del sistema capitalista en términos generales.

La bibliografía sobre *Catch-22* es muy extensa (véase Weixelmann 1974, Keegan, 1978, Ruderman 1991, Sorkin 1993). Sin embargo, la mayor parte de las obras son críticas de la novela desde un punto de vista literario y se centran en aspectos como la cronología de la obra, el valor satírico de la misma o la caracterización de los personajes. Algunos autores mencionan aspectos lingüísticos, como la lógica circular (Seed 1989, Ruderman, 1991), e incluso, brevemente, la negación (en Ruderman 1991), pero no he encontrado ningún trabajo de investigación crítica que profundice en el lenguaje de la novela. En este sentido, esta tesis es una contribución a los trabajos sobre *Catch-22* en cuanto que propone un planteamiento lingüístico del análisis de la novela basado en el estudio de la función de la negación.

CAPITULO 2: APROXIMACIÓN A LA NEGACIÓN

El capítulo 2 es una revisión crítica de las teorías sobre la negación, con particular atención a las teorías pragmáticas y del discurso. Se parte de la definición de la negación como operador lógico y su función en enunciados complejos, como la

contradicción y la disyunción. A continuación, se analiza el papel de la negación en la filosofía del lenguaje y la psicología, como punto de partida para la descripción de la negación como fenómeno lingüístico.

2.1. Nociones introductorias sobre la negación

La negación es un tema que ha sido objeto de estudio y de polémica desde la antigüedad clásica (véase Horn 1989). Ya en nuestro siglo, se asocia la negación a una serie de problemas filosóficos y lógicos que plantearon los filósofos del lenguaje (véase Russell 1905) y que han tenido una influencia enorme sobre las teorías lingüísticas actuales. Entre estos, ha resultado particularmente polémica la cuestión de la relación entre la supuesta ambigüedad de la negación y la presuposición en enunciados como (1):

(1) a. El Rey de Francia es calvo.
b. El Rey de Francia no es calvo.

El problema planteado por la paradoja de negar lo que se afirma mediante la presuposición ha llevado a diferentes conclusiones, que varían desde el considerar la negación como semánticamente ambigua, pragmáticamente ambigua o vaga. La propuesta que ha recibido quizá mayor aceptación, y que ha dado lugar a una línea productiva de investigación, es la de Horn (1989), que considera los enunciados como (1) b. ejemplos de NEGACIÓN METALINGÜÍSTICA, es decir, un tipo de negación que niega la validez del enunciado anterior en términos generales.

La negación también ha sido objeto de estudio en la

psicología, un campo que ha aportado hallazgos importantes sobre los aspectos cognitivos y psicológicos que condicionan la elección del enunciado negativo frente al afirmativo (véase Wason 1965, Just y Clark 1973, Clark y Clark 1977). Los investigadores en este campo coinciden en la observación de que el enunciado negativo tiene un carácter marcado frente al afirmativo, puesto que es más difícil de procesar y presupone la existencia previa de un enunciado afirmativo en el discurso, en forma de una expectativa, un enunciado explícito o una suposición implícita, cuya validez cancela la negación.

Los estudios realizados en el campo de la filosofía del lenguaje y de la psicología constituyen un punto de partida para numerosos estudios de orientación lingüística que se describen a continuación.

2.2. La negación en la gramática descriptiva

La primera cuestión desde un punto lingüístico a la hora de describir la negación es la definición de la negación. Esto supone la definición de lo que es una palabra negativa. Por sencilla que pueda parecer, la definición de la negación lingüística implica una serie de problemas tanto teóricos como prácticos. En primer lugar, mientras que hay una serie de palabras que fácilmente se describen como negativas (*no, not, never, nobody,* etc.), puesto que se comportan como tales desde un punto de vista sintáctico, morfológico y semántico, hay otras palabras que no tienen rasgos morfológicos o sintácticos negativos, pero sí poseen un valor negativo que adquieren al

pertenecer a una pareja de opuestos en el que contrastan con un término positivo (*good/bad*). Klima (1964) propone una serie de tests sintácticos que distinguen las palabras definidas como *explicit negatives* (palabras explícitamente negativas) e *implicit negatives* (implícitamente negativas). Las primeras incluyen los rasgos negativos morfosintácticos y semánticos, mientras que las segundas sólo se reconocen como negativas por su contenido semántico.

Esta distinción resulta útil en su aplicación al estudio de textos, especialmente cuando el estudio se realiza mediante un programa computerizado, como el estudio de Tottie (1991) y el análisis cuantitativo de esta tesis. La distinción entre palabras explícitamente negativas e implícitamente negativas excluye de un análisis computerizado a las palabras implícitamente negativas, ya que la labor de establecer criterios para identificar el polo negativo entre dos opuestos no es siempre fácil. Así, Jespersen (1917) puntualiza que, aunque es natural considerar que *fail* es igual a *not succeed*, desde un punto de vista lógico tiene el mismo sentido afirmar que *succeed* es igual a *not fail*.

La distinción expuesta es también objeto de estudio en las gramáticas descriptivas del inglés (véase Huddleston 1983, Quirk *et al.* 1985, Downing y Locke 1992, Givón 1993), que suelen establecer una distinción entre lo que denominaré como *syntactic negation* (negación sintáctica) y *lexical negation* (negación léxica). Asimismo, se distingue también entre lo que generalmente

se denomina *clausal negation* (negación de la oración) y *constituent negation* (negación del constituyente). Esta distinción, que afecta a las palabras explícitamente negativas, establece una diferenciación entre la negación como operador o inflexión verbal (*not-negation*), y las palabras negativas que se encuentran en otros constituyentes de la oración (*no-negation*). Las gramáticas también tratan en detalle el problema de la aplicación del campo semántico de la negación (*the scope of negation*), y cómo está condicionado por factores estructurales, semánticos y prosódicos.

En cuanto a la negación léxica, existen numerosos estudios sobre los tipos de opuestos y las diferentes relaciones de oposicón que pueden observarse (véase Werth, 1984, Cruse, 1986, Horn, 1989). En esta tesis adoptaré la clasificación general propuesta por Horn que distingue, en líneas generales, entre contradictorios y contrarios, pero no entraré en más detalles respecto a los subtipos de opuestos puesto que esta tarea sobrepasaría los límites de la misma.

2.3. La negación en las teorías pragmáticas y del discurso

En las teorías pragmáticas (véase Searle 1969, Vanderveken 1991), la negación se asocia al acto de habla de la *(de)negación*, que cubre los dos usos más generales como enunciado negativo (*negative statement*) o denegación (*denial*). Asimismo, existen también otros actos de habla que pueden realizarse tanto en afirmativo como en negativo, como las preguntas y las órdenes.

El análisis de la negación en la lógica, la filosofía del

lenguaje, la gramática y la pragmática hace aportaciones importantes para la comprensión de la negación como fenómeno discursivo, pero también tiene limitaciones a las que debe enfrentarse una teoría discursiva. La limitación principal consiste en que las teorías mencionadas anteriormente sólo tratan la negación en ejemplos de oraciones aisladas y fuera de un contexto. Una teoría discursiva de la negación debe abordar el tema desde la perspectiva del análisis textual. La bibliografía sobre la negación desde esta perspectiva es escasa. Cabe destacar el estudio de Tottie (1991) sobre las frecuencias de los tipos de negación en las variedades hablada y escrita del inglés, un estudio muy útil como punto de referencia para estudios posteriores sobre la negación en otros textos. En esta tesis se utiliza su clasificación de las funciones de la negación para el estudio cuantitativo del capítulo 6. Otros autores que tratan la negación dentro de un marco discursivo son Leinfeller (1994), Pagano (1994) y Givón. La teoría de Givón merece comentario aparte.

2.4. La negación en Givón (1978, 1979, 1984, 1993)

Givón desarrolla una teoría de la negación a partir de principios cognitivos y pragmáticos que constituyen una base sólida para el desarrollo de una teoría discursiva. Desde un punto de vista cognitivo, Givón describe la negación como el término marcado del sistema de la polaridad. El carácter marcado de la negación se manifiesta de forma morfosintáctica, semántica,

psicológica y pragmática con respecto a la mayor simplicidad de la forma afirmativa. Desde un punto de vista pragmático-discursivo, la negación tiene menor valor informativo que la afirmación, y raramente se utiliza para introducir información nueva en el discurso. Según Givón, la negación presupone una forma correspondiente afirmativa, que está presente en el discurso de una forma explícita o implícita. Las características de la negación como forma marcada y presuposicional, en un sentido amplio de la palabra, determinan sus peculiaridades ontológicas que, según Givón, se definen por analogía con las nociones Gestalt de figura y fondo. En esta interpretación, la afirmación describe lo que se entiende por figura, el hecho que sobresale sobre un fondo estático, mientras que la negación describe precisamente este fondo que constituye la norma general dentro de la cual los hechos o sucesos constituyen excepciones. Como instrumento lingüístico, la negación se utiliza cuando el no-hecho o el no-ser son más informativos que el hecho o el ser, cuando describen la excepción a la regla general.

CAPITULO 3: LA NEGACION Y LA TEORIA DE MUNDOS DEL TEXTO

A pesar de las importantes aportaciones de las teorías descritas en el capítulo anterior al análisis de la negación, ninguno de los planteamientos comentados ofrece un modelo sólido que permita describir en detalle las funciones de la negación en el discurso. Por este motivo, se sugiere en esta tesis que el modelo más complejo que incorpora las características de la negación descritas hasta ahora puede encontrarse en el modelo de

mundos del texto de Werth (1995c), que se comenta en el apartado 3.2. de este capítulo.

3.1. Mundos posibles y mundos del texto

La teoría de mundos posibles ha ejercido una gran influencia en la semántica, sobre todo en la explicación de las formas no-fácticas del verbo, y de modo más especial, de los verbos modales, los condicionales, el tiempo y el aspecto. En cuanto a su aplicación a las teorías del texto, las teorías de mundos posibles han supuesto la sustitución de principios lógicos (por ejemplo, las nociones de posibilidad y necesidad lógica) por otros principios epistémicos más acordes con el proceso de producción y procesamiento del texto. Este cambio se manifiesta en la importancia que se concede a principios como la coherencia textual y la cooperación, factores que no tienen cabida en una teoría formal de mundos posibles, pero que son elementos fundamentales de toda teoría del texto. Asimismo, las leyes o normas que rigen la posibilidad lógica se abandonan a favor del principio de *accesibilidad*, que permite explicar las diferencias entre un mundo posible y un mundo central (*Actual World*) determinado, así como las diferentes estructuras internas de un mundo posible.

3.2. La negación como submundo en Werth (1995c)

Werth (1995c) propone un planteamiento de la negación como submundo dentro de un marco teórico general del discurso como

mundo del texto. El modelo que desarrolla este autor se basa en el establecimiento de diferentes niveles conceptuales de percepción cognitiva y lingüística, que corresponden a los diferentes niveles de interacción en el discurso. Así, el mundo o nivel del discurso incluye como interlocutores al escritor y al lector cuando se trata de la comunicación escrita. El mundo del texto corresponde al texto en sí, sin tener en cuenta el nivel superior en que se produce e interpreta. Finalmente, dentro del mundo del texto hay posteriores niveles textuales que se definen como submundos, y que se clasifican según características semánticas y cognitivas. Así, hay submundos que son directamente accesibles al lector, puesto que son creados por los narradores, y definen espacios temporales o espaciales alternativos a los descritos por la línea narrativa principal del texto. Hay otros submundos que no son directamente accesibles al lector, puesto que están mediatizados por la conciencia de un personaje. Este tipo de submundo incluye, por ejemplo, los dominios hipotéticos, los dominios cognitivos o los dominios epistémicos. Desde un punto de vista estrictamente lingüístico, se pueden dividir en tres grupos principales: (a) alternancias deícticas, (b) actitudes proposicionales, y (c) modalizaciones. La negación pertenece a este último grupo.

La negación en el modelo de Werth (op. cit.) reúne las características cognitivas y pragmáticas descritas por Givón, pero adquiere, además, un carácter ontológico más complejo y elaborado al tener una definición más precisa dentro de una teoría textual-discursiva. Según Werth (op. cit.) la negación

como submundo tiene la función de cancelar parámetros que se han introducido anteriormente en el mundo del texto y que ya no son válidos. Dichos parámetros pueden entenderse como información deíctica referente a entidades, lugares o parámetros temporales, o puede ser también un parámetro que indica la presencia de otro submundo. La negación siempre opera sobre la base de información que se encuentra subyacente en el discurso, en forma de marcos semánticos y esquemas cognitivos que contribuyen a la especificación y comprensión de la información por parte del lector.

Werth (op. cit.) señala que la negación tiene una segunda función discursiva, más atípica que la anterior, y que recibe el nombre de *negative accommodation*. En esta función, el submundo negativo introduce un elemento para negarlo simultáneamente. Se puede decir que en esta función la negación, excepcionalmente, se utiliza como vehículo de expresión de información nueva, que típicamente suele expresarse a través del enunciado afirmativo.

3.3. La negación y el conflicto en Ryan (1991b)

La teoría de mundos del texto de Werth (1995c) se complementa con la teoría de Ryan (1991b) sobre mundos posibles en la novela, un planteamiento que nos permite analizar más de cerca la función de la negación en relación al desarrollo del conflicto en un mundo de ficción. Ryan (op. cit.) elabora un modelo en el que sistematiza las posibles relaciones de accesibilidad entre un mundo ficticio y el mundo real a partir

de una serie de variables, como compatibilidad de inventariado, compatibilidad de propiedades, compatibilidad física, cronología, lógica, y otros. Según estos parámetros, podemos establecer que el mundo de *Catch-22* coincide con el mundo real en casi todas las variables, lo que le confiere el carácter pseudo-histórico; sin embargo, no coincide en la compatibilidad de inventariado, puesto que los personajes son ficticios, ni en la cronología, ya que la novela posee una estructura deliberadamente caótica, y tampoco en la variable lógica. La transgresión de este último componente se manifiesta de forma lingüística, ya que los personajes de la novela se encuentran atrapados por la lógica circular de la cláusula (o trampa) 22, que gobierna los acontecimientos de ese mundo.

El modelo de Ryan también propone un planteamiento del conflicto en el mundo de ficción que resulta ilustrativo de la función de determinadas formas lingüísticas en el mundo del texto. Así, establece una distinción entre el mundo del texto y otros mundos posibles alternativos, que corresponden a las proyecciones de deseos, obligaciones, intenciones y pensamientos de los personajes.

Indudablemente, se puede establecer una relación entre esta noción de submundo, orientada hacia la sistematización del mundo a partir de las relaciones que se establecen entre los personajes, y las expresiones lingüísticas que se utilizan para expresar cada una de las variables. Así, podemos observar que la negación contribuye al desarrollo de una serie de conflictos en el mundo de *Catch-22* que pueden resumirse como un choque entre

'lo que es' y 'lo que no es', o 'lo que no puede ser' y 'lo que es'. Esto se manifiesta, por ejemplo, en el deseo de numerosos personajes de ofrecer un imagen de sí mismos diferente a la real, y de engañar así a los demás. Según el modelo de Ryan, una actitud como esta refleja un conflicto entre un submundo que proyecta un deseo de un personaje, y el *estatus quo* del mundo de la ficción, que no se corresponde con ese deseo. Otras variedades de conflicto se desarrollan a partir de deseos conflictivos entre los submundos de personajes diferentes (como en los deseos conflictivos entre los oficiales de alto rango y los soldados), o entre los submundos diferentes pertenecientes a un mismo personaje, pero que también pueden ser contradictorios.

CAPITULO 4: LA NEGACION Y LA TEORIA DE MARCOS SEMÁNTICOS Y *ESQUEMAS COGNITIVOS*

El capítulo 4 complementa a los anteriores al proponer un análisis de las posibilidades explicativas de las teorías de esquemas cognitivos para la profundización del fenómeno discursivo de la negación, especialmente en las paradojas. En el capítulo anterior hemos señalado que el modelo de Werth (1995c) resalta la importancia de los marcos semánticos y cognitivos en el proceso de comprensión del texto en general, en particular con el fin de entender la función de la negación en el discurso. Sin embargo, Werth (1995c) no incluye la contradicción ni la paradoja como ejemplos de funciones de la negación. Por este motivo, propongo complementar el marco teórico de Werth por medio de las teorías que se detallan a continuación.

4.1. La negación en la teoría de marcos semánticos de Fillmore

En autores como Fillmore (1982, 1985), Shanon (1981) y Pagano (1981) la negación se trata desde la perspectiva de los marcos semánticos. Fillmore establece una distinción entre lo que llama *within frame negation* (negación dentro de un marco semántico) y *across frame negation* (negación entre miembros de marcos diferentes), lo que explica la diferencia entre opuestos como los ejemplificados en (2) a. y (2) b. respectivamente:

(2) a. He is not generous, he is stingy.
b. He is not generous, he is thrifty.

La negación entre miembros de diferentes marcos semánticos, como en (2) b., es realmente un ejemplo de lo que Horn ha denominado como negación metalingüística. La contribución principal de las teorías de marcos semánticos se encuentra más bien en la posibilidad de explicar las condiciones en las que un enunciado negativo será aceptable pragmáticamente. Así, Shanon (1981) compara (3) a. y (3) b.:

(3) a. The picnic was nice but nobody had any food.
b. ? The picnic was nice, but nobody watered the grass.

Shanon (op. cit.) señala que (3) a. es aceptable porque FOOD forma parte del marco semántico PICNIC, mientras que (3) b. no es aceptable porque WATER THE GRASS no forma parte de ese marco.

A pesar de que las observaciones de estos autores no se desarrollan en más profundidad, se sientan las bases para un planteamiento de la negación según principios cognitivos que tienen en cuenta el modo en que se procesa y organiza la información en el acto comunicativo.

4.2. Las teorías de Schank y Abelson (1977) y Schank (1982)

Las teorías de Schank y Abelson (1977) y Schank (1982) se describen en detalle con la idea de proporcionar un modelo más complejo de marcos semánticos que pueda aplicarse a la interpretación de la paradoja en *Catch-22*. El modelo de Schank (1982) es especialmente adecuado para este propósito y, de forma particular, las nociones de *Memory Organisation Packet, MOP,* (Paquete de Organización de la Memoria) y *Thematic Organisation Packet, TOP,* (Paquete de Organización Temático). Las ventajas del modelo de Schank (1982) respecto a los modelos descritos en la sección anterior se encuentran en la estructura jerárquica de la información y el carácter dinámico y flexible que propone del proceso de comprensión y procesamiento del texto. Así, se sugiere en esta tesis que el fenómeno de la paradoja puede explicarse adecuadamente por medio de la aplicación de las nociones de MOP y TOP. En el capítulo 5 se propone un modelo en el que se integran estas nociones al modelo de mundos del texto de Werth (1995c). La idea de la integración de teorías de mundos posibles y teorías de marcos semánticos parte de la obra de Semino (1994, 1995) sobre los mundos del texto en la poesía.

4.3. Marcos semánticos, esquemas y discurso literario

En la segunda parte de este capítulo se estudia la influencia de las teorías de marcos semánticos en las teorías del texto literario como discurso, y se hace hincapié en el modelo propuesto por Cook (1994). La mayor parte de la bibliografía

sobre este tema se centra en el estudio de las gramáticas de historias (*story grammars*) (véase van Dijk 1982) y, en menor medida, en el estudio del proceso de comprensión del texto literario (véase de Beaugrande, 1987, Miall y Kuiken, 1994, Cook 1994). Cook (1994) propone un modelo de análisis del discurso literario basado en una reformulación de las nociones de *carácter destacado*, *desviación discursiva* y *desfamiliarización* de los formalistas rusos a partir de una teoría discursiva que incorpora los marcos semánticos. En este modelo, la comprensión del texto es un proceso dinámico continuo en el que el lector coteja la representación mental que él se crea del texto a partir de las expectativas que van surgiendo durante la lectura, con la información que proporciona el texto. Este proceso puede resultar en un reforzamiento o confirmación de marcos semánticos y cognitivos del lector, o bien puede llevar a un cuestionamiento y posterior cambio de esquemas cognitivos adquiridos. El proceso que lleva al cambio de esquemas adquiridos corresponde al proceso de *desfamiliarización*, o, en términos de Cook (1994), *schema refreshment* (renovación de esquemas). Según el autor, la principal función de la literatura es precisamente la de inducir la renovación de esquemas, función que define, en términos generales, como la función de cambio cognitivo (*function of cognitive change*).

En esta tesis se propone que la novela *Catch-22* potencialmente conduce al cambio, renovación o cuestionamiento de esquemas cognitivos, y que la negación juega un papel fundamental en este proceso. Esto se explica en mayor detalle en

los capítulos siguientes.

CAPITULO 5: UNA PROPUESTA PARA UNA INTERPRETACION DE LA NEGACION EN EL DISCURSO SEGUN LA TEORIA DE MUNDOS DEL TEXTO

En este capítulo, algunos aspectos teóricos tratatados en capítulos anteriores se aplican a la definición de las funciones discursivas de la negación y se establece una conexión con el posible efecto de *desfamiliarización* y de renovación de esquemas cognitivos. Dicho análisis sigue un procedimiento de análisis cualitativo, que se complementará con el análisis cuantitativo del capítulo 6.

5.1. Una interpretación de la negación según el modelo de mundos del texto

El análisis cualitativo se realiza a partir de la aplicación y desarrollo de la teoría de mundos del texto a la interpretación de las funciones de la negación en el discurso. Así, se establece una distinción fundamental entre las funciones de la negación que contribuyen a la canalización de la información y las funciones que bloquean el procesamiento de la información. Dicha distinción se corresponde con la creación de espacios semántico-conceptuales no-fácticos con características ontológicas diferentes. Esta clasificación se ha considerado como la más adecuada para el estudio del carácter marcado de los enunciados y las palàbras negativas y su contribución a la creación de un patrón de desviación discursiva. El análisis cualitativo se centra en ejemplos ilustrativos del subcorpus, pero se proponen también

generalizaciones que pueden aplicarse a grupos de extractos que reflejan una actitud determinada hacia un tema significativo de la novela.

5.2. Funciones de la negación como submundo prototípico

En su función más prototípica, la negación crea un submundo que cancela parámetros anteriormente presentes en el mundo del texto, tal y como se describe en el capítulo 3. Así, en el análisis, se comenta una selección de extractos donde la negación cancela parámetros anteriores con la finalidad de crear una apariencia que contrasta con el estado de las cosas en el mundo de la ficción. Dicho contraste pone de manifiesto un conflicto entre *lo que parece ser pero no es* y *lo que es* en el mundo del texto. Este contraste pone en evidencia las estratagemas de numerosos altos cargos militares y otros profesionales, que se preocupan más por su propia imagen personal que por los problemas más serios de la guerra y de los soldados que están bajo su mando. Se analizan ejemplos de negación con las siguientes funciones pragmático-discursivas: (a) cancelar parámetros deícticos; (b) cancelar parámetros introducidos por submundos anteriores; (c) negar la aplicabilidad de marcos semántico-cognitivos en un contexto determinado; (d) negación dentro del contexto de otro submundo; (e) *negative accommodation*, o la función por la que la negación presenta y niega un parámetro al mismo tiempo.

Como submundo, es decir, como espacio semántico-cognitivo, la negación puede entenderse de dos maneras complementarias: (i)

como el ámbito semántico sobre el que la negación tiene aplicación dentro de un enunciado, y (ii) como una unidad discursiva cuyos límites son variables y dependen de la relación entre el enunciado negativo y los enunciados que la preceden y siguen en el discurso. Este último caso se da en numerosos ejemplos de negación marcada, es decir, negación que, a pesar de ser gramatical, se percibe como anómala. Dicha anomalía suele estar relacionada con la no realización de expectativas sobre temas determinados tratados en la novela. Así, hay varios ejemplos en que el efecto que describimos como *desfamiliarizador* no se puede identificar en un enunciado o palabra o contraste en particular, sino en un proceso que puede ocupar un párrafo, o incluso un capítulo entero. Esta visión de la negación dificulta su análisis según métodos cuantitativos, por lo que las clasificaciones del capítulo 6 no tienen en cuenta estas observaciones.

Además de las funciones más prototípicas mencionadas anteriormente, la negación, tanto sintáctica como léxica, se utiliza para crear contradicciones y paradojas, a las que me refiero en el apartado siguiente.

5.3. Funciones de la negación como submundo paradójico

A diferencia de las funciones anteriores, la negación contradictoria y paradójica no canaliza la información en el mundo del texto, sino que la bloquea produciendo así una especie de cortocircuito comunicativo. Dentro de esta función,

encontramos los tipos siguientes: (a) la contradicción, (b) la lógica circular, (c) la paradoja léxica. En la contradicción se establece una distinción entre la contradicción tradicional, que forma un enunciado compuesto, y la variedad que he definido como 'contradicción discursiva'. En esta última, el enunciado negativo no niega al afirmativo dentro de un mismo enunciado compuesto, sino que niega la validez de un enunciado expresado anteriormente en el discurso. La lógica circular es una forma de paradoja creada a partir de la negación sintáctica, cuyo ejemplo más claro es el de la cláusula 22:

(4) a. Si estás loco, puedes darte de baja.
b. Para darte de baja, debes hacer una petición formal.
c. Si haces una petición formal, no estás loco.

El tipo de razonamiento ejemplificado en (4) por la cláusula 22 es una trampa lógica que incluye la afirmación y negación de la misma proposición como parte del razonamiento. El resultado es una paradoja sin solución, lo que significa que los soldados nunca pueden ser dados de baja ni volver a casa. Para terminar, la paradoja léxica se crea a partir de la asignación de propiedades opuestas a una misma entidad, como por ejemplo:

(5) Mac Watt is both crazy and sane.

En este capítulo he propuesto una interpretación de la paradoja basada en la aplicación del modelo de esquemas cognitivos de Schank (1982), al que me he referido en el capítulo 4. Las nociones *Memory Organisation Packet* y *Thematic Organisation Packet* propuestas por el autor permiten la resolución de la paradoja en un nivel superior de comprensión, lo que permite asignar un significado al sin-sentido aparente del

nivel literal. Este proceso, en términos generales, nos lleva a entender las paradojas como críticas indirectas del modo en que se tratan una serie de temas en la sociedad de nuestra época, no sólo la guerra, sino otros aspectos fundamentales que tienden a ser aceptados sin cuestionar.

5.4. Funciones ontológicas de la negación en *Catch-22*

Las funciones de la negación descritas en las secciones anteriores se corresponden a dos funciones ontológicas diferentes de la negación en la novela. La primera función, que cancela parámetros anteriores y da prominencia al no-hecho y al no-ser con la finalidad de crear una apariencia ilusoria, da lugar a una ontología vacía; lo que no es adquiere mayor relevancia y prominencia que lo que es; de este modo se invierte el proceso comunicativo más usual, en el que lo que es nos resulta más informativo y, por consiguiente, más interesante. La segunda función, la función paradójica, tiene como resultado general el de anular la distinción entre opuestos que representan conceptualizaciones básicas de nuestra experiencia. Así, no se puede establecer la diferenciación entre aspectos como estar vivo y estar muerto, o estar cuerdo y estar loco, o entre lo que es bueno y lo que es malo, ya que los opuestos, al usarse simultáneamente en paradojas, pierden su delimitación individual.

Si consideramos las dos tendencias de forma conjunta, podemos observar que el mundo de *Catch-22* descrito en estos términos es un sistema cerrado, como la cláusula 22 que le da su

nombre, con reglas propias y que no admite cambios del exterior. En términos utilizados por la teoría de la información, es un sistema que tiende a la entropía absoluta, a la muerte térmica. Esta muerte entrópica parece tener su expresión lingüística en la negación que, en sus funciones discursivas, anula la realidad e impone realidades paralelas ilusorias y neutraliza las oposiciones entre antónimos.

CAPITULO 6: ANALISIS CUANTITATIVO DEL CORPUS

En este capítulo se realiza un análisis cuantitativo del corpus, que complementa el análisis cualitativo del capítulo anterior.

6.1. Objetivos y metodología del análisis cuantitativo

El objetivo del análisis cuantitativo es el de verificar la hipótesis 3 mencionada en la introducción, según la cual se predecía que la frecuencia de palabras negativas es superior en *Catch-22* que en otros textos del mismo género. Estos resultados contribuyen al estudio de la tesis en términos generales en cuanto que proporcionan la base empírica de las observaciones realizadas sobre la negación a lo largo del trabajo.

Como se ha señalado en la introducción, se ha realizado una distinción entre el corpus de la novela completa y un subcorpus de 134 extractos que se han analizado en mayor detalle. En primer lugar, se realizó una búsqueda de las palabras que se definen como *explícitamente negativas* y de las palabras que contienen afijos negativos, tanto en el corpus como en el subcorpus. La

búsqueda se realizó mediante los programas Micro Concord y Mono Concord, una vez que el corpus había sido adaptado a un formato computerizado. Las frecuencias obtenidas en el corpus se comparan a las frecuencias de las palabras negativas en otros *corpora* similares, con la finalidad de establecer si la frecuencia de la negación en *Catch-22* es superior a la media de otros textos. Asimismo, se comparan las frecuencias obtenidas en el corpus y el subcorpus, para establecer la validez del análisis cuantitativo del subcorpus como representativo de la novela entera. Estos dos planteamientos comprueban la validez externa e interna de la hipótesis 3.

Para terminar, se realizaron varias clasificaciones de los tipos de negación según los siguientes criterios: (a) categoría gramatical de la negación; (b) función pragmático-discursiva de la negación y (c) tipos ontológicos de negación. Estas clasificaciones se realizaron manualmente. La clasificación según categoría gramatical establece una primera distinción entre negación sintáctica y negación léxica. Dentro de la negación sintáctica, se establecen distinciones entre *no-negation*, *not-negation* y negación por medio de otras palabras (*never, neither, nor*). La frecuencia de estas categorías se compara con los resultados obtenidos por Tottie (1991) en su estudio sobre la negación en el inglés hablado y escrito. En cuanto a la clasificación de los tipos de negación según la función pragmático-discursiva, de nuevo se calcula la frecuencia de las funciones comunicativas de la negación siguiendo, en líneas

generales, el modelo propuesto por Tottie (1991). Asimismo, se calcula la frecuencia de las negaciones en las secciones narrativas frente a las secciones dialogadas de la novela, para poder establecer una comparación con las cifras obtenidas en las variedades del inglés hablado y escrito. Para finalizar el análisis, se calcula la frecuencia de las negaciones que se definen como *marcadas*, y se clasifican en dos grupos principales que presentan características ontológicas diferentes (ontología vacía y ontología paradójica).

6.2. Resultados del análisis cuantitativo

Los resultados generales del cómputo de la frecuencia de las palabras negativas en *Catch-22* y su posterior comparación con las frecuencias en otros *corpora* demuestran que en *Catch-22* es superior a la media de otros textos similares (19.21 en *Catch-22*, frente a 18.0 y 13.5 en los *corpora LOB y Brown*). Sin embargo, también cabe observar que la frecuencia de la negación en los textos de ficción es mucho más variable que en otros tipos de texto, de manera que pueden encontrarse obras con una frecuencia de palabras negativas muy baja frente a otras con una frecuencia mucho más alta (véase Biber 1990).

En cuanto a su distribución por tipos de negación según la categoría gramatical, la frecuencia de las palabras negativas en *Catch-22* se corresponde con las tendencias generales en inglés, que muestran un predominio de la negación sintáctica, preferiblemente con el operador *not*. En cuanto a la frecuencia de las funciones pragmáticas y discursivas, encontramos un

predominio de la (de)negación (*denial*, según la terminología adoptada por Tottie, 1991). Estos resultados también concuerdan con las tendencias generales de uso de la negación en inglés. Los resultados del *análisis de la frecuencia de las variantes* marcadas y no marcadas de la negación demuestran que la negación no marcada es más frecuente que la marcada (un 57% frente a un 42.9%). Estos resultados parecen indicar que el fenómeno de la negación entendido como rasgo marcado que contribuye a la creación de un patrón de desviación discursiva tiene una base cualitativa y no cuantitativa.

Los resultados analizados nos permiten concluir que el carácter marcado de la negación, tal y como se ha analizado desde un punto de vista cualitativo en el capítulo 5, tiene un respaldo cuantitativo en la frecuencia superior a la media de palabras negativas en *Catch-22* frente a otros textos similares. Sin embargo, el estudio cuantitativo resulta limitado para el *análisis del corpus Catch-22*, puesto que el carácter marcado de la negación percibido como fenómeno discursivo no se refleja en la frecuencia de formas marcadas y no marcadas de las negaciones en el corpus. Esto nos lleva a concluir que el carácter marcado de la negación en *Catch-22* es, fundamentalmente, un fenómeno cualitativo.

CAPITULO 7: CONCLUSIONES

Las conclusiones de esta tesis recogen observaciones referentes a los marcos teóricos comentados a lo largo de los

capítulos 1 a 4, y comentarios generales sobre la verificación de las hipótesis en el análisis cualitativo y cuantitativo de los capítulos 5 y 6. Asimismo, se señalan las contribuciones específicas de este trabajo a obras anteriores sobre la negación en el discurso y sobre la novela *Catch-22*. Para terminar, se indican posibles vías de investigación en el futuro.

7.1. Conclusiones generales

El comentario de los marcos teóricos sobre la negación nos permite concluir que la descripción de las funciones de la negación en el discurso es una tarea compleja que se encuentra en una fase inicial de desarrollo. Mientras que la bibliografía sobre las características lógicas, filosóficas, gramaticales y semánticas de la negación es extensa, los trabajos de investigación sobre sus características pragmático-discursivas son escasos. En esta tesis se ha propuesto un modelo para el estudio de la negación en el discurso según un modelo de mundos del texto que permite incorporar los rasgos semánticos, cognitivos, pragmáticos y ontológicos que se consideran necesarios para el análisis de las funciones de la negación en un texto. A lo largo de la tesis se han señalado las dificultades que se encuentran en un planteamiento de este tipo, fundamentalmente a la hora de realizar un análisis cuantitativo del corpus. Así, se ha observado que la negación puede entenderse no sólo como un aspecto semántico-estructural que ejerce una influencia sobre los constituyentes de una oración, sino que también se puede considerar como un fenómeno discursivo que

afecta a secuencias lingüísticas mayores y de límites variables. Esta visión de la negación se corresponde con su definición lingüística como submundo dentro de un mundo del texto.

En cuanto a las hipótesis formuladas en la introducción, el análisis de los capítulos 5 y 6 nos permite concluir que las tres hipótesis de partida se han verificado. La hipótesis 1, que establecía que la negación es un fenómeno marcado en *Catch-22*, se verifica fundamentalmente a través del análisis cualitativo del capítulo 5 y, parcialmente, por los resultados del análisis cuantitativo del capítulo 6. Así, la hipótesis 2, que establecía que la negación es un rasgo lingüístico marcado que contribuye a la creación de un patrón discursivo, se verifica a través del análisis cualitativo, que demuestra que la negación tiende a usarse de forma anómala en *Catch-22*. Esta anomalía se describe como un efecto marcado que percibe el lector y que le lleva a un replanteamiento y posible renovación de esquemas cognitivos adquiridos sobre temas fundamentales tratados en la obra, como la guerra, la religión o la economía. La hipótesis 3, que predecía que la frecuencia de palabras negativas es superior en *Catch-22* que en otros textos similares también se verifica, aunque estos resultados deben considerarse con reserva, dadas las características idiosincráticas del texto literario.

Las contribuciones de la tesis a los estudios de la negación y de la novela *Catch-22* pueden resumirse en los siguientes puntos: (a) se realiza un resumen crítico de obras sobre la negación que cubren un amplio espectro de planteamientos

teóricos, incluyendo el modelo de Werth (1995c); (b) se estudian en detalle las posibilidades explicativas del modelo de Werth (1995c) de mundos del texto y se proponen algunas puntualizaciones, que se detallan a continuación: (b1) se incorpora la función paradójica al modelo de mundos del texto; (b2) se incorpora un modelo complejo de esquemas cognitivos (Schank 1982) al modelo de mundos del texto de Werth (1995c); (b3) se define el uso marcado de la negación y se especifica cómo éste contribuye a la creación de un patrón de desviación discursiva que produce un efecto desfamiliarizador. Dentro de los objetivos planteados con respecto al último punto, se ha hecho hincapié en la relación entre las funciones discursivas de la negación y las características ontológicas de los dos tipos de submundo negativo principales en *Catch-22*: un submundo vacío y un submundo paradójico. Para terminar, se ha indicado que dichas funciones y características ontológicas de la negación contribuyen al desarrollo de una actitud crítica subyacente en la obra hacia temas fundamentales relacionados con una experiencia humana concreta.

7.2. Sugerencias para investigaciones posteriores

A lo largo del proceso de investigación de esta tesis he tocado numerosos temas que, sin embargo, no han llegado a profundizarse, dadas las limitaciones de este trabajo. Así, en posteriores trabajos de investigación se podría profundizar en temas como la negación léxica, que ha ocupado una posición secundaria en esta tesis, y sobre todo en la investigación de las

funciones discursivas de la negación según el modelo de mundos del texto propuesto. Esta tesis no es más que un punto de partida en este campo, donde aún hay mucho por hacer.

Bibliografía

Adams, M. and A. Collins (1979) A schema-theoretical view of reading, in Freedle (ed.). 1-22.

Aguirre, M. (1991) Some commonsense notions on postmodernism, *Studia Patricia Shaw Oblata*, vol. III, Publicaciones de la Universidad de Oviedo. 3-13.

Allén S. (ed.) (1989) *Possible Worlds in the Humanities, Arts and Sciences*. Proceedings of the Nobel Symposium 65. New York and Berlin.

Allwood et. al (1974) *Logic in Linguistics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Anderson, J.R. (ed.) (1981) *Cognitive Skills and their Acquisition*. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlabum.

Apter, M. J. (1982) *The Experience of Motivation: The Theory of Psychological Reversals*. London: Academic Press.

Atlas, J. D. (1977) Negation, ambiguity and presupposition, *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 1, 321-336.

Atlas, J. D. and S. Levinson (1981) Negation and implicature: A problem for the standard version of radical pragmatics, in It-clefts, informativeness and logical form: Radical pragmatics (revised version), in P. Cole (ed.). 32-37.

Austin, J.K. (1962) *How to do Things with Words*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Baker, M., G. Francis and E. Tognini-Bonelli (eds.) (1993) *Text and Technology*. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: J. Benjamins.

Bartlett, F.C. (1932) *Remembering*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bateson, G. (1972) A theory of play and fantasy, in G. Bateson (ed) (1972). 177-193.

Bateson G., D. D. Jakson, J. Haley and J. H. Weakland (1972) Towards a theory of schizophrenia, in G. Bateson (ed.). 201-227.

Bateson G., (ed) (1972) *Steps to an Ecology of Mind.* London: Intertext Books.

Bauman R., and J. Sherzer (eds.) (1974) *Explorations in the Ethnography of Speaking.* Cambridge: Cambridge Univesity Press.

de Beaugrande, R. (1980) *Text, Discourse and Process.* Norwood: Ablex Publishing Co.

de Beaugrande, R. (1987) Schemas for Literary communication in Halász L. (ed.) *Literary Discourse.*

Bernárdez, E. (1995) *Teoría y Epistemología del Texto.* Madrid: Cátedra.

Biber, D. (1988) *Variation across Speech and Writing.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Birch, D. (1989) *Language, Literature and Critical Practice.* London: Routledge.

Blues, T. (1971) The moral structure of *Catch-22*, *Studies in the Novel*, 3. 64-79.

Bockting, I. (1994) Mind style as an interdisciplinary approach to characterisation in Faulkner, *Language and Literature*, 3, 3. 157-174.

Bolinger, D. (1977) *Meaning and Form.* London: Longman. 37-65.

Bradley, R. and N. Swartz (1979) *Possible Worlds: An Introduction to Logic and Its Philosophy*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Breuer, R. (1980) Irony, Literature and Schizophrenia,' *New Literary History*, 12, 1. 107-118.

Brown G. & G. Yule (1983) *Discourse Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brown, R. (1973) *A First Language*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Budick, S. and W. Iser (eds.) (1989) *Languages of the Unsayable: The Play of Negativity in Literature and Literary Theory*. New York/Oxford: Columbia University Press.

Budick, S and W. Iser (1989) Introduction: The Critical turn: Toward negativity and the 'unsayable', in S. Budick and W. Iser (eds.). xi-xxv.

Burnham, C. S. (1974) 'Spindrift and the Sea: Structural Patterns and Unifying Elements in *Catch-22*' in Nagel (ed) (1974b). 40-50.

Burrows, J.F. (1992) Computers and the study of literature, in C. Butler (ed.).

Burton, D. (1980) *Dialogue and Discourse*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Burton. D. (1982) Through glass darkly: Through dark glasses, in Carter (ed.) 195-216.

Butler, C. (ed.) (1992) *Computers and Written Texts*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Calvo, C. (1991) Pronouns of address and social negotiation in

As You Like it. Language and Literature. 1, 1. 5-28.

Carrell, P., J. Devine and D. Eskey (eds.) (1988) *Interactive Approaches to Second Language Reading.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Carroll, J.B. (ed.) (1956) *Language, Thought and Reality. Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf.* New York: Wiley.

Carston, R. (1996) Metalinguistic negation and echoic use, *Journal of Pragmatics* 25, 309-330.

Carter, R. A. (ed.) (1982) *Language and Literature.* London: Allen and Unwin.

Carter R. A. and P. Simpson (eds.) (1989) *Language, Discourse and Literature.* London: Unwin Hyman.

Carter R. A. and W. Nash (1990) *Seeing Through Words.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Chapman, A.J. and H.C. Foot (eds.) (1976) *Humour and Laughter: Theory, Research and Applications.* London: Wiley.

Clark, H. H. (1976) *Semantics and Comprehension.* Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter. 18-57.

Clark, H. H. and E. Clark (1977) *Psychology and Language: An Introduction to Psycholinguistics.* New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovic.

Cole, P. (ed) (1978) *Syntax and Semantics 9: Pragmatics.* New York: Academic Press.

Cole P. (ed.) (1981) *Radical Pragmatics,* New York: Academic Press.

Cole, P. and J. Morgan (eds.) (1975) *Syntax and Semantics 3:*

Speech Acts. London: Academic Press.

Cook, G. (1994) *Discourse and Literature: the Interplay of Form and Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Coulthard, M. (ed) (1994) *Advances in Written Text Analysis*. London: Routledge.

Cruse, D.A. (1986) *Lexical Semantics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Davis, G. W. (1984) *Catch-22* and the Language of Discontinuity in Nagel J. (ed) (1984) *Critical Essays on Joseph Heller*. 62-73.

Derks, P., J. Palmer, E. Safer, L. Sherman & S. Svebak (1994) A Multidisciplinary Approach to Joseph Heller's *Catch-22* -A Symposium, International Society of Humor Studies Conference, Ithaca, New York, 1994.

van Dijk T. A. (1977) *Text and Context: Explorations in the Semantics and Pragmatics of Discourse*. London: Longman.

van Dijk T. A. (ed.) (1982) *New Developments in Cognitive Models of Discourse Processing* (special issue of *Text* 2-1/3). Amsterdam: Mouton.

van Dijk, T. A. (1985) *Discourse and Literature*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: J. Benjamins.

van Dijk T. A. and W. Kintsch (1983) *Strategies of Discourse Comprehension*. New York: Academic Press.

Dolezel, L. (1976) Narrative modalities, *Journal of Literary Semantics*, 5, 1. 5-14.

Dolezel, L. (1989) Possible Worlds and Literary Fictions, in S. Allén (ed.). 321-342.

Downing, A. and P.L. Locke (1992) *A University Course in English Grammar*. Hemel Hempstead: Prentice-Hall. 179-182.

Downing, A. (1995) A functional grammar for students of English: An extended review of Givón (1993), *Functions of Language*, 2, 2, 229-247.

Dummett, M. (1981) *Frege - Philosophy of Language*. London: The Trinity Press.

Eco, U. (1989) Report on session 3: Literature and the arts, in Allén (ed.) 343-355.

Ehrlich, S. (1990) *Point of View: A Linguistic Analysis of Literary Style*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Emmott, C. (1994) Frames of reference: contextual monitoring and the interpretation of narrative discourse, in M. Coulthard (ed) 157-166.

Empson, W. (1995) *Seven Types of Ambiguity*. Harmosworth: Penguin. [1930].

Enkvist, N. E. (1989) Connexity, interpretability, universes of discourse, and text worlds, in Allén (ed.). 162-186.

Escandell Vidal, M.V. (1990) Estrategias en la interpretación de enunciados contradictorios, *Actas del Congreso de la Sociedad Española de Lingüística, XX Aniversario*. Madrid, Gredos. 923-936.

Fairclough, N. (1989) *Language and Power*. London: Longman.

Fillmore, C. (1982) 'Frame semantics' in The Linguistic Society of Korea (eds.) *Linguistics in the Morning Calm*. 11-137.

Fillmore, C. (1985) 'Frames and the semantics of understanding'

Quaderni di Semantica, 6, 2, 222-254.

Fish, S. (1980) *Is There a Text in this Class?* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Fodor, J.A. and J.J. Katz (eds.) (1964) *The Structure of Language: Readings in the Philosophy of Language.* Hemel Hempstead: Prentice Hall.

Fowler, R. (1977) *Linguistics and the Novel*. London: Methuen.

Fowler, R. (1986) *Linguistic Criticism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Freedle, R. (1979) *New Directions in Discourse Processing*. Norwood: Ablex Publishing Co.

Freud, S. (1976a.) La negación, in *Obras Completas*, vol. 21. Translated from James Strachey (ed). Buenos Aires: Amorrotu. [1927].

Freud, S. (1976b.) El humor, in *Obras Completas*, vol. 21. Translated from James Strachey (ed.). Buenos Aires: Amorrotu. 153-162. [1927].

Freud, S. (1966) *Six Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Garvin, P. L.(ed.) (1964) *A Prague School Reader on Esthetics, Literary Structure and Style*. Transl. Washington D.C. Georgetown University Press.

Gaukroger, D. (1970) Time Structure in *Catch-22*, *Critique*, 12, 2. 70-85. Repreinted in Nagel (ed) (1974b).

Givón, T. (1978) Negation in Language: Pragmatics, function, ontology, in P. Cole (ed). 69-112.

Givón, T. (1979) *On Understanding Grammar*. New York: Academic

Press. 91-142.

Givón, T. (1984) *Syntax: A Functional-Typological Introduction.* Amsterdam: J.Benjamins. 321-351.

Givón, T. (1989) *Mind, Code and Context: Essays in Pragmatics.* Hillsdale, N.J.: L.Erlbaum Associates. 127-172.

Givón, T. (1993) *English Grammar: A Function-Based Approach.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 187-208.

Goffman, E. (1974) *Frame Analysis.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Green, K. (1995) *New Essays in Deixis.* Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Greenberg, A. (1966) The Novel of Disintegration: Paradoxical Impossibility in Contemporary Fiction, *Wisconsin Studies in Contemporary Literature*, 7, 1, 103-124.

Grice, H.P. (1975) Logic and Conversation, in Cole and Morgan (eds) 41-57.

Halász, L. (ed.) (1987) *Literary Discourse.* Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter.

Hall, G. (1996) A review of G. Cook's (1994) *Discourse and Literature: The Interplay of Form and Mind*, in *Language and Literature* 5, 1. 74-77.

Halliday, M.A.K. (1973) *Exploration in the Functions of Language.* London: Arnold.

Halliday, M.A.K. (1978) *Language as Social Semiotic.* London: Arnold. 164-182.

Halliday, M.A.K.(1994) *An Introduction to Functional Grammar*, 2nd edition. London: Arnold. 88-92.

Halliday, M.A.K. and R. Hasan (1985) *Language, Text and*

Context: Aspects of Language in a Social Semiotic Perspective. London: Arnold.

Havránek, B. (1964) The functional differentiation of the standard language, in P. L. Garvin (ed.). 3-16.

Heller, J. (1961) *Catch-22*. London: Johnathan Cape, (1986).

Hodge R. and G. Kress (1994) *Language as Ideology*. 2nd edition. London: Routledge.

Horn, L. (1989) *A Natural History of Negation*. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.

Huddleston, R. (1984) *An Introduction to the Grammar of English*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 419-432.

Hunt, J. W. (1974) Comic escape and anti-vision: Joseph Heller's *Catch-22*, in Nagel J.(ed) (1974b). 125-130.

Iser, W. (1989) The play of the text, in S. Budick and W. Iser (eds.). 325-339.

Jackendoff, R. (1983) *Semantics and Cognition*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Jakobson, R. (1964) Closing statement: Linguistics and poetics, in T. Sebeok (ed.) *Style in Language*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 350-377.

Jespersen, O. (1917) *Negation in English and in Other Languages*. 2nd edition. Copenhaguen: Ejnar Munksgaard Publishers. 1966.

Just, M.A. and H. H. Clark (1973) Drawing inferences from the presuppositions and implications of affirmative and negative sentences, *Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior*, 12, 21-31.

Keegan, B. M. (1978) *Joseph Heller: A Reference Guide*. Boston:

G.K. Hall.

Kempson, R. (1975) *Presupposition and the delimitation of Semantics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Klima, E. S. (1964) Negation in English, in Fodor and Katz (eds.). 246-323.

Krassner, P. (1962) An Impolite Interview with Joseph Heller, in Sorkin A.J. (ed) (1993). 6-29.

Kripke, S. (1971) Semantic considerations of modal logic, in Linsky (ed.). 63-73.

Kuno, S. (1992a) 'Negation and Extraction', paper read at the 'Seminario de Semántica Cognitiva y Gramática Funcional' University of Seville, December 1993. Manuscript copy.

Kuno, S. (1992b) 'Remarks on Negative Islands', paper read at the 'Seminario de Semántica Cognitiva y Gramática Funcional' University of Seville. December 1993. Manuscript copy.

Kurrick, M. J. (1979) *Literature and Negation.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Labov, W. (1972) The Transformation of Experience in Narrative Syntax, in *Language in the Inner City.* Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 354-397.

Labov, W. and D. Fanshel (1977) *Therapeutic Discourse*. New York: Academic Press. 334-343.

Leech, G. (1974) *Semantics.* Harmonsworth: Penguin.

Leech G. (1983) *Principles of Pragmatics.* London: Longman.

Leech G. & Short M. (1981) *Style in Fiction*. London: Longman.

Leinfeller, E. (1994) The broader perspective of negation,

Journal of Literary Semantics, 13, 2. 77-98.

Lemon, L.T. and M.J. Reis (1965) *Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Levinson S. (1983) *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lewis, D. (1979) Possible worlds, in Loux (ed.) 182-189.

Linsky, L. (ed.) (1971) *Reference and Modality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

LOB and Brown corpora.

Louw, B. (1993) Irony in the text or insincerity in the writer? The diagnostic potential of semantic prosodies, in Baker *et al*. (eds).

Loux, M. J. (1979) *The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphisics of Modality*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Lyons, J. (1977) *Semantics*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Lyons, J. (1981) *Language, Meaning and Context*. Suffolk: Fontana.

Lyons, J. (1995) *Linguistic Semantics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marsh, R. C. (ed.) (1988) *Bertrand Russell: Logic and Knowledge*. London: Unwin Hyman.

McCawley, J.D. (1981) *Everything that Linguists Wanted to Know about Logic but Were Afraid to Ask*. Oxford: Blackwell.

McCawley, J. D. (1995) Jespersen's 1917 monograph on negation, *Word*, 46, 1, 29-40.

McHale, Brian (1987) *Postmodernist Fiction*. London: Methuen.

Mellard, James M. (1968) *Catch-22*: Dejà vu and the Labyrinth of Memory, *Bucknell Review*, 16, 2, 29-44.

Merrill, R. (1987) *Joseph Heller*. Boston, Mass.: Twayne Publishers.

Merrill, S. (1975) *Playboy* Interview, in Sorkin (ed) (1993) 144-176.

Miall, D. S. and D. Kuiken (1994) Beyond text theory: Understanding literary response, *Discourse Processes*, 17. 337-352.

Minsky, M.L. (1975) A framework for representing knowledge, in P. Winston (ed.). 211-27.

Mukarowsky, J. (1964) Standard language and poetic language, in Paul L. Garvin (ed.). 17-30.

Müske, E. (1990) Frame and literary discourse, *Poetics*, 19. 433-461.

Nagel, J. (1974a) *Catch-22* and Angry Humor: A Study of the Normative Values of Satire, *Studies in American Humor*, 1, 2, 99-106.

Nagel, J. (1974b) *Critical Essays on Catch-22*. Encino: Dickenson.

Nagel, J. (1984) *Critical Essays on Joseph Heller*. Boston: J.K. Hall.

Nash, W. (1985) *The Language of Humour*. London: Longman.

Nelson, T.A. (1971) Theme and structure in *Catch-22*, *Renascence*, 23, 4. 173-182.

Norrick, N. (1986) A frame-theoretical analysis of verbal humor: Bisociation as schema conflict, *Semiotica* 60/3-4. 225-245.

Norrick, N. (1993) *Conversational Joking*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Ochs, E. and B.B. Schieffelin (eds.) (1979) *Developmental Pragmatics*. New York: Academic Press. 281-321.

Oh, C. and D.A. Dinneen (eds.) (1979) *Syntax and Semantics 11: Presupposition*. New York, Academic Press.

Pagano, A. (1994) Negatives in written text in M. Coulthard (ed) 250-265.

Partee, B. H. (1989) Possible worlds in model-theoretic semantics: A linguistic perspective, in Allén (ed.) 93-123.

Pavel, T. (1985) Literary narratives, in T.A. van Dijk (ed.). 85-103.

Pavel, T. (1986) *Fictional Worlds*. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press.

Pavel, T. (1989) Fictional worlds and the economy of the imaginary, in Allén (ed) 249-259.

van Peer, W. (1986) *Stylistics and Psychology: Investigations of Foregrounding*. London: Croom Helm.

van Peer, W. (1988) *The Taming of the Text*. London: Routledge.

Petrey, S. (1990) *Speech Acts and Literary Theory*. London: Routledge.

Petöfi, J. (1989) Possible worlds - Text worlds: Quo vadis linguistica? in Allén (ed.) 209-218.

Pilkington, A. (1996) Relevance theory and literary style,

Language and Literature, 5, 3. 157-163.

Pinsker, S. (1991) *Understanding Joseph Heller*. Columbia: the University of South Carolina Press.

Pratt, M. L. (1977) *Towards a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Protherough, R. (1971) The sanity of *Catch-22*, *The Human World*, 3. 59-70.

Quirk, R. *et al* (1985) *A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language*. London: Longman. 775-799.

Quirk R., and S. Greenbaum (1990) *A Student's Grammar of the English Language*. London: Longman. 223-230.

Ramsey, V. (1968) From here to absurdity: Heller's *Catch-22*, in T.B. Whitbread (ed). 99-118.

Raskin, V. (1985) *Semantic Mechanisms of Humour*. Dordrecht/Boston: Reidel Publishing Co. [1944].

Rescher, N. (1979) The ontology of the possible, in Loux (ed.) 166-181.

Rosenhan D.L. (1973) Estar sano en lugares insanos, *Science*, n. 179, 250-258. Translation by Carmelo Vázquez.

Rosch, E. (1973) Natural Categories, *Cognitive Psychology* 4, 328-506.

Ruderman, J. (1991) *Joseph Heller: Criticism and Interpretation*. New York: The Continuum Publishing Company.

Rumelhart, D.E. (1980) Schemata: the building blocks of cognition, in R.J. Spiro et al. (eds.). 33-58.

Rumelhart, D.E. and D. A. Norman (1981) Analogical processes in

learning, in Anderson (ed.), 335-360.

Russell, B. (1988) On denoting, in Marsh (ed.) 39-57. [1905].

Ryan, M.L. (1985) The modal structure of narrative universes, *Poetics Today*, 6:4. 717-755.

Ryan, M.L. (1991a) Possible worlds and accessibility relations: a semantic typology of fiction, *Poetics Today* 12:3. 553-576.

Ryan, M.L. (1991b) *Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence and Narrative Theory*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Sacks, H. (1974) An analysis of the course of a joke's telling in conversation, in R. Bauman and J. Sherzer (eds.). 337-353.

Schank, R.C. (1982) *Dynamic Memory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schank, R.C. and R. Abelson (1977) *Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding*. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Searle, J.R. (1969) *Speech Acts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Searle, J.R. (1975) The logical status of fictional discourse, *New Literary History*, 6. 319-332.

Seed, D. (1989) *The Fiction of Joseph Heller: Against the Grain*. New York: St.Martin's Press.

Sell, R. and P. Verdonk (1994) *Literature and the New Interdisciplinarity*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Semino, E. (1993) A Review of Ryan's (1991) *Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence and Literary Theory*. *Language and Literature* 2, 2. 146-148.

Semino, E. (1994) *Poems, Schemata and Possible Worlds: Text Worlds in the Analysis of Poetry*. Unpublished Phd. Dissertation. Lancaster University.

Semino, E. (1995) Schema Theory and the Analysis of Text Worlds in Poetry, *Language and Literature*, 4, 2, 79-108.

Shklovsky, V. B. [1917] (1965) Art as technique in L. T. Lemon and M. J. Reis: 3-24.

Short, M. H. (1989) *Reading, Analysing and Teaching Literature*. London: Longman.

Short, M., E. Semino, and J. Culpeper (1996) Using a corpus for stylistics research: speech and thought presentation, *in* J Thomas and M. Short (eds.). 110-131.

Shulz, T.R. (1976) A cognitive-developmental analysis of humour, in A.J. Chapman and H.C. Foot (eds.). 11-36.

Simpson, P. (1989) Politeness phenomena in Ionesco's *The Lesson*, in Carter and Simpson (eds.) (1989). pps. 171-194.

Simpson, P. (1993) *Language, Ideology and Point of View*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Solomon, E. (1969) From Christ in Flanders to *Catch-22*: An approach to war fiction, *Texas Studies in Literature and Language*, 11, 1. 852-866.

Solomon, J. (1974) The Structure of Joseph Heller's *Catch-22*, in Nagel (ed) (1974b). 78-88.

Sorkin, Adam J. (ed) (1993) *Conversations with Joseph Heller*. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi.

Sperber, D. & D. Wilson (1986) *Relevance*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Spiro, R.J. *et.al.* (eds.) (1980) *Theoretical Issues in Reading Comprehension*. Hillsdale N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Tannen, D. (ed) (1993) *Framing in Discourse*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tanner, T. (1971) *City of Words: American Fiction 1950-1970*. New York/London: Harper and Row Publishers.

Teleman, U. (1989) The world of words - and pictures, in Allén (ed.) 199-208.

Thomas J., and M. Short (eds.) (1996) *Using Corpora for Language Research*. London: Longman.

Thorndyke P.W. and F.R. Yekovich (1980) A critique of schema-based theories of human story memory, *Poetics*, 9. 23-49.

Toolan M. (1988) *Narrative, a Critical Linguistic Introduction*. London: Routledge.

Toolan, M. (ed.) (1992) *Language, Text and Context: Essays in Stylistics*. London: Routledge.

Tottie, G. (1982) Where do negative sentences come from? *Studia Linguistica*, 36, 1, 88-105.

Tottie, G. (1991) *Negation in English Speech and Writing: A Study in Variation*. San Diego: Academic Press.

Tucker, L. (1984) Entropy and information theory in *Something Happened*, *Contemporary Literature*, XXV, 3. 323-340.

Van der Sandt, R. A. (1991) Denial, *Papers from the 27th Regional Meeting of the CLS: Parasession on Negation*. 331-344.

Vanderveken, D. (1991) *Meaning and Speech Acts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Verdonk, P. and J. J.Weber (eds.) (1995) *Twentieth-Century Fiction: From Text to Context*. London: Routledge.

Waldmeir, J. J. (1964) Two Novelists of the Absurd: Heller and Casey, in Nagel (ed) (1974b), 150-154.

Walsh, J. (1982) *American War Literature, 1914 to Vietnam*. New York: St. Martn's Press.

Wason, P.C. (1965) The contexts of plausible denial, *Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior*, 4, 7-11.

Watson, G. (1996) Something will come of nothing: An empirical model of negation for prose literature. Paper presented at the 1996 PALA Conference, Belfast.

Weixlmann, J. (1974) A Bibliography of Joseph Heller's *Catch-22*, in *Bullettin of Bibliography*, 31, 1. 32-35.

Werlich, E. (1983) *A Text Grammar of English*. Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer.

Werth, P. (1976) Roman Jakobson's verbal analysis of poetry *Journal of Linguistics*, 12, 21-73.

Werth, P. (1984) *Focus, Coherence and Emphasis*. London: Croom Helm.

Werth, P. (1993) Accomodation and the myth of presupposition: the view from discourse, *Lingua* 89, 39-95.

Werth, P. (1994) Extended metaphor - A text-world account, *Language and Literature*, 3, 2, 79-104.

Werth, P. (1995a.) How to build a world (in a lot less than six days, using only what's in your head), in Green (ed.), 49-80.

Werth, P. (1995b.) 'World enough, and time': Deictic space and the interpretation of prose. in P. Verdonk and J. J. Weber (eds.). 181-205.

Werth, P. (1995c) *Text Worlds: Representing Conceptual Space in Discourse.* Pre-publication manuscript copy.

Widdowson H. (1975) *Stylistics and the Teaching of Literature.* London: Longman.

Widdowson, H. (1992) *Practical Stylistics.* London: Longman.

Winston, P. (1975) *The Psychology of Computer Vision.* New York: McGraw-Hill.